



2026 TRADE POLICY AGENDA

AND

2025 ANNUAL REPORT

of the PRESIDENT *of the* UNITED STATES
on the TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE



FOREWORD

The 2026 Trade Policy Agenda and 2025 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program are submitted to the Congress pursuant to Section 163 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 2213).

The 2025 Annual Report comprises five chapters and five annexes. Chapter IV and Annex V of this document meet the requirements of Sections 122 and 124 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 with respect to the World Trade Organization (19 U.S.C. §§ 3532, 3534).

This year's Annual Report has been reorganized to more clearly communicate the efforts of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to successfully implement the President's 2025 Trade Policy Agenda, while providing Congress, industry, and other stakeholders a more coherent and accessible record of the actions, priorities, and outcomes that defined U.S. trade policy throughout 2025. The Report includes a comprehensive account of USTR's actions to support President Trump's America First Trade Policy, including negotiations with key trading partners to secure strong disciplines and expand market access for U.S. exporters. Furthermore, activities related to opening foreign markets for American agricultural products, enforcing environmental and labor obligations, and enhancing the benefits of trade for U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises are now reported within the respective regional sections under II. Monitoring and Enforcement of Trade Agreements. This updated reporting structure reflects how USTR addressed trade barriers and trade agreement compliance issues in 2025 and provides a more cohesive view of USTR's work across regions and sectors to advance the interests of American workers, manufacturers, farmers, ranchers, and businesses.

USTR is responsible for the preparation of this document and gratefully acknowledges the contributions of all USTR staff to its writing and production. We note, in particular, the contributions of Andrew J. Audas, Laura Buffo, Jiexi "Jesse" Huang, Marylenny Iglesias, Karim A. Kebaish, Karen M. Lezny, Edward D. Marcus, Tia Potskhverashvili, Subuola Sangodina, Imam U. Sawez, David A. Shannon, and Michael P. Starr. Appreciation is also extended to Trade Policy Staff Committee agencies.

FEBRUARY 2026

LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS

AD.....	Antidumping
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ART	Agreement on Reciprocal Trade
CAFTA–DR.....	Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement
CBP.....	U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection
CVD.....	Countervailing Duty
DOL	U.S. Department of Labor
DSB.....	WTO Dispute Settlement Body
DST.....	Digital Services Tax
DSU	WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
EO	Executive Order
EU	European Union
FMVSS	U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
FTA.....	Free Trade Agreement
G7.....	Group of Seven
G20.....	Group of Twenty
GATS.....	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT.....	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Genetically engineered
GPA	WTO Agreement on Government Procurement
ICT.....	Information and Communications Technology
ICTIME.....	Interagency Center on Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement
ILO.....	International Labor Organization
IP	Intellectual Property
ITA.....	WTO Information Technology Agreement
MFN.....	Most-Favored-Nation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NMPPs.....	Non-market policies and practices
OECD.....	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RRM.....	Rapid Response Labor Mechanism
SBA.....	U.S. Small Business Administration
SCM.....	WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
SPS.....	Sanitary and Phytosanitary
TAA.....	Trade Adjustment Assistance
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade

TIFA.....	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TPRG	Trade Policy Review Group
TPSC.....	Trade Policy Staff Committee
TRIMS	Trade-Related Investment Measures
TRIPS.....	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TRQ	Tariff-Rate Quota
USITC.....	U.S. International Trade Commission
USMCA	United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement
USTR	Office of the United States Trade Representative
WTO	World Trade Organization

Table of Contents

<i>THE PRESIDENT’S 2026 TRADE POLICY AGENDA</i>	<i>1</i>
--	-----------------

THE 2025 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM

<i>I. AMERICA FIRST TRADE POLICY</i>	<i>1</i>
A. 2025 Overview Addressing the Causes of the U.S. Trade Deficit	1
B. Reciprocal Trade and Tariff Negotiations	3
1. Ecuador.....	4
2. European Union	4
3. India	4
4. Japan.....	5
5. Korea	5
6. North Macedonia	5
7. Switzerland/Liechtenstein	6
8. Thailand.....	6
9. United Kingdom	6
10. Vietnam.....	6
C. Trade Enforcement Initiatives and Actions	7
1. Overview.....	7
2. Section 301—Addressing Unfair Foreign Practices Affecting U.S. Trade.....	10
3. Section 201—Granting Temporary Import Relief to U.S. Domestic Industries.....	32
4. Countering Non-Market Policies and Practices and Enhancing Economic Security	33
5. Special 301—Providing Adequate and Effective Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property	35
6. Section 307—U.S. Forced Labor Import Prohibition	37
7. Section 1377—Review of Telecommunications Agreements	39
8. Section 337—Review of U.S. International Trade Commission Investigations	39
9. Implementation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws	41
10. Defending U.S. Interests in Free Trade Agreements and at the World Trade Organization	42
<i>II. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS</i>	<i>45</i>
A. The Americas	45
1. United States–Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment	45
2. Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement.....	45
3. United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement	47
4. United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement.....	47
5. United States–El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade	48
6. United States–Guatemala Agreement on Reciprocal Trade	49
7. United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement.....	49
8. United States–Panama Trade Promotion Agreement.....	55
9. United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement	55
10. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements	56
B. Europe and the Middle East	57
1. United States–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement	57
2. United States–Israel Free Trade Agreement.....	57
3. United States–Jordan Free Trade Agreement	58
4. United States–Morocco Free Trade Agreement.....	58
5. United States–Oman Free Trade Agreement	58

6. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements	59
7. Other Agreements and Trade Activities.....	59
C. Sub-Saharan Africa	61
1. Other Agreements and Trade Activities.....	61
D. South and Central Asia.....	61
1. United States–Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade	61
2. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements	62
3. Other Agreements and Trade Activities.....	62
E. China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mongolia	63
1. United States–China Economic and Trade Agreement	63
2. United States–Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade	64
3. United States–Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade	64
4. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements	65
F. Japan and Korea.....	65
1. United States–Japan Trade Agreement	65
2. United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement	65
3. Other Agreements and Trade Activities.....	66
G. Southeast Asia and the Pacific	66
1. United States–Cambodia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade	66
2. United States–Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade	67
3. United States–Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade	67
4. United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement.....	68
5. United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement	68
6. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements	69
III. MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES	71
A. Group of Seven	71
B. Group of Twenty	71
C. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum	72
D. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	74
E. International Labor Organization.....	76
F. Trade Capacity Building.....	76
G. Preference Programs.....	78
IV. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION	81
A. Introduction	81
B. General Council.....	82
C. World Trade Organization Negotiations	83
1. Committee on Agriculture Special Session	83
2. World Trade Organization Fisheries Subsidies.....	83
3. Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development	83
D. Council for Trade in Goods.....	84
1. Committee on Agriculture.....	84
2. Committee on Antidumping Practices	84
3. Committee on Customs Valuation	85
4. Committee on Import Licensing	85
5. Committee on Market Access.....	85
6. Committee on Rules of Origin.....	86
7. Committee on Safeguards	86
8. Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures	86
9. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures	87

10. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.....	87
11. Committee on Trade Facilitation.....	88
12. Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures	89
13. Working Party on State Trading Enterprises	89
E. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.....	89
F. Council for Trade in Services	90
1. Committee on Trade in Financial Services.....	90
2. Working Party on Domestic Regulation; Joint Statement Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation.....	90
3. Committee on Specific Commitments	91
G. Other General Council Bodies and Activities.....	91
1. Committee on Trade and Environment.....	91
2. Committee on Trade and Development	91
3. Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	91
4. Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration.....	92
5. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements	92
6. Accessions to the World Trade Organization	92
7. Working Group on Trade, Debt, and Finance.....	92
8. Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology	93
9. Work Program on Electronic Commerce	93
H. Dispute Settlement Understanding.....	93
1. Dispute Settlement Reform	93
2. Roster of Governmental and Non-Governmental Panelists	94
3. Rules of Conduct for the Dispute Settlement Understanding	94
4. Dispute Settlement Activity in 2025	95
I. Trade Policy Review Body	95
J. Plurilaterals	96
1. Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft.....	96
2. Committee on Government Procurement.....	96
3. Information Technology Agreement Committee	97
K. Subsidies Monitoring and Enforcement	97
1. Subsidies Enforcement	97
2. Monitoring and Challenging Foreign Antidumping, Countervailing Duty, and Safeguard Actions.....	98
 V. TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES	 101
A. Policy Coordination	101
B. Transparency and Public Input	102
1. Transparency	103
2. Public Outreach	104
3. The Trade Advisory Committee System.....	104
4. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises.....	107
5. State, Local, and Tribal Government Relations	109
6. Freedom of Information Act.....	110
C. Congressional Consultations.....	110

ANNEX I: U.S. TRADE IN 2025

I. 2025 Overview

II. The U.S. Trade Balance

III. Exports

A. U.S. Goods Exports

B. U.S. Services Exports

IV. Imports

A. U.S. Goods Imports

B. U.S. Services Imports

ANNEX II: U.S. TRADE-RELATED AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS

I. Agreements That Have Entered Into Force

II. Agreements That Have Been Negotiated, But Have Not Yet Entered Into Force

III. Other Trade-Related Agreements, Understandings and Declarations

ANNEX III: TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

ANNEX IV: FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ENFORCEMENT

ANNEX V: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

**THE PRESIDENT'S
2026 TRADE POLICY AGENDA**

THE PRESIDENT’S 2026 TRADE POLICY AGENDA

The America First Trade Policy

A Trade Policy That Puts America First

The world has never seen an economic juggernaut like the United States. The Constitution is our most important trade agreement, fostering growth and social mobility for American citizens joined together by this social contract. Trade policy has played an important role in this success, promoting U.S. production and jobs when properly developed and implemented, or limiting economic opportunities when misused. President Trump has focused his trade policy on ensuring that workers are rewarded for what they produce, and that the long-term economic success of American families and communities is the most important consideration.

The United States should produce more of what it consumes. Production—in manufacturing, agriculture, and their attendant services—makes for an economy that has higher wages, more innovation, and greater national security.¹ In other words, creating wealth through production opens the door for consumption that grows the economy in a healthy and stable way. Financing our consumption of foreign imports with increasing debt does the opposite.

For the last thirty years, U.S. trade policy has focused on debt-driven consumption divorced from domestic production. The United States currently runs the largest trade deficit in human history, after offshoring 5 million manufacturing jobs and losing more than 70,000 factories during a period of hyper-globalization.² The conditions reflected in our massive trade deficit—an atrophied industrial base, downward pressure on American wages, and risks to our economic and national security—make that clear. These conditions have persisted for far too long and worsened in recent years: the U.S. trade deficit in goods and services exploded by 40 percent from 2020 to the end of the Biden Administration. And, in a dangerous and uncertain world, these conditions have given rise to a *national emergency*.

The United States started running a small trade deficit in goods in 1976.³ “That’s probably fine,” many U.S. policymakers would have said at the time, “thanks to our comparative advantages we still have trade surpluses in advanced technology products and agriculture.”

But in 2002, the United States started running trade deficits in advanced technology products.⁴ Concerning to be sure, but ultimately acceptable in the minds of policymakers since America still had its agricultural advantage. Not anymore. The United States ran significant trade deficits in agriculture in 2023 and 2024.⁵ These deficits have become structural in nature. Something is afoot in the global economy.

¹ [Ambassador Jamieson Greer, U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks at the Reindustrialize Summit in Detroit, Michigan \(July 16, 2025\)](#).

² [U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics \(BDS\)](#), (showing an approximately 74,000 decline in manufacturing establishments in the U.S. between 1995 and 2022); [U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All Employees, Manufacturing \[MANEMP\]](#), [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED](#).

³ [U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Trade in Goods and Services – Balance of Payments \(BOP\) Basis, 1960 Through 2024](#).

⁴ [U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods with Advanced Technology Products](#) (last visited Feb. 16, 2026).

⁵ [U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States \(FATUS\): U.S. Agricultural Trade Data Update](#) (last visited Feb. 16, 2026).

What is happening to the United States with respect to international trade is not about comparative advantage at all. The United States has the best workers, the smartest inventors, the most fertile land, nearly endless natural resources, bountiful capital, and still many, many factories—and yet, despite these advantages, it has to bring from abroad so much of what it needs to thrive, to survive. How can this be? Some things, like cocoa and bananas, obviously cannot be produced in the United States in quantities to meet demand. But what about cars, cookies, clothes, and computer chips? Tools, titanium, and tanks? There is no inherent reason why U.S. production cannot satisfy more of U.S. consumption of goods like these.

The reasons are myriad and implicate many of the domestic policies—like tax, workforce, technology, regulatory, and permitting policy—that President Trump is fixing. But for trade policy, the reason is starkly apparent: a lack of effective reciprocity in our global trading system. After decades of advocating for aggressive market liberalization, the U.S. market is far more open to foreign goods and services than the markets of foreign trading partners are to U.S. exports. This is best evidenced by the fact that the United States maintains among the lowest average bound Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff rates, while other countries maintain average bound rates that are much higher.⁶ Furthermore, while the United States has few non-tariff barriers to foreign trade and investment, other countries deploy extensive legal, regulatory, and standards-based policies that serve as non-tariff barriers against U.S. commerce.

When coupled with other unfair policies and practices by other countries—including wage suppression, subsidies, lax regulatory standards, and currency misalignment and manipulation—the global trading system becomes stacked against the United States. Instead of a rules-based order that promotes economic welfare by allowing countries to maximize their actual comparative advantage, the system has become structured in a way that artificially boosts the competitiveness of foreign imports and harms the competitiveness of U.S. exports. This is part of why, despite all of our wonderful attributes as a nation, we produce so little of what we consume. It is a key driver of our unprecedented trade deficit.

Through a combination of tariffs and trade agreements, the United States is bringing back the domestic production it needs to regain its economic competitiveness and strengthen its national security. Through a focus on key sectors including metals, semiconductors, energy, and pharmaceuticals, the United States is rebuilding its strength in the most critical national security sectors. This is the America First Trade Policy.

The First Year of the America First Trade Policy

Evidence from the past year demonstrates the America First Trade Policy is working. Since the President began implementing his policy in April 2025, the trade deficit in goods decreased, on a year-over-year basis, every month through December 2025.⁷ Further, the largest driver of our overall trade deficit in goods—our trade deficit with China—was down 32 percent, year-over-year, in 2025.⁸ For the first time since 2000, China is no longer the trading partner with which the United States has its largest trade deficit.⁹ In other words, in one short year, the United States has substantially diversified its import sources and reduced its import dependency on China.

⁶ [World Trade Organization, *World Tariff Profiles 2025*](#), (detailing how the U.S. simple average MFN bound rate of 3.4 percent is lower than the respective bound rates of all major trade partners including the European Union, at 5 percent, China, at 10 percent, Vietnam, at 11.7 percent, Brazil, at 31.4 percent, and India, at 50.8 percent).

⁷ [U.S. Census Bureau, *Trade in Goods with World, Not Seasonally Adjusted*](#) (last visited Feb. 19, 2026); [U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, *U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December 2025*](#) (Jan. 29, 2026).

⁸ [U.S. Census Bureau, *Trade in Goods with China*](#) (last visited Feb. 19, 2026).

⁹ In 2025, the U.S. goods trade deficit with China (\$202.1B) fell below the U.S. goods trade deficit with the EU (\$218.8B). In Q4, 2025, the U.S. goods trade deficit with China was lower than the U.S. goods trade deficit with Taiwan, Mexico, and Vietnam. [See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, *U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December 2025*](#) (Feb. 19, 2026).

In addition to changing the United States' import profile, trade policy is supporting an increase in U.S. exports and the expansion of domestic production. Since the launch of the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) program to expand market access for U.S. workers and firms, goods and services exports have increased \$199.8 billion (6.2 percent) to a record \$3.4 trillion.¹⁰ In 2025, U.S. exports of capital goods—including civilian aircraft, computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications equipment—rose \$63.9 billion (9.9 percent).¹¹

In tandem, domestic production has started to scale. In January 2026, a leading indicator based on surveys of U.S. manufacturers signaled that factory activity expanded for the first time in over two years.¹² Manufacturing productivity improved steadily in 2025, reversing a troubling steady decline—in absolute terms—in recent years.¹³ Shipments of core capital goods—a leading indicator of new industrial capacity—reached a record high in July and again in each month from September through December, peaking at approximately \$78.7 billion.¹⁴ In 2025, the United States surpassed Japan in crude steel production for the first time since 1999, becoming the world's third-largest steel producer behind China and India.¹⁵

The result is that wages are up for American workers and the economy is growing at a faster rate than it did during the Biden years. Real personal disposable income, as adjusted for inflation, grew at 1.6 percent in 2025, and average earnings in the private sector are estimated to have increased by over \$2,700 in President Trump's first 12 months in office.¹⁶ In the second half of President Trump's first year—when tariffs were fully in place—the real economy grew at an annualized rate of 2.3 percent,¹⁷ despite the government shutdown forced by Congressional Democrats.

It's not just rhetoric; the data tell the story. America is back.

The America First Trade Policy in 2026

The Trump Administration is going to double down on the America First Trade Policy in 2026 to capitalize on the wins from 2025 and keep momentum going for domestic producers and the U.S. economy. The Administration—working closely with Congress and American workers, farmers, ranchers, producers, and service-providers—will focus on six core areas in furtherance of the America First Trade Policy:

- Continue the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) Program;
- Pursue Robust Enforcement of ARTs, Other Trade Agreements, and United States Trade Laws;
- Secure Supply Chains for Critical Minerals and Sectors;
- Conduct the Review of the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA);
- Manage Trade with China for Reciprocity and Balance; and
- Promote American Interests in International Fora.

¹⁰ [U.S. Census Bureau & Bureau of Economic Analysis, *U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December 2025*](#) (Feb. 19, 2026);

¹¹ [U.S. Census Bureau & Bureau of Economic Analysis, *U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, November 2025, Exhibit 6*](#) (Jan 29, 2026).

¹² [Institute for Supply Management, *Manufacturing PMI Report: January 2026*](#) (February 2, 2026).

¹³ [U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Manufacturing Sector: Labor Productivity \(Output per Hour\) for All Workers \[OPHMFG\]*](#), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED, (last visited Feb. 19, 2026).

¹⁴ [U.S. Census Bureau, *Manufacturers' Value of Shipments: Nondefense Capital Goods Excluding Aircraft \[ANXAVS\]*](#), Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED (Updated Jan 29, 2026).

¹⁵ [World Steel Ass'n, *Monthly Crude Steel and Iron Production Statistics*](#) (2025).

¹⁶ [U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Real Disposable Personal Income*](#), Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED (updated Dec. 23, 2025); [Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Real Earnings — December 2025*](#) (Jan. 13, 2026).

¹⁷ [U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Table 1.1.6. Real Gross Domestic Product, Chained Dollars*](#) (Feb. 20, 2026).

Continue the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade Program

For the last 40 years, the United States has chronicled the multitude of foreign trade barriers which contribute to our trade deficit. And for the last 40 years, other administrations have done little, if anything, to rectify them—instead pursuing negotiations with a limited set of partners, which took many years, if ever, to conclude.

When announcing the reciprocal tariff program on April 2, 2025, President Trump spoke to this policy failure. He held up the National Trade Estimate, the annual report which compiles these barriers and practices, and directed his Administration to confront these imbalances at the heart of the global trading system. In response, dozens of trading partners stepped forward to signal their willingness to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements to address U.S. concerns. And so, the ART program was born.

In the 10 months since, USTR has signed ARTs with Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan and announced framework deals with Ecuador, the European Union, India, Japan, North Macedonia, South Korea, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, Thailand, and Vietnam. USTR is actively negotiating to upgrade each framework deal into an ART or equivalent. Legally-binding and fully enforceable, each ART requires (1) a trading partner to significantly lower its tariffs and non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports and (2) the United States to maintain a modified tariff on the trading partner (*i.e.*, a supplemental tariff higher than the statutory MFN rate). This will help achieve balance by increasing exports of U.S. agricultural and industrial goods while reducing import dependencies.

The commitments secured in the ARTs are historically meaningful. Tariff and non-tariff barriers that have harmed American exporters and workers for decades are finally being resolved *en masse*. The ART program has produced new broad-ranging commitments on market access, labor and environmental standards, and national and economic security, all while retaining the tariffs needed for our reindustrialization.

For example, trading partners are eliminating nearly all tariffs on U.S. products, including Indonesia (99 percent), Malaysia (97 percent), Cambodia (100 percent), India (99 percent for industrial goods), and the European Union (100 percent for industrial goods). The European Union will also provide preferential market access for a wide range of U.S. seafood and agricultural products, including tree nuts, dairy products, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed goods, planting seeds, soybean oil, and pork and bison meat. The United Kingdom has committed to opening its market to \$700 million in U.S. ethanol exports and duty-free treatment for \$250 million in additional U.S. agricultural exports, including beef.

Trading partners are also removing significant non-tariff barriers. Several countries (including Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Malaysia, and Taiwan) will provide fair access to U.S. exports of meats and cheeses with common names. Trading partners (including Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan) will enact import bans on products made with forced labor, the most progress made on this pernicious human rights and economic arbitrage issue ever.

In many cases, commitments secured in the ARTs, or achieved thanks to Reciprocal Tariffs and the ART program, address problems that have bedeviled the United States for many years. This includes Australia ending its ban on U.S. beef (22 years), Indonesia committing to support the permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions (28 years), and Israel providing the United States with comprehensive and permanent agricultural market access (41 years). The United States also secured commitments for countries to address long-standing intellectual property (IP) issues identified in previous Special 301 Reports, including from Argentina to repeal restrictive patentability criteria, which has been a major barrier for U.S. innovators, and from Guatemala to resolve IP enforcement issues with trademark

counterfeiting and copyright piracy, which has harmed U.S. brand owners and creators. In addition, the United States has secured commitments from thirteen countries to accept vehicles built to U.S. safety and emissions standards—removing what had often been long-standing regulatory barriers to U.S. auto exports into those markets.

One of the most significant results of the ART program is the end of the false choice, long endemic to U.S. trade policy, between increased market access for agriculture and services and protection for manufacturing. Under the traditional trade paradigm, the United States historically slashed its tariffs on industrial goods, sacrificing our industrial base to gain limited foreign market access commitments for U.S. agriculture or services. But under the ARTs, farms and factories are no longer in competition for the benefits of U.S. trade policy—all sectors stand to win from the ART program. Instead of pitting workers and sectors against each other in a race to the bottom, the America First Trade Policy is a trade policy for all sectors and workers.

In 2026, the United States will continue to seek to lower foreign tariffs and non-tariff barriers with trading partners in the context of the ART program. Although the tools for implementing and maintaining tariffs in connection with the ARTs are subject to judicial review, and may change when appropriate, we expect to continue to work with our partners to implement these deals.

Pursue Robust Enforcement of Agreements on Reciprocal Trade, Other Trade Agreements, and United States Trade Laws

In addition to striking new deals with our trading partners, USTR will pursue robust enforcement of all of our trade agreements and trade laws. In 2026, USTR will closely monitor implementation of existing ART commitments and those embodied in forthcoming ARTs, as well as other existing trade agreements, and enforce when necessary. USTR also will pursue broader measures to support customs enforcement and prevent duty evasion.

Additionally, USTR will continue robust efforts to combat unreasonable and discriminatory measures that burden or restrict U.S. commerce through existing Section 301 actions. USTR will also evaluate whether it is appropriate to initiate new Section 301 investigations, or use other enforcement mechanisms, to address additional structural and cross-cutting distortions to the global trading system. The United States has substantial concerns regarding global overcapacity, abuses related to seafood and fishing, unfair domestic and export-driven agricultural policies, pharmaceutical pricing, digital services taxes and digital discrimination, and many other policies and practices. USTR will also continue its work pursuant to ongoing Section 301 actions, including the investigation into China's compliance with the Phase One Agreement, and responsive actions with respect to Nicaragua's labor practices, China's shipbuilding practices, and China's semiconductor practices. In May, USTR will commence the statutorily required Four Year Review of the Section 301 responsive action on forced technology transfer. In July, USTR will also consider whether to take action in the Section 301 investigation involving the enforcement of U.S. rights in the World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes involving large civil aircraft.

Secure Supply Chains for Critical Minerals and Sectors

While the ART program responds to the national emergency posed by the conditions of the large and persistent trade deficit overall, some sectors are so critical for national security that they require a specialized response. Many of these sectors have been identified by the Department of Commerce pursuant

to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.¹⁸ The United States will continue to pursue resilience of its critical supply chains by reshoring industry and diversifying trade in these sectors.

Economic security is national security. And domestic production is intrinsic to economic security. Other administrations slept and let critical industries be shipped overseas, squandering our nation’s post-Cold War advantages as the world moved into an era of great power competition. As the National Defense Strategy emphasized, President Trump’s historic effort to reshore strategic industries and supercharge our defense industrial base will restore deterrence and bolster our nation’s security. Under the America First Trade Policy, the United States will ensure peace through strength by orienting, in the words of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, “our industrial base to a wartime footing.”¹⁹

The United States will continue to pursue resilience of its critical supply chains by reshoring industry and diversifying trade across the entire value chain of multiple sectors. These efforts will include—but will not be limited to—pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, metals and their downstream products, energy inputs and technologies, semiconductors and semiconductor equipment, automotive parts and finished vehicles, and critical mineral production and refining.

Critical Minerals are a good example of where the Administration is taking strong action through a whole-of-government approach to secure critical supply chains. On the basis of the Secretary of Commerce’s finding that the United States is dangerously reliant on imports of critical minerals, the President directed, pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, USTR and Commerce to negotiate an agreement to reduce that import dependence. In response, USTR will negotiate a plurilateral agreement—the Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals (ATCM)—with like-minded partners to establish common border-adjusted price mechanisms for specific minerals and downstream products. These mechanisms—as well as other provisions on fundamental labor rights and environmental standards, export controls, stockpiling, and competitiveness—will help re-shore critical minerals mining and processing by establishing a preferential trade zone free from non-market distortions, and will create a reliable supply for critical minerals that we cannot extract domestically.

The Administration’s trade actions will also seek to attract constructive foreign investment while ensuring that foreign investment will not imperil national security. The United States can benefit from an open investment climate, especially when foreign investment supports greenfield projects that enhance economic opportunities for Americans and grow our industrial base. For example, the Department of Commerce has negotiated historic agreements with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to promote the greenfield investment necessary for U.S. reindustrialization. However, some foreign investment can also harm the United States and its national security. The United States will continue to actively use the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to guard against national security threats, and will implement the provisions of the American First Investment Policy to promote productive, market-based investment in the United States.

¹⁸ Sectors for which an investigation was initiated in 2025, or for which tariff modifications were made on pre-existing investigations include the following: steel and steel derivatives; aluminum and aluminum derivatives; automobiles, light trucks, and auto parts; copper and copper derivatives; timber, lumber, and wood products; pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients; semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment; medium / heavy duty trucks, truck parts, and derivatives; processed critical minerals and derivatives; commercial aircraft, jet engines, and parts; polysilicon and components; robotics and industrial machinery; personal protective equipment, medical consumables, and medical equipment. See [Bureau of Industry & Security, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Section 232 Investigations](#) (last visited Feb. 16, 2026).

¹⁹ [Pete Hegseth, Sec’y of War, Remarks on the Arsenal of Freedom \(Nov. 7, 2025\) \(as delivered\)](#).

Conduct the Review of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement

In his first term, President Trump recognized the harm caused to U.S. workers and U.S. competitiveness by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and took historic action to fix it. NAFTA cost the United States an estimated 700,000 jobs and increased our trade deficit by approximately \$160 billion²⁰—replacing it with the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) was critical and long overdue.

The USMCA was an important step in rebalancing our economic relationships with Mexico and Canada, but many problems require resolution. For example:

- The United States not only continues to run large trade deficits with both Mexico and Canada, but those deficits have also increased since the entry into force of USMCA²¹;
- Mexico has adopted a series of preferential measures to benefit national champions in its energy and mining sectors, particularly concerning oil, gas, and electricity, to the detriment of U.S. investors;
- Mexico has undermined its overall investment climate;
- Mexico’s inadequate labor laws and lax protection of such laws continue to undermine U.S. workers;
- Canada continues to maintain policies that violate its USMCA dairy market access commitments; and
- Canada maintains discriminatory and restrictive digital measures, including its Online Streaming Act.

Moreover, the USMCA must address certain urgent challenges, including a surge in investment from companies domiciled in non-market economies in the region and the effects of industrial overcapacity on the three economies. The USMCA will also need to strengthen rules of origin across key sectors and include effective measures against transshipment and offshoring. These issues are critical per the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. The Western Hemisphere is of unique importance to the economic and national security of the United States, and that begins with Mexico and Canada.

Importantly, President Trump included an innovative mechanism in the USMCA to allow for a joint review and revision. In 2026, USTR will lead discussions with Mexico and Canada during that Joint Review. This process will include bilateral engagement with each country, as well as trilateral engagement where appropriate, to address challenges in our relationships. USTR will negotiate firmly to resolve issues identified through the Joint Review, and will recommend renewal only if such resolution can be achieved.

Manage Trade with China for Reciprocity and Balance

There is now no doubt about the costs of more than two decades of unfettered free trade with China. The United States lost millions of jobs as the result of unfair competition after China acceded to the WTO in 2001. China has been the largest driver of the United States’ trade deficit for over 20 years, and many critical supply chains have been weakened as a result of China’s non-market policies and practices.

²⁰ See [Robert E. Scott, Heading South: U.S.-Mexico Trade and Job Displacement after NAFTA, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper No. 308 \(May 3, 2011\)](#); Robert E. Scott, *The Effects of NAFTA on US Trade, Jobs, Investment, 1993-2013*, 2 *Review of Keynesian Economics* 429 (2014).

²¹ In 2020, the goods trade deficit with Canada was approximately \$14 billion—in 2025 it was \$46 billion. Likewise, the goods trade deficit with Mexico increased from approximately \$111 billion in 2020 to approximately \$197 billion in 2025. Notably, the U.S. agricultural trade deficit with Canada grew from \$3.1 billion in 2020 to \$11.1 billion in 2025, while the agricultural trade deficit with Mexico grew from \$14.7 billion in 2020 to \$13.4 billion in 2025. See [U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods with Canada](#) (last visited Feb. 19, 2026); [U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods with Mexico](#) (last visited Feb. 19, 2026).

President Trump’s trade policy has been focused across his two administrations to address this issue head-on.

The United States expects ongoing trade with China and will continue to engage to ensure that trade is based on reciprocity and balance. To achieve that end, the United States will seek to work with China so that both sides can better manage their bilateral trade with the aim of promoting economic benefits for producers and consumers in each country. By managing bilateral trade with arrangements negotiated among each country’s political leaders, the U.S.-China economic relationship can be improved for fairness, balance, and predictability. The deal reached between President Trump and President Xi at Busan, Korea in October 2025 represents the first step in that direction. The United States will continue to closely monitor China’s compliance with the deal.

Promote American Interests in International Fora

The United States will advance the foundations of a new trading system based on reciprocity and balance in various plurilateral and multilateral economic engagements.

The United States will continue to lead at the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to focus coordinated attention on crucial issues of the day, including industrial overcapacity, economic imbalances, the scourge of forced labor, and the weaponization of trade in food.

At the WTO, the United States will continue its day-to-day work to reduce barriers to U.S. trade and will pursue realistic and practical outcomes of benefit to all trading nations. At the upcoming 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), the United States will be clear-eyed about the limited opportunities for outcomes and reform, but will continue to seek realistic outcomes including permanent extension of the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions.

At MC14 and beyond, the United States will encourage a reorientation of the WTO’s atrophied negotiating function by favoring meaningful plurilateral agreements and urging reassessment of the MFN principle so that trading nations can differentiate among trading partners more effectively in their liberalization commitments. The United States is pleased and encouraged that other countries already have begun to share U.S. views on these issues and recognize the importance of balance and reciprocity.

Conclusion: A Trade Policy for American Workers and Communities

In 1971, when the U.S. trade deficit in goods was a mere \$2.3 billion, the situation was so alarming President Nixon imposed a universal baseline tariff.²² More than \$1 trillion later—including a 40 percent increase in the overall trade deficit during the Biden Administration—the United States is again threatened by large and systemic economic imbalances.²³ But this time, our country is behind the curve for the domestic production necessary for its broader economic and national security, especially in strategic sectors. The United States of 1971 was still a globally dominant producer of nearly everything from cars to steel to foodstuffs and even rare earth magnets. Therefore, the present response must be proportionate to the challenge—higher tariffs, more bilateral agreements, and specialized interventions to support critical sectors.

For the past thirty-odd years, many American policymakers and insiders successfully argued that our burgeoning trade deficit and loss of domestic production was nothing to worry about. Think tank warriors

²² U.S. Census Bureau, *U.S. Trade in Goods and Services – Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis, 1960 Through 2025*.

²³ U.S. Census Bureau, *U.S. Trade in Goods and Services – Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis, 1960 Through 2025*.

and news analysts told consumers that “you have a trade deficit with your barber,” dismissing concerns about the underlying fundamentals of losing the means of production to foreign countries. Such aphorisms obscure what was actually going on. It is not sustainable to have a trade deficit with the butcher, the barber, and the baker, if one *does not have a job* because it has been offshored to another country. Life cannot be financed on credit forever, whether it be a household or a nation. Driven by the trade deficit, the overall U.S. current account is in deficit. That deficit ranged between 3.4 and 4.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the past four years—something nearly all admit is unsustainable.²⁴

This could be fixed, in significant part, if the United States produced more of what it consumed.

For the past few decades, the return of domestic production was stymied by outdated thinking about the benefits of global economic integration without focusing on the desired outcomes for our society. This gave rise to a trade policy which hurt workers and their families and communities by rewarding a race to the bottom and offshoring. Accomplishing the goals of this year’s Trade Policy Agenda will correct those historic shortcomings. And while trade policy is but one piece of the puzzle, it can do and it has done much to restore our economic vitality and national security.

As the America First Trade Policy makes clear: our present international economic predicament requires changing policies and resisting an instinct to revert to the *status quo ante* that put our economy into extreme imbalance. Running the old playbook will not help us produce more of what we consume, nor will it restore our sovereignty and security. The America First Trade Policy recalls the recommendation of President Lincoln’s second annual message to Congress: “The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise—with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.”²⁵

Executing the America First Trade Policy means rejecting the reactionary tendency among many in the international economic establishment. Extolling the purported benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership or negotiating comprehensive free trade agreements with select partners will not solve structural economic imbalances that have made us dangerously dependent on imports in key sectors. By implementing a fresh trade policy, with the future of American workers and communities as its lodestar, President Trump and his administration will continue to put America First.

²⁴ [World Bank, Current Account Balance \(% of GDP\) — United States, World Development Indicators](#) (last visited Feb. 16, 2026).

²⁵ Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), *reprinted in 5 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* 518, 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).

**THE 2025 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM**

I. AMERICA FIRST TRADE POLICY

A. 2025 OVERVIEW ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT

For decades, U.S. trade policy was guided by the mistaken belief that reducing trade barriers at home and expanding global trade under shared rules abroad would best serve American interests. During the second half of the 20th century, the United States played a leading role in constructing the postwar global economic order, beginning with the Bretton Woods system and the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions were designed to foster stability in exchange rates, reduce tariffs, and encourage economic integration. Under the GATT system and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), countries committed to lowering trade barriers in exchange for, theoretically, greater access to each other's markets. The architects of these systems presupposed that trade liberalization under a common set of rules would yield convergent economic behavior, expanded consumption abroad, and enhanced export opportunities for all—with few if any downsides or collateral imbalances—and the United States led the way in providing increased access to its market on the basis of these suppositions. Yet, as is now apparent, there was insufficient reciprocity in these multilateral negotiations. While the United States opened its market almost completely, nearly every other country kept its markets closed to U.S. exports. They leveraged a variety of methods to achieve this goal, including high tariffs or various non-tariff barriers—such as regulatory arbitrages established via weak or non-existent enforcement of fundamental standards across labor, environment, and other areas—to promote their own competitiveness at the expense of the United States.

Even as the United States helped establish these global trading structures, traditional assumptions about the relationship between trade liberalization and shared prosperity began to diverge from economic realities. For some time, these structures complemented America's unrivaled economic and industrial strength: the United States maintained a robust manufacturing base, exported high-value goods, and generally ran balanced current accounts or trade surpluses, reflecting its dominant industrial capacity. During this period, the United States used a multi-pronged strategy to extensively subsidize the economic development and reconstruction of its partners. This included providing a defense and national security umbrella, financing efforts such as the European Recovery Program (known as the "Marshall Plan") to accelerate allied industrial development, and allowing allied producers to access demand from the robust U.S. consumer market. Over time, however, the assumptions underpinning the global trading system eroded as foreign governments pursued mercantilist strategies, currency misalignment, and industrial policies that were incompatible with fair and reciprocal trade. In 1971, the United States recorded its first modern merchandise trade deficit—approximately \$2.3 billion—signaling a fundamental shift from historical patterns of surplus to persistent deficits in goods.

Over the ensuing decades, these trade deficits widened and became a chronic feature of the U.S. economy, symptomatic not of temporary dislocations but of deeper structural distortions in global trade relationships. This deficit pattern reflected shifts in comparative advantage created by industrial and export promotion policies, capital flows, consumption patterns, and global production networks that never normalized to balance the U.S. trade deficit. The increasing and persistent trade deficit was driven by the integration of newly and not-yet industrialized economies into the existing global trading system under fossilized rules that were fundamentally unable to ensure reciprocal market access for American exports. Despite targeted efforts to address these imbalances, including the 1971 Smithsonian Agreement and 1985 Plaza Accord, as well as its coordinated effort to realign exchange rates and depreciate the U.S. dollar, trade imbalances became a consistent feature of the U.S. economy, contrary to economic theory of self-correcting trade flows and comparative advantage.

The rules-based trading order initially memorialized in the GATT and later expanded through the WTO, did not produce the economic convergence many had anticipated. Instead, manufacturing supply chains continued to migrate offshore, encouraged by foreign industrial policies; lower production costs, enabled by exchange rates and labor and regulatory arbitrage; and lax enforcement of trade disciplines. Over time, these shifts hollowed out domestic production capacity, weakened supply chain resilience, and atrophied key sectors of the U.S. manufacturing base. Furthermore, because of the centrality of the Most-Favored-Nation principle to the GATT and WTO regimes, countries were able to enjoy the benefit of access to the U.S. market at low, bound tariff rates without committing to comparable levels of market openness or discipline. As a result, the United States—maintaining one of the world’s lowest average applied tariff rates of 3.4 percent—increasingly opened its market to imports and was rewarded with limited leverage against persistent tariff and non-tariff barriers maintained by trading partners, exacerbating deficits in goods trade and accelerating the decimation of its manufacturing base.

More recent events have intensified the problems described above. For example, a Second China Shock emerged in the 2020s as global overcapacity, renewed Chinese export momentum, and the People’s Republic of China’s increased competitiveness in critical sectors further highlighted the limitations of existing trade disciplines in addressing non-market policies and practices. U.S. exporters also face persistent trade barriers in other major markets: the European Union maintains high tariffs and restrictive regulations on autos, agriculture, and technology; Japan and Korea imposed non-tariff barriers and sector-specific standards that limit U.S. access to key sectors; and other trading partners maintain prohibitive tariffs and import restrictions that further constrain American competitiveness abroad.

By 2024, the cumulative harmful effects of decades of non-reciprocal trade practices, supply chain offshoring, labor and environmental arbitrage, and deindustrialization were undeniable. In 2024, the United States recorded a goods trade deficit of approximately \$1.2 trillion—the largest globally in human history—reflecting not temporary imbalances but a structural failure of the global trading system to deliver fairness and reciprocity to American workers, farmers, ranchers, and businesses. This figure represented a 40 percent increase in the goods trade deficit over the preceding five years alone.

Confronted with these realities, President Trump acted on his first day in office by issuing the America First Trade Policy Presidential Memorandum, marking a decisive break from past approaches that tolerated persistent deficits and one-sided openness. On April 1, 2025, the America First Trade Policy Report, which provided a foundation and resource for trade policy actions to make America great again by putting America first, was transmitted to the President. The report presented comprehensive recommendations covering the full scope of trade policies and challenges, from market access and the duty exemption for *de minimis* packages to export controls and outbound investment restrictions.

Recognizing that chronic trade imbalances constitute a threat to the U.S. economy and national security, President Trump acted quickly to restore balance and open markets for U.S. exports. On April 2, 2025, the President exercised his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose reciprocal tariffs, after declaring a national emergency arising from the long-standing asymmetries in trade relationships that resulted in the atrophy of domestic production capacity, including the U.S. manufacturing and defense-industrial base. President Trump acted in response to unfair foreign trade practices that for too long distorted markets, disadvantaged U.S. workers and businesses, and undermined supply chain security and resilience. Shortly after issuing Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, [Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficit](#), the United States in 2025 began assessing reciprocal duties on imports designed to address the barriers imposed on U.S. exports by foreign trading partners—both non-reciprocal differences in tariff rates and extensive use of non-tariff barriers—that have contributed to large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits.

These actions reflect the Administration’s core belief that the United States can no longer tolerate one-sided trade: foreign barriers that limit U.S. exports would be met with reciprocal measures to protect American producers from unfair competition. President Trump’s actions underscore the reality that our enduring trade deficit is not merely an economic statistic nor a neutral byproduct of globalization, but a threat to U.S. national security and economic resilience. The America First Trade Policy affirms that trade must support domestic production, strengthen supply chains, and ensure American workers and businesses can compete on a level playing field. The 2025 Annual Report details how the Office of the United States Trade Representative implemented and advanced the President’s vision throughout 2025 through negotiations, enforcement actions, and sustained engagement with our trading partners to restore fair and reciprocal trade.

B. RECIPROCAL TRADE AND TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS

On April 2, 2025, President Trump imposed a reciprocal tariff in Executive Order (EO) 14257, [Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits](#), to address the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the United States caused by the lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships, as indicated by our exploding annual goods trade deficit. Asymmetries in the global trading system and the domestic economic policies of our trading partners have been an important cause of persistent and growing imbalances in our global and bilateral trade relationships, which have resulted in the erosion of our domestic manufacturing capacity and undermined our defense preparedness.

In the weeks and months following April 2, 2025, dozens of trading partners have contacted the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) seeking to negotiate Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs) in order to address the concerns identified in EO 14257. Following outreach from each such trading partner, USTR identified the most significant tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including those identified in the [2025 National Trade Estimate Report](#), and assessed the potential economic value of eliminating those barriers for U.S. manufacturers, workers, farmers, ranchers, and exporters. Trading partners identified to USTR those barriers they were willing to reduce or eliminate, and USTR negotiated with these countries with the aim of reaching ARTs. Based on the strength of a given offer, the President found it appropriate to adjust the reciprocal tariff rates for certain countries. Trading partners’ commitments toward achieving more-reciprocal trade with the United States are memorialized in public joint statements, fact sheets, or similar documents, before final and legally-binding Agreements on Reciprocal Trade are negotiated and signed.

USTR has remained in close coordination with all relevant executive branch agencies to prioritize outcomes in these negotiations, primarily through the Trade Policy Staff Committee process. Since April 2, 2025, USTR conducted in-person and virtual briefings on a weekly basis with Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committee Members and relevant staff, helping to inform Congress on the details of the President’s trade actions and the status of the reciprocal trade negotiations. Public consultation significantly informed USTR’s reciprocal trade negotiation process via regular consultations with private-sector and civil-society stakeholders through statutory advisory committees. USTR also conducted a public comment period from February 20, 2025 to March 11, 2025 to identify harm flowing from our non-reciprocal trade arrangements and further inform our negotiating positions with trading partners.

In 2025 through the start of 2026, the United States reached final ARTs with Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan and issued joint statements, fact sheets, or similar documents with 10 other countries or entities under the reciprocal trade paradigm. The United States continues to engage with partner countries and negotiate towards final ARTs.

1. Ecuador

On November 13, 2025, the United States and Ecuador issued a Joint Statement on a Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. Seeking to strengthen their commercial and economic relationship, both countries agreed to provide enhanced access to each other's markets and increase alignment on economic and national security matters. Key terms of the Framework include commitments by Ecuador to streamline regulatory requirements and approvals for U.S. exports, including, accepting remanufactured goods from the United States; accepting vehicles and automotive parts built to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) and emission standards; accepting U.S. medical devices marketed in the United States, and Medical Device Single Audit Program audit reports or certificates for medical device manufacturing facilities; and accepting U.S. pharmaceutical products marketed in the United States, and surveillance findings by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for U.S. manufacturing facilities in the United States. Under the Framework, Ecuador intends to reduce or eliminate tariffs in key sectors for the United States, including machinery, health products, information and communication technology goods, chemicals, motor vehicles, and certain agricultural goods. Both countries intend to work together to address NTBs in Ecuador's agriculture sector, as well as trade facilitation, intellectual property, labor, environment, and services. Likewise, Ecuador committed to facilitate digital trade and to strengthen economic and national security cooperation.

2. European Union

On August 21, 2025, the United States and the European Union (EU) issued a Joint Statement on a United States–European Union Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade. In the Framework, the EU committed to eliminate tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods and provide preferential market access in various seafood and agricultural goods, creating new market access opportunities for a significant volume of U.S. goods exports. The EU also committed to address U.S. exporters' NTB concerns, such as complicated sanitary certificate requirements for U.S. pork and dairy products, burdensome environmental and supply chain measures, costly automotive regulatory requirements, and unjustified digital trade barriers. In addition, the EU committed to consult with the United States and U.S. traders on digitalization of trade procedures and implementation of the legislation currently proposed on EU Customs Reform. The Framework also includes EU purchase commitments in energy products (\$750 billion), artificial intelligence chips for computing centers (\$40 billion), as well as \$600 billion in investments into the United States. The Framework also contains commitments to develop strong rules of origin and economic security alignment to address non-market policies and practices, unfair competition, and lack of reciprocity in public procurement with respect to third countries. These commitments demonstrate that the United States can maintain tariffs to shrink the significant goods trade deficit with the EU while expanding U.S. market access by addressing long-standing market access issues that have impeded U.S. exports to the EU.

3. India

On February 13, 2025, President Trump announced that the United States will negotiate a Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with India in order to deepen the U.S.–India economic relationship and rebalance the trade relationship. India maintains the highest tariffs of any major economy in the world and its use of NTBs to promote domestic production has also historically restricted U.S. access to the market. Through BTA negotiations, USTR is working with India to open the Indian market for U.S. products and reduce its 2025 trade deficit of \$58.2 billion. In March 2025, the United States and India finalized the scope of the BTA negotiations, which focus on reducing tariffs, eliminating NTBs, and securing rules-based commitments in several areas to ensure long-term benefits.

On February 6, 2026, the United States and India issued a Joint Statement on a Framework for an Interim Agreement Regarding Reciprocal and Mutually Beneficial Trade. Under the Interim Agreement, India will eliminate or reduce tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods and a wide array of U.S. food and agricultural products, including dried distillers' grains (DDGs), red sorghum for animal feed, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, wine and spirits, and additional products.

Under the Interim Agreement, India will address long-standing barriers to trade in U.S. medical devices; eliminate restrictive import licensing procedures that delay market access for, or impose quantitative restrictions on, U.S. Information and Communication Technology goods; and determine, with a view towards a positive outcome, within six months of entry into force of the Agreement, whether U.S.-developed or international standards, including testing requirements, are acceptable for the purposes of U.S. exports entering the Indian market in identified sectors. India will also address long-standing NTBs to the trade in U.S. food and agricultural products. The United States and India will strengthen economic security alignment to enhance supply chain resilience and innovation through complementary actions to address non-market policies and practices of third parties, as well as cooperation on inbound and outbound investment reviews and export controls. The United States and India will work towards finalizing the Interim Agreement with a view to concluding a mutually beneficial BTA.

4. Japan

On July 22, 2025, the United States and Japan announced a Framework Agreement. Under this Framework, Japan intends to invest \$550 billion directed by the United States to rebuild and expand core American industries. Japan also committed to increase imports of U.S. rice procurements by 75 percent within the Minimum Access rice scheme, accept for sale U.S. passenger vehicles meeting U.S. automotive safety requirements without additional testing, and purchase \$8 billion in U.S. goods, including corn, soybeans, fertilizer, and bioethanol including for sustainable aviation fuel.

5. Korea

On November 13, 2025, the United States and Korea issued a Joint Fact Sheet, which included details of the U.S.–Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal announced on July 30, 2025. In the Joint Fact Sheet, Korea committed to invest \$350 billion to rebuild the American manufacturing base in critical sectors, including \$150 billion dedicated to the shipbuilding industry. Additionally, Korea committed to eliminate the 50,000-unit cap on U.S.-originating FMVSS-compliant vehicles that can enter Korea without further modifications and not require additional documentation in its emissions certification process. Korea also committed to address NTBs affecting trade in food and agricultural products. This commitment includes addressing the backlog of market access requests for U.S. horticultural products and streamlining the regulatory approval process of U.S. biotechnology products. Korea also committed that its laws and policies on digital services, including network usage fees and online competition regulations, will not discriminate against U.S. companies and to facilitate cross-border transfer of data. Korea also agreed to ensure that its international procurement obligations provide a benefit to those countries that have taken on the same commitments.

6. North Macedonia

On February 12, 2026, the United States and North Macedonia issued a Joint Statement on a Framework for Negotiating an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. Under the Framework, North Macedonia committed to eliminate customs duties for all U.S. industrial and agricultural goods exported to North Macedonia. North Macedonia has also agreed to address and prevent barriers to U.S. agricultural products in the Macedonian market, to finalize commitments on digital trade to foster an open and competitive digital

economy, and to protect internationally recognized labor rights and prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced or compulsory labor. The United States is engaging with North Macedonia to strengthen economic and national security cooperation to enhance supply chain resilience and innovation through complementary actions to address non-market policies and practices of other countries, as well as to combat duty evasion and cooperate on investment reviews and export controls.

7. Switzerland/Liechtenstein

On November 14, 2025, the United States, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein issued a Joint Statement on a Framework for an Agreement on Fair, Balanced, and Reciprocal Trade. On December 10, 2025, Switzerland removed duties on all U.S. industrial goods, U.S. seafood, and certain U.S. agricultural goods including various fresh and dried nuts, certain fruits, chemicals, and spirits such as whiskey and rum. In addition, Switzerland established tariff rate quotas for U.S. poultry, beef, and bison.

8. Thailand

On October 26, 2025, the United States and Thailand issued a Joint Statement on a U.S.–Thailand Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. Under the Framework, Thailand committed to eliminate tariff barriers on approximately 99 percent of goods, covering a full range of U.S. industrial, food, and agricultural products. Thailand also committed to address NTBs for U.S. agricultural and industrial goods and finalize commitments related to protecting internationally recognized labor rights and strengthen labor law enforcement.

9. United Kingdom

On May 8, 2025, the United States and the United Kingdom announced the General Terms for the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Economic Prosperity Deal (General Terms). The General Terms specify a number of areas where the United States and United Kingdom plan to engage in negotiations to remove tariff and NTBs that face U.S. goods, and to align our economic and national security trade policies. Shortly after the conclusion of the General Terms, the United Kingdom removed its duties on its current quota for U.S. beef and created an additional 13,000 metric tons preferential duty-free quota per year for U.S. beef. The United Kingdom also established a preferential duty-free tariff-rate quota (TRQ) of 1.4 billion liters per year for U.S. ethanol.

Following the announcement of the General Terms, the United States and the United Kingdom began negotiating the Economic Prosperity Deal to formalize the commitments outlined in the General Terms.

10. Vietnam

On October 26, 2025, the United States and Vietnam issued a Joint Statement on a United States–Vietnam Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade. Under the Framework, Vietnam committed to provide preferential market access for substantially all U.S. industrial and agricultural exports. Vietnam has also committed to address NTBs for U.S. industrial and agricultural products, including by accepting vehicles built to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and emissions standards, addressing issues related to import licenses for U.S. medical devices; and streamlining regulatory requirements and approvals for U.S. pharmaceutical products. The United States is engaging with Vietnam to address digital trade, services, investment, intellectual property, labor, environment, customs and trade facilitation, good regulatory practices, and any distortionary behaviors of state-owned enterprises.

C. TRADE ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES AND ACTIONS

1. Overview

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) coordinates U.S. Government monitoring and enforcement of rules and norms that underlie the international trading system and promote fair, market-oriented conditions for U.S. workers and businesses. USTR also enforces U.S. trade statutes designed to combat unfair foreign trade practices and works to ensure foreign government compliance with trade agreements to which the United States is a party, including through dispute settlement procedures in those agreements. Vigorous monitoring and investigation efforts by USTR and relevant expert agencies, including the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, Labor, State, and Treasury, help ensure that these agreements yield the maximum benefits in terms of ensuring foreign market access for Americans, advancing understanding and respect for international commitments, and creating a fair, competitive, and market-oriented trading environment.

Enforcement of U.S. Trade Agreements

Ensuring full implementation of U.S. trade agreements is one of the strategic priorities of the United States. USTR seeks to achieve this goal through a variety of means, including:

- Invoking U.S. trade laws to promote compliance, including in conjunction with bilateral, plurilateral, and World Trade Organization (WTO) mechanisms when appropriate;
- Promoting U.S. interests under free trade agreements (FTAs) through work programs, accelerated tariff reductions, and strategic use of dispute settlement mechanisms, including with respect to labor and environmental obligations, such as through the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) Facility-Specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM);
- Vigorously monitoring and enforcing other bilateral and plurilateral agreements;
- Asserting U.S. rights through WTO bodies and committees charged with monitoring implementation and surveillance of agreements and disciplines, and use of dispute settlement as appropriate; and
- Providing technical assistance to trading partners, especially to developing countries, to ensure that key obligations are implemented on schedule.

Through the vigorous application of U.S. trade laws and strategic use of international dispute settlement procedures, the United States helps defend U.S. workers, businesses, and farmers against unfair practices; promotes a level playing field characterized by fair, competitive, market-oriented conditions; and opens foreign markets to U.S. goods and services. For example, USTR's Office of Monitoring and Enforcement leads U.S. efforts to defend U.S. interests through investigations and actions under Section 301, in WTO and FTA disputes, and through investigations and actions under the USMCA RRM. These enforcement efforts have resulted in major benefits for U.S. workers, farmers, ranchers, and businesses, as well as workers around the world.

Enforcement of U.S. Trade Laws

USTR also worked in consultation with other U.S. Government agencies to ensure the most effective use of U.S. trade laws to obtain elimination of foreign government acts, policies, and practices that are

unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Often, these problems are not covered by existing WTO and U.S. free trade agreements.

USTR has applied Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to address unfair foreign government measures, Special 301 for intellectual property (IP) rights protection and enforcement, and Section 1377 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 for telecommunications trade problems.

For example, in 2025, in the Section 301 Investigation of China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that the People's Republic of China's (China) acts, policies, and practices are unreasonable and burden or restrict U.S. commerce; determined to take responsive action; modified the action; and suspended the action for one year. At the direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Brazil related to digital trade and electronic payment services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption interference; IP protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. The U.S. Trade Representative, at the direction of the President, in light of the Government of China's apparent failure to comply with the January 15, 2020, Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China (Phase One Agreement), initiated an investigation to determine whether the rights of the United States under the Phase One Agreement are being denied or an act, policy, or practice of China violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, the Phase One Agreement. In the Section 301 Investigation of Nicaragua's acts, policies, and practices related to abuses of labor rights, abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and dismantling of the rule of law, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that Nicaragua's acts, policies, and practices are unreasonable and burden or restrict U.S. commerce, and determined to take responsive action. In the Section 301 Investigation of China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that China's acts, policies, and practices are unreasonable and burden or restrict U.S. commerce and determined to take responsive action.

Dispute Resolution Successes

Dispute settlement is one mechanism that the United States may use to secure benefits for U.S. stakeholders. Whenever possible, the United States has sought to reach favorable resolutions or settlements that eliminate the foreign breach without having to resort to engaging in prolonged dispute settlement proceedings.

In past years, the United States had already achieved this preferred result in 42 disputes concluded, involving: Argentina's protection and enforcement of patents; Australia's ban on salmon imports; Belgium's duties on rice imports; Brazil's automotive investment measures; Brazil's patent law; Canada's additional duties on certain products; Canada's antidumping and countervailing duty investigation on corn; China's value-added tax exemptions for certain domestically produced aircraft; China's Demonstration Base/Common Service Platform export subsidy program; China's Automobile and Automotive Parts Export Bases prohibited subsidy program; China's value-added tax on integrated circuits; China's use of prohibited subsidies for green technologies; China's treatment of foreign financial information suppliers; China's subsidies for so-called Famous Brands; China's support for wind power equipment; Denmark's civil procedures for IP enforcement; Egypt's apparel tariffs; the European Union's (EU) market access for grains; an EU import surcharge on corn gluten feed; the EU's subsidies to Airbus for large civil aircraft; the EU's claim of compliance in the dispute involving subsidies to Airbus for large civil aircraft; the EU's additional duties imposed on a variety of U.S. exports; Greece's protection of copyrighted motion pictures and television programs; Hungary's agricultural export subsidies; India's compliance regarding its patent protection; India's import restrictions on poultry products; India's domestic content requirements for participation in solar power generation; India's measures relating to certain export subsidy programs;

India's imposition of additional duties in retaliation for the U.S. Section 232 national security measures on steel and aluminum; Indonesia's barriers to the importation of horticultural products (two disputes); Ireland's protection of copyrights; Japan's protection of sound recordings; Korea's shelf life standards for beef and pork; Mexico's additional duties on certain products; Mexico's restrictions on hog imports; Pakistan's protection of patents; the Philippines' market access for pork and poultry; the Philippines' automotive regime; Portugal's protection of patents; Romania's customs valuation regime; Sweden's enforcement of IP rights; and Türkiye's box office taxes on motion pictures.

Dispute Settlement Litigation Successes

When U.S. trading partners have not been willing to negotiate settlements, USTR has pursued its offensive cases to conclusion. For example, in 2025, the United States prevailed in a USMCA RRM dispute proceeding involving alleged labor violations at the Atento Servicios (Atento) call center in the Mexican state of Hidalgo. This is the first denial of rights determination by an RRM panel, and the first successful labor case under the dispute mechanism of any trade agreement. The United States also prevailed in a USMCA dispute with Mexico on Mexican biotechnology measures concerning genetically engineered (GE) corn, after the panel found that Mexico's measures were not based on science and undermined the market access that Mexico agreed to provide in the USMCA. As a result of this finding, Mexico declared ineffective both its ban on the use of GE corn in dough and tortillas and its instruction to Mexican government agencies to gradually eliminate the use of GE corn for other food uses and in animal feed.

In previous years, the United States had prevailed in 49 cases against foreign trade barriers involving: Argentina's import licensing restrictions and other trade-related requirements; Argentina's tax and duties on textiles, apparel, and footwear; Australia's export subsidies on automotive leather; Canada's administration of USMCA dairy tariff-rate quotas; Canada's barriers to the sale and distribution of magazines; Canada's export subsidies and an import barrier on dairy products; Canada's law protecting patents; China's provision of agricultural domestic support for grains producers in excess of its commitment levels; China's administration of its tariff-rate quotas for grains; China's charges on imported automotive parts; China's measures restricting trading rights and distribution services for certain publications and audiovisual entertainment products; China's enforcement and protection of IP rights; China's measures related to the exportation of raw materials; China's countervailing and antidumping duties on grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel from the United States; China's claim of compliance in the dispute involving China's countervailing and antidumping duties on grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel from the United States; China's measures affecting electronic payment services; China's countervailing and antidumping duties on broiler parts from the United States; China's countervailing and antidumping duties on automobiles from the United States; China's export restrictions on rare earths and other materials; China's imposition of additional duties in retaliation for the U.S. Section 232 national security measures on steel and aluminum; the EU's subsidies to Airbus for large civil aircraft; the EU's claim of compliance in the dispute involving subsidies to Airbus for large civil aircraft; the EU's import barriers on bananas; the EU's ban on imports of beef; the EU's regime for protecting geographical indications; the EU's moratorium on biotechnology products; the EU's non-uniform classification of LCD monitors; the EU's tariff treatment of certain information technology products; India's export subsidies on a variety of products; India's ban on poultry meat and various other U.S. agricultural products allegedly to protect against avian influenza; India's import bans and other restrictions on 2,700 items; India's protection of patents on pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals; India's discriminatory local content requirements for solar cells and modules under its National Solar Mission (two merged complaints); India's and Indonesia's discriminatory measures on imports of U.S. automobiles; Indonesia's barriers on the importation of horticultural products, beef, poultry, and animals (three complaints); Japan's restrictions affecting imports of apples, cherries, and other fruits; Japan's barriers to apple imports; Japan's and Korea's discriminatory taxes on distilled spirits; Korea's restrictions on beef imports; Mexico's antidumping duties on high fructose corn syrup; Mexico's telecommunications barriers; Mexico's antidumping duties on rice; Mexico's discriminatory soft drink tax;

the Philippines' discriminatory taxation of imported distilled spirits; Türkiye's measures affecting the importation of rice; and Türkiye's imposition of additional duties in retaliation for the U.S. Section 232 national security measures on steel and aluminum.

Interagency Center for Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement

On February 24, 2016, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 was signed into law. Section 604 of the law established the Interagency Center on Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement (ICTIME) within USTR to support the following activities: investigating potential disputes under the WTO and bilateral and regional trade agreements; monitoring and enforcing trade agreements to which the United States is a party; and monitoring implementation by foreign parties of trade agreements. The statute provided funding to USTR to staff ICTIME directly. ICTIME brings together research, analytical resources, and expertise from within USTR and across the federal government into one office within USTR to significantly enhance USTR's capability to investigate foreign trade practices that are potentially unfair or adverse to U.S. commercial interests.

In 2025, ICTIME continued to provide analysis under the USMCA RRM, various Section 301 investigations, and in ongoing dispute settlement cases at the WTO, as well as monitored the enforcement of United States–China trade arrangements.

2. Section 301—Addressing Unfair Foreign Practices Affecting U.S. Trade

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act) is designed to address unfair foreign practices affecting U.S. commerce. Section 301 may be used to enforce U.S. rights under bilateral and multilateral trade agreements or to respond to unreasonable, unjustifiable, or discriminatory foreign government practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce. For example, Section 301 investigations may be initiated in response to foreign policies, actions, or practices that limit market opportunities for U.S. goods and services, break labor or environmental norms or trade commitments, constitute anticompetitive activities, or discriminate against or hinder U.S. intellectual property rights.

Operation of the Statute

The Section 301 provisions of the Trade Act provide a domestic procedure through which interested persons may petition the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate a foreign government act, policy, or practice and take appropriate action. The U.S. Trade Representative also may self-initiate an investigation.

In each investigation, the U.S. Trade Representative must seek consultations with the foreign government(s) whose acts, policies, or practices are under investigation. If the acts, policies, or practices are determined to violate a trade agreement or to be unjustifiable, the U.S. Trade Representative generally must take action. If they are determined to be unreasonable or discriminatory and to burden or restrict U.S. commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative must determine whether action is appropriate and, if so, what action to take.

Actions that the U.S. Trade Representative may take under Section 301 include to: (1) suspend trade agreement concessions; (2) impose duties or other import restrictions; (3) impose fees or restrictions on services; (4) enter into agreements with the subject country to eliminate the offending practice or to provide compensatory benefits for the United States; or (5) restrict service sector authorizations. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is required to monitor a foreign country's implementation of any agreements entered into, or measures undertaken, to resolve a matter that was the subject of the investigation. If the foreign country fails to comply with an agreement or the U.S. Trade Representative

considers that the country fails to implement a World Trade Organization (WTO) recommendation, the U.S. Trade Representative must determine what further action to take under Section 301.

1. The People’s Republic of China’s Implementation of Commitments under the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China

On October 24, 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation to examine whether the People’s Republic of China (China) has fully implemented its commitments under the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Phase One Agreement), the burden or restriction on U.S. commerce resulting from any non-implementation by China of its commitments, and what action, if any, should be taken. On the same day, the United States requested consultations with the Government of China pursuant to Section 303 of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2413). On October 24, 2025, USTR opened a docket for public comments on issues covered by the investigation and comments were due by December 1, 2025. On December 16, 2025, the Section 301 Committee, a subordinate, staff-level body of the USTR-chaired, interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), held a public hearing. The investigation is ongoing.

2. Brazil’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Digital Trade and Electronic Payment Services; Unfair, Preferential Tariffs; Anti-Corruption Enforcement; Intellectual Property Protection; Ethanol Market Access; and Illegal Deforestation

At the specific direction of the President, on July 15, 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Brazil related to digital trade and electronic payment services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption interference; intellectual property protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. The U.S. Trade Representative also requested consultations with the Government of Brazil pursuant to Section 303 of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2413).

The Section 301 investigation will initially focus on the following issue areas: (1) Brazil may be engaging in a variety of acts, policies, and practices that undermine the competitiveness of U.S. companies engaged in digital trade and electronic payment services; (2) Brazil has lowered tariffs on an unfair preferential basis by entering into partial-scope preferential trade arrangements with certain large trading partners, while disadvantaging the United States by applying higher tariffs to U.S. imports; (3) evidence suggests that Brazil’s efforts to fight corruption have weakened considerably in some areas; (4) Brazil engages in a variety of acts, policies, and practices that apparently deny adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights; (5) the United States is subject to higher tariffs on ethanol exports to Brazil as a result of Brazil’s decision to abandon a prior agreement to provide reciprocal, virtually duty-free treatment for U.S. ethanol exports which had increased ethanol production in both countries and promoted balanced, flourishing, and mutually beneficial trade; and (6) Brazil’s lack of effective enforcement of its environmental laws and regulations has contributed to illegal deforestation in Brazil, and Brazilian ranchers and farmers have made use of such illegally deforested land by using it for agricultural production for livestock and a wide range of crops, including corn and soybeans.

On July 17, 2025, USTR opened a docket for public comments on issues covered by the investigation and comments were due by August 18, 2025. On September 3, 2025, the Section 301 Committee, held a public hearing. The investigation is ongoing.

3. The People's Republic of China's Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance

On December 23, 2024, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated an investigation under Section 302(b) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)) regarding acts, policies, and practices of the Government of China related to targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance. The U.S. Trade Representative requested consultations with the Government of China pursuant to Section 303 of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2413). The Government of China declined to hold consultations.

On December 22, 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that China's acts, policies, and practices are actionable under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and to take appropriate responsive action.

The U.S. Trade Representative determined that China's targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance is unreasonable, including for the following reasons. First, China's targeting of the semiconductor industry is unreasonable because China exerts extraordinary control over the semiconductor industry, and other economic actors, in order to achieve its targeted dominance, including through political guidance, directives, and control within state and private enterprises and activities of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Second, China's targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance is unreasonable because it does not reflect market competition and is unconstrained by market forces. China's targeting, both by design and in effect, displaces foreign firms, deprives market-oriented businesses and their workers of commercial opportunities, and lessens competition. China's plans, including as demonstrated by specific market share targets, are to achieve a long-term dominant position in these economic sectors. Third, China's targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance harms foreign competitors and purchasers by creating and exploiting dependencies. China's objective is to ultimately displace foreign competitors throughout the semiconductor value chain in domestic and foreign markets, which increases the world's dependence on its companies, products, services, and technology. The creation of dependencies also increases risk for individual firms and their workers, for economic sectors (including workers' communities), and for supply chain resilience.

The U.S. Trade Representative also determined that China's targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, including for the following reasons. First, China's targeted dominance burdens or restricts U.S. commerce because it undercuts business opportunities for and investments in the U.S. semiconductor industry. China's targeting for dominance contributes to lost sales, chronic underinvestment in numerous segments, and a diminished U.S. industry, constituting a burden and restriction on U.S. commerce. Second, China's targeting for dominance burdens or restricts U.S. commerce because it creates economic security risks from dependence and vulnerabilities in sectors critical to the functioning of the U.S. economy. China's targeting for dominance has created, and will continue to accelerate, dependencies for the U.S. semiconductor industry and for purchasers of semiconductors, creating vulnerabilities across the U.S. economy. China has also revealed the capacity and willingness to weaponize dependencies and vulnerabilities through economic coercion. Over-reliance on a single economy for semiconductors and related technology or products increases the cost of any disruption.

Pursuant to Sections 301(b) and (c), the U.S. Trade Representative determined that responsive action is appropriate and that appropriate responsive action includes taking tariff action now on semiconductors from China, with an initial tariff level of zero percent, increasing in 18 months on June 23, 2027, to a rate to be announced not fewer than 30 days prior to that date. These new Section 301 tariffs would be additional to the existing 50 percent Section 301 tariff on semiconductors from China imposed pursuant to the Section 301 investigation related to forced technology transfer. The U.S. Trade Representative will continue to monitor the efficacy of this action, the progress made toward resolution of this matter, and the need for any additional action.

4. Nicaragua's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Rule of Law

On December 10, 2024, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated an investigation under Section 302(b) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)) to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Nicaragua related to labor rights, human rights, and the rule of law are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. The investigation is the first under Section 301 to investigate acts, policies, and practices that may violate labor rights, human rights, and dismantle the rule of law that may burden U.S. commerce. The U.S. Trade Representative requested consultations with the Government of Nicaragua pursuant to Section 303 of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2413). The Government of Nicaragua declined to hold consultations.

On October 20, 2025, based on information obtained during the investigation, and in consultation with the Section 301 Committee, USTR released a public report on the investigation. As detailed in the report, Nicaragua has engaged in increasingly pervasive abuses of labor rights, as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms, and has systematically dismantled rule of law protections against arbitrary government action. First, the Ortega-Murillo regime has committed or allowed a number of abuses of internationally recognized labor rights. These include repression of freedom of association and collective bargaining; interference in worker and employer organizations; seizure of assets and removal of citizenship of members of worker and employer organizations; arbitrary dismissals and arrests; child and forced labor; human trafficking; and workplace abuses. Second, the Ortega-Murillo regime engages in abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including against U.S. persons and property, such as the repression of religious organizations through the forced closure and seizures of institutions and properties. Third, the Ortega-Murillo regime has engaged in the dismantling of the rule of law in Nicaragua. This includes imposing arbitrary or incorrect fines, taxes, customs inspections, and rulings; revoking the legal status of prominent business organizations; and seizing property interests without legal recourse.

Considering information obtained during the investigation, as reflected in the report, and taking account of public comments and the advice of the Section 301 Committee and advisory committees, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that the acts, policies, and practices covered in the investigation are unreasonable and burden or restrict U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2411(b) and 2414(a)).

In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that the acts, policies, and practices of Nicaragua related to abuses of labor rights, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and dismantling the rule of law are unreasonable within the meaning of the Section 301 statute for several reasons. First, Nicaragua's acts, policies, and practices are fundamentally unfair, incompatible with, and run counter to basic norms against abuses of labor rights, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Second, these acts, policies, and practices are also contrary to the norms, rules, and rights reflected in Nicaragua's own laws and constitution. Third, they are unreasonable in light of regional and international labor and human rights conventions, instruments, agreements, or treaties to which Nicaragua itself is party and that establish norms against the kind of acts, policies, and practices undertaken by the Nicaraguan Government.

The U.S. Trade Representative also determined that Nicaragua's acts, policies, and practices related to labor rights, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law burden or restrict U.S. commerce by creating unfair competition against U.S. workers and businesses through denial of basic labor rights resulting in artificially low-cost Nicaraguan products; creating disincentives or lost sales and exports for U.S. enterprises seeking to access or operate in Nicaragua by weakening its economy through diminishing worker participation and productivity; and causing lost investment and commercial opportunities for U.S. workers and companies through the creation of a high-risk environment in which to invest or conduct business.

In light of the determinations, the U.S. Trade Representative proposed a range of Section 301 actions aimed to obtain the elimination of Nicaragua’s acts, policies, and practices relating to labor rights, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and invited the public to provide written comments.

On December 10, 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative, determined that appropriate action in the investigation is the imposition of a 15 percent tariff on all imported Nicaraguan goods that are not originating under the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement that is phased-in over two years. Accordingly, the tariff would be set at zero percent on January 1, 2026, increasing to 10 percent on January 1, 2027, and 15 percent on January 1, 2028.

5. The People’s Republic of China’s Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance

On March 12, 2024, five national labor unions filed a petition requesting an investigation into the acts, policies, and practices of the Government of China targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance. The petition was filed pursuant to Section 302(a)(1) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1)), requesting action pursuant to Section 301(b) (19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)).

On April 17, 2024, after consideration of the petition and on the advice of the Section 301 Committee, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated the investigation. The U.S. Trade Representative also requested consultations with the Government of China pursuant to Section 303 of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2413). The Government of China declined to hold consultations regarding the investigation under this statutory framework.

Based on the information obtained during the investigation, USTR released a public report on the investigation. The report supports the determination that China’s targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce and thus is actionable.

As detailed in the report, for nearly three decades, China has targeted the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance and has employed increasingly aggressive and specific targets in pursuing dominance. China has largely achieved its dominance goals, severely disadvantaging U.S. companies, workers, and the U.S. economy generally through lessened competition and commercial opportunities and through the creation of economic security risks from dependencies and vulnerabilities. Top-down industrial planning and targeting is a critical feature of China’s state-led, non-market economic system. China organizes the development of its economy at a high level through broad national-level five-year economic and social development plans. It then employs industry-specific plans that typically align chronologically with the national five-year plans. These plans often contain detailed quantitative and qualitative targets, including for production, domestic content, and domestic and international market shares, and outline the non-market policies and practices China should use to achieve these targets. Market share targets necessitate substitution by Chinese companies at the expense of foreign competitors—for Chinese companies to gain market share, they must displace foreign companies in existing markets and take new markets as they develop in the future. China’s industrial targets have become more aggressive and sophisticated over the years. China’s plans reveal its targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance.

China’s targeting of these sectors for dominance has undercut competition and taken market share with dramatic effect: raising China’s shipbuilding market share from less than 5 percent of global tonnage in 1999, to over 50 percent in 2023; increasing China’s ownership of the commercial world fleet to over 19

percent as of January 2024; and controlling production of 95 percent of shipping containers and 86 percent of the world's supply of intermodal chassis, among other components and products.

Based on the information obtained during the investigation and taking into account public comments, as well as the advice of the interagency Section 301 Committee and advisory committees, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that China's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance is actionable under Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(b) and 2414(a)).

Specifically, USTR found China's targeting for dominance unreasonable because it displaces foreign firms, deprives market-oriented businesses and their workers of commercial opportunities, and lessens competition and creates dependencies on China, increasing risk and reducing supply chain resilience. China's targeting for dominance is also unreasonable because of Beijing's extraordinary control over its economic actors and these sectors.

USTR found that China's targeting for dominance burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by undercutting business opportunities for and investments in the U.S. maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors; restricting competition and choice; creating economic security risks from dependence and vulnerabilities in sectors critical to the functioning of the U.S. economy; and undermining supply chain resilience.

On February 21, 2025, USTR proposed Section 301 actions aimed to obtain the elimination of China's acts, policies, and practices targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance and published a notice inviting public comment on the proposal (90 FR 10843).

On April 9, 2025, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 14269, [Restoring America's Maritime Dominance](#). With respect to this investigation, Section 5 of the EO directs the U.S. Trade Representative to consider proposing: (i) tariffs on ship-to-shore (STS) cranes manufactured, assembled, or made using components of Chinese origin, or manufactured anywhere in the world by a company owned, controlled, or substantially influenced by a Chinese national; and (ii) tariffs on other cargo handling equipment.

Pursuant to Sections 301(b), 301(c), and 304(a) of the Trade Act, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to take and propose certain responsive actions. The April 23, 2025 *Federal Register* notice of that determination provided that for 180 days, all fees established through the action would be set at \$0 (90 FR 17114). The April 23 notice provided further that beginning on October 14, 2025, responsive action would include: fees on vessel owners and operators of China; fees on operators of Chinese-built ships; and fees on operators of foreign-built car carrier vessels. The April 23 notice provided that some of these fees will increase incrementally for three years until April 17, 2028. Beginning on April 17, 2028, the responsive action includes certain measures regarding the use of U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-flagged vessels for the maritime transport of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG).

Consistent with the President's direction in EO 14269, the U.S. Trade Representative proposed duties on STS cranes and on an initial list of other cargo handling equipment as Annex V of the April 23 notice (90 FR 17114, 17124–5). On May 19, 2025, USTR held a public hearing and received testimony from seven witnesses on the proposed modification. USTR also received more than 70 comments.

On June 6, 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative proposed modification of certain aspects of the action by: for Annex III, providing for a targeted coverage provision pertaining to vessels in the Maritime Security Program and changing the basis of the fee to net tons; and for Annex IV, eliminating paragraph (j), retroactive to April 17, 2025, under which USTR may direct the suspension of LNG export licenses until the terms of paragraph (f) of the Annex are met, changing the data reporting requirements in paragraph (k),

and applying Annex IV restrictions to vessel owners or operators (90 FR 24856, 24857-8). USTR received more than 60 comments.

In an October 16, 2025 notice, the U.S. Trade Representative (1) finalized modifications proposed in the April 23 notice (90 FR 17114) and June 12 notice (90 FR 24856); (2) issued ministerial clarifications regarding the operation of the action under certain circumstances; (3) proposed additional modifications to the actions; and (4) directed the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection to establish a deferred payment period (retroactive to October 14, 2025) until December 10, 2025, for Annex I and Annex III service fees. The comment period on these proposed modifications ended on November 12 (90 FR 48320).

On November 1, 2025, USTR announced a historic trade and economic deal reached between President Trump and President Xi Jinping of China. On November 6, 2025, at the direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative proposed to suspend for one year, beginning on November 10, 2025, the responsive actions taken in this investigation. During the suspension period, the U.S. Trade Representative proposed that the United States would negotiate with China pursuant to Section 301 regarding the issues raised in this investigation. The U.S. Trade Representative proposed further that while taking these actions, the United States would continue its domestic efforts and its discussions with key allies and partners on revitalizing American shipbuilding. USTR also announced a public comment process on the proposed suspension. Interested persons were afforded the opportunity to provide written comments by November 7, 2025.

In light of the trade and economic deal reached between President Trump and President Xi Jinping of China, and at the direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that the action taken on April 17, 2025, as modified, is no longer appropriate and will be suspended for one year. The U.S. Trade Representative's determination to modify the actions that have been taken in this investigation is premised upon China's commitment to negotiate pursuant to Section 301 regarding the issues raised in this investigation, the public comments received in response to the November 6 notice (90 FR 50762), the extensive public comments previously provided, advice from the Section 301 Committee, and consultations with petitioners and advisory committees.

6. The People's Republic of China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation

Pursuant to the President's direction, in August 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated an investigation under Section 302(b) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)) to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of China related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce (82 FR 39007). The findings of the investigation, along with advice from the Section 301 Committee and advisory committees, supported a determination that China's acts, policies, and practices are actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)). USTR published an extensive 200-page [report with the findings of the investigation](#) on March 22, 2018.

Based on this report, the U.S. Trade Representative in April 2018 published a notice of a determination that the following acts, policies, and practices of China are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act (83 FR 14906). China uses foreign ownership restrictions, such as joint venture requirements and foreign equity limitations, and various administrative review and licensing processes, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S. companies. China's regime of technology regulations forces U.S. companies seeking to license technologies to Chinese entities to do so on non-market-based terms that favor Chinese recipients. China directs and unfairly facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies and assets

by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and generate the transfer of technology to Chinese companies. China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the computer networks of U.S. companies to access their sensitive commercial information and trade secrets (83 FR 14906).

With respect to the second category of acts, policies, and practices (involving technology licensing regulations), the U.S. Trade Representative decided that relevant U.S. concerns could be appropriately addressed through recourse to WTO dispute settlement. Accordingly, on March 23, 2018, USTR initiated a WTO dispute by requesting consultations with the Government of China regarding certain specific aspects of China's technology regulations.

To obtain the elimination of the acts, policies, and practices in the three other categories listed above, the U.S. Trade Representative, at the direction of the President, determined to impose additional duties on certain products of China. The additional duties were imposed in four tranches, referred to as List 1 through List 4. For each list, USTR invited public comment and held public hearings.

Lists 1 and 2

Duties were imposed under Section 301 on products in the first two tranches during the one-year initial period of investigation. In July 2018, an additional 25 percent duty was imposed on products in the first tranche, known as List 1, which covered 818 tariff subheadings with an approximate annual trade value of \$34 billion (83 FR 28710). Subsequently in August 2018, an additional 25 percent duty was imposed on products in the second tranche, known as List 2, which covered 279 tariff subheadings with an approximate annual trade value of \$16 billion (83 FR 40823).

List 3

In September 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative, at the direction of the President, determined to modify the prior actions in the investigation by imposing additional duties on products of China classified under 5,733 tariff subheadings with an approximate annual trade value of \$200 billion (83 FR 47974; 83 FR 49153). The rate of the additional duty on these List 3 products was initially 10 percent *ad valorem* and was later increased to 25 percent *ad valorem* in May 2019 (84 FR 20459).

List 4

In August 2019, the U.S. Trade Representative, at the direction of the President, determined to modify the prior actions in the investigation by imposing additional 10 percent *ad valorem* duties on products of China classified under approximately 3,805 tariff subheadings with an approximate annual trade value of \$300 billion (84 FR 43304). The tariff subheadings subject to the 10 percent additional duties were separated into two lists with different effective dates: September 1, 2019 for the list in Annex A, known as List 4A, and December 15, 2019 for the list in Annex C, known as List 4B. Subsequently, at the direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to increase the rate of the additional duties from 10 percent to 15 percent (84 FR 45821).

i. Four-Year Review

In May 2022, the U.S. Trade Representative commenced the statutory four-year review process by notifying representatives of domestic industries that benefit from the tariff actions of the possible termination of those actions and of the opportunity for the representatives to request continuation. In September 2022, USTR announced that because requests for continuation were received, the tariff actions had not terminated and USTR would conduct a review of the tariff actions. USTR opened a docket on November 15, 2022, for

interested persons to submit comments with respect to a number of considerations concerning the review. USTR received nearly 1,500 comments.

As part of the statutory review process, throughout 2023 and early 2024, USTR and the Section 301 Committee held numerous meetings with agency experts concerning the review and the comments received.

On May 14, 2024, USTR issued a report on the findings of the four-year review. Specifically, the report concludes:

- The Section 301 actions have reduced some of the exposure of U.S. persons and businesses to these technology transfer-related acts, policies, and practices.
- China has not eliminated many of its technology transfer-related acts, policies, and practices, which continue to impose a burden or restriction on U.S. commerce. Instead of pursuing fundamental reform, China has persisted, and in some cases become more aggressive, including through cyber intrusions and cybertheft, in its attempts to acquire and absorb foreign technology, which further burden or restrict U.S. commerce.
- Economic analyses generally find that tariffs have had small negative effects on U.S. aggregate economic welfare, positive impacts on U.S. production in the 10 sectors most directly affected by the tariffs, and minimal impacts on economy-wide prices and employment.
- Negative effects on the United States are particularly associated with retaliatory tariffs that China has applied to U.S. exports.
- Critically, these analyses examine the tariff actions as isolated policy measures without reference to the policy landscape that may be reinforcing or undermining the effects of the tariffs.
- Economic analyses, including the principal U.S. Government analysis published by the U.S. International Trade Commission, generally find that the Section 301 tariffs have contributed to reducing U.S. imports of goods from China and increasing imports from alternate sources, including U.S. allies and partners, thereby potentially supporting U.S. supply chain diversification and resilience.

In connection with the review, and in accordance with the specific direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to modify the actions being taken in the investigation by imposing additional Section 301 duties or increasing the rate of existing Section 301 duties, on certain products of China in strategic sectors; propose increasing tariff rates for certain tungsten products, wafers, and polysilicon, with a public comment process; establish a temporary exclusion process for certain machinery used in domestic manufacturing; and modify the actions to temporarily exclude from Section 301 duties certain solar manufacturing equipment (89 FR 76581). On October 15, 2024, the U.S. Trade Representative established a process by which stakeholders could request temporary exclusion of machinery classified within 317 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States subheadings under chapters 84 and 85 (84 FR 29576).

ii. The Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China

The cumulative effect of the tariffs imposed on the products in the four tranches succeeded in encouraging China to agree to take steps to address U.S. concerns. On December 13, 2019, the United States and China announced that they would be entering into an agreement. On January 15, 2020, they signed the Phase One

Agreement. In this Agreement, China's commitments include taking steps to address some—though not all—of the issues covered in the Section 301 investigation.

On December 18, 2019, at the direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative suspended the additional 15 percent duties on the products covered by List 4B (84 FR 69447). On January 22, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that, at the direction of the President, the duties on List 4A would be reduced to 7.5 percent effective February 14, 2020, the scheduled date for entry into force of the Phase One Agreement (85 FR 3741).

On February 14, 2020, the Phase One Agreement entered into force. Since entry into force, the United States has worked to ensure that the Agreement is fully implemented, which has involved constant monitoring and, when appropriate, raising compliance issues with the Government of China.

As noted in *I.C.ii.1. The People's Republic of China's Implementation of Commitments under the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China*, on October 24, 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation to examine whether China has fully implemented its commitments under the Phase One Agreement, the burden or restriction on U.S. commerce resulting from any non-implementation by China of its commitments, and what action, if any, should be taken.

iii. Product Exclusions

The U.S. Trade Representative established processes by which stakeholders may request that particular products classified within a covered tariff subheading be excluded from the additional duties (83 FR 32181; 83 FR 47236). USTR received and reviewed approximately 11,000 and 2,900 exclusion requests pertaining to Lists 1 and 2, respectively, approving approximately 3,700 and 1,100 of them. USTR subsequently established an exclusion process for products of China covered under List 3 (84 FR 29576). USTR received approximately 30,300 exclusion requests under List 3. USTR approved approximately 1,500 requests. USTR also established an exclusion process for products of China covered under List 4A (84 FR 57144). USTR received approximately 8,800 requests and approved 575 of them.

Extension of Exclusions and Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

The first tranche of approved exclusions expired in December 2019 and the final tranche of approved exclusions expired in October 2020. Starting in November 2019, USTR established processes for submitting public comments on whether to extend particular exclusions (85 FR 6687; 85 FR 38482). Pursuant to these processes, USTR determined to extend 137 exclusions covered under List 1, 59 exclusions on List 2, 266 exclusions on List 3, and 87 exclusions on List 4, for a total of 549 exclusions. Most of the extended exclusions expired in December 2020.

On March 25, 2020, USTR sought public comment on additional modifications to the tariff actions in order to address the COVID-19 pandemic. On December 22, 2020, USTR announced its determination to further extend certain product exclusions on medical-care products and to make further modifications to remove Section 301 duties from additional medical-care products to address the COVID-19 pandemic (85 FR 85831). An additional extension was announced on March 10, 2021 (86 FR 13785). On August 27, 2021, USTR sought public comment on whether to further extend the 99 product exclusions for medical-care products (86 FR 48280). On November 16, 2021, USTR determined to further extend 81 of the product exclusions for medical-care products for an additional six months (86 FR 63438). On June 3, 2022, USTR announced a subsequent extension for an additional six months (until November 30, 2022) (87 FR 33871). On November 29, 2022, the U.S. Trade Representative further extended the same exclusions for an additional three months (until February 28, 2023).

On February 7, 2023, USTR published a notice requesting public comments on whether to further extend any of the COVID-related exclusions (88 FR 8027). On May 17, 2023, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to extend 77 of the COVID-related exclusions through September 30, 2023 (88 FR 31580). On September 11, 2023, the U.S. Trade Representative further extended the same COVID-related exclusions through December 31, 2023 (88 FR 62423). On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Trade Representative further extended the same exclusions for five months, through May 31, 2024 (88 FR 90225).

On October 8, 2021, USTR opened a docket seeking public comment on the possible reinstatement of the 549 previously extended exclusions (86 FR 56345). On March 28, 2022, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to further modify the action by reinstating 352 of the 549 expired exclusions. The reinstated exclusions applied as of October 12, 2021, and were effective through December 31, 2022 (87 FR 17380). On December 16, 2022, USTR announced that the U.S. Trade Representative had decided to extend the reinstated exclusions through September 30, 2023 (87 FR 78187). On September 11, 2023, the U.S. Trade Representative further extended these exclusions through December 31, 2023 (88 FR 62423). On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Trade Representative further extended the same exclusions for five months, through May 31, 2024 (88 FR 90225).

On December 29, 2023, USTR announced the opening of a docket for public comments on whether to further extend any of the current 429 exclusions (352 previously reinstated exclusions and 77 COVID-related exclusions) beyond May 31, 2024 (88 FR 90225). On May 30, 2024, USTR announced that the U.S. Trade Representative had decided to extend all current exclusions through June 14, 2024, to provide a transition period, and to further extend certain exclusions through May 31, 2025 (89 FR 46948). On May 31, 2025, USTR announced that the U.S. Trade Representative had decided to extend all current exclusions through August 31, 2025 (90 FR 23987). The exclusions were then extended again, through November 29, 2025. Additionally, USTR invited public comments on whether any of the 178 current exclusions warranted further extension beyond November 29, 2025. In light of the trade and economic deal reached between President Trump and President Xi Jinping of China announced by the White House, USTR announced on November 26, 2025, that the U.S. Trade Representative was further extending the 178 current exclusions until November 10, 2026 (90 FR 55232).

7. Acts, Policies, Practices Related to Digital Services Taxes

Austria

In October 2019, Austria adopted a digital services tax (DST) that applies a five percent tax to revenues from online advertising services. The law went into force on January 1, 2020. The tax applies only to companies with at least €750 million (approximately \$833 million) in annual global revenues for all services and €25 million (approximately \$28 million) in in-country revenues for covered digital services.

On June 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation of Austria's DST. On the same day, the U.S. Trade Representative requested consultations with the Government of Austria (85 FR 34709).

Based on information obtained during the investigation, USTR prepared a comprehensive report on Austria's DST. Based on the information obtained during the investigation and the advice of the Section 301 Committee, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that Austria's DST is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and therefore is actionable under Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act (86 FR 6406).

On June 2, 2021, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to take action in the form of additional duties on certain products of Austria and to immediately suspend those additional duties for up to 180 days (86 FR 30361).

On October 8, 2021, Austria joined the United States and 134 other jurisdictions participating in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/Group of 20 (G20) Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in reaching a political agreement on a two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the world economy. As part of Pillar 1, all parties would remove existing DSTs and other relevant similar measures, and would coordinate the withdrawal of these taxes.

On October 21, 2021, the United States, under the prior Administration, issued a joint statement with Austria and four other countries on a transitional approach to those countries' DSTs during the transitional period prior to implementation of Pillar 1. According to the statement, DST liability that accrued to Austria during a transitional period would be creditable in defined circumstances against future corporate income tax liability due under Pillar 1. In return, the Section 301 trade action initiated with respect to goods of Austria was not continued. The arrangement set out in the October 21, 2021, joint statement was extended to June 30, 2024. The arrangement has not been in effect since.

On January 20, 2025, the United States issued a White House Memorandum titled, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Global Tax Deal (Global Tax Deal)." The memorandum stated:

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the OECD shall notify the OECD that any commitments made by the prior Administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress adopting the relevant provisions of the Global Tax Deal.

On January 22, 2025, appropriate representatives of the U.S. Department of Treasury provided notice to the Director of the Centre of Tax Policy and Administration at the OECD. On January 24, 2025, the U.S. Permanent Delegation to the OECD provided similar notice to the Secretary General of the OECD. In coordination with the U.S. Department of Treasury, USTR has continued to monitor the relevant measures.

A February 21, 2025, Presidential Memorandum titled "Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties" instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to determine whether to renew investigations of DSTs, including Austria's DST, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

France

On March 6, 2019, the Government of France released a proposal for a three percent levy on revenues that certain companies generate from providing certain digital services to, or aimed at, persons in France. The President of France signed the bill into law on July 24, 2019.

On July 10, 2019, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated an investigation of the proposed French DST pursuant to Section 302(b)(1)(A) of the Trade Act (84 FR 34042). Based on information obtained during the investigation, USTR, with the advice of the Section 301 Committee, prepared a report setting out findings of the investigation.

On December 6, 2019, the U.S. Trade Representative determined under Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) and 2414(a)) that the act, policy, or practice covered in the investigation, namely the French DST, is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and is thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act (84 FR 66956).

On July 10, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that action was appropriate in this investigation and to take action in the form of additional duties on certain products of France (85 FR 43292). To allow additional time for bilateral and multilateral discussions, and in recognition of France's agreement to suspend collection of its DST during 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to suspend the additional duties for up to 180 days, pursuant to Section 305(a) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2415(a)) (85 FR 43292). Subsequently, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to further suspend the action in this investigation as of January 6, 2021, to allow USTR to coordinate actions in all DST investigations (86 FR 2479).

On October 8, 2021, France joined the United States and 134 other jurisdictions participating in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in reaching a political agreement on a two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the world economy. As part of Pillar 1, all parties would remove existing DSTs and other relevant similar measures, and would coordinate the withdrawal of these taxes.

On October 21, 2021, the United States, under the prior Administration, issued a joint statement with France and four other countries on a transitional approach to those countries' DSTs during the transitional period prior to implementation of Pillar 1. According to the statement, DST liability that accrued to France during the transitional period would be creditable in defined circumstances against future corporate income tax liability due under Pillar 1. In return, the Section 301 trade action initiated with respect to goods of France was not continued. The arrangement set out in the October 21, 2021 joint statement was extended to June 30, 2024. The arrangement has not been in effect since.

On January 20, 2025, the United States issued a White House Memorandum titled, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Global Tax Deal (Global Tax Deal)." The memorandum stated:

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the OECD shall notify the OECD that any commitments made by the prior Administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress adopting the relevant provisions of the Global Tax Deal.

On January 22, 2025, appropriate representatives of the U.S. Department of Treasury provided notice to the Director of the Centre of Tax Policy and Administration at the OECD. On January 24, 2025, the U.S. Permanent Delegation to the OECD provided similar notice to the Secretary General of the OECD. In coordination with the U.S. Department of Treasury, USTR has continued to monitor the relevant measures.

A February 21, 2025, Presidential Memorandum titled "Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties" instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to determine whether to renew investigations of DSTs, including France's DST, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

As of December 31, 2025, the French National Assembly was considering a proposal to increase its DST from three to five or six percent. Such a rate hike would seem to exacerbate the discriminatory effect of the tax.

India

In March 2020, India adopted a two percent DST. The tax only applied to non-resident companies, and covered online sales of goods and services to, or aimed at, persons in India. The tax applied to companies with annual revenues in excess of approximately Rs. 20 million (approximately \$239,000). The tax went into effect on April 1, 2020 (85 FR 34709).

On June 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation of India's DST. On the same day, the USTR requested consultations with the Government of India (85 FR 34709).

Based on information obtained during the investigation, USTR prepared a comprehensive report on India's DST. Based on the information obtained during the investigation and the advice of the Section 301 Committee, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that India's DST is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and therefore is actionable under Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act (86 FR 2478).

On June 2, 2021, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to take action in the form of additional duties on certain products of India and to immediately suspend those additional duties for up to 180 days (86 FR 30356).

On October 8, 2021, India joined the United States and 134 other jurisdictions participating in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in reaching a political agreement on a two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the world economy. As part of Pillar 1, all parties would remove existing DSTs and other relevant similar measures, and would coordinate the withdrawal of these taxes.

On November 24, 2021, India and the United States, under the prior Administration, issued a joint statement on a transitional approach to India's DST during the transitional period prior to implementation of Pillar 1. According to the statement, DST liability that accrued to India during the transitional period would be creditable in defined circumstances against future corporate income tax liability due under Pillar 1. In return, the Section 301 trade action initiated with respect to goods of India was not continued. The arrangement set out in the joint statement was extended to June 30, 2024. The arrangement has not been in effect since.

On January 20, 2025, the United States issued a White House Memorandum titled, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Global Tax Deal (Global Tax Deal)." The memorandum stated:

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the OECD shall notify the OECD that any commitments made by the prior Administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress adopting the relevant provisions of the Global Tax Deal.

On January 22, 2025, appropriate representatives of the U.S. Department of Treasury provided notice to the Director of the Centre of Tax Policy and Administration at the OECD. On January 24, 2025, the U.S. Permanent Delegation to the OECD provided similar notice to the Secretary General of the OECD. In coordination with the U.S. Department of Treasury, USTR has continued to monitor the relevant measures.

In The Finance (No. 2) Bill of 2024, India removed the two percent DST.

Italy

Italy adopted a DST, effective on January 1, 2020. As originally enacted, Italy's DST applied to companies that generate €750 million (approximately \$833 million) or more in worldwide revenues and €5.5 million (approximately \$6.1 million) or more in revenues deriving from the provision of digital services in Italy. However, in 2025, Italy eliminated the €5.5 million domestic revenue threshold. Italy's DST applies a three percent rate on the total amount of taxable revenues generated during the calendar year (86 FR 2477).

On June 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation of Italy's DST. On the same day, the U.S. Trade Representative requested consultations with the Government of Italy (85 FR 34709). Based on the information obtained during the investigation and the advice of the Section 301 Committee, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that Italy's DST is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and therefore is actionable under Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act (86 FR 2477). On June 2, 2021, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to take action in the form of additional duties on certain products of Italy and to immediately suspend those additional duties for up to 180 days (86 FR 30350).

On October 8, 2021, Italy joined the United States and 134 other jurisdictions participating in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in reaching a political agreement on a two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the world economy. As part of Pillar 1, all parties would remove existing DSTs and other relevant similar measures, and would coordinate the withdrawal of these taxes.

On October 21, 2021, the United States, under the prior Administration, issued a joint statement with Italy and four other countries on a transitional approach to those countries' DSTs during the transitional period prior to implementation of Pillar 1. According to the statement, DST liability that accrued to Italy during the transitional period would be creditable in defined circumstances against future corporate income tax liability due under Pillar 1. In return, the Section 301 trade action initiated with respect to goods of Italy was not continued. The arrangement set out in the joint statement was extended to June 30, 2024. The arrangement has not been in effect since.

On January 20, 2025, the United States issued a White House Memorandum titled, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Global Tax Deal (Global Tax Deal)." The memorandum stated:

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the OECD shall notify the OECD that any commitments made by the prior Administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress adopting the relevant provisions of the Global Tax Deal.

On January 22, 2025, appropriate representatives of the U.S. Department of Treasury provided notice to the Director of the Centre of Tax Policy and Administration at the OECD. On January 24, 2025, the U.S. Permanent Delegation to the OECD provided similar notice to the Secretary General of the OECD. In coordination with the U.S. Department of Treasury, USTR has continued to monitor the relevant measures.

A February 21, 2025, Presidential Memorandum titled "Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties" instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to determine whether to renew investigations of DSTs, including Italy's DST, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Spain

Spain adopted a DST on October 7, 2020. Spain's DST applies a three percent tax to revenues from certain digital advertising, digital intermediation services, and data transmission services. The DST applies to companies generating at least €750 million (approximately \$833 million) in global revenues and €3 million (approximately \$3.33 million) in revenues attributable to Spain (86 FR 6407).

On June 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation of Spain's DST. On the same day, the U.S. Trade Representative requested consultations with the Government of Spain (85 FR 34709).

On October 8, 2021, Spain joined the United States and 134 other jurisdictions participating in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in reaching a political agreement on a two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the world economy. As part of Pillar 1, all parties would remove existing DSTs and other relevant similar measures, and would coordinate the withdrawal of these taxes.

On October 21, 2021, the United States, under the prior Administration, issued a joint statement with Spain and four other countries on a transitional approach to those countries' DSTs during the transitional period prior to implementation of Pillar 1. According to the statement, DST liability that accrued to Spain during the transitional period would be creditable in defined circumstances against future corporate income tax liability due under Pillar I. In return, the Section 301 trade action initiated with respect to the goods of Spain was not continued. The arrangement set out in the joint statement was extended to June 30, 2024. The arrangement has not been in effect since.

On January 20, 2025, the United States issued a White House Memorandum titled, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Global Tax Deal (Global Tax Deal)." The memorandum stated:

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the OECD shall notify the OECD that any commitments made by the prior Administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress adopting the relevant provisions of the Global Tax Deal.

On January 22, 2025, appropriate representatives of the U.S. Department of Treasury provided notice to the Director of the Centre of Tax Policy and Administration at the OECD. On January 24, 2025, the U.S. Permanent Delegation to the OECD provided similar notice to the Secretary General of the OECD. In coordination with the U.S. Department of Treasury, USTR has continued to monitor the relevant measures.

A February 21, 2025, Presidential Memorandum titled "Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties" instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to determine whether to renew investigations of DSTs, including Spain's DST, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Türkiye

Türkiye adopted a DST on December 7, 2019, and the DST entered into force as of March 1, 2020. The DST applies to companies that, during the previous calendar year, generated €750 million (approximately

\$833 million) or more in worldwide revenues and TRY 20 million (approximately \$608,000) or more in revenues deriving from the provision of digital services in Türkiye (86 FR 2480).

On June 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation of Türkiye's DST. On the same day, the U.S. Trade Representative requested consultations with the Government of Türkiye (85 FR 34709). Based on the information obtained during the investigation and the advice of the Section 301 Committee, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that Türkiye's DST is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and therefore is actionable under Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act (86 FR 2480). On June 2, 2021, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to take action in the form of additional duties on certain products of Türkiye and to immediately suspend those additional duties for up to 180 days (86 FR 30353).

On October 8, 2021, Türkiye joined the United States and 134 other jurisdictions participating in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in reaching a political agreement on a two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the world economy. As part of Pillar 1, all parties would remove existing digital services taxes and other relevant similar measures, and would coordinate the withdrawal of these taxes.

On November 22, 2021, the United States, under the prior Administration, issued a joint statement with Türkiye on a transitional approach to Türkiye's ST during the transitional period prior to implementation of Pillar 1. According to the statement, DST liability that accrued to Türkiye during the transitional period would be creditable in defined circumstances against future corporate income tax liability due under Pillar 1. In return, the Section 301 trade action initiated with respect to goods of Türkiye was not continued. The arrangement set out in the joint statement was extended to June 30, 2024. The arrangement has not been in effect since.

On January 20, 2025, the United States issued a White House Memorandum titled, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Global Tax Deal (Global Tax Deal)." The memorandum stated:

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the OECD shall notify the OECD that any commitments made by the prior Administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress adopting the relevant provisions of the Global Tax Deal.

On January 22, 2025, appropriate representatives of the U.S. Department of Treasury provided notice to the Director of the Centre of Tax Policy and Administration at the OECD. On January 24, 2025, the U.S. Permanent Delegation to the OECD provided similar notice to the Secretary General of the OECD. In coordination with the U.S. Department of Treasury, USTR has continued to monitor the relevant measures.

A February 21, 2025, Presidential Memorandum titled "Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties" instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to determine whether to renew investigations of DSTs, including Türkiye's DST, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom adopted a DST on July 22, 2020. The U.K. DST applies a two percent tax on the revenues of certain search engines, social media platforms and online marketplaces. The U.K. DST applies only to companies with global digital services revenues exceeding £500 million (approximately \$625

million) and U.K. digital services revenues exceeding £25 million (approximately \$31.3 million). Companies became liable for this DST on April 1, 2020 (86 FR 6406).

On June 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation of the United Kingdom's proposed DST, which was subsequently adopted. On the same day, the U.S. Trade Representative requested consultations with the Government of the United Kingdom (85 FR 34709).

On October 8, 2021, the United Kingdom joined the United States and 134 other jurisdictions participating in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in reaching a political agreement on a two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the world economy. As part of Pillar 1, all parties would remove existing DSTs and other relevant similar measures, and would coordinate the withdrawal of these taxes.

On October 21, 2021, the United States, under the prior Administration, issued a joint statement with the United Kingdom and four other countries on a transitional approach to those countries' DSTs during the transitional period prior to implementation of Pillar 1. According to the statement, DST liability that accrued to the United Kingdom during the transitional period would be creditable in defined circumstances against future corporate income tax liability due under Pillar 1. In return, the Section 301 trade action initiated in respect of goods of the United Kingdom was not continued. The arrangement set out in the joint statement was extended to June 30, 2024. The arrangement has not been in effect since.

On January 20, 2025, the United States issued a White House Memorandum titled, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Global Tax Deal (Global Tax Deal)." The memorandum stated:

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the OECD shall notify the OECD that any commitments made by the prior Administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress adopting the relevant provisions of the Global Tax Deal.

On January 22, 2025, appropriate representatives of the U.S. Department of Treasury provided notice to the Director of the Centre of Tax Policy and Administration at the OECD. On January 24, 2025, the U.S. Permanent Delegation to the OECD provided similar notice to the Secretary General of the OECD. In coordination with the U.S. Department of Treasury, USTR has continued to monitor the relevant measures.

A February 21, 2025, Presidential Memorandum titled "Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties" instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to determine whether to renew investigations of DSTs, including the U.K. DST, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

8. Enforcement of U.S. World Trade Organization Rights in European Union Large Civil Aircraft Dispute

On October 6, 2004, the United States requested WTO dispute settlement consultations with the EC (now the EU), France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom (certain Member States) concerning certain subsidies granted by the EU and certain Member States to the EU large civil aircraft (LCA) domestic industry, on the basis that these subsidies appeared to be inconsistent with their obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).

In May 2011, a WTO panel report, as amended by an Appellate Body report, confirmed that EU and certain Member State subsidies on the manufacture of LCA breached the EU's obligations under the SCM Agreement. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the reports on June 1, 2011, and recommended that the EU and certain Member States bring the WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with WTO rules. The EU and certain Member States had until December 1, 2011, to bring the measures into compliance. On December 1, 2011, the EU asserted that it had implemented the DSB recommendations. The United States did not agree, and requested authorization from the DSB to impose countermeasures commensurate with the adverse effects of the WTO-inconsistent measures. The EU objected to the request, referring the matter to arbitration to assess the proper level of any countermeasures.

In early 2012, the United States and the EU entered into a procedural agreement pursuant to which the arbitration would be suspended until after WTO compliance panel and any appellate proceedings determined whether the EU had implemented the DSB recommendations. On May 28, 2018, the DSB adopted compliance panel and Appellate Body reports confirming that launch aid to the Airbus A380 and A350 XWB aircraft continued to cause WTO-inconsistent adverse effects to U.S. interests.

At the request of the United States, and in accordance with the procedural agreement, on July 13, 2018, the WTO Arbitrator resumed its work in determining the level of countermeasures to be authorized as a result of the WTO inconsistencies.

On April 12 2019, USTR announced the initiation of a Section 301 investigation to enforce U.S. rights in the dispute. The notice of initiation solicited written comments on several aspects of the investigation, as well as comments on a list of products with a value of \$21 billion being considered for additional duties of up to 100 percent (84 FR 15028). Public hearings were held on May 15 to May 16, 2019.

USTR issued a second notice on July 5, 2019, that requested public comments on a supplementary list of products with a value of \$4 billion for which additional duties of up to 100 percent were also being considered (84 FR 32248). A second public hearing was held on August 5, 2019.

On October 2, 2019, the WTO Arbitrator issued a report that concluded that the appropriate level of countermeasures in response to the WTO-inconsistent launch aid provided by the EU or certain Member States to their LCA domestic industry was approximately \$7.5 billion annually.

On October 9, 2019, the U.S. Trade Representative announced in the *Federal Register* (84 FR 54245) a determination that, based on the original panel and appellate reports, the compliance panel and appellate reports, the report of the WTO Arbitrator, and information obtained during the investigation, including public comments, the advice of the advisory committees, the Section 301 Committee, and the TPSC, U.S. rights under the GATT 1994 and Articles 5 and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement were being denied, that the subsidies provided by the EU and certain Member States were inconsistent with these agreements, and that the EU and certain Member States had not satisfactorily implemented the recommendation of the WTO DSB. The October 9 notice also announced a list of the products with an annual trade value of approximately \$7.5 billion that would be subject to additional duties of 10 percent or 25 percent, effective October 18, 2019.

On December 12, 2019, USTR published a notice in the *Federal Register* (84 FR 67992) seeking comments on a review of the October 18 action. Pursuant to the Section 301 statute, the notice sought comments on whether products subject to additional duties should be removed or remain on the final list, whether the rate of additional duty on specific products should be increased up to a level of 100 percent, and whether additional duties should be imposed on products which had been subject to public comment but were not subject to the October 18 action and the rate of additional duty to be applied to such products. A periodic revision of the action was announced on February 14, 2020, and a notice published in the *Federal Register*

on February 21, 2020 (85 FR 10204). The February notice also included a determination that the United States may take appropriate action upon any EU imposition of additional duties on U.S. products in connection with the EU LCA dispute or the U.S. LCA dispute brought by the EU.

The next review was announced June 26, 2020, and included a notice which sought comment on an additional list of products with a value of approximately \$3.1 billion being considered for additional duties (85 FR 38488, as amended by 85 FR 39661 on July 1, 2020). The revised action was announced August 12, 2020, and included the determination that the action may be revised upon any EU imposition of additional duties on U.S. products in connection with the EU LCA dispute or the U.S. LCA dispute brought by the EU (85 FR 50866).

On November 9, 2020, following a decision by the WTO arbitrator in the U.S. LCA dispute that Washington State tax rate reductions in a 2012 reference period caused \$4 billion per year in adverse effects, the EU announced that it would impose additional duties of 15 percent and 25 percent on goods of the United States, effective November 10, 2020. The Washington State measure was withdrawn in April 2020, and the EU had no legal basis to retaliate. Furthermore, in exercising its \$4 billion authorization, the EU relied on a benchmark reference period affected by the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which enabled the EU to cover a greater volume of imports than if, like the United States, it had used data from a period when trade was not affected by the pandemic.

On December 31, 2020, in response to the EU's action, the United States announced certain revisions to the August 2020 action, including an adjustment to mirror the benchmark period used by the EU in exercising its authorization (86 FR 674). Using the new benchmark period, coupled with appropriate adjustments, the December 31, 2020, revision remained consistent with the WTO arbitrator's award to the United States.

In February 2021, the U.S. Trade Representative together with the affected United States industry agreed that it was unnecessary at that time to revise the action in the Section 301 investigation (86 FR 9420).

In March 2021, the United States and the United Kingdom, and the United States and the EU, issued joint statements promoting a resolution of the disputes and announcing that each party would suspend their imposition of additional duties on products of the other for four months. In accord with the joint statements, the United States announced modification of the action to suspend additional duties on products of the United Kingdom and of EU Member States, effective March 4, 2021 and March 11, 2021, respectively (86 FR 13961 and 86 FR 14513).

On June 15 and June 17, 2021, the United States reached understandings on cooperative frameworks with the United Kingdom and the EU regarding the dispute. In accordance with the understandings, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to suspend the action being taken in the Section 301 investigation for five years, beginning July 4, 2021, with respect to tariffs on U.K. goods, and beginning July 11, 2021, with respect to tariffs on goods of EU Member States (86 FR 36313). USTR continued to monitor implementation by the EU and United Kingdom of the framework understandings and their respective measures related to the matters covered in the LCA dispute, including whether the EU or United Kingdom provides financing to an LCA producer for the production or development of LCA that is not on market terms. If USTR considers that the implementation of the framework understandings or measures related to the WTO dispute are not satisfactory, USTR will take any and all appropriate and feasible action under Section 301 to enforce U.S. WTO rights.

9. European Union—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)

The EU prohibits imports into the EU of animals and meat from animals to which certain hormones have been administered (the “hormone ban”). In 1996, the United States initiated a WTO dispute with respect to the hormone ban. WTO panel and Appellate Body reports found that the measure was inconsistent with WTO obligations because the ban was not based on scientific evidence, a risk assessment, or relevant international standards. Under WTO procedures, the EC, the predecessor to the EU, was to come into compliance with its obligations by May 13, 1999, but it failed to do so. Accordingly, in May 1999, the United States requested authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the EC, and Member States thereof, of tariff concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994. The EC did not contest that it had failed to comply with its WTO obligations, but it objected to the level of suspension proposed by the United States.

On July 12, 1999, a WTO arbitrator determined that the level of nullification or impairment suffered by the United States as a result of the WTO inconsistent hormone ban was \$116.8 million per year. Accordingly, on July 26, 1999, the DSB authorized the United States to suspend the application to the EC and its Member States of tariff concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994, covering trade up to \$116.8 million per year. In a notice published in July 1999, USTR announced that the United States was acting pursuant to this authorization by initiating proceedings under Section 301 to impose 100 percent *ad valorem* duties on certain products of certain EC Member States (64 FR 40638).

In February 2005, a WTO panel was established to consider the EU’s claims that it had brought its hormone ban into compliance with its WTO obligations and that the increased duties imposed by the United States were no longer authorized by the DSB. In 2008, the DSB adopted panel and Appellate Body reports that confirmed that the July 1999 DSB authorization remained in effect.

In January 2009, the U.S. Trade Representative: (1) removed certain products from the 1999 list of products subject to 100 percent *ad valorem* duties; (2) imposed 100 percent *ad valorem* duties on some new products from certain EU Member States; (3) modified the coverage with respect to particular EU Member States; and (4) raised the level of duties on one product. The trade value of the products subject to the modified list did not exceed the \$116.8 million per year authorized by the WTO.

In March 2009, the U.S. Trade Representative delayed the effective date of the additional duties (items two through four above) imposed under the January 2009 modifications in order to allow additional time for reaching an agreement with the EU. The effective date of the removal of duties under the January modifications remained March 23, 2009. Accordingly, subsequent to March 23, 2009, the additional duties put in place in July 1999 remained applicable to a reduced list of products.

In May 2009, the United States and the EU concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which, under the first phase of the MOU scheduled to conclude in August 2012, obligated the EU to open a new duty-free tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for beef not produced with certain growth-promoting hormones. The United States in turn agreed not to impose duties above those in effect as of March 23, 2009.

On August 3, 2012, the United States and the EU, by mutual agreement, entered into a second phase of the MOU, to expire in one year. Under phase two, the U.S. Trade Representative terminated the remaining additional duties, and the EU expanded the TRQ from 20,000 to 45,000 metric tons. In August 2013, the United States and the EU extended phase two for an additional two years, until August 2015.

On December 9, 2016, representatives of the U.S. beef industry requested that the U.S. Trade Representative reinstate trade action against the EU because the TRQ was not providing benefits sufficient to compensate for the harm caused by the EU’s hormone ban. On December 28, 2016, USTR published a

Federal Register notice seeking public comments on specific EU products in order to consider possible reinstatement of duties (81 FR 95724). USTR held a public hearing on February 15, 2017.

In 2019, the United States and the EU concluded successful negotiations to resolve concerns with the operation of the TRQ established by the MOU. On August 2, 2019, the EU and United States signed the Agreement on the Allocation to the United States of a Share in the Tariff Rate Quota for High Quality Beef Referred to in the Revised MOU Regarding the Importation of Beef from Animals Not Treated with Certain Growth-promoting Hormones and Increased Duties Applied by the United States to Certain Products of the European Union. The Agreement establishes a duty-free TRQ exclusively for the United States. Under the Agreement, American ranchers will have an initial TRQ of 18,500 metric tons annually, valued at approximately \$220 million. Over seven years, the TRQ will grow to 35,000 metric tons annually, valued at approximately \$420 million. On December 13, 2019, USTR published in the *Federal Register* notice of its determination not to reinstate action under Section 306(c) in connection with the EU's measures (84 FR 68286). Pursuant to the notice, the Section 306(c) proceeding was terminated effective January 1, 2020, the date the EU applied the U.S.-specific TRQ allocation.

During 2025, USTR continued to monitor the operation of the TRQ.

10. Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to the Import and Use of Illegal Timber

On October 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated an investigation regarding whether Vietnam's acts, policies, and practices related to Vietnam's import and use of illegally harvested or traded timber ("illegal timber") are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict United States commerce. On the same day, the United States requested consultations with Vietnam. The notice of initiation (85 FR 63639) explained that Vietnam relies on imports of timber harvested in other countries to supply the timber inputs needed for its wood products manufacturing sector, and evidence suggests that a significant portion of that imported timber was illegally harvested or traded. Through the notice of initiation, USTR solicited written comments. USTR received 71 submissions in response.

USTR and the Section 301 Committee convened a virtual public hearing on December 28, 2020, during which 19 witnesses provided testimony and responded to questions. On January 8, 2021, the United States held consultations with the Government of Vietnam.

On October 1, 2021, the United States and Vietnam signed an agreement that addresses U.S. concerns in the timber investigation (86 FR 55681). The agreement secures commitments by Vietnam that will help keep illegally harvested or traded timber out of the supply chain, including commitments to improve its Timber Legality Assurance System; keep confiscated timber (*i.e.*, timber seized for violating domestic or international law) out of the commercial supply chain; verify the legality of domestically harvested timber regardless of export destination; and work with high-risk source countries to improve customs enforcement at the border and law enforcement collaboration. In April 2022, the United States and Vietnam convened the first meeting of the Timber Working Group, which was established to facilitate coordination between the Parties and oversee implementation of the agreement. The Timber Working Group has held three more meetings since 2022.

In September 2024, with a view to implementing several core commitments in the agreement, Vietnam issued a regulation—Amending and supplementing Decree No. 102/2020/ND by the Government of Viet Nam on Timber Legality Assurance System. Those commitments include (1) broadening the scope of Vietnam's Timber Legality Assurance System (*e.g.*, to include Vietnamese importers); (2) amending how Vietnam evaluates timber imports into Vietnam to take into account the risk of illegal logging, illegal timber trade, and fraudulent documentation; and (3) verifying domestically harvested timber exported to the United

States or other destinations. In 2025, USTR continued to monitor Vietnam’s implementation of the agreement, including Vietnam’s amending other timber legality legislation pursuant to the agreement.

11. Vietnam’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Currency Valuation

On October 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated an investigation regarding whether Vietnam’s acts, policies, and practices related to the valuation of its currency are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict United States commerce. On the same day, the United States requested consultations with Vietnam. The notice of initiation (85 FR 63637) explained that the State Bank of Vietnam’s management of its currency is closely tied to the U.S. dollar, and that available analysis indicated that Vietnam’s currency had been undervalued for the past three years. The notice further explained that available evidence indicated that the Government of Vietnam, through the State Bank of Vietnam, actively intervened in the foreign exchange market which contributed to the dong’s undervaluation in 2019. Through the notice of initiation, USTR solicited public comments. USTR received 66 submissions in response.

On December 23, 2020, the United States held consultations with the Government of Vietnam. On December 29, 2020, USTR and the Section 301 Committee held a virtual public hearing on the investigation. During the hearing, 21 witnesses testified and responded to questions.

On January 15, 2021, in consultation with the U.S. Department of Treasury, based on the information obtained in the investigation, and taking account of public comments and advice of the Section 301 Committee and advisory committees, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that Vietnam’s acts, policies, and practices related to currency valuation, including excessive foreign exchange market interventions and other related actions, taken in their totality, are unreasonable and burden or restrict U.S. commerce, and thus actionable under Section 301 (86 FR 6732).

On July 23, 2021, based on an agreement reached between the U.S. Department of Treasury and the State Bank of Vietnam regarding Vietnam’s currency practices, the U.S. Trade Representative determined that no action under Section 301 in the currency investigation was warranted at that time because Vietnam’s agreement with the U.S. Department of Treasury provided a satisfactory resolution of the matter subject to the investigation (86 FR 40675). In coordination with the U.S. Department of Treasury, during 2025, USTR continued to monitor Vietnam’s implementation of its commitments under the agreement and associated measures.

The United States has six free trade agreements (FTAs) with 12 countries in the Americas: Mexico and Canada under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) (2020), which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994); Chile (2004); Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic under the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (2006–2009); Peru (2009); Colombia (2012); and Panama (2012). The United States also has signed Agreements on Reciprocal Trade with Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

3. Section 201—Granting Temporary Import Relief to U.S. Domestic Industries

Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides a procedure whereby the President may grant temporary import relief to a domestic industry if increased imports are a substantial cause of serious injury or the threat of serious injury. Relief may be granted for an initial period of up to four years, with the possibility of

extending the relief to a maximum of eight years. Import relief—which may consist of increased tariffs, quantitative restrictions, or other forms of relief—is designed to redress the injury and to facilitate positive adjustment by the domestic industry. Section 201 also authorizes the President to grant provisional relief in cases involving “critical circumstances” or certain perishable agricultural products.

For an industry to obtain relief under Section 201, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) must first determine that a product is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause (a cause which is important and not less than any other cause) of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the U.S. industry producing a like or directly competitive product. If the USITC makes an affirmative injury determination and recommends a remedy to the President, the President may provide relief either in the form recommended by the USITC or in such other form as the President finds appropriate. The criteria for import relief in Section 201 are based on Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, commonly referred to as the “escape clause,” and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Safeguards.

Section 204(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 also requires the USITC to monitor developments with respect to the domestic industry following the President’s determination to impose a safeguard measure. Pursuant to Section 204(a)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974, when the duration of a safeguard measure is longer than three years, the USITC must submit a report to the President and Congress on the results of its monitoring no later than the midterm of the measure.

Safeguard measures are limited to an initial period of no more than four years. However, pursuant to Section 204 of the Trade Act of 1974, the relevant domestic industry may file a petition to extend a safeguard measure, or the President may request an extension investigation. If such a petition or request is received, the USITC must investigate and determine, pursuant to Section 204, whether (1) the action continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and (2) there is evidence that the industry is making a positive adjustment to import competition. If the USITC reaches an affirmative determination on these two questions, then Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to extend the safeguard measure. The effective period of any safeguard action, including any extensions of a safeguard action, may not, in the aggregate, exceed eight years.

In 2025, the United States maintained Section 201 safeguard measures on imports of certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not partially or fully assembled into other products (solar products), and on imports of fine denier polyester staple fiber (PSF). The safeguard measure on solar products, which the President first imposed in February 2018 and the prior administration extended in February 2022, comprises a tariff-rate quota on imports of solar cells, and a duty on imports of solar modules. The solar safeguard measure expires on February 7, 2026. The President imposed the safeguard measure on PSF in November 2024 for an initial four-year duration. The PSF safeguard remedy is comprised of a quantitative restriction on imports of this product that are entered under temporary importation under bond.

In addition, in 2025, the USITC instituted a new investigation under Section 201 regarding imports of quartz surface products. The USITC instituted this investigation based on a petition by the domestic industry. Its investigation is currently ongoing.

4. Countering Non-Market Policies and Practices and Enhancing Economic Security

Non-market policies and practices (NMPPs)—such as targeting of industrial sectors for dominance, non-market excess capacity, forced labor and other labor rights violations, and distorting activities of firms that are state-owned or state-sponsored, or whose market power is directly supported by the government—have

been used to create dependencies and vulnerabilities that undermine U.S. economic security. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) engages with trade partners in multiple forums to develop or coordinate effective responses to NMPPs in order to defend U.S. workers and industries, enhance economic security, strengthen supply chains, and cooperate with trusted partners. In addition to other USTR activities that may address NMPPs, USTR has developed and engaged in the following initiatives.

Addressing Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices

The United States continued to work with a group of like-minded trade partners to address a range of threats to U.S. economic security. These efforts included coordination to deter and respond to trade-related economic coercion as well as actions to address NMPPs with a range of partners, including those that endorsed the 2023 Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices.

Group of Seven

In addition to other trade-related Group of Seven (G7) activity, in 2025, the United States and other G7 partners took a number of steps to advance cooperation on addressing NMPPs and to promote economic security and supply chain resilience, as well as effectively deter and respond to economic coercion.

In 2025, the United States engaged with G7 partners to monitor and analyze NMPPs in key sectors. This work followed from previous G7 statements calling for cooperation to address harmful market distortions and global excess capacity in key sectors resulting from NMPPs. The United States worked to deepen the G7's collective knowledge about the impacts of NMPPs on key sectors and best position the G7 to cooperate on responding effectively.

The United States and other G7 partners also continued work in the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to increase collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, and further promote cooperation with partners beyond the G7. The United States worked with G7 partners within the Coordination Platform to exchange information about economic coercion cases and new tactics and tools used by adversaries in deploying economic coercion, regularly consulted each other, collaboratively assessed situations, explored coordinated responses, deterred and, where appropriate, countered economic coercion.

Large Civil Aircraft Cooperative Frameworks

As part of the understandings reached on cooperative frameworks with the United Kingdom and the European Union (EU) in June 2021, the United States has worked with U.K. and EU partners to implement the understanding on cooperation on non-market economies. Through two distinct Large Civil Aircraft (LCA) Working Groups, USTR has worked with U.K. and EU counterparts to collaborate on jointly analyzing and addressing NMPPs of third parties that may harm the countries' respective LCA industries.

The LCA Working Groups have engaged in analytical work related to The People's Republic of China's (China) NMPPs in the sector, such as China's state-directed industrial dominance targeting, discriminatory and anti-competitive activities of state- or party-controlled entities, state-directed purchases, financial support, and forced technology transfer policies.

Critical Minerals

In critical minerals, NMPPs have resulted in dependencies that undermine U.S. economic security. To address these dependencies, in 2025, the United States took a number of steps to improve the resilience of its supply chains for critical minerals. USTR both negotiated agreements that themselves contributed to the diversification of critical minerals supply chains and supported a whole-of-government initiative, led by the White House, intended to achieve this outcome.

On August 21, 2025, the United States and the EU issued a Joint Statement on a United States–European Union Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade. Under this Framework, the United States and the EU committed to strengthen bilateral cooperation and action in response to critical mineral and rare earth element export restrictions imposed by third parties.

On October 28, 2025, the United States and Japan deepened their cooperation on critical minerals by announcing the United States–Japan Framework for Securing the Supply Chain of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing (U.S.–Japan Critical Minerals Agreement). In particular, the U.S.–Japan Critical Minerals Agreement memorializes the shared commitment of the United States and Japan with respect to the critical minerals sector to facilitate trade, promote fair competition and market oriented conditions for trade in critical minerals, advance robust labor and environment standards, and cooperate in efforts to ensure secure and transparent critical minerals supply chains. That Agreement built on the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan on Strengthening Critical Minerals Supply Chains, signed on March 28, 2023.

Negotiated by USTR in 2025, a number of the Agreements on Reciprocal Trade contained provisions that contributed to the resiliency of critical minerals supply chains. Signed on October 26, 2025, the Agreement between the United States of America and Malaysia on Reciprocal Trade, for example, contained provisions that would promote U.S. investment in critical minerals production in Malaysia and a commitment by Malaysia to address the national security risks that inbound investment in critical minerals has the potential to create. Also signed on October 26, 2025, the Agreement between the United States of America and Cambodia on Reciprocal Trade contained its own provisions on critical minerals. In the Agreement, Cambodia committed to allowing and facilitating U.S. investment in the mining, extraction, processing, transportation, and distribution of critical minerals in its territory.

In addition, on December 4, 2025, the U.S. Department of State negotiated a Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That Strategic Partnership Agreement included a number of provisions that will serve to advance the goal of diversifying U.S. supply chains of critical minerals.

Each of these agreements contributed to the diversification of U.S. supply chains for critical minerals. And by so doing, the United States advanced its economic security.

5. Special 301—Providing Adequate and Effective Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property

Pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (19 U.S.C. § 2242), the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is required to identify “those foreign countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, or deny fair and equitable market access to United States persons that rely on intellectual property protection.” Countries that have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices and

whose acts, policies, or practices have the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on relevant U.S. products are designated as “Priority Foreign Countries” (PFCs), unless those countries are entering into good-faith negotiations or are making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property (IP).

In addition, USTR has created a Special 301 “Priority Watch List” (PWL) and “Watch List” (WL). Placement of a trading partner on the PWL or WL indicates that particular problems exist in that country with respect to intellectual property (IP) protection, enforcement, or market access for persons relying on IP. Countries placed on the PWL are the focus of increased bilateral attention concerning the specific problem areas. USTR develops an action plan for each foreign country identified for placement on the PWL and that has remained on the PWL for at least one year.

Additionally, Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 requires USTR to monitor a trading partner’s compliance with measures that are the basis for resolving an investigation under Section 301. USTR may take trade action if a country fails to implement such measures satisfactorily.

The Special 301 PWL and WL placements not only indicate those trading partners whose IP protection and enforcement regimes most concern the United States, but also alert firms considering trade or investment relationships with such countries that their IP may not be adequately protected.

2025 Special 301 Review Results

On April 29, 2025, USTR announced the results of the 2025 Special 301 Review. The 2025 Special 301 Report was the result of stakeholder input and interagency consultation.

USTR requested written submissions from the public through a [Federal Register notice](#) published on December 6, 2024. USTR fostered public participation through written submissions, and a public hearing held on February 19, 2025, that allowed interested persons, including representatives of foreign governments, industry, and non-governmental organizations, to provide oral testimony to members of the interagency Special 301 Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC).

The *Federal Register* notice drew submissions from 45 non-government stakeholders and 19 foreign governments. USTR posted online all submissions received, as well as the written questions from the TPSC and the written responses at www.regulations.gov, docket number [USTR-2024-0023](#).

For more than 30 years, the Special 301 Report has identified positive advances as well as areas of continued concern. The Report has reflected changing technologies, promoted best practices, and situated these critical issues in their policy context, underscoring the importance of IP protection and enforcement to the United States and its trading partners. During this period, there has been significant progress in a variety of countries, including Australia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Spain, Taiwan, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan.

Considerable concerns still remain. In 2025, USTR received stakeholder input on more than 100 trading partners, but focused the review on the nominations contained in submissions that complied with the requirement in the *Federal Register* notice to identify whether a particular trading partner should be designated as a PFC, or placed on the PWL or WL, or not listed in the Special 301 Report, and that were filed by the deadlines provided in the notice. Following extensive research and analysis, USTR listed 8 countries on the PWL and 18 countries on the WL. Several countries, including Chile, India, Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China (China), Thailand, and Türkiye, have been listed every year since the Report’s inception. The 2025 listings were as follows:

Priority Watch List: Argentina, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela.

Watch List: Algeria, Barbados, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, and Vietnam.

When appropriate, USTR may conduct an Out-of-Cycle Review (OCR) to encourage progress on IP issues of concern. OCRs provide an opportunity to address and remedy such issues through heightened engagement with trading partners and other stakeholders. Successful resolution of specific IP issues of concern can lead to a positive change in a trading partner’s Special 301 status outside of the typical period for the annual review.

USTR also conducts a review focused on prominent and illustrative examples of online and physical markets that reportedly engage in or facilitate substantial piracy or counterfeiting. USTR started identifying notorious markets in the Special 301 Report in 2006. In 2010, USTR began publishing the Notorious Markets List (NML) separately from the Special 301 Report in order to increase public awareness and guide related enforcement efforts. Since publication of the first NML, several online markets closed or saw their business models disrupted as a result of enforcement efforts. In some instances, in an effort to legitimize their overall business, companies made the decision to close down problematic aspects of their operations; while others cooperated with authorities to address unauthorized conduct on their sites. Notwithstanding the progress that has occurred, online piracy and counterfeiting continue to grow, requiring robust, sustained, and coordinated responses by governments, private sector stakeholders, and consumers.

The NML also includes an “issue focus” that highlights an issue related to the facilitation of substantial trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy. The [Federal Register notice](#) published on August 18, 2025, indicated the issue focus for the 2025 NML would be copyright piracy of sports broadcasts.

The Special 301 Review and NML serve a critical function by identifying opportunities and challenges related to adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement facing U.S. innovative and creative industries that operate globally and which are key industries for job creation and economic development. The Special 301 Report and NML inform the public and U.S. trading partners, and serve as a positive catalyst for change. USTR remains committed to meaningful and sustained engagement with U.S. trading partners, with the goal of resolving these challenges. Information related to Special 301 (including public hearing transcripts and videos), the NML, and USTR’s overall IP efforts can be found on [USTR’s website](#).

6. Section 307—U.S. Forced Labor Import Prohibition

Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1307), prohibits the importation of goods made, wholly or in part, with convict labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions, including forced or indentured child labor. Section 307 was further enhanced with the passage of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (P.L. No. 117-78) (UFLPA), which created a rebuttable presumption that goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), or by an entity on the UFLPA Entity List, are the product of forced labor and are therefore prohibited and not entitled to entry at any ports of the United States.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) worked through the interagency Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETf) in 2025 to coordinate and monitor the enforcement of Section 307 and the implementation of the [Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China](#) (also referred to as the UFLPA Strategy) and its subsequent updates. The FLETf is composed of the following interagency members: The

U.S. Departments of Homeland Security (Chair), Labor, State, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, in addition to USTR.

Withhold Release Orders and Findings

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for enforcing the forced labor import prohibition in Section 301. CBP issues a withhold release order (WRO) when the agency has a reasonable suspicion that goods (or their inputs) entering the United States were made with forced labor. A WRO allows CBP to detain the products in question at all U.S. ports of entry unless or until importers can prove the absence of forced labor in their product's supply chain. CBP issues a Finding when the agency has conclusive evidence of the use of forced labor in the manufacturing or production of a good or goods entering the U.S. supply chain. A Finding allows CBP to seize the products in question at all U.S. ports of entry.

By December 31, 2025, CBP had enforced 54 WROs and 8 Findings involving imports from across the globe. During the year, CBP issued 5 new WROs.

CBP issues a WRO when the agency has reasonable suspicion that goods (or their inputs) being imported, or likely to be imported, into the United States were made with forced labor. A WRO allows CBP to detain the products in question at U.S. ports of entry unless or until importers can demonstrate admissibility, either by showing that the goods were not produced, wholly or in part, with forced labor or that they were not subject to the scope of the WRO. CBP issues a Finding when the agency determines that there is probable cause that forced labor was used in the manufacture or production of goods being imported or likely to be imported into the United States. A Finding allows CBP to seize the products in question at U.S. ports of entry.

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

The UFLPA was enacted in December 2021 to prevent the systematic use of forced labor in the XUAR by strengthening the existing prohibition against the importation of goods made wholly or in part with forced labor into the United States.

The UFLPA:

- Establishes a rebuttable presumption that goods produced, wholly or in part, in the XUAR or by entities on the UFLPA Entity List, are prohibited under Section 307 (i.e., made with forced labor) and are not entitled to entry at any ports of the United States;
- Charges the FLETF to develop a strategy for supporting the enforcement of Section 307, to prevent the importation into the United States of goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor in the People's Republic of China, including in the XUAR; and
- Requires the FLETF to maintain a UFLPA Entity List comprised of entities that are subject to the UFLPA rebuttable presumption.
- Requires the FLETF to maintain a UFLPA Entity List comprised of entities that are subject to a rebuttable presumption that the importation of goods from those entities is prohibited under Section 307.

The UFLPA’s rebuttable presumption went into effect in June 2022. Since the implementation of the UFLPA to December 31, 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) examined 18,049 shipments, valued at \$3.81 billion, to ensure that goods made with forced labor do not enter U.S. commerce. On August 19, 2025, the FLETF published Updates to the Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China. The updated strategy identified five new high-priority sectors for enforcement—caustic soda, copper, jujubes, lithium, and steel—to inform the trade community of supply chains that involve a higher risk of forced labor from the XUAR. As of December 31, 2025, 144 entities have been designated on the UFLPA Entity List.

7. Section 1377—Review of Telecommunications Agreements

Section 1377 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to review by March 31 of each year the operation and effectiveness of U.S. telecommunications trade agreements. The purpose of this review is to determine whether any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country that has entered into a telecommunications-related agreement with the United States: (1) is not in compliance with the terms of the agreement, or (2) otherwise denies, within the context of the agreement, to telecommunications products and services of U.S. firms, mutually advantageous market opportunities in that country.

USTR addresses these issues in its annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. This approach allows USTR to describe, in one comprehensive report, all of the overlapping barriers concerning telecommunications services and goods, along with any related digital trade issues.

In its 2025 Section 1377 Review, USTR focused on issues related to: barriers to competition and spectrum allocation, restrictions on market access, technical barriers related to standards and conformity assessment procedures, and tariffs on telecommunications equipment.

8. Section 337—Review of U.S. International Trade Commission Investigations

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, makes it unlawful to engage in unfair acts or unfair methods of competition in the importation of goods or sale of imported goods. Most Section 337 investigations concern alleged infringement of intellectual property rights, such as U.S. patents.

The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) conducts Section 337 investigations through adjudicatory proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act. The proceedings normally involve an evidentiary hearing before a USITC administrative law judge who issues an Initial Determination that is subject to review by the USITC (all sitting commissioners). If the USITC finds a violation, it can order that imported infringing goods be excluded from entry into the United States, issue cease and desist orders requiring firms to stop unlawful conduct in the United States, such as the sale or other distribution of imported infringing goods in the United States, or both. The USITC also is authorized to issue temporary exclusion or cease and desist orders before it completes an investigation if the complainant demonstrates that there is reason to believe there has been a violation of Section 337 and shows that it will suffer irreparable harm absent issuance of a temporary exclusion order. Many Section 337 investigations are terminated after the parties reach settlement agreements or agree to the entry of consent orders. In cases in which the USITC finds a violation of Section 337, it must decide whether certain public interest factors nevertheless preclude the issuance of a remedial order. The four public interest considerations are the order’s effect on: (1) public health and welfare; (2) competitive conditions in the U.S. economy; (3) the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States; and (4) U.S. consumers. USITC Section 337 determinations are subject to judicial review on the merits in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, with possible appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection enforces USITC exclusion and seizure orders.

If the USITC issues an affirmative determination and concomitant remedial order(s), it transmits the determination, order(s), and the record upon which the determination is based to the President for policy review. The presidential review, set out in Section 337(j)(1)(B), Section 337(j)(2), and Section 337(j)(4) of the Tariff Act of 1930, has been delegated to the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The USTR conducts these reviews in consultation with other agencies. Importation of the subject goods may continue during this review process if the importer pays a bond in an amount determined by the USITC. If the USTR disapproves a determination before the end of the 60-day review period, the determination and order(s) have no force or effect as of the date the USTR notifies the USITC. If the USTR does not disapprove the USITC's determination within the 60-day review period, or if the USTR formally approves the determination before the end of the 60-day review period, the determination and order(s) become final on the day after the close of such period or the date that the President or the USTR notifies the USITC of the approval, as the case may be. During 2025, the USITC instituted 41 new Section 337 investigations and commenced 17 ancillary proceedings. The USITC also issued affirmative determinations and remedial orders in 15 investigations in calendar year 2025. The USTR did not take any action in 14 of those investigations in calendar year 2025:

Certain Vaporizer Devices, Cartridges Used Therewith, and Components Thereof, 337-TA-1368;

Certain Liquid Transfer Devices with an Integral Vial Adapter, 337-TA-1362 (Remand);

Certain Power Converter Modules and Computing Systems Containing the Same, 337-TA-1370;

Certain Icemaking Machines and Components Thereof, 337-TA-1369;

Certain Eye Cosmetics and Packaging Therefor, 337-TA-1407;

Certain Products Containing Tirzepatide and Products Purporting to Contain Tirzepatide, 337-TA-1377;

Certain Components for Injection Molding Machines, and Products Containing the Same, 337-TA-1427;

Certain Hydrodermabrasion Systems and Components Thereof (III), 337-TA-1417;

Certain Selective Thyroid Hormone Receptor-Beta Agonists, Processes for Manufacturing or Relating to Same, and Products Containing Same, 337-TA-1352;

Certain Dryer Wall Exhaust Vent Assemblies and Components Thereof, 337-TA-1437;

Certain Liquid Coolers for Electronic Components in Computers, Components Thereof, Devices for Controlling Same, and Products Containing Same, 337-TA-1394;

Certain Exercise Equipment and Subassemblies Thereof, 337-TA-1419;

Certain Smart Wearable Devices, Systems, and Components Thereof, 337-TA-1398; and

Certain Pre-Stretched Synthetic Braiding Hair and Packaging Therefor, 337-TA-1415.

All 14 determinations and orders became final in 2025 after presidential review. The presidential review of the remaining investigation was completed in early 2026:

9. Implementation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws

Antidumping Actions

Under the U.S. antidumping (AD) law, duties are imposed on imported merchandise when the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) determines that the merchandise is being dumped (sold at “less than fair value”) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) determines that there is material injury or threat of material injury to the domestic industry, or material retardation of the establishment of an industry, “by reason of” those imports. The AD law’s provisions are incorporated in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 and have been substantially amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015.

An AD investigation usually begins when a U.S. industry, or an entity filing on its behalf, submits a petition alleging, with respect to certain imports, the dumping and injury elements described above. If the petition meets the applicable requirements, Commerce will initiate an AD investigation. In special circumstances, Commerce also may self-initiate an investigation.

After initiation, the USITC decides, generally within 45 days of the filing of the petition, whether there is a “reasonable indication” of material injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry, or material retardation of an industry’s establishment, by reason of the allegedly dumped imports. If this preliminary injury determination by the USITC is negative, the investigation is terminated and no duties are imposed; if it is affirmative, Commerce will make preliminary and final determinations concerning the allegedly dumped sales into the U.S. market. If Commerce’s preliminary determination is affirmative, it will direct the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to suspend liquidation of entries and require importers to post a cash deposit equal to the estimated weighted-average dumping margin. If Commerce’s preliminary determination is negative, there is no suspension of liquidation of entries. In either scenario, Commerce will complete its investigation and issue a final determination.

If Commerce’s final determination regarding dumping is negative, the investigation is terminated and no duties are imposed. If affirmative, the USITC makes a final injury determination. If the USITC determines that there is material injury or threat of material injury, or material retardation of an industry’s establishment, by reason of the dumped imports, then Commerce will issue an AD order and direct CBP to assess, upon further instruction by Commerce, AD duties and require cash deposits on imported goods. If the USITC’s final injury determination is negative, the investigation is terminated and the cash deposits are refunded.

Upon request of an interested party, Commerce conducts annual reviews of dumping margins pursuant to Section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. Section 751 also provides for Commerce and USITC review in cases of changed circumstances and periodic review in conformity with the five-year “sunset” provisions of the U.S. AD law.

AD determinations may be appealed to the U.S. Court of International Trade, with further judicial review possible in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. For certain investigations involving Canadian or Mexican merchandise, final determinations may be reviewed by a binational panel established under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA).

The United States initiated 39 AD investigations in 2025 and imposed 46 AD orders.

Countervailing Duty Actions

The U.S. countervailing duty (CVD) law dates back to late 19th century legislation authorizing the imposition of CVDs on subsidized sugar imports. The current CVD provisions are contained in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by subsequent legislation including the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994. As with the AD law, the USITC and Commerce jointly administer the CVD law, and CBP collects duties and enforces CVD orders on imported goods.

The CVD law's purpose is to offset certain foreign government subsidies that benefit imports into the United States. CVD procedures under Title VII are very similar to AD procedures, and CVD determinations by Commerce and the USITC are subject to the same system of judicial review as AD determinations. Commerce normally initiates investigations based on a petition submitted by a U.S. industry or an entity filing on its behalf. The USITC is responsible for investigating material injury issues. The USITC makes a preliminary finding as to whether there is a reasonable indication of material injury or threat of material injury, or material retardation of an industry's establishment, by reason of imports subject to investigation. If the USITC's preliminary determination is negative, the investigation terminates; otherwise, Commerce issues preliminary and final determinations on subsidization. If Commerce's final determination of subsidization is affirmative, the USITC proceeds with its final injury determination of whether a domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports for which Commerce has made an affirmative determination. If the USITC's final determination is affirmative, Commerce will issue a CVD order. CBP collects CVDs on imported goods. If the USITC's final injury determination is negative, the investigation is terminated.

Upon request of an interested party, Commerce conducts annual reviews of countervailable subsidy rates pursuant to Section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. Section 751 also provides for Commerce and USITC review in cases of changed circumstances and periodic review in conformity with the five-year "sunset" provisions of the U.S. countervailing duty law.

As with AD determinations, CVD determinations may be appealed to the U.S. Court of International Trade with further judicial review possible in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. For certain investigations involving Canadian or Mexican merchandise, final determinations may be reviewed by a binational panel established under the USMCA.

The United States initiated 31 CVD investigations and imposed 35 new CVD orders during 2025.

10. Defending U.S. Interests in Free Trade Agreements and at the World Trade Organization

This section includes a discussion of current U.S. involvement in World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade agreement (FTA) dispute settlement processes. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) continued to prioritize enforcement efforts with respect to key U.S. values, such as promoting fair, competitive, and market-oriented trade; labor rights; environmental protection; and the interests of U.S. farmers, as well as strategic priorities of the United States.

The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) includes an innovative labor-related Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM) in the dispute settlement chapter to address protection of the right of free association and collective bargaining at the facility level.

Key Developments in 2025

In August 2025, a RRM panel established under USMCA found in favor of the United States in a determination regarding a labor dispute between Atento Servicios (Atento) and Sindicato de Telefonistas de la República Mexicana (STRM), a Mexican labor union, at the Atento call center in the Mexican State of Hidalgo. The Panel found a Denial of Rights occurred at the Atento call center and that the actions taken by Mexico were not sufficient to remediate the Denial of Rights, especially “in view of the gravity, duration and structural nature of the denial” because Mexico’s actions “did not change the labor climate.” This is the first denial of rights determination by an RRM panel, and the first successful labor case under the dispute mechanism of any trade agreement.

The United States had requested consultations in 2024 with Canada under USMCA Chapter 31 concerning the Digital Service Tax (DST) that Canada enacted on June 28, 2024. Canada’s DST applied a three percent tax on the sum of revenues deemed connected to Canada from online marketplaces, online targeted advertising, social media platforms, and user data. On June 30, 2025, Canada halted collection of its DST and announced it would rescind the measure. An act to rescind the DST was tabled in Parliament on November 4, 2025.

In 2024, the United States prevailed in its USMCA challenge to measures set out in Mexico’s February 13, 2023 decree, specifically the ban on use of biotechnology corn in tortillas or dough, and the instruction to Mexican government agencies to gradually substitute—*i.e.*, ban—the use of biotechnology corn in all products for human consumption and for animal feed. On February 6, 2025, USTR welcomed the action taken by the Government of Mexico to declare ineffective the two sets of measures successfully challenged in the dispute.

On June 8, 2018, Vietnam requested the establishment of a WTO panel to examine U.S. antidumping measures on fish fillets from Vietnam. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel on July 20, 2018. On January 17, 2025, the United States and Vietnam notified the DSB that they had reached a mutually agreed solution in this dispute.

Ongoing FTA dispute settlement actions in 2025 included dispute settlement consultations requested by Canada under the USMCA regarding duties imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), with respect to the failure of Canada to take action with respect to illegal immigration and the fentanyl crisis; dispute settlement consultations requested by Canada under USMCA regarding the imposition of tariffs pursuant to Section 232 on certain steel and aluminum articles; and dispute settlement consultations requested by Canada under the USMCA regarding the imposition of tariffs pursuant to section 232 on passenger vehicles, light trucks, and automotive parts.

Ongoing WTO dispute settlement actions in 2025 included a panel proceeding brought by Argentina challenging U.S. antidumping measures pertaining to oil country tubular goods from Argentina and Section 771(7)(G) of the Tariff Act of 1930; a panel proceeding brought by the People’s Republic of China (China) challenging aspects of the Inflation Reduction Act; an arbitration under Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on the EU’s request for authorization to suspend concessions relating to U.S. countervailing duties on ripe olives from Spain and Article 771B of the Tariff Act of 1930; a consultation request by China concerning duties imposed under IEEPA with respect to the failure of China to take action with respect to the fentanyl crisis; a consultation request by Canada regarding duties imposed under IEEPA with respect to the failure of Canada to take action with respect to illegal immigration and the fentanyl crisis; a consultation request by Canada regarding the imposition of tariffs pursuant to Section 232 on certain steel and aluminum articles; a consultation request by Canada regarding the imposition of tariffs pursuant to section 232 on passenger vehicles, light trucks, and automotive parts; a consultation request

from China concerning “reciprocal tariff measures” imposed under IEEPA; and a consultation request by Brazil regarding duties imposed under IEEPA.

Further information on WTO disputes to which the United States is a party, and a list of U.S. submissions, are available on the [USTR website](#).

For further information about current U.S. involvement in FTA and WTO dispute settlement processes, see Annex IV. Free Trade Agreement and World Trade Organization Enforcement.

II. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS

A. THE AMERICAS

1. United States–Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment

On February 5, 2026, the United States and Argentina signed the United States–Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment (ARTI). The ARTI is pending entry into force. The ARTI demonstrates the two countries’ shared ambition to build a strong bilateral partnership and deepen trade and investment cooperation.

The ARTI includes tariff preferences by Argentina for key U.S. goods, including medicines, chemicals, machinery, information technologies products, medical devices, motor vehicles, and a wide range of agricultural products, including beef, dairy products, tree nuts, and processed products. In addition, Argentina will provide duty-free access for up to 80,000 metric tons of U.S. beef through the end of 2026.

The ARTI also includes provisions covering non-tariff barriers. Argentina will accept U.S. standards, and eliminate specific non-tariff barriers on U.S. goods, including medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and automotive goods. For example, it will accept U.S. vehicles and parts manufactured to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Argentina has committed to address and prevent barriers to U.S. agricultural products in its market, including for poultry, beef, and pork, and assure U.S. market access for U.S. cheese and meat producers who rely on the use of common names. On intellectual property, a long-standing area of concern, Argentina will take action on the range of issues identified in the [2025 Special 301 Report](#). Argentina will protect internationally recognized labor rights and prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced or compulsory labor. The ARTI also includes commitments to facilitate digital trade, and to align with the United States on economic security matters including addressing non-market policies and practices and other distortions in global markets. The ARTI will also provide opportunities for the United States in development of Argentina’s critical minerals sector, including from Argentina’s commitment to allow investment by U.S. companies on par with domestic investors, fast track applications for eligible projects, invest in its mining infrastructure and prioritize trade with the United States over market manipulating countries.

2. Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement

On August 5, 2004, the United States signed the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA–DR) with five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic. The Agreement entered into force for the United States and El Salvador on March 1, 2006; for Honduras and Nicaragua on April 1, 2006 for Guatemala on July 1, 2006; for the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007; and for Costa Rica on January 1, 2009.

The CAFTA–DR eliminates tariffs, reduces barriers to services, and promotes transparency and customs and administrative efficiencies, facilitating intra-regional supply chains and integrated operations and fostering greater prosperity, formal employment, and economic opportunities throughout the region. U.S. export and investment opportunities with Central America and the Dominican Republic have continued to grow under the CAFTA–DR. All of the CAFTA–DR Parties have committed to strengthening trade

facilitation, regional supply chains, and implementation of the Agreement. U.S. consumer and industrial goods and most agricultural products may enter duty free in CAFTA–DR member country markets. U.S. textile and apparel goods meeting the Agreement’s rules of origin enter CAFTA–DR countries’ markets duty free and quota free. Under the CAFTA–DR, tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for sensitive agricultural products continued to increase annually through 2025, after which some TRQs will continue to expand while most will be eliminated and the affected products will enter CAFTA–DR countries duty free.

The CAFTA–DR Free Trade Commission is the central oversight body for the Agreement.

Agriculture

In 2025, the United States continued to press CAFTA-DR Parties for progress to address specific non-tariff barriers and other trade concerns in order to facilitate U.S. market access in Central American countries and the Dominican Republic for agricultural products. In 2025, U.S. exports of agricultural products to the CAFTA–DR region were valued at approximately \$8.5 billion, an 11 percent increase from 2024.

Environment

The Parties to the CAFTA–DR continued efforts to strengthen environmental protection and implement the commitments of the CAFTA–DR Environment Chapter. In 2025, the CAFTA–DR Secretariat for Environmental Matters (Secretariat) received one new submission from the public on effective enforcement of environmental laws. Throughout 2025, the Secretariat continued to conduct outreach to inform the public about this monitoring mechanism and promote participation in submissions on enforcement matters.

Labor

In 2025, the United States continued to monitor and enforce the Labor Chapter of the CAFTA-DR. Working through the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, the United States engaged with Guatemalan and Honduran officials and labor stakeholders on the countries’ ongoing efforts to reform their labor legislation and address issues, including those that were identified in a submission filed under the Labor Chapter of the CAFTA-DR related to Honduras.

Textiles

In 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and other U.S. Government agencies engaged with U.S. textile and apparel stakeholders and associations representing manufacturers in the CAFTA–DR region to identify and develop initiatives to improve utilization of the CAFTA–DR and to strengthen regional supply chains. These efforts were aimed at enhancing job creation, maximizing opportunities for trade in textiles and apparel with the United States and within the region as part of efforts to promote resilient supply chains.

In addition to receiving direct updates on the business interests of U.S. textile and apparel stakeholders, USTR officials met with government officials and private sector groups representing textile and apparel manufacturers in the CAFTA–DR region.

Other Implementation Matters

Throughout 2025, the United States continued to advance its trade priorities with Central America and the Dominican Republic to expand U.S. exports and market access opportunities; build resilient regional supply chains; highlight the textile and apparel sector in the region as an area of opportunity for resilient economic growth and facilitating trade; and improve transparency and good regulatory practices, to build trade and

economic opportunities and formal sector employment in the region. Through bilateral and subregional discussions, CAFTA–DR Coordinators addressed policy cooperation and trade capacity building activities related to improving efficiencies and expanding bilateral and intra-regional trade and investment opportunities.

The United States also continued to work closely with other CAFTA–DR Parties on bilateral and regional matters related to implementation of the CAFTA–DR, including agricultural and sanitary and phytosanitary trade matters. The U.S. Government worked to improve the transparency and effectiveness of Central American regulatory and customs practices, which has resulted in improved customs procedures.

3. United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on January 1, 2004. Under the FTA, since January 1, 2015, Chile has provided duty-free access to all goods exports.

The United States–Chile Free Trade Commission is the central oversight body for the FTA. In 2025, the United States continued its engagement with Chile, including on labor and intellectual property issues.

4. United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement

The United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) entered into force on May 15, 2012. Under the CTPA, Colombia provides duty-free access to all U.S. non-agricultural consumer and industrial products. In addition, more than half of U.S. agricultural exports to Colombia became duty free immediately upon entry into force, with virtually all remaining tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods to be eliminated by 2026 (reflecting a 15-year phase-out period). Tariffs on a few of the most sensitive agricultural products will be phased out 17 to 19 years after entry into force.

Operation of the United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement

The United States–Colombia Free Trade Commission is the central oversight body for the CTPA. The United States and Colombia held CTPA committee meetings during 2025 to maintain dialogue on several issues.

Additionally, following U.S. engagement, Colombia delayed by one year the implementation of its requirement for third-party certification of U.S. vehicles manufactured in accordance with the U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). The additional time will allow the United States to work with Colombia to find a resolution regarding Colombia’s acceptance of vehicles built to FMVSS.

Agriculture

On September 10, 2025, Colombia officially reopened its market to U.S. live cattle after Colombia stopped issuing import permits for U.S. live cattle in April 2024, citing unjustified concerns with highly pathogenic avian influenza.

The United States also secured a one-year delay in implementation by Colombia of requirements for exporting countries’ authorities to register facilities producing certain agricultural products, which will allow time to find a solution to avoid unnecessary burdens on U.S. authorities and disruption of trade.

Environment

The United States continued to work closely with Colombia to monitor implementation of the CTPA Environment Chapter and oversee the operation of the Secretariat for Environmental Enforcement Matters. On September 5, 2025, the United States and Colombia held the second meeting of the Environmental Affairs Council, convened jointly with the second meeting of the Environmental Cooperation Commission established pursuant to the United States–Colombia Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. These meetings, hosted in Bogotá, Colombia, provided an opportunity to review the governments’ respective efforts to meet their environment commitments under the CTPA, exchange information and best practices on combating wildlife trafficking and illegal logging and associated trade, and discuss future cooperation activities. A public session was held as part of these meetings, which provided an opportunity for members of the public to offer comments and questions on current environmental issues and ideas for future cooperation.

Labor

In 2025, the United States continued to monitor and enforce the Labor Chapter of the CTPA. Working through the DOL Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, the United States engaged with Colombian officials and labor stakeholders on the country’s efforts to reform its labor legislation and address issues that were identified in a 2016 submission filed under the Labor Chapter of the CTPA.

5. United States–El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade

On January 30, 2026, the United States and El Salvador signed the United States–El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART). The ART is pending entry into force. The ART will further strengthen and build upon our long-standing economic relationship under CAFTA–DR, which entered into force for the United States and El Salvador in 2006. Qualifying U.S. goods exports to El Salvador receive duty-free access under the CAFTA–DR.

The ART also includes provisions covering non-tariff barriers. Key provisions of the ART include El Salvador’s commitment to streamline regulatory requirements and approvals for U.S. exports, including pharmaceutical products and medical devices; remove import restrictions on remanufactured goods; accept U.S. vehicles produced to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; streamline certificate of free sale requirements and accept electronic certificates; remove apostille requirements; and expedite product registration requirements for U.S. exports. El Salvador has committed to address and prevent barriers to U.S. agricultural products in its market, including to accept currently agreed certificates issued by U.S. regulatory authorities, to streamline requirements to facilitate imports of U.S. food and agricultural products, and to assure U.S. market access for U.S. cheese and meat producers who rely on the use of common names. El Salvador has also committed to move forward with certain international intellectual property treaties and provide transparency and fairness regarding geographical indications; to prevent barriers to services and digital trade with the United States and refrain from imposing discriminatory digital services taxes; to continue facilitating trade, as well as adopting and implementing good regulatory practices; to protect internationally recognized labor rights and prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced or compulsory labor; to adopt and maintain high levels of environmental protection and to effectively enforce their environmental laws; to address potential distortionary actions of state-owned enterprises and industrial subsidies that may have an impact on the bilateral trading relationship; and to strengthen economic and national security cooperation to enhance supply chain resilience and innovation through complementary actions to address non-market policies and practices of other countries, as well as to address duty evasion and cooperate on government procurement, investment security, and export controls.

6. United States–Guatemala Agreement on Reciprocal Trade

On January 30, 2026, the United States and Guatemala signed the United States–Guatemala Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART). The ART is pending entry into force. The ART will further strengthen and build upon our long-standing economic relationships under the CAFTA–DR, which entered into force for the United States and Guatemala in 2006. Qualifying U.S. goods exports to Guatemala receive duty-free access under the CAFTA–DR.

The ART also includes provisions covering non-tariff barriers. Key provisions of the ART include Guatemala’s commitment to streamline regulatory requirements and approvals for U.S. exports, including pharmaceutical products and medical devices; remove import restrictions on remanufactured goods; accept U.S. vehicles produced to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; streamline certificate of free sale requirements and accept electronic certificates; remove apostille requirements; and expedite product registration requirements for U.S. exports. Guatemala has committed to address and prevent barriers to U.S. agricultural products in its market, including to accept currently agreed certificates issues by U.S. regulatory authorities, to streamline requirements to facilitate imports of U.S. food and agricultural products, and to assure U.S. market access for U.S. cheese and meat producers who rely on the use of common names; to move forward with certain international intellectual property treaties and provide transparency and fairness regarding geographical indications; to prevent barriers to services and digital trade with the United States and refrain from imposing discriminatory digital services taxes; to facilitate trade by following best practices in customs, to adopt and implement good regulatory practices; to protect internationally recognized labor rights and prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced or compulsory labor; to adopt and maintain high levels of environmental protection and to effectively enforce its environmental laws; to address potential distortionary actions of state-owned enterprises and industrial subsidies that may have an impact on the bilateral trading relationship; and to strengthen economic and national security cooperation to enhance supply chain resilience and innovation as well as to address duty evasion and cooperate on investment security and export controls. Guatemala has also committed to take steps to restrict access to central level procurement covered by its free trade agreement commitments for suppliers from non-free trade agreement partners, permitting exemptions as necessary, in a manner comparable to the United States’ procurement restrictions.

7. United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement

The USMCA entered into force on July 1, 2020. The USMCA modernized NAFTA to include strong, enforceable labor and environmental obligations in its core text, including a facility-specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM) that provides for quick review of alleged denials of workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The USMCA also includes dedicated chapters related to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and North American Competitiveness.

The USMCA includes updated rules of origin for automobiles and automotive parts that were intended to create strong incentives to invest and manufacture in North America, better ensuring that benefits of the USMCA provisions accrue to the Parties. The USMCA also contains important improvements that benefit American farmers, ranchers, and agribusinesses, including expanded access into the Canadian market for U.S. dairy, poultry, and egg products.

The USMCA includes commitments on investment, financial services, intellectual property rights, and digital trade. The USMCA also addresses problematic non-tariff barriers, which can hinder U.S. exports, through provisions on transparency and regulatory matters, including chapters covering technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and good regulatory practices. Finally, the USMCA contains

provisions to combat subsidies and non-market practices that have the potential to disadvantage American workers and businesses, including a chapter to address unfair currency practices, rules on trade distortions caused by state-owned enterprises, and transparency obligations with respect to any USMCA Party's future trade negotiations with non-market economies.

During 2025, the Parties undertook consultations in preparation for the first Joint Review of the USMCA, which will take place on July 1, 2026. The Joint Review is an opportunity for the Parties to review the operation of the USMCA and to evaluate any recommendations for action submitted by a Party, and decide on any appropriate actions. As part of the Joint Review, each Party must confirm if it wishes to extend the term of the Agreement. In addition, a Party wishing to make a recommendation for the Commission to take action must do so at least one month before the Joint Review meeting takes place (by June 1, 2026).

Consistent with the requirements of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement Implementation Act (the USMCA Implementation Act) (19 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4732), on September 17, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) published a [*Federal Register* notice](#) soliciting comments on the operation of the USMCA. On December 3–5, USTR also conducted a public hearing on the operation of the USMCA, which included 30 panels, with testimony from roughly 150 witnesses representing business and agricultural associations, manufacturers, farmers, ranchers, service providers, labor unions, migrant groups, think tanks, academics, non-governmental organizations, and other advocacy groups and coalitions, as well as individuals and Members of Congress. USTR also solicited the written views of the advisory committees established by Congress in 1974. These committees include the 15 Industry Trade Advisory Committees, one Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee, six Agricultural Technical Advisory Committees for Trade, and the Labor Advisory Committee. On December 16 and 17, the U.S. Trade Representative reported to the relevant congressional committees regarding these transparency requirements and the views of the Administration regarding the Joint Review.

The Administration's focus in the Joint Review will be to ensure that the USMCA remains in the interest of American workers, farmers, ranchers, fishers, growers, manufacturers, and service providers, and that it is effective in strengthening regional supply chains, and preventing free riding from third countries.

Mexico Biotechnology

On August 17, 2023, the United States established a dispute settlement panel under the USMCA, challenging two sets of measures reflected in Mexico's February 13, 2023 presidential decree: (1) the ban on use of genetically engineered (GE) corn in tortillas or dough; and (2) the instruction to Mexican government agencies to gradually substitute—*i.e.*, ban—the use of GE corn in all products for human consumption and for animal feed. The United States considered that Mexico's measures were inconsistent with several of Mexico's USMCA commitments under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Market Access Chapters. On June 26, 2024, the United States participated in a hearing before the dispute settlement panel, and on December 20, 2024, the panel released its final report. The panel agreed with the United States on all seven legal claims, finding that Mexico's measures were not based on science and undermined the market access that Mexico agreed to provide in the USMCA. On February 5, 2025, Mexico declared ineffective the two sets of measures that USTR successfully challenged in the USMCA dispute.

Canada Dairy

On January 31, 2023, the United States, for the second time, requested and established a dispute settlement panel under the USMCA on Canada's dairy tariff-rate quotas allocation measures. The final panel report was released to the Parties on November 10, 2023, and to the public on November 24, 2023. Two of the three panelists found that Canada's measures do not breach any of the USMCA commitments that the United States cited. One panelist, however, agreed with a principal U.S. claim challenging Canada's narrow

definition of eligible applicants, which excludes a substantial number of importers that would be eager to bring higher-value, retail-ready U.S. dairy products to Canadian consumers. The United States is disappointed by the panel's findings. Throughout 2025, USTR continued to work closely with U.S. industry to consider all options to ensure that the U.S. dairy sector receives the full benefit of market access under the USMCA.

Environment

The USMCA Environment Chapter obligations are fully enforceable under the USMCA's dispute settlement mechanism and address key environmental challenges, such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and disciplining harmful fisheries subsidies. The USMCA commits the United States, Mexico, and Canada to take actions to combat and prevent trafficking in timber, fish, and other wildlife, and includes provisions to address other environmental issues, such as air quality and marine litter.

The USMCA Implementation Act allocated over \$400 million in new resources to agencies to support cooperation and enhanced monitoring and enforcement of USMCA environment provisions, including resources to support the construction of high-priority wastewater facilities along the United States–Mexico border as well as cooperation to combat IUU fishing and address marine litter. USTR was allocated \$60 million of these resources over five years to bolster monitoring and enforcement of USMCA obligations. These resources supported the Interagency Environment Committee on Monitoring and Enforcement (IECME) to monitor and enforce USMCA environmental obligations and up to three Environment Attaché positions in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, to liaise directly with government, industry, and civil society counterparts to further assist with monitoring and enforcement of environmental obligations. The resources allocated to USTR have enabled it to strengthen other U.S. Government agencies' capacity to deliver on their respective monitoring and enforcement mandates by providing additional resources that enhance U.S. intelligence and enforcement capacity, promote sustainable forest management and combat illegal logging, and promote sustainable fisheries management and conservation of marine species.

The USMCA modernizes the previous framework under the former North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) by bringing environmental obligations into the core of the USMCA, rather than in a side agreement, and by making the obligations fully enforceable under the USMCA's dispute resolution provisions. The USMCA Environment Chapter includes the most comprehensive set of enforceable environmental obligations of any previous U.S. free trade agreement. The USMCA includes commitments to implement key multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

Full implementation of the USMCA Environment Chapter continued to be a key USTR priority throughout 2025. USTR's Office of Environment and Natural Resources worked closely with the Environment Attaché posted at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, to support and monitor implementation of the USMCA's Environment chapter commitments.

In February 2022, USTR requested environment consultations with the Government of Mexico under Article 24.29.2 of the USMCA Environment Chapter, which were elevated to Senior Representative consultations under USMCA Article 24.29.3. These consultations concern Mexico's USMCA Environment Chapter obligations relating to the protection of the critically endangered vaquita porpoise (*Phocoena sinus*), prevention of illegal fishing, and trafficking of the totoaba fish (*Totoaba macdonaldi*). As part of the consultations, numerous meetings were held in 2022 through 2025 between the United States and Mexico to work toward a solution to enhance Mexico's implementation of its USMCA Environment Chapter commitments, including with respect to the effective enforcement of its fisheries-related environmental laws. In the fall of 2025, the United States and Mexico finalized and signed the Plan to

Protect the Vaquita Marina, Prevent Illegal Fishing in the Upper Gulf of California, and Combat Totoaba Trafficking, thereby resolving the consultations. USTR will continue to closely monitor the implementation of the Plan and, as required under the Plan, regularly engage with Mexico on this matter.

During 2025, USTR, along with its Mexican and Canadian counterparts, met monthly to discuss efforts to implement and enforce USMCA environmental obligations. The Parties assessed ongoing efforts in law enforcement collaboration and discussed mechanisms to improve stakeholder engagement. The USMCA Environment Committee also conducted a five-year review of the implementation and operation of the Environment Chapter. As part of the review, USTR highlighted relevant law enforcement achievements, including enhanced interdiction capacities at the southern border; technological improvements that further enable U.S. Government agencies' implementation of the USMCA's environment commitments; and support for U.S. Government agencies to improve monitoring and enforcement of the Agreement's environment commitments.

USTR also continued to advance implementation of the USMCA's environment Chapter provisions by convening regular meetings of the IECME to discuss issues related to monitoring and enforcement of Canada's and Mexico's USMCA environmental obligations. In 2025, as part of the IECME's role, USTR, along with its interagency partners, reviewed three Submissions on Enforcement Matters submitted to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation.

Labor

The USMCA's robust and comprehensive labor provisions are fully incorporated into its core text and fully enforceable under the USMCA's dispute settlement mechanism. Among other obligations, the USMCA includes provisions requiring Parties to prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced labor and to address violence against workers exercising their labor rights. In 2025, the United States collaborated with both Canada and Mexico to improve the implementation of both countries' respective forced labor import prohibition.

The USMCA also includes an innovative RRM in the Dispute Settlement Chapter to address the protection of right of free association and collective bargaining at the facility level. The mechanism provides for the suspension of USMCA tariff benefits or the imposition of other penalties, such as blocking imports from businesses that are repeat offenders, in cases of noncompliance with key labor obligations.

In 2025, the United States initiated the RRM 14 times, seeking review by the Government of Mexico for alleged denials of rights at various facilities. This brings the total number of times USTR has invoked the RRM to 45, as of December 31, 2025. The United States worked collaboratively with Mexico to successfully resolve multiple cases. To date, the mechanism has produced results at 27 facilities. Work through the mechanism has resulted in concrete and positive outcomes for workers, such as reinstatement and backpay for dismissed workers, increased opportunities for unions to organize and compete on equal footing, free and fair union representation elections in which workers selected unions to represent them, and new collective bargaining agreements with substantial improvements in wages and working conditions.

In 2025, the United States received a favorable RRM panel determination involving a facility that provides call center services. This was the first Denial of Rights determination by an RRM panel, and the first successful labor case under the dispute mechanism of any trade agreement. These actions demonstrate the commitment of the United States to enforcing the USMCA and show that the mechanism works, as intended, to bring rapid, significant wins for workers on the ground and promote a race to the top. For additional information on the RRM cases, see [USTR's website](#).

Throughout 2025, the United States, including through the Interagency Labor Committee for Monitoring and Enforcement (Interagency Labor Committee), continued to consult closely with the Government of Mexico and monitor Mexico’s implementation of its obligations related to the labor justice reform included in the Labor Chapter annex. Monitoring, including related to budget resources for the reforms, helped ensure that Mexico fulfills its USMCA commitments so that American workers and businesses fully benefit from the Agreement.

The Interagency Labor Committee, established in 2020 and co-chaired by the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Secretary of Labor, met regularly in 2025 to review labor rights issues in Mexico and prepared reports every 180 days and transmitted them to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means.

In order to ensure adequate monitoring and enforcement resources for the USMCA labor obligations, the USMCA Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4732) allocated funds to both USTR and DOL for enforcement. The agencies used those funds to hire staff in Washington, DC, and Mexico City, Mexico, to spearhead the work detailed in this section.

In addition, the USMCA Implementation Act allocated \$180 million to the DOL for technical assistance programs to support labor justice system reforms in Mexico. The DOL awarded all \$180 million and announced in 2025 the availability of \$10 million “to reduce wage suppression and other unfair labor practices in key trade sectors in Mexico to allow American workers to compete on a level playing field in trade.”

Manufacturing

Automotive Rules

The USMCA raises regional value content requirements to 75 percent for automobiles and requires that at least 70 percent of a producer’s steel and aluminum purchases originate in North America. The USMCA also includes a new labor value content rule that requires that 40-45 percent of the value of qualifying vehicles be produced by employees making at least \$16 per hour.

The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113) required the establishment of an Interagency Committee on Trade in Automotive Goods (Interagency Autos Committee), which was established on February 28, 2020. The Interagency Autos Committee met regularly throughout 2025 to monitor the implementation of the USMCA’s automotive rules of origin.

In order to provide vehicle manufacturers time to adjust to the new requirements, the USMCA afforded the opportunity for manufacturers to apply for an alternative staging regime that would create a detailed and credible plan to gradually meet regional value content and labor value content levels before having to satisfy the standard USMCA rules of origin requirements. The alternative staging regime differs from the standard staging regime by providing additional flexibility with respect to the phase-in of certain rules of origin requirements. Most alternative staging regimes expired in 2025 as vehicle manufacturers transitioned to meeting the standard rules of origin.

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

Lack of transparency relating to relevant regulations and unduly burdensome customs procedures present particular challenges for U.S. SMEs exporting abroad. U.S. trade agreements, as well as other trade dialogues and fora, provide a critical opportunity to address specific concerns of U.S. SMEs and facilitate their participation in export markets. For example:

- The USMCA includes a dedicated chapter on SMEs, in recognition of the fundamental role of SMEs as engines of the North American economy. Mexico and Canada are the top two export destinations for U.S. SME goods. In 2023 (most recent year available), nearly 90,000 U.S. SMEs exported over \$74 billion in goods to Canada, and over 50,000 U.S. SMEs exported over \$107 billion in goods to Mexico.
- The USMCA SME Chapter created a trilateral USMCA SME Committee—composed of government officials from each country—that promotes ongoing SME cooperation among the Parties to increase SME trade and investment opportunities, develops information-sharing tools that help SMEs better understand the benefits of the Agreement, and provides other information useful for SMEs doing business in the region. The chapter also launched a new framework for an ongoing SME Dialogue, which is open to participation by SMEs.

The following activities occurred under the USMCA SME Chapter in 2025:

- In November 2025, the United States, Canada, and Mexico held the fourth USMCA SME Dialogue in Phoenix, Arizona, which was hosted by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) Commercial Service in Arizona and the Arizona District Export Council (AZ DEC). Over 250 small business stakeholders from across North America attended in person, with interpretation provided in English and Spanish. The Dialogue’s participants included government officials; small businesses; and business support organizations who shared perspectives, best practices, and business guidance. The USMCA SME Dialogue, is convened by USTR, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), and Commerce; Global Affairs Canada and Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service; and the Development Productive Unit and the Vice Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Economy of Mexico. Discussions at the fourth USMCA SME Dialogue included USMCA small business trade opportunities; SMEs in sports and tourism; SMEs and artificial intelligence and technology; and SME training and talent development. The USMCA SME Dialogue provides a unique opportunity for small businesses to connect and promote trade within North America. To further support this effort, the AZ DEC, in partnership with the Greater Phoenix Economic Council and the University of Arizona, hosted a small business matchmaking program connecting North American SMEs with industry leaders.
- The USMCA SME Committee expanded its network of Small Business Development Center SME counselors within the United States, Canada, and Mexico to share best practices and help SME clients prepare for new trade opportunities under the USMCA. USTR and SBA worked with America’s Small Business Development Centers (America’s SBDC) to promote an online networking platform, MOBILIZE, hosted by America’s SBDC, for the use of the USMCA SME Counselor pilot network. The platform is intended to encourage information sharing and connections among SME counselors in North America to help SMEs take advantage of USMCA trade opportunities.
- In July 2025, the United States, Canada, and Mexico convened the sixth USMCA SME Counselors Network meeting, with over 60 SME counselors and government officials participating to discuss resources to support SME manufacturers and producers in North America, and local and regional trade promotion events of interest to small businesses in North America.

Outside of the SME Chapter, the USMCA contains numerous other provisions that benefit SMEs, including customs and trade facilitation provisions to cut red tape and reduce costs; provisions to support Internet-enabled small businesses; and other provisions to protect the intellectual property of innovators, support

cross border trade in services for small businesses, and support small businesses through good regulatory practices to promote transparency and accountability when developing and implementing regulations.

Textiles

The United States engaged with Canada and Mexico to ensure proper implementation of the USMCA textile provisions, including administration of tariff preference levels. USTR provided assistance to its Mexican counterparts to review and update Harmonized Tariff Schedule codes as necessary to facilitate programming for the issuance of Tariff Preference Level certificates.

8. United States–Panama Trade Promotion Agreement

The United States–Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) entered into force on October 31, 2012. Under the TPA, Panama provides duty-free access to all U.S. consumer and industrial products. Nearly half of U.S. agricultural exports immediately became duty free upon entry into force, with remaining tariffs on most U.S. agricultural goods to be eliminated by January 1, 2026. Tariffs on most sensitive agricultural products will be phased out 18 to 20 years after entry into force.

Prior to the TPA’s entry into force, Panama improved its tax transparency practices, including via signature of a tax information exchange agreement with the United States, which entered into force on April 18, 2011.

The United States–Panama Free Trade Commission is the central oversight body for the TPA. In August 2025, the United States and Panama participated in several discussions in the committees established under the TPA. The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures discussed efforts to improve regulatory transparency and coordination. The Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade focused on technical regulations. The Committee on Agriculture discussed import and licensing requirements and regulatory implementation, Panama’s safeguard application methodology, and Panama’s administration of its World Trade Organization quotas.

9. United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement

The United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (Agreement) entered into force on February 1, 2009. Most tariff lines were eliminated upon entry into force, with all remaining tariffs on U.S. agricultural products eliminated as of January 1, 2026.

Environment

The United States continued to prioritize monitoring and enforcement of environmental commitments in the United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement and its landmark Annex on Forest Sector Governance (Forest Annex), including by convening meetings of the Interagency Committee on Trade in Timber Products from Peru to discuss and monitor developments in Peru to combat illegal logging and associated trade and work toward improving forest sector governance.

On September 18, 2024, the United States requested that Peru conduct a verification of five timber shipments from Peru to the United States. This was the third such verification request under the Agreement. The timber verification provision is a monitoring tool provided in the Agreement to ensure robust monitoring and enforcement of Peruvian forestry laws throughout the supply chain. Peru submitted an initial verification report in January 2025, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative is continuing to work closely with Peru to complete a thorough verification and compliance with domestic laws as required by the Forest Annex.

Labor

In 2025, the United States continued to monitor the issues identified in a [2016 U.S. Department of Labor report](#) in response to a submission received under the Labor Chapter of the United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement.

10. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements

USTR chairs bilateral meetings with non-FTA partners in the Americas to discuss a wide range of issues, including labor and the environment, market access, regulatory matters, and enhancing opportunities for SMEs, and to address trade irritants. The United States has trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs) or trade and investment council (TIC) agreements in force with Argentina, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The United States has an Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (ATEC) in force with Brazil.

In 2025, the United States continued its engagement with its non-FTA partners in the region with the goal of promoting trade and resolving trade problems. The activities below describe the key outcomes that advance the U.S. trade and investment agenda with these countries. In all of these engagements, USTR emphasized agricultural trade, environmental sustainability, and labor standards as fundamental for advancing this work.

Argentina

In 2025, the United States and Argentina continued work under the United States–Argentina TIFA, including meetings of the Working Group on Supply Chain Resilience established in June 2024 by the TIFA’s Trade and Investment Council. In March 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative met virtually with the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations to review priorities.

Brazil

Bilateral dialogue with Brazil is conducted through the United States–Brazil Commission on Economic and Trade Relations, established by the ATEC. The ATEC also includes a Protocol Relating to Trade Rules and Transparency. The Protocol entered into force on February 2, 2022, and comprises annexes on anticorruption, good regulatory practices, and trade facilitation and customs administration.

Caribbean Community

In 2025, the United States and CARICOM continued to monitor the progress of trade and investment in the region. In July 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative held a virtual meeting with the CARICOM Secretariat to discuss the President’s American First Trade Policy and opportunities for engagement on reciprocal trade in the Caribbean.

Ecuador

In 2025, the United States and Ecuador initiated negotiations on the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART), and a Framework for the ART was announced on November 13, 2025. Once finalized, implementation of the agreement will be discussed through the bilateral TIC. Also in 2025, the United States and Ecuador continued to work on full implementation of the 2020 Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency, an

addendum to the TIC. The Protocol entered into force in 2022 and comprises annexes on anticorruption, good regulatory practices, trade facilitation and customs administration, and SMEs.

Paraguay

On September 11, 2025, in Asunción, Paraguay, the United States and Paraguay convened the fourth meeting of the Trade and Investment Council under the United States–Paraguay TIFA. During the meeting, the two governments discussed mutual interest in addressing issues of reciprocal trade, and deepening the economic partnership. They also discussed regulatory matters, trade facilitation, labor, and intellectual property. The two governments discussed progress under the United States–Paraguay Intellectual Property Work Plan that was finalized in September 2022. Concurrent with the Council meeting, the U.S. delegation visited Ciudad del Este and the Itaipu Dam facilities to meet with government officials and stakeholders.

Uruguay

In 2025, the United States and Uruguay discussed trade-related priorities. USTR shared with officials of the new Uruguayan administration potential for work related to the America First Trade Policy and reciprocal trade, including through the TIFA. The two countries continued to discuss negotiations on an update to the United States–Uruguay TIFA with a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency.

B. EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. United States–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on August 1, 2006. Under the FTA, as of August 1, 2006, Bahrain provides duty-free access to 100 percent of the trade in industrial and consumer products, and trade in most agricultural products. In addition, under the FTA, Bahrain opened its services market, which provides opportunities for U.S. financial services providers and U.S. companies that offer telecommunication, audiovisual, express delivery, distribution, health care, architecture, and engineering services. Under the 2018 United States–Bahrain Memorandum of Understanding on Trade in Food and Agriculture Products, Bahrain continues to accept existing U.S. export certifications for food and agricultural products. The United States–Bahrain Joint Committee is the central oversight body for the FTA.

2. United States–Israel Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on August 19, 1985. The Agreement was the United States’ first FTA, and continues to serve as the foundation for the trade and investment relationship between the United States and Israel.

The United States–Israel Joint Committee is the central oversight body for the FTA. The governments met in May 2025 to continue collaborative efforts to improve bilateral trade and investment, including with respect to Israel’s obligation to remove all remaining tariffs on U.S. products and acceptance of all U.S. product standards. In December 2025, Israel proposed amendments to its laws to accept U.S. product standards and requirements. The United States continues to engage Israel as it amends its regulatory system to ensure that U.S. standards are accepted and that the amended laws do not create unnecessary barriers to trade.

United States–Israel Aspects of Trade in Agricultural Products Permanent Amendment

Since 1996, agricultural trade between the United States and Israel has been governed by two successive United States–Israel agreements concerning certain aspects of trade in agricultural products (ATAPs): a 1996 ATAP and the successor 2004 ATAP. The 2004 ATAP was originally set to expire in 2008, but each year since then, both the United States and Israel have agreed to annual one-year extensions. Under the 2004 ATAP, Israel provided the United States less advantageous tariff treatment than the United States provided Israel. The United States provided Israel with duty-free access to 90 percent of agricultural tariff lines, while Israel provided the United States with duty-free access to only 72 percent of agricultural tariff lines. Given existing disparities, the consistent, long-term goal of the United States has been a permanent agreement providing for full elimination of tariffs on all U.S. agricultural exports. Following almost two decades of impasse, on December 1, 2025 both sides reached a breakthrough and signed a permanent ATAP to that effect. The ATAP will provide the United States with preferential treatment that exceeds the treatment provided to all of Israel’s other trading partners to help the United States regain market share it has lost to these trading partners and strengthen the U.S.–Israel agricultural trade relationship.

3. United States–Jordan Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on December 17, 2001. Under the FTA, Jordan provides duty-free access to substantially all U.S. exports.

Jordanian exporters also benefit from the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) program established by the U.S. Congress in 1996. The QIZ program allows products exported from Jordan with a specified amount of Israeli content to enter the United States duty free if manufactured in Egypt, Jordan, or the West Bank and Gaza. QIZ products accounted for about 2.1 percent U.S. imports from Jordan in 2025. Over the past five years, the QIZ share of U.S. imports from Jordan has declined relative to the share of imports from Jordan shipped to the United States under the FTA.

The United States–Jordan Joint Committee is the central oversight body for the FTA. During the May 2023 Joint Committee meeting, the United States and Jordan discussed a range of bilateral trade and investment issues to promote greater reciprocal exchanges of agricultural and industrial goods and services, and the United States followed up on Jordan’s commitment to develop a Road Map to increase respect for freedom of association and elevate workers’ voices in Jordan. In 2025, both governments remedied outstanding agricultural trade concerns, including import sampling issues affecting U.S. corn exports.

4. United States–Morocco Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on January 1, 2006. The FTA has supported the ongoing economic and political reforms in Morocco and has laid the groundwork for improved commercial opportunities for U.S. exports to Morocco in several agricultural and industrial sectors. The United States–Morocco Joint Committee (JC) is the central oversight body for the FTA.

5. United States–Oman Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on January 1, 2009. The FTA, along with other U.S. FTAs in the Middle East and North Africa region, promotes economic reform and openness throughout the region. Under the FTA, Oman provides duty-free access to all industrial and consumer products. The FTA also contains comprehensive obligations for services and investment.

The United States–Oman Joint Committee is the central oversight body for the FTA. The April 2025 meeting focused on key issues such as Omani market access measures affecting U.S. agricultural products and digital services, ensuring continued recognition by Oman of U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and market access for compliant U.S. exports and discriminatory excise taxes. The meeting also included discussion of labor issues, which USTR will continue to monitor pursuant to labor provisions of the FTA.

6. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements

The United States did not hold formal Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) meetings with trading partners in the Europe and Middle East regions in 2025. However, the United States continued to monitor, implement, and enforce existing U.S. Free Trade Agreements in the region (Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman) and sought to engage other Middle Eastern, North African, and Eurasian countries through existing, informal TIFA mechanisms.

7. Other Agreements and Trade Activities

United States–Saudi Arabia Exchange of Letters on Automobiles

On November 17, 2025, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement through an exchange of letters whereby Saudi Arabia formally recognized U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), the procedures for enforcing FMVSS, and the associated safety regulations maintained by the United States as fully meeting Saudi Arabia’s motor vehicle safety requirements.

Saudi Arabia is a key export market for the United States, with U.S. automobile and light truck exports totaling \$1.9 billion in 2025. Historically, Saudi Arabia accepted motor vehicles built to conform to either FMVSS or the Europe-led United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 1958 Agreement regulations. However, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has been moving away from FMVSS in favor of adopting either UNECE standards, or developing unique Saudi standards, thereby threatening U.S. exports to that market. This agreement will help ensure U.S.-made automobiles continue to be accepted into the vital Saudi market.

European Union

The U.S. trade and investment relationship with the European Union (EU) is the largest and most complex economic relationship in the world. Transatlantic trade flows (goods and services trade) averaged an estimated \$4.0 billion each day of 2024 (latest data available). The total stock of transatlantic investment was \$4.8 trillion in 2023 (latest data available). U.S. goods and services nonetheless face persistent barriers to entering and maintaining access to the EU market, limiting the opportunity of U.S. workers and businesses to benefit from transatlantic trade. Some of these barriers have persisted despite repeated efforts to resolve them through bilateral consultations, World Trade Organization (WTO) committee meetings, or WTO dispute settlement.

Türkiye, the Middle East, and North Africa

Throughout 2025, USTR continued exploring, in consultation with other U.S. Government agencies, as well as with outside experts and stakeholders in the United States, prospective areas for trade and investment cooperation with Türkiye and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries.

In 2025, the United States continued to monitor, implement, and enforce existing U.S. FTAs in the region (Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman) and sought to engage other MENA countries through existing TIFA mechanisms and preference program review processes. The United States held FTA Joint Committee consultations with Israel on May 7 through May 8, 2025, in Washington, D.C.

Eurasia

The U.S. engagement in Eurasia in 2025 continued to be largely shaped by the Russia–Ukraine war. Since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States, working with its partners and allies, has imposed sanctions, import bans, export controls, tariff increases, and other economic measures on Russia. USTR has ceased direct engagement with Russia on trade and investment issues. (For information on Russia’s compliance with its WTO commitments, see the [2024 Report on the Implementation and Enforcement of Russia’s WTO Commitments](#).)

In 2025, the United States continued to engage with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova on trade and investment related issues to strengthen economic relationships.

United States–Switzerland Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices Mutual Recognition Agreement

The Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the Swiss Confederation and United States of America Relating to Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practice (MRA) entered into force on July 27, 2023. The MRA allows U.S. and Swiss regulators to share documents from their routine good manufacturing practice inspections of pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities, thereby reducing duplicative efforts. In 2025, the United States and Switzerland worked together to implement the MRA in an effort to make sure their regulators could better exercise their respective regulatory discretion to re-allocate resources to where they would be most needed, thereby helping to ensure that all drugs imported into each country were as safe as possible.

United States–United Kingdom Small- and Medium-Sized Dialogue

In May 2025, USTR, Commerce and SBA convened with the U.K. Department of Business and Trade and the U.K. Embassy at the 9th United States–United Kingdom Small- and Medium-Sized (SME) Dialogue in Charlotte, North Carolina, hosted by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Commercial Service in North Carolina and the North Carolina District Export Council. Launched under the first Trump Administration, the SME Dialogue brings together small business stakeholders on both sides together with officials to discuss trade opportunities and challenges and aims to foster increased bilateral trade opportunities for small businesses. Participants at the SME Dialogue discussed U.S.–U.K. trade interests and barriers; SME commercialization of innovative technologies; small business disaster mitigation and recovery from natural disasters and pandemics, and financing SME exports and start-ups. Around 90 percent of U.S. exporters to the United Kingdom are small and medium-sized firms, with just over 35,000 small businesses from across the 50 states exporting \$27.2 billion in goods to the United Kingdom in 2025.

C. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. Other Agreements and Trade Activities

Trade and Investment Engagement

Throughout 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has worked with sub-Saharan African countries to achieve a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship that benefits American businesses, farmers, and ranchers.

The United States Trade Representative met with the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa in May 2025 and numerous African trade ministers throughout the year. The United States Trade Representative also joined the President at the White House on July 9, 2025, to welcome and meet with the leaders of Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal. In December 2025, the United States Trade Representative met with the President of Kenya to discuss deepening the U.S.–Kenya trade relationship, including through the negotiation of an agreement on reciprocal trade. Aside from bilateral engagement, USTR supported U.S. Government interagency efforts to build more diverse, secure and reliable supply chains for strategic goods traded with sub-Saharan African countries, including critical minerals.

USTR’s bilateral engagements in 2025 with sub-Saharan African countries have been productive. For example, USTR helped obtain enhanced market access for U.S. agricultural exports in certain African countries, including Namibia (poultry) and South Africa (blueberries). Following numerous consultations by USTR and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Angola did not implement a planned stoppage on the issuance of import licenses for U.S. poultry after announcing it would do so in February 2025. In a separate win for U.S. syringe manufacturers, after extensive USTR and U.S. Government interventions the Government of Nigeria announced it would not enforce an import ban on foreign-made syringes, which went into effect on January 1, 2025.

D. SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

1. United States–Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade

On February 9, 2026, the United States and Bangladesh signed the United States–Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART). The ART is pending entry into force. The ART will provide American exporters with access to Bangladesh’s market of 175 million people and bolster the bilateral economic security partnership.

Under the ART, U.S. industrial and agricultural goods will receive significant preferential market access, including elimination or reduction of customs duties on chemicals, machinery and parts, medical devices, motor vehicles and parts, information and communications technology equipment, energy products, soy products, dairy products, beef, poultry, and tree nuts and fruit.

The ART also includes provisions which will eliminate key agricultural and non-agricultural non-tariff barriers. Bangladesh has committed to accept certificates issued by U.S. regulatory authorities, recognize U.S. sanitary and phytosanitary measures for food and agricultural products, and assure market access for U.S. cheese and meat producers who rely on the use of common names; permit the free transfer of data across trusted borders, accept vehicles built to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; accept U.S. Food and Drug Administration certificates and prior marketing authorizations for medical devices and pharmaceuticals; and remove any import restrictions or licensing requirements on U.S. remanufactured

goods or their parts. In addition, Bangladesh has committed to protect internationally recognized labor rights, including by amending its labor laws to ensure workers' rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Bangladesh has also committed to adopt and implement a prohibition on the importation of goods produced by forced or compulsory labor.

2. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements

The United States has bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with Afghanistan, Iraq, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and, collectively, the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The United States and Bangladesh have a Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement (TICFA). A Trade Policy Forum (TPF) exists to facilitate trade and investment dialogue between the United States and India. The United States did not hold any TIFA, TICFA, or TPF meetings in 2025 with the aforementioned countries.

3. Other Agreements and Trade Activities

U.S. trade policy engagement in South and Central Asia sought to bring fairness and reciprocity in trade relationships and align the countries in the region with the United States on economic and national security matters. The region encompasses approximately two billion people, and many countries have been experiencing rapid economic growth and progression up the development ladder, presenting important opportunities for U.S. exporters of goods, services, and agricultural products. The digital economy is also a potential engine for growth and, in 2025, the United States advanced its economic relationship with South and Central Asian partners through engagement on digital trade. Similarly, the United States increased its engagement with the region in several strategic sectors, including critical minerals, logistics, and energy and related infrastructure.

India

The U.S.–India Leaders' meeting in February 2025 sought to unlock new opportunities to rebalance and deepen the bilateral trade relationship through negotiations of a “mutually beneficial Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA).” During 2025, the United States focused on developing a roadmap for the BTA negotiations and completed several rounds of negotiations with India. While gaps remain on sensitive issues, the United States and India continue to work towards an agreement that will enhance market access, reduce long-standing tariff and non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports, develop new rules to address systemic concerns impacting the trade relationship, and address India's trade surplus with the United States.

Bangladesh

Throughout 2025, the United States engaged with the Interim Government of Bangladesh to rebalance the bilateral trade relationship. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), supported by the U.S. interagency, initiated dialogue to address a number of non-tariff barriers, including on laws and regulations that restrict trade in the agricultural, digital, and services sectors. USTR also engaged with the Interim Government of Bangladesh as it drafted amendments to the Bangladesh Labor Act (BLA) in order to ensure the amendments aligned with international labor standards, supported a fair and transparent minimum wage process for garment workers, and addressed elements of the U.S. Labor Action Plan, such as those regarding violence against and harassment of workers, unfair labor practices, freedom of association, and collective bargaining. USTR worked closely with stakeholders such as trade union leaders, workers, trade associations, non-governmental organizations, the International Labor Organization, and apparel brands to increase support for improvements in worker rights in Bangladesh. Following the passage of the BLA amendments in November 2025, USTR continues to engage with Bangladesh regarding their

implementation. The United States also garnered key wins in the agriculture sector, particularly in public and private purchases of U.S. soybeans and wheat, and engaged intensively with the Interim Government of Bangladesh on legislation that may erect new barriers to the free flow of data. U.S. advocacy for improvements to the commercial climate resulted in the payment of outstanding balances to U.S. companies and permission to repatriate in-country profits back to the United States.

Pakistan

U.S. bilateral engagement with Pakistan in 2025 focused on negotiating an agreement on reciprocal trade to enhance market access and address non-tariff barriers for agricultural and non-agricultural goods as well as U.S. services suppliers. The United States also advanced U.S. commercial interests in key sectors, including, among others, rail and critical minerals.

Sri Lanka

In 2025, the United States engaged with the Government of Sri Lanka to rebalance the bilateral trade relationship and address a number of non-tariff barriers, including for U.S. agriculture and service providers. The United States also engaged with Sri Lanka to advance key commercial opportunities in agriculture, logistics, civil aviation, and digital trade, including changes that would allow for a level playing field for U.S. companies.

Central Asia (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)

In 2025, the United States engaged with countries in Central Asia (predominately with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) on trade and investment-related issues to strengthen bilateral economic relationships. The bilateral engagements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan facilitated the advancement of key commercial deals with U.S. companies and strengthened the foundation for expanded investment in the United States, and cooperation in the critical minerals sector. The United States also initiated scoping negotiations on a potential reciprocal trade agreement with Kazakhstan to reduce the trade deficit, bring fairness and reciprocity to the bilateral trade relationship, and deepen overall economic ties. The United States also engaged with Uzbekistan regarding an agreement on reciprocal trade.

E. CHINA, HONG KONG, TAIWAN, AND MONGOLIA

1. United States–China Economic and Trade Agreement

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has been closely monitoring the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s (China) progress in implementing its commitments under the United States–China Economic and Trade Agreement (the Phase One Agreement) since it was signed in January 2020. This chapter provides illustrative examples of the United States’ concerns with China’s implementation of its commitments in the Phase One Agreement. On October 24, 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a Section 301 investigation to examine whether the Government of China has fully implemented its commitments under the Phase One Agreement, the burden or restriction on U.S. commerce resulting from any non-implementation by China of its commitments, and what action, if any, should be taken.

Agriculture

Throughout 2025, USTR continued to monitor China’s implementation of the agriculture-related commitments contained in the Phase One Agreement. China’s retaliatory tariffs and unjustified non-tariff

barriers imposed on U.S. agricultural goods appear contrary to relevant commitments in the Phase One Agreement, and the United States has taken steps to minimize their negative impact.

Intellectual Property

Throughout 2025, the United States continued to closely monitor a number of implementation concerns under the Intellectual Property chapter of the Phase One Agreement. Outstanding implementation concerns include areas such as: the protection of trade secrets and confidential business information from unauthorized disclosures by government personnel and third-party experts; criminal enforcement of trade secrets theft; enforcement procedures to combat online infringement, including an effective notice and takedown system; the protection and enforcement of trademark rights, particularly against bad faith trademark registrations; increases in the minimum and maximum levels of statutory damages and criminal penalties for intellectual property infringement; patent term extensions for unreasonable marketing approval delays; and geographical indications.

Financial Services

A key implementation issue under the Financial Services chapter of the Phase One Agreement relates to China's prolonged delay in making a decision on an application filed by the largest U.S. credit card company seeking to operate in China as an electronic payment services provider. In 2025, the United States continued to engage with the U.S. company and to raise the issue with senior Chinese officials.

Technology Transfer

Since the entry into force of the Phase One Agreement, including in 2025, the United States has continually engaged with the U.S. business community, which has expressed concern about China's actions, including those that are informal and unwritten, that force or pressure U.S. companies to transfer their technology to Chinese entities, including as a condition for obtaining market access.

2. United States–Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade

On June 1, 2023, the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States signed an agreement under the United States–Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade. This agreement includes high-standard commitments and economically meaningful outcomes in the areas of anticorruption, good regulatory practices, customs administration and trade facilitation, services domestic regulation, and small and medium-sized enterprises. The agreement entered into force on December 10, 2024.

3. United States–Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade

On February 12, 2026, the United States–Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) was signed by the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, and is pending entry into force. The ART will further strengthen and build upon the long-standing economic relationship and bolster the bilateral economic security partnership between the two sides.

Under the ART, upon entry into force, customs duties for qualifying U.S. goods will be reduced or eliminated on 99 percent of Taiwan's tariff lines on agricultural and industrial goods.

The ART also includes provisions covering non-tariff barriers. Taiwan will streamline regulatory requirements and approvals for U.S. exports, including pharmaceutical products and medical devices, and accept U.S. vehicles produced to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Taiwan will resolve and prevent non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, including beef, pork, poultry, and processing potatoes and work to complete the regulatory process to allow bison meat imports. Taiwan will assure U.S. market access for U.S. cheese and meat producers who rely on the use of common names and will enhance the protection of intellectual property. Taiwan will prohibit the importation of goods made by forced labor, protect internationally recognized labor rights, strengthen environmental protection, address public enterprises and subsidies, strengthen economic and national security cooperation to enhance supply chain resilience, prevent barriers to services and digital trade with the United States, and refrain from imposing discriminatory digital services taxes. In several areas, including good regulatory practices and trade facilitation, the ART affirms and builds on provisions in the United States–Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade.

4. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements

Taiwan

The United States–Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council, which meets under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, is the key forum for both economies to resolve and make progress on a wide range of issues affecting the United States–Taiwan trade and investment relationship. In 2025, the United States continued to monitor the progress being made by Taiwan on matters discussed during the TIFA Council meeting held in June 2021 and raised concerns with Taiwan regarding various non-tariff trade barriers on an *ad hoc* basis.

Hong Kong, China

In 2025, the United States addressed trade matters with respect to Hong Kong, China (Hong Kong), as appropriate, and the United States has continued to urge Hong Kong to update its copyright system to address concerns regarding digital copyright piracy.

F. JAPAN AND KOREA

1. United States–Japan Trade Agreement

The United States–Japan Trade Agreement entered into force on January 1, 2020. In 2025, the United States continued to engage with the Government of Japan to raise and address existing and emerging bilateral trade issues, including market access for American producers in sectors such as automobiles and agriculture.

2. United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) entered into force on March 15, 2012. In 2018, the United States negotiated further amendments and modifications, which entered into force on January 1, 2019.

The United States monitors and enforces implementation of KORUS commitments through the 21 committees and working groups established under KORUS. In 2025, the United States continued to engage

with the Korean Government to raise and address existing and emerging bilateral trade issues including issues related to digital trade.

3. Other Agreements and Trade Activities

United States–Japan Exchange of Letters to Expand Organic Equivalence to Cover Alcohol Beverages

On September 26, 2025, the United States and Japan announced the expansion of their organic equivalence arrangement to include alcohol beverages. The original United States–Japan organic equivalence arrangement has allowed plant-based products and livestock products to be sold as organic in the United States and Japan if certified to either country’s organic standards since 2014 and 2020, respectively. The expanded arrangement streamlines organic certification requirements for U.S. organic alcohol beverage exports to Japan. U.S. wines certified for the “made with organic grapes” labeling claim will now be permitted to use the Japanese organic logo when exported to Japan. In 2025, U.S. alcohol beverage exports to Japan were approximately \$167 million, U.S. exports of organic alcohol beverages alone are not tracked.

G. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

1. United States–Cambodia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade

On October 26, 2025, the Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Cambodia on Reciprocal Trade (ART) was signed. The ART is pending entry into force. The agreement will provide U.S. exporters with unprecedented access to the Cambodian market, further strengthen and build upon our long-standing economic relationship, and bolster the bilateral economic security partnership.

Under the ART, customs duties for all U.S. goods will be eliminated.

The ART also includes provisions covering non-tariff barriers. Under the ART, Cambodia has committed to streamline and reduce import licensing and regulatory requirements; accept U.S. manufactured vehicles built to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and emissions standards; and accept U.S. Food and Drug Administration certificates and prior marketing authorizations for medical devices and pharmaceuticals. Cambodia has committed to resolve and prevent non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, including by recognizing U.S. regulatory oversight and accepting certificates issued by U.S. regulatory authorities, as well as recognizing U.S. sanitary and phytosanitary measures and other measures for food and agricultural products. Cambodia has committed to assure U.S. market access for U.S. cheese and meat producers who rely on the use of common names and will enhance the protection of intellectual property. Cambodia has committed to prohibit the importation of goods made by forced labor; amend its labor laws to fully protect workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining; strengthen the enforcement of its labor law; strengthen environmental protection; address public enterprises and subsidies, advance trade facilitation and good regulatory practices, strengthen economic and national security cooperation to enhance supply chain resilience, and prevent barriers to services and digital trade with the United States and refrain from imposing discriminatory digital services taxes.

The United States will monitor Cambodia’s implementation of its commitments under the ART.

2. United States–Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade

The United States–Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) was signed on February 19, 2026, and is pending entry into force. The ART will provide U.S. exporters with unprecedented access to Indonesia’s market.

Under the ART, customs duties for qualifying U.S. goods will be reduced or eliminated on approximately 99 percent of Indonesia’s tariff lines on agricultural and industrial goods.

The ART also includes provisions covering non-tariff barriers. Under the ART, Indonesia has committed to address non-tariff barriers related to U.S. industrial goods, including by exempting U.S. companies and originating goods from local content requirements; accepting vehicles built to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and emissions standards; accepting FDA certificates and prior marketing authorizations for medical devices and pharmaceuticals; removing certain labeling requirements; removing import restrictions or licensing requirements on U.S. remanufactured goods and their parts; eliminating preshipment inspections or verification requirements on imports of U.S. goods; adopting and implementing good regulatory practices; exempting U.S. exports of cosmetics, medical devices, and other manufactured goods from certain requirements; taking steps to resolve many long-standing intellectual property issues identified in USTR’s [2025 Special 301 Report](#); protect internationally recognized labor rights including by amending its labor laws and strengthening labor law enforcement; and addressing U.S. concerns with conformity assessment procedures.

Indonesia also committed to address and prevent non-tariff barriers related to U.S. food and agricultural products, including by exempting U.S. food and agricultural products from all import licensing regimes, including commodity balance requirements; ensuring transparency and fairness with respect to geographical indications; providing permanent Fresh Food of Plant Origin designation for all applicable U.S. plant products; and recognizing U.S. regulatory oversight, including listing of all U.S. meat, poultry, and dairy facilities and accepting certificates issued by U.S. regulatory authorities. Indonesia also committed to eliminate existing tariff lines on “intangible products” and suspend related requirements on import declarations, and to support a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions at the World Trade Organization immediately and without conditions. Additionally, Indonesia committed to join the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity and take effective actions to address global excess capacity in the steel sector and its impacts. To strengthen critical mineral supply chains, Indonesia committed to allow U.S. investment on par with domestic investors, remove restrictions on exports to the United States of industrial commodities, including critical minerals, expedite development of its rare earth and critical minerals sector, provide greater certainty for companies involved in mineral extraction, and ensure foreign-owned facilities adhere to mining quotas. Indonesia further committed to cooperate with the United States on the critical mineral supply chain.

3. United States–Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade

On October 26, 2025, the United States and Malaysia signed the United States–Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART). The ART is pending entry into force. The ART will provide U.S. exporters with unprecedented access to Malaysia’s market; further strengthen and build upon our long-standing economic relationship; and bolster the bilateral economic security partnership.

Under the ART, upon entry into force, customs duties for qualifying U.S. goods will be reduced or eliminated on more than 90 percent of Malaysia’s tariff lines on agricultural and industrial goods. Malaysia will continue to reduce or eliminate duties for certain tariff lines over the five years following entry into force.

The ART also includes provisions covering non-tariff barriers. Under the ART, Malaysia has committed to accept U.S. manufactured vehicles built to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and emissions standards; streamline import licenses for U.S. alloy steel and pipe products and steel-containing goods; streamline halal requirements for products including cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices; and address U.S. concerns with conformity assessment procedures. Malaysia has also committed to resolve and prevent non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, including by accepting currently agreed certificates issued by U.S. regulatory authorities; streamlining halal and facility registration requirements to facilitate imports of U.S. food and agricultural products; and implementing regionalization of the United States for animal diseases Malaysia has committed to assure U.S. market access for U.S. cheese and meat producers who rely on the use of common names and will enhance the protection of intellectual property. Malaysia has committed to address labor law violations in sectors with a high-risk of forced labor and child labor; strengthen environmental protection; address public enterprises and subsidies; advance trade facilitation and good regulatory practices; strengthen economic and national security cooperation to enhance supply chain resilience, and prevent barriers to services and digital trade with the United States and refrain from imposing discriminatory digital services taxes. Malaysia has also committed to refrain from banning, or imposing quotas on, exports to the United States of critical minerals or rare earth elements. Malaysia has committed to the expedient development of its critical minerals and rare earths sectors in partnership with U.S. companies, including by refraining from banning, or imposing quotas on, exports to the United States of critical minerals or rare earth elements; facilitate and promote investment by U.S. companies; granting extended operating licenses so that businesses have certainty to increase production; ensuring no restrictions on sale of rare earth magnets to U.S. companies, and expediting the development of its critical minerals and rare earths sectors in partnership with U.S. companies.

4. United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on January 1, 2005.

The United States–Australia Joint Committee is the central oversight body for the FTA. The United States met regularly with Australia throughout 2025 to monitor implementation of the FTA and review concerns about market access, including with respect to digital trade. The United States continued to monitor Australia’s policies impacting digital trade to ensure compliance with the FTA and to ensure that U.S. companies are not unfairly targeted. The United States also continued to work closely with Australia to deepen the bilateral trade relationship and coordinate on issues of regional and international importance, including on U.S. market access requests for agricultural products in 2025. In July 2025, Australia removed its restrictions on fresh and frozen beef from the United States.

5. United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement

The United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on January 1, 2004.

The United States–Singapore Joint Committee is the central oversight body for the FTA. In 2025, the United States continued to work closely with Singapore to deepen the bilateral trade relationship and coordinate on issues of regional and international importance, including ensuring reciprocity in the bilateral trade relationship and promoting secure supply chains for strategic goods.

6. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements

The United States continued to engage throughout 2025 with countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific to pursue outcomes that would address unfair trade practices in order to strengthen trade and economic relations and advance economic growth.

United States–Association of Southeast Asian Nations Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement

The United States continued to work under the auspices of the United States–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement to advance economic growth and further enhance trade and investment ties between the United States and ASEAN. At the annual ASEAN Economic Ministers–USTR Consultation in September 2025, the United States and ASEAN decided to continue cooperation on labor; agriculture; competition and consumer protection; good regulatory practices; micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprise development; trade facilitation; the digital economy; and intellectual property rights.

III. MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES

A. Group of Seven

In 2025, the United States cooperated with other Group of 7 (G7) members—Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom—on a range of trade-related priorities, including addressing non-market policies and practices (NMPPs), promoting economic security and supply chain resilience, and effectively deterring and responding to economic coercion. In furtherance of this work, the United States and the G7 also collaborated with developing countries in pursuit of a more resilient global trade and investment environment, while committing to intensify these engagements in the future.

Under Canada’s presidency during 2025, the G7 took a number of steps to enhance cooperation in responding effectively to NMPPs, particularly those of the People’s Republic of China (China). The G7 continued to build a shared understanding of the challenges posed by a wide range of NMPPs, such as those that contribute to strategies to pursue domestic and global market dominance in key sectors, and recommitted to effectively use and develop trade tools to identify, challenge, and counter these practices.

The G7 worked to ensure resilient and reliable supply chains and reduce critical dependencies, including in the G7 semiconductor Point of Contact Group and the Critical Minerals Working Group. The United States and G7 partners also continued work to support joint actions to address harmful market distortions and non-market excess capacity in key sectors resulting from NMPPs.

The G7 engaged in further work in the G7 Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion, an initiative that was launched in 2023 “to increase our collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, and further promote cooperation with partners beyond the G7.” The United States worked with G7 partners within the Coordination Platform to share information, regularly consult one another, collaboratively assess situations, explore coordinated responses, and deter and, where appropriate, counter economic coercion.

B. Group of Twenty

In 2025, the United States continued its engagement in the Group of Twenty (G20) Trade and Investment Working Group (TIWG) under South Africa’s presidency.

The G20 is a grouping of 21 countries or regional bodies, most of which rank among the largest economies: the African Union, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The G20 operates on two separate “tracks” of discussion, a “Sherpa track” and a “finance track”; the TIWG, which was created in 2016, is part of the Sherpa track. Although finding consensus in the TIWG can be challenging, the United States values the G20 as a forum for constructive dialogue with a diverse set of partners, including several developing countries.

Each year, the G20 presidency sets out its priorities to guide discussions in the TIWG and pursue deliverables to which Ministers can commit at the final meeting of the year, the Trade and Investment Ministerial Meeting (TIMM). South Africa established four priorities for its presidency during 2025: “trade and inclusive growth”; a “responsive trade and investment agenda to address the challenge of global commons”; a “G20 framework on green industrialization and investments”; and World Trade Organization (WTO) reform.

In the TIWG discussions in 2025, the United States noted that some G20 members had failed to embrace free market economics, and that many had used a range of policies, including non-tariff barriers, state support, suppression of wages, and lax regulations and environmental rules, that led to massive distortions and structural asymmetries in the global economy as well as deindustrialization and growing dependencies in the United States. The United States used these meetings to explain to G20 members that U.S. tariff actions were necessary to correct for a serious lack of reciprocity and balance in our trading relationships, and that the United States is negotiating new terms of trade with trading partners that are willing to participate constructively in U.S. reindustrialization by lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers to U.S. goods. The United States also reiterated that the WTO has been fundamentally unable and unwilling to address major global economic challenges. At the TIMM in October 2025, G20 members reached consensus on a ministerial statement.

The United States took over the G20 presidency in December 2025 and will host a TIWG and TIMM in 2026. The United States intends to focus discussions on overcapacity, reform of Most-Favored-Nation treatment, forced labor, and the weaponization of food.

C. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is a voluntary, nonbinding, and consensus-building economic forum of 21 member economies from both sides of the Pacific, with the goal to create “an open, dynamic, resilient, and peaceful Asia-Pacific community by 2040.” APEC has served as an incubator of unique and effective policy ideas, and since its inception in 1989 has substantially contributed to steps that have led to lowering barriers to U.S. goods and services exports across the region.

Through its engagements in APEC and coordination with 2025 host Korea, the United States has fostered supply chain resilience, promoted trade and investment facilitation, and worked to address root causes of U.S. trade deficits in the region. The United States has developed innovative approaches to expand markets and reduce barriers for American exporters, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and facilitate regional coordination on services trade and standards. Including through high-level participation at APEC ministerial meetings, the United States underscored the need for fairness and reciprocity in global trade and advocated for ways for APEC to address unfair trade practices and policies that create market distortions and systemic imbalances.

Trade Facilitation: In 2025, the United States cooperated with Korea on several customs-related workshops and discussions, including on cross-border electronic commerce, digitalization of trade procedures, and others. The United States reconvened the APEC Alliance for Supply Chain Connectivity, which included a review of APEC economies’ policies related to trader data and discussed key regional initiatives addressing trends in supply chains, particularly the role of innovation and new technologies in reshaping how companies operate and trade globally. To strengthen public-private collaboration and advance paperless trade in the region, the United States also coordinated with interested economies and the APEC Business Advisory Council to appropriately scope and launch the APEC Centre of Excellence on Paperless Trade.

Standards and Conformance: The United States led a workshop on strengthening standards and technical regulations for higher water quality, which brought together experts from international organizations, relief groups, and standards developers to develop a blueprint to improve water quality. The United States also led a workshop that focused on strengthening understanding of the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement through examining the obligations in the agreement, comparing TBT chapters in regional trade agreements, and reviewing dispute settlement cases, as well as studying real-world cases to consider the necessity of regulations. A third workshop led by the United States looked at

how standards users could apply new technologies to tailor, transmit, and apply digitalized standards more easily, which included a site visit to a company in Korea that is using digital standards.

Good Regulatory Practices: The United States contributed to APEC’s long-standing emphasis on the importance of good regulatory practices (GRPs) to foster a transparent regulatory environment. The United States provided speakers in the annual conference on GRP within the APEC Economic Committee and emphasized the importance of public consultation practices when developing regulations and employing technology to facilitate regulatory cooperation. The United States also continued its work on the rollout and use of the GRP Blueprint to assist economies in their implementation of GRP.

Services: The United States continued to advance a wide range of services initiatives in 2025, as well as advocate for a successor to the APEC Services Competitiveness Roadmap, which sunsets after 2025. The United States championed the APEC Index for Measuring the Regulatory Environment for Services Trade in the APEC Region, and worked with APEC economies to expand economic and sectoral coverage of the Index and enhance its usability. The United States also led work on Services Domestic Regulation, including through initiating work on services technical standards development, distributing a non-paper on APEC Non-binding Principles for Developing Technical Standards for Services, and leading a workshop to enhance APEC services officials’ understanding of principles for technical standards development, which serve to strengthen regulatory quality, reduce unnecessary barriers, and promote alignment with global best practices. The United States also supported cross-fora cooperation on structural reform in the services sector and related work on services domestic regulation in pursuit of openness, balance, and transparency.

Market Access: The United States organized a workshop that examined the rules of origin under free trade agreements and unilateral preference programs. The workshop studied how such rules can be crafted to achieve policy objectives, and speakers included from international organizations, customs and trade officials, and representatives from industry.

Intellectual Property: In 2025, the United States continued to use the Intellectual Property Experts Group (IPEG) to build capacity and raise standards on intellectual property protection and enforcement matters in the Asia-Pacific region. This included continued discussions with APEC economies on effective practices for enforcement against illicit streaming in a U.S.-led initiative. The United States organized workshops on enhancing innovation with more efficient patent systems and on strategies and approaches to enforcement against illicit streaming.

Digital Trade: The United States continued to advance an ambitious digital trade agenda within APEC in 2025 that recognized the impact of the digital economy on a range of stakeholders through policy dialogues and capacity-building initiatives throughout the year. The United States also worked with Korea to organize a Digital Trade Policy Dialogue on cross-border data flows, which included an exchange of best practices and priorities, discussions on the role of cross-border data flows in micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) business models and their impact on growth in digital trade, and engagement with stakeholders on how to enable data flows in a responsible, secure manner.

Stakeholder Engagement: Throughout its workstreams in APEC, the United States continued to engage with the private sector and relevant stakeholders to drive strong and dynamic economic growth throughout the region and benefit American workers, manufacturers, farmers, ranchers, entrepreneurs, and businesses. The United States has leveraged this engagement to advance trade policy that works for all Americans, promote a level playing field in the region, expand markets for consumers to buy American goods and services, and push for higher labor standards and stronger environmental protections in global supply chains. The United States hosted a workshop on leveraging data and analytic tools to support trade and trade policy analysis, which brought together statistical agencies and other stakeholders to strengthen data collection and analysis aimed at better understanding the impacts of trade on people.

In the APEC forum, APEC member economies continued to advance initiatives to facilitate MSME access to global markets, including by promoting approaches to strengthen the digital economy. In 2025, the United States worked with host Korea and other APEC members to support multiple workshops and capacity-building activities, including through the APEC Alliance for Supply Chain Connectivity. APEC member economies also continued to update the [APEC Trade Repository](#) to help MSMEs seeking information on tariff rates, customs procedures, and other information related to doing business in the APEC region.

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs): In APEC, member economies continued to advance initiatives to facilitate SME access to global markets, including by promoting approaches to strengthen the digital economy. In 2025, the United States worked with host Korea and other APEC members to support multiple workshops and capacity-building activities, including through the APEC Alliance for Supply Chain Connectivity, in which the United States focused on implementation of Phase III of the Supply Chain Framework Action Plan and its efforts to facilitate SMEs' access and integration into global supply chains. APEC member economies also continued to update the APEC Trade Repository to help SMEs seeking information on tariff rates, customs procedures, and other information related to doing business in the APEC region.

D. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

USTR engaged in significant work in 2025 to advance U.S. interests through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD is a grouping of economically significant countries that serves as a policy forum for a broad spectrum of economic, social, environmental, and scientific areas. Established in 1961 and headquartered in Paris, the OECD currently comprises 38 democracies in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and the Pacific Rim. The OECD provides a setting where both OECD Members and non-Members can compare experiences, seek answers to common challenges, identify good practices, and promote economic growth. Member governments, supported by Secretariat staff, convene committees, expert groups, and working groups to consult on substantive policy areas with emphasis on discussion and peer review. Most OECD decisions require consensus among Member governments. The like-mindedness of the OECD's members on the core values of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and open markets uniquely positions the OECD to serve as a valuable policy forum to address real world issues. On trade and trade policy, the OECD engages in meaningful research and provides a forum for Members to discuss complex and sometimes difficult issues.

1. Trade Committee Work Program

In 2025, the OECD Trade Committee (Trade Committee), its subsidiary Working Party of the Trade Committee (WPTC), the Joint Working Party on Trade and Environment (JWPTE), and the Joint Working Party on Trade and Agriculture continued to address a number of significant issues affecting trade. The Trade Committee met in April and October, and the WPTC met in March, June, October, and December. The Trade Committee and its subsidiary groups paid particular attention to digital trade, trade facilitation, services trade, level playing field issues, and supply chains. The [OECD website](#) contains up-to-date information on published analytical work and other trade-related activities.

In 2025, the Trade Committee built upon its research on industrial subsidies, state enterprises, and level playing field issues. The 2025 Global Forum on Trade focused on “Government support, the level playing field and inclusive opportunities in the global economy”; participants discussed the ecosystem of subsidies and other government support measures, overcapacity, and the role of state enterprises in international markets. The Trade Committee also continued its analysis on the effects of services trade at the worker

level and launched work on leveraging trade to secure the supply of critical minerals and economic development. In addition, the Trade Committee leveraged its core databases (*i.e.*, Trade Facilitation Indicators, Digital Trade Inventory, Services Trade Restrictiveness Index, and the Manufacturing Groups and Industrial Corporations) to underpin analysis in several work products in 2025.

In May 2025, Costa Rica chaired the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting under the theme of “Leading the Way Towards Resilient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Prosperity Through Rules-based Trade, Investment and Innovation.” The United States participated in the three trade-related sessions on enhancing multilateral cooperation and fostering global value chains, reflecting on trade policies vis-à-vis environment and social goals, and leveraging the digital transformation and cross-border data flows to promote economic growth.

2. Trade Committee Dialogue with Non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Members

The OECD conducts wide-ranging activities to reach out to non-Member countries and economies, businesses, and civil society, in particular through its series of workshops and “Global Forum” events held around the world each year. Non-Member countries and economies may also participate as committee observers when Members believe that participation will be mutually beneficial. Key Partners—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa—participate to varying degrees in OECD activities through the Enhanced Engagement program. The program seeks to establish a more structured and coherent partnership, based on mutual interest, between these five major economies and OECD Members. The regular invitees to the Trade Committee and the WPTC are Argentina; Brazil; Hong Kong, China; and Singapore. The OECD also carries out a number of regional and bilateral cooperation programs with non-Members, including those interested in aligning policies with OECD instruments and tools such as the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index.

In 2025 the Trade Committee continued to prioritize the OECD Secretariat’s support for trade-related discussions in major intergovernmental economic groupings through its evidence-based analysis and policy insights. The intergovernmental economic groupings included the Group of 20, Group of Seven, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The Trade Committee is also involved in the OECD’s process for considering applications from new countries to join the OECD. The process consists of (1) a candidate submitting an “Initial Memorandum” assessing the alignment of its legislation, policies, and practices with OECD legal instruments, (2) the OECD Secretariat conducting a Market Openness Review of the candidate country, and (3) Member’s deliberation of a candidate’s trade regime against accession requirements. As of December 31, 2025, six countries—Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Indonesia, Peru, and Romania—had submitted Initial Memorandums and were in the Market Openness Review process, and two additional countries—Argentina and Thailand—were working on submitting Initial Memorandums. The Trade Committee participated in detailed discussions in 2025 for three of the countries in the Market Openness Review stage of candidacy—Bulgaria, Peru, and Romania.

Finally, the Trade Committee participated in discussions on issues of concern with representatives of the private sector and civil society, including members of Business at OECD and the Trade Union Advisory Council.

3. Other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Work Related to Trade

Representatives of the OECD Member countries meet in specialized committees to advance ideas and review progress in specific policy areas, such as economics, trade, regulatory policy, science, employment,

education, countering illicit trade, and financial markets. There are about 300 committees, working groups, and expert groups at the OECD.

Examples of U.S. engagement included working with like-minded trading partners in the OECD Steel Committee, which brings together government, industry, and labor representatives to discuss developments across the global steel sector and to build consensus on approaches to addressing challenges including excess capacity. In 2025, the United States also worked with like-minded partners in the OECD-facilitated Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC) to consider new approaches that might effectively address the root causes and consequences of excess capacity, taking into account that the situation is worsening and that existing approaches and international trade rules have had only a limited impact so far. In October 2025, ministers and high-level representatives of GFSEC Members, as well as other invited countries, agreed to develop a framework for joint action to address the global steel crisis, take immediate actions to address excess capacity and its impacts, and exchange information on non-market policies and practices in the sector. The United States will chair the GFSEC in 2026.

USTR, along with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of State, participated in the OECD's JWPTE meetings in March and September 2025. The JWPTE provides a forum to discuss the effects of environmental policies on trade and the effects of trade policies on the environment.

E. International Labor Organization

The International Labor Organization (ILO), founded in 1919, is a specialized agency of the United Nations that works to promote and build international consensus on labor rights around the world. The ILO is the only “tripartite” organization in the UN system; representatives of business and organized labor have seats at the negotiating table alongside government representatives. The ILO *Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work* (1998), as amended in 2022, serves as a basis for labor provisions in U.S. free trade agreements, trade and investment framework agreements, reciprocal trade agreements, and other trade programs and arrangements.

In 2025, USTR met with ILO experts to discuss the implementation of international labor standards in trade partner countries and to discuss broader labor themes such as labor inspection, forced labor, global supply chains, and the ILO Better Work program.

F. Trade Capacity Building

Trade capacity building (TCB) is intended to facilitate effective integration of developing countries into the international trading system and enable them to benefit further from global trade while promoting economic growth. This section reports on these efforts in 2025.

U.S. Trade-Related Assistance under the World Trade Organization Framework

The United States supports the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) trade-related technical assistance initiatives that align with U.S. priorities.

Aid-for-Trade Initiative

The Aid-for-Trade Initiative was launched at the WTO's Sixth Ministerial Conference in 2005 to “help developing countries, particularly least-developed countries (LDCs), to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade.” In 2006, an Aid-for-Trade Task Force identified three primary

goals for the initiative: bolster supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure; facilitate, implement, and adjust to trade reform and liberalization; and support trade negotiations and assist in the implementation of the WTO agreement. In 2025, the United States remained an active partner in Aid-for-Trade discussions.

The Standards and Trade Development Facility

The Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) is a global partnership to promote the increased capacity of developing countries to implement international sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, guidelines, and recommendations and hence improve their ability to gain and maintain access to markets. The STDF Working Group reviews and approves the STDF's work program and funding requests and oversees operation of the STDF Secretariat. The United States, along with other donor countries and international organizations, participates in the STDF Working Group, advocating for science- and risk-based approaches to SPS standards. The partnership convenes and connects SPS stakeholders and supports and implements innovative pilot projects in developing countries.

Since its launch in 2004, the STDF has supported more than 260 projects and project preparation grants across Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, totaling more than \$100 million. During 2020 through 2025, 63 percent of STDF-funded activities benefited LDCs and other low-income countries. The STDF organized more than 80 events with participation from approximately 6,300 stakeholders. In 2025, donors' contributions reached a total of \$7,620,000. The United States has supported the STDF primarily through the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services.

The STDF's SPS capacity building complements broader U.S. Government TCB and SPS technical assistance spanning from training on electronic certification, use of evidence to prioritize SPS investments, and implementation of good regulatory practices. The United States regularly reports SPS capacity-building activities to the WTO through the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.

Standards Alliance

The Standards Alliance is a program made possible by the support of the United States Government. The goal of this program is to build capacity among developing countries in the areas of legal and regulatory framework, standards development, conformity assessment procedures, and private sector engagement.

The American Standards Institute (ANSI) is the implementing partner of the Standards Alliance and official U.S. representative to the International Organization for Standardization. ANSI coordinates private sector subject matter experts from its member organizations to deliver training and other technical exchange with eligible and interested Standards Alliance countries on international standards, best practices, and other subjects supporting implementation of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. In consultation with the Trade Policy Staff Committee and private sector experts, ANSI requested and reviewed applications for assistance. As part of its review, ANSI considered bilateral trade opportunities, available private sector expertise that may be leveraged, demonstrated commitment and readiness for assistance, and potential development impact.

Phase 2 (2019-2026) of the Standards Alliance program commits funds to help increase the capacity of developing countries to implement accepted international best practices to reduce instances of poor quality and unsafe products, services, and infrastructure. Areas of cooperation include: critical minerals and related critical and emerging technologies; medical devices; and water, sanitation, and hygiene.

As of December 31, 2025, under Phase 2, the Standards Alliance had engaged with more than 6,000 participants from 28 countries to develop national standards regimes, support governments in implementing

international trade obligations, and enhance public-private dialogue on standards and technical regulations. In addition to mobilizing more than \$6 million in technical assistance to support countries' response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Standards Alliance has deployed more than \$4 million in technical assistance during Phase 2 to support standardization for biofuels, water and sanitation systems, water quality improvement, and maternal and child health, thereby benefiting millions of people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Global Information and Communications Technology and Critical Emergency Standards Program

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) shares common goals with the U.S. Department of State and the National Institute on Standards and Technology (NIST) to implement Executive Order 14179 of January 23, 2025, [Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence](#), and in 2025 began coordinating with The Global Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Critical and Emerging Technology (CET) Standards (GICS) Program to promote awareness with WTO Members, including by providing a technical assistance update on its activities during the November 2025 meeting of the WTO TBT Committee. In 2025, USTR also worked with United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) partners to ensure the participation of trade officials in the GICS Program, who are responsible for formulating artificial intelligence (AI) standards and regulatory policy and participated in an ongoing USMCA dialogue on AI standards.

The GICS Program is a cooperative agreement between the ANSI and CDP. This three-year program focuses on capacity building for allied countries. It aims to strengthen ANSI's and CDP's participation in international standards development, as well as improve implementation of international standards in the ICT and CET sectors. The program covers an array of countries in five geographical regions, including South and Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and Europe. GICS aims to support an international standards development process grounded in transparency, private sector leadership and public sector support, and broad technical participation. It also aims to enhance participation in related standards activities and assist countries in adopting international standards.

G. Preference Programs

1. Generalized System of Preferences

USTR did not undertake activities under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program during this reporting period due to the lapse in the program's authorization.

The U.S. GSP program (19 U.S.C. § 2461 *et seq.*) was created by the Trade Act of 1974. The GSP was authorized initially for a 10-year period, beginning on January 1, 1976. Congress reauthorized the program 14 times subsequently, most recently in March 2018. That authorization lapsed on December 31, 2020.

2. The African Growth and Opportunity Act

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Title I of The Trade and Development Act of 2000, P.L. 106-200, 19 U.S.C. § 3701 *et seq.*) provided eligible sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for certain products. The AGOA required the President to designate annually which of the sub-Saharan African countries listed in the Act are eligible to receive AGOA benefits. This year, the Implementation Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee examined, through the initiation of an annual review, whether each country already eligible for AGOA benefits had continued to meet the eligibility criteria and whether circumstances in ineligible countries had improved sufficiently to

warrant their designation as AGOA beneficiary countries. The AGOA eligibility criteria included establishing or making continual progress in establishing: (1) a market-based economy; (2) rule of law; (3) poverty-reduction policies; (4) a system to combat corruption and bribery; and (5) protection of internationally recognized worker rights. The AGOA also required that eligible countries do not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security or foreign policy interests or engage in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. The annual review took into account information drawn from U.S. Government agencies, civil society, African governments, the private sector, and other interested stakeholders and included an annual public hearing, which convened on July 18, 2025.

AGOA authorization lapsed on September 30, 2025 and was reauthorized on February 3, 2026 through December 31, 2026, with retroactive application to September 30, 2025.

3. Caribbean Basin Initiative

Seventeen Caribbean countries and territories are beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which was launched in 1983 through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) (P.L. 98-67, 19 U.S.C. § 2701 *et seq.*). The CBERA facilitates the development of Caribbean Basin economies by providing beneficiaries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods. In 2000, the United States enacted the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) (Title II of the Trade and Development Act of 2000, P.L. 106-200), to enhance existing CBERA preferences. The CBTPA recognized the significance of apparel as a component of CBI exports to the United States and expanded the degree of preferential treatment applied to U.S. imports of apparel made in the Caribbean Basin region. Eight of the CBERA beneficiary countries and territories are also beneficiaries under the CBTPA. The CBTPA has been renewed by Congress several times since it was enacted, most recently on October 10, 2020, when the program was extended until September 30, 2030.

CBI benefits for Haiti were further expanded with the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE Act) (P.L. 109-432, Div. D, Title V), the HOPE II Act of 2008 (HOPE II Act) (P.L. 110-234, Title XV, Subtitle D, Part I), and the Haitian Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 (HELP Act) (P.L. 111-171), which provided Haiti preferential treatment for its textile and apparel products. The Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 (TPEA) (P.L. 114-27) extended trade benefits provided to Haiti in the HOPE Act, the HOPE II Act, and the HELP Act until September 30, 2025. The TPEA also extended the value-added rule for apparel articles wholly assembled or knit-to-shape in Haiti until December 19, 2025.

USTR monitors CBI beneficiaries' compliance with the eligibility criteria set out in the various statutes, including the CBERA and the CBTPA. For the CBERA, these criteria include taking steps to respect internationally recognized worker rights, providing the United States with equitable and reasonable market access, respecting certain intellectual property rights, and enforcing arbitral awards in favor of U.S. citizens or corporations. For the CBTPA, these criteria include demonstrating a commitment to undertake World Trade Organization obligations; providing appropriate intellectual property protection; providing internationally recognized worker rights; implementing commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor; meeting U.S. counter-narcotics criteria; taking steps to implement the Inter-American Convention against Corruption; and applying transparent, nondiscriminatory, and competitive procedures in government procurement.

For information on compliance of each beneficiary with CBI eligibility criteria, see USTR's [Sixteenth Report to Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act](#).

4. Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through the Partnership Encouragement Act and Haiti Economic Lift Program Act

The HOPE Act, the HOPE II Act, and the HELP Act provided duty-free treatment for eligible imports of apparel, select textiles, and certain other goods from Haiti. The HOPE Act and HELP Act trade preference programs were reauthorized on February 3, 2026 through December 31, 2026, with retroactive application to September 30, 2025.

Pursuant to the HOPE II Act's requirements, Haitian producers were required to comply with internationally recognized worker rights to be eligible for duty-free treatment. The U.S. Government, in cooperation with the ILO, monitored compliance of producers with worker rights and issued an annual report on the status of the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR) program. (For information on monitoring efforts, see the [2025 USTR Annual Report on the Implementation of the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation \(TAICNAR\) Program and Assessment of Producer Eligibility](#).) In March 2025, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) terminated funding for the implementation of the TAICNAR program. The ILO continued to fund a core team to operate the TAICNAR program through the end of 2025.

The HOPE II Act required Haiti to establish or make continual progress toward establishing the protection of internationally recognized worker rights to be eligible for the TAICNAR program. The HOPE II Act also required Haitian producers to comply with core labor standards and the corresponding labor laws of Haiti for their goods to receive duty-free treatment under the Act. The DOL, in consultation with USTR, was charged with publicly identifying noncompliant producers on a biennial basis and providing assistance to such producers to comply with the standards. In addition, the DOL provided support to at-risk producers to help ensure compliance. During 2025, the DOL monitored producer-level compliance with worker rights criteria and followed up with producers to address concerns related to worker rights criteria to ensure continued compliance with the HOPE II Act's labor requirements. As noted above, the United States also worked with the Government of Haiti and the ILO on implementation of the TAICNAR program to monitor factories' compliance with internationally recognized worker rights.

5. Nepal Trade Preference Program

The Nepal Trade Preference Program (NTPP) (19 U.S.C. § 4454) was authorized by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 and provides duty-free treatment for 77 tariff lines from Nepal, which include certain carpets, headgear, shawls, and scarves.

The NTPP includes statutory criteria necessary to receive the benefits of the preference program, which include, among others, establishing or making continual progress toward establishing a market-based economy, rule of law, and the protection of internationally recognized worker rights. The United States regularly engages with Nepal through the United States–Nepal Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Council, and has worked in that forum to ensure that Nepal meets the NTPP statutory criteria.

The Nepal trade preference program lapsed on December 31, 2025.

IV. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

A. INTRODUCTION

The United States engaged in numerous activities at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2025 to advance U.S. trade interests. These efforts related both to broad efforts to reform the WTO and in day-to-day work at the various WTO Standing Committees and their subsidiary bodies, WTO negotiating groups, and plurilateral initiatives. The United States also engaged in efforts to implement and enforce WTO agreements, and consideration of requests from various trading partners to join the WTO.

Notably in 2025, the United States advanced U.S. interests in discussions on WTO reform, and other critical issues, in preparations for the Fourteenth WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14). In November, the United States submitted a draft Ministerial Decision to extend on a permanent basis the moratorium on duties on electronic transmissions. In December, the United States circulated a communication on WTO reform to the General Council to: (1) express U.S. views on the three issues pursued by the Reform Facilitator (decision making, special and differential treatment, and level playing field); (2) clarify that a reform agenda at the WTO must address more than just those three issues, to include concerns regarding the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) principle, the role of the Secretariat, and application of the essential security exception; and (3) explain the U.S. view that the WTO is unable to address certain systemic problems, such as imbalances, overcapacity, economic security, and supply chain resilience.

The WTO operates through more than 20 standing committees, as well as a number of additional working groups, working parties, and negotiating bodies. These groups meet regularly, enabling WTO Members to exchange views, monitor and resolve questions about Members' compliance with commitments, and develop initiatives aimed at systemic improvements. These groups also serve to promote transparency in Members' trade policies. Through discussions in these groups, Members can pursue detailed information on individual Members' trade policy actions, and collectively consider their impact on individual Members and the trading system as a whole. The discussions enable Members in their domestic policymaking to assess and potentially address concerns raised by other WTO Members. The United States also takes advantage of opportunities in standing committees to consider ways to improve implementation of existing WTO provisions and to discuss areas where future rules could be developed.

The remainder of this chapter contains highlights of work carried out in the WTO Committees, other bodies, and plurilateral configurations, including:

- General Council;
- WTO Negotiations;
 - Committee on Agriculture, Special Session;
 - WTO Fisheries Subsidies;
 - Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development;
- Council for Trade in Goods;
 - Committee on Agriculture;
 - Committee on Antidumping Practices;
 - Committee on Customs Valuation;
 - Committee on Import Licensing;
 - Committee on Market Access;
 - Committee on Rules of Origin;
 - Committee on Safeguards;
 - Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures;

- Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures;
- Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade;
- Committee on Trade Facilitation;
- Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures;
- Working Party on State Trading Enterprises;
- Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights;
- Council for Trade in Services;
 - Committee on Trade in Financial Services;
 - Working Party on Domestic Regulation and Joint Statement Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation;
 - Committee on Specific Commitments;
- Other General Council Bodies and Activities;
 - Committee on Trade and Environment;
 - Committee on Trade and Development;
 - Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions;
 - Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration;
 - Committee on Regional Trade Agreements;
 - Accessions to the WTO;
 - Working Group on Trade, Debt, and Finance;
 - Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology;
 - Work Program on Electronic Commerce;
- Dispute Settlement Understanding;
- Trade Policy Review Body;
- Plurilaterals;
 - Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft;
 - Committee on Government Procurement Agreement;
 - Information Technology Agreement Committee; and
- Subsidies Monitoring and Enforcement (Subsidies Enforcement, and Monitoring and Challenging Foreign Antidumping, Countervailing Duty, and Safeguard Actions).

For more information on the work of these entities, see their annual reports, found on the [WTO website](#).

B. GENERAL COUNCIL

The General Council is the highest-level decision-making body in the WTO that meets on a regular basis each year. It exercises all of the authority of the Ministerial Conference, which is expected to meet no less than once every two years. Only the Ministerial Conference and the General Council have the authority to adopt authoritative interpretations of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), submit amendments to the WTO Agreement for consideration by Members, and grant waivers of obligations. The General Council or the Ministerial Conference must approve the terms for all accessions to the WTO. The General Council uses both formal and informal processes to conduct the business of the WTO. Informal groupings, which generally include the United States, play an important role in consensus building.

In 2025, the United States participated in all of the General Council meetings to advance U.S. interests at the WTO, including discussions on WTO reform and preparation for MC14, which will be held in March 2026 in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

C. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION NEGOTIATIONS

1. Committee on Agriculture Special Session

USTR, along with representatives from the United States Department of Agriculture, engaged actively in the Committee on Agriculture Special Session to ensure that WTO negotiations took into account the priorities and sensitivities of U.S. agricultural stakeholders. In particular, the United States continued to play a key role advocating for reform-oriented negotiations and fighting back against efforts by some WTO Members to erode rules under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).

2. World Trade Organization Fisheries Subsidies

After more than two decades of negotiations, WTO Members achieved an agreement at the Twelfth WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June 2022 to discipline certain harmful fisheries subsidies. The WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies contains several important disciplines, including prohibitions on subsidies to vessels or operators engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, subsidies for fishing overfished stocks, and subsidies for fishing on the unregulated high seas. The agreement also includes robust transparency provisions to strengthen WTO Members' notification of fisheries subsidies and thereby enable effective monitoring of Members' implementation of their obligations. The Fisheries Agreement entered into force on September 15, 2025, with more than two-thirds of WTO Members having accepted the agreement.

At both MC12 and MC13, WTO Members committed to continue the fisheries subsidies negotiations with a view to making recommendations for additional provisions that would achieve comprehensive disciplines on harmful fisheries subsidies, including disciplines on certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing. Consensus was not reached on additional provisions in the lead-up to and during MC13, nor throughout 2024 when there were two more attempts to reach agreement during the July and December General Council sessions. In May 2025, the chair of the negotiations convened small group sessions to consider the viability of concluding on the basis of the draft text. Again, no consensus was reached, and negotiations were paused while a new chair was designated. In December 2025, Members designated a new chair and continue to consider the way forward for the negotiations.

Throughout 2025, in addition to taking a lead role in the fisheries subsidies negotiations and continuing to press for a meaningful outcome, the United States also supported technical deliberations on the working procedures for the new Committee on Fisheries Subsidies and for reporting templates to enable full implementation of the Agreement's transparency commitments. The United States continued to encourage other WTO Members to support the adoption of additional disciplines on fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, as well as greater transparency with respect to the use of forced labor on fishing vessels.

3. Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development

The United States engaged in the Committee on Trade and Development Special Session to ensure that any negotiations take into account U.S. priorities to oppose long-standing proposals by certain WTO Members to exclude developing countries from numerous WTO obligations to which they have already agreed.

D. COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS

The WTO Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) is the central oversight body for all WTO agreements related to trade in goods. It oversees the activities of 12 WTO committees: Agriculture, Antidumping Practices, Customs Valuation, Import Licensing, Information Technology, Market Access, Rules of Origin, Safeguards, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Technical Barriers to Trade, and Trade-Related Investment Measures, and the Working Party on State-Trading Enterprises. The CTG is the forum for discussing issues and decisions that may ultimately require the attention of the WTO General Council for resolution or a higher-level discussion, and for putting issues in a broader context of the rules and disciplines that apply to trade in goods.

In 2025, the CTG held formal meetings in April, July, and November. It also met informally in February, April, May, and October. The United States used the meetings to explain the basis for recent U.S. trade measures and to counter criticism from other Members, tying the U.S. actions to its efforts at meaningful and substantive WTO reform. The United States also identified Members who had not met their notification obligations and assisted developing Members in fulfilling their obligations.

1. Committee on Agriculture

The WTO Committee on Agriculture (CoA) is a vital instrument for the United States to monitor and seek compliance with the agricultural trade commitments undertaken by WTO Members. Under the AoA, Members agree to provide notifications of progress in meeting their commitments, and the CoA has met frequently to review the notifications and monitor activities of Members to ensure that trading partners honor their commitments.

In 2025, the CoA held formal meetings in March, June, September, and November to review progress on the implementation of commitments of the AoA. In 2025, 368 notifications were subject to review, and the United States raised 217 questions (or sets of questions) to other WTO Members. The United States participated actively in the review process and raised issues concerning the operation of other WTO Members' agricultural policies. Notably, the United States asked 50 questions to India regarding its public stockholding, subsidy schemes, export duties, and export restrictions. In addition, during CoA meetings, U.S. questions to other WTO Members covered topics relating to the People's Republic of China's (China) domestic subsidy measures for a variety of commodities, Pakistan's export restrictions on wheat and flour, the Philippines' tariff-rate quota (TRQ) program for certain agricultural products, the United Kingdom's post-Brexit farm subsidy schemes, and various WTO Members' TRQ administration policies, among other topics. In addition, the United States answered 49 questions from other WTO Members on a range of subjects, including various U.S. programs for disaster relief and emergency assistance, domestic support measures, and export promotion programs. Finally, in 2025, the CoA successfully completed the second triennial review of the operation of the Bali TRQ Decision, which established in 2013 mechanisms for Members to address chronic underfill of TRQs for agricultural products. The CoA also adopted a decision aimed at further increasing transparency in the notification and administration of TRQs.

2. Committee on Antidumping Practices

The Committee on Antidumping Practices oversees the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 (AD Agreement). This agreement sets forth detailed rules and disciplines prescribing the manner and basis on which Members may take action to offset the injurious dumping of products imported from another Member. In 2025, the United States participated in formal meetings in April and October, as well as an informal meeting in September, and activities of two subsidiary bodies: the Working Group on Implementation and the Informal Group on Anticircumvention. In the

formal meetings, the United States continued to advocate for Members to fulfill their requirements to submit timely notifications regarding their antidumping laws and regulations.

3. Committee on Customs Valuation

The Committee on Customs Valuation oversees the implementation of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994, commonly referred to as the Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA), which is intended to ensure that determinations of customs value for the calculation of duties on imported products are made in a fair, neutral, and uniform manner. CVA rules help prevent the use of arbitrary or fictitious, inflated customs values that could lead to an increase in total import duties and thus the total costs on imported products. Such practices can act as non-tariff barriers and impede market access.

In 2025, the Committee on Customs Valuation held formal meetings in May and November. The United States raised concerns on behalf of U.S. exporters across all sectors that have experienced difficulties with foreign customs agencies' application of their customs valuation and pre-shipment inspection regimes. The United States also raised awareness about the growing use of pre-shipment inspection procedures for conformity assessment purposes. The issue will now be discussed in meetings over the next year, which are anticipated to lead to greater transparency of these types of measures.

As of November 10, 2025, 149 Members had notified their national legislation on customs valuation, and 127 Members had provided responses to the "Implementation and Administration of the Agreement on Customs Valuation" checklist of issues. The United States continues to urge all Members to fulfill these notification requirements for the proper functioning of the CVA.

4. Committee on Import Licensing

The Committee on Import Licensing was established to administer the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures and to monitor compliance with the mutually agreed rules on import licensing procedures. The committee reviews information on import licensing submitted by WTO Members in accordance with the obligations set out in the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. The committee also serves as a forum for Members to submit questions on the licensing regimes of other Members, whether or not those regimes have been notified to the committee, and to address specific observations and complaints concerning Members' licensing systems.

In 2025, the committee held formal meetings in May and October. At both meetings, the United States raised concerns with licensing in India and Indonesia. Further, the United States continued to stress the importance of timely and complete notifications and Members' transparency within the committee. Additionally, the committee held informal meetings in March and September to discuss updates and implementation of the eAgenda online tool for development of the committee's meeting agenda.

5. Committee on Market Access

The Committee on Market Access (MA Committee) is responsible for the implementation of concessions related to tariffs and non-tariff measures that are not explicitly covered by another WTO body. This committee's work includes the verification of new concessions on market access in the goods area, the monitoring of quantitative restrictions on goods, and the operation of the WTO's Integrated Database of tariff and trade data. The MA Committee also provides a forum for Members to address market access issues, to exchange information and clarify issues, and to aim to resolve trade concerns.

In 2025, the MA Committee held formal meetings in May and October. During these meetings the United States raised specific market access concerns with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Indonesia, and Mexico. The United States also used the formal meetings to promote transparency by stressing the importance of timely and complete notifications of Members' quantitative restrictions. Additionally, the MA Committee held thematic discussions for Members to share experiences on enhancing supply chain resilience and to discuss "greening" the Harmonized System, or identifying goods using environmental characteristics, which is used to classify traded goods.

The MA Committee also held several informal meetings in 2025 to review technical transpositions of Members' tariff schedules to ensure tariff commitments are maintained as schedules are updated and modernized.

6. Committee on Rules of Origin

The Agreement on Rules of Origin is administered by the Committee on Rules of Origin, which in 2025 held meetings in April and November. The committee serves as a forum to exchange views on notifications by Members concerning their non-preferential rules of origin along with relevant judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application.

In 2025, the committee continued its discussion of the rules of origin applicable under trade preferences for least-developed countries.

7. Committee on Safeguards

The Committee on Safeguards administers the Safeguards Agreement, which established rules for the application of safeguard measures as provided in Article XIX of the GATT 1994. The Safeguards Agreement requires Members to notify the committee of their laws, regulations, and administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures. The agreement also requires Members to notify the committee of various safeguards actions, such as: (1) the initiation of an investigatory process; (2) a finding by a Member's investigating authority of serious injury or threat thereof caused by increased imports; (3) the taking of a decision to apply or extend a safeguard measure; and (4) the proposed application of a provisional safeguard measure.

In 2025, the committee held formal meetings in April and October, and one informal meeting in September. In the formal meetings, the United States continued to advocate for Members to fulfill their requirements to submit timely notifications regarding their safeguard laws and regulations. The United States, with other Members, also expressed concerns regarding the conduct of China's bovine meat safeguard investigation.

8. Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) provides a forum for review of the implementation and operation of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), consultation on Members' existing and proposed SPS measures, technical assistance, other informational exchanges, and the participation of the international standard setting bodies recognized in the SPS Agreement. These international standard setting bodies are: for food safety, the Codex Alimentarius Commission; for animal health, the World Organization for Animal Health; and for plant health, the International Plant Protection Convention.

The SPS Committee also discusses and provides guidelines on the SPS Agreement, which provides an opportunity to assist Members in meeting specific SPS obligations. For example, the SPS Committee has

issued procedures or guidelines regarding: notification of SPS measures; the “consistency” provision of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement; equivalence; transparency regarding the provisions for special and differential treatment; and regionalization.

In 2025, the SPS Committee held meetings in March, June, and November. The United States raised concerns regarding the adverse impact on U.S. food and agricultural exports resulting from particular SPS measures of other WTO Members. The United States continued to join a broad coalition of countries raising concerns with the European Union’s hazard-based pesticide policies, including the withdrawal of several pesticide maximum residue levels critical to international agricultural trade and measures that appear to restrict the ability of regulators in third countries to regulate based on local conditions. The United States also raised concerns about China’s delays in approving requests for new listing and reinstatement of export establishments.

The SPS Committee also concluded the Sixth Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement. The United States worked to ensure that the review reflected U.S. priorities related to transparency and international standard setting. Key recommendations from the review include establishment of a transparency working group, continued engagement with the international SPS standard setting organizations, and building on previous work to proactively address new SPS challenges and emerging SPS risks. In 2025, the SPS Committee also held thematic sessions on “Innovative Regulatory Approaches to Facilitate Safe Trade,” “Addressing Antimicrobial Resistance through SPS Measures in International Trade,” and “Science-Based Import Controls to Facilitate Safe Trade.”

9. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) provides rules and disciplines for the use of government subsidies and the application of remedies, through either WTO dispute settlement or countervailing duty (CVD) action taken by individual WTO Members, to address subsidized trade that causes harmful commercial effects. The SCM Agreement prohibits subsidies that are contingent upon export performance or the use of domestic over imported goods. In addition, the agreement provides that otherwise permitted subsidies are actionable (through CVD or WTO dispute settlement actions) if they are: (1) “specific” (*i.e.*, limited to a firm, industry, or group thereof within the territory of a WTO Member); and (2) found to cause adverse trade effects, such as material injury to a domestic industry or serious prejudice to the trade interests of another Member.

In 2025, the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures held regular and special meetings in April and October. At both of the regular meetings, the United States, Canada, the EU, Japan, and others sponsored an agenda item on how government subsidies have led to overcapacity. Members discussed a synthesis of research on subsidies and overcapacity in key industrial sectors and the impact of those subsidies, particularly from China, on developing and least-developed countries. The United States also continued to advocate for initiatives to enhance the transparency of Members’ subsidy regimes and reform the operations of the committee. The United States also sought information on programs for which China did not provide transparency.

10. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade

The Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) serves as a forum for Members’ consultation on issues associated with implementing and administering the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), which establishes rules and procedures regarding the development, adoption, and application of standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures for all products. The implementation issues include Members’ notification of proposed technical regulations and

conformity assessment procedures through [ePing](#), the public WTO SPS and TBT Platform. According to the WTO, the United States is home to the second-most users of ePing, with more than 1,400 users. In 2025, WTO Members made more than 4,200 notifications, with the United States notifying more than 350 proposed measures and follow-on actions. The United States and its stakeholders submitted comments on more than 200 notifications and follow-on actions, while receiving 25 comments on U.S. proposed measures and follow-on actions through the U.S. WTO TBT Enquiry Point.

The TBT Committee provides an opportunity for Members to discuss specific trade concerns (STCs) regarding technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures that a Member proposes or maintains. The TBT Committee also allows Members to discuss systemic issues affecting implementation of the TBT Agreement (*e.g.*, transparency, use of good regulatory practices, and regulatory cooperation), exchange information on Members' practices related to implementing the TBT Agreement, and receive updates from observing international organizations.

In 2025, the TBT Committee held formal meetings in March, June, and November, as well as informal meetings in February, May, and October. The formal meetings focused on raising STCs and implementing the TBT Committee's new workplan during the Tenth Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement. The meetings were held in person and via a virtual platform. In total, the United States formally raised 34 STCs. Informally and on a bilateral basis, the United States raised another 50 STCs and responded to six STCs.

The 2025 WTO TBT Committee held thematic discussions on: (1) international standards for critical and emerging technologies; (2) the role of metrology in facilitating trade; (3) regulatory impact assessment and trade related impacts; (4) special and differential treatment; (5) decarbonization standards; (6) traceability of bulk agricultural commodities; (7) food contact materials; and (8) regulatory cooperation on medical devices. The Committee also held its 11th Special Meeting on Information Exchange.

The Transparency Working Group within the TBT Committee has been steadily working informally to make all WTO TBT notifications electronic, with more specific menu options for WTO TBT Enquiry Points. As a result, WTO notifications are much easier to complete. The United States has noted improvements as a result of this activity, such as more frequent notification of: extensions for comments; revised proposals with additional comment periods; the final text of a measure; and enforcement dates and any delays of enforcement. Finally, the Committee engaged in informal sessions with the chairs of the Committee on Trade and Environment, Committee on Trade and Development, and the Committee on Information Technology Products to improve communication in areas of common interest.

11. Committee on Trade Facilitation

The Committee on Trade Facilitation implements and administers the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA), which established WTO trade rules to simplify customs and border procedures and reduce unwarranted border delays. The TFA is intended to reduce burdensome red tape and delays, which can have the effect of acting as non-tariff trade barriers. Implementation of the TFA is particularly important for small and medium-sized businesses.

In 2025, the committee held formal meetings in March, June, and December. These meetings facilitated experience sharing discussions among Members and also included dedicated sessions on transit issues and capacity building. The United States continued to work within the committee to address concerns related to Indonesia's imposition of customs duties on intangible products transmitted electronically. The United States also raised concerns with trading partners that maintain measures that reward customs officials directly from the proceeds of customs penalties, potentially leading to conflicts of interest that would impair focusing on illegitimate trade. The committee will conduct a second review of the operation and

implementation of the TFA in 2026, as required under Article 23.1.6 of the agreement and agreed to by the committee.

12. Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures

The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement) prohibits investment measures that are inconsistent with national treatment obligations under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, and reinforces the prohibitions on quantitative restrictions set out in Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The TRIMS Agreement requires the elimination of certain measures imposing requirements on, or linking advantages to, certain actions of foreign investors, such as measures that require, or provide benefits for, the use of local inputs (local content requirements) or measures that restrict a firm's imports to an amount related to the quantity of its exports or foreign exchange earnings (trade balancing requirements).

The Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures has been a forum to address concerns, gather information, and raise questions about the maintenance, introduction, or modification of trade-related investment measures by Members. In 2025, the committee held formal meetings in March and October. During the meetings, United States and other Members continued to discuss particular Members' measures that are of concern to the United States, such as Indonesia's local content requirements and Kazakhstan's preferential subsidies for domestically produced agricultural machinery.

13. Working Party on State Trading Enterprises

Article XVII of the GATT 1994 requires Members to ensure that state trading enterprises act in a manner consistent with the general principles of nondiscriminatory treatment and make purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations. WTO Members are required to submit new and full notifications to the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises for review every two years. In 2025, this working party held formal meetings in May and November, as well as an informal meeting in October. The United States continued to lead efforts in the working party to improve transparency and notifications among Members. The United States also garnered the support of 40 Members to promote transparency and encourage Members to make their required notifications within the working party, culminating in a joint statement that was presented at the November meeting.

E. COUNCIL FOR TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) monitors the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, provides a forum in which WTO Members can consult on intellectual property matters, and carries out the specific responsibilities assigned to the Council in the TRIPS Agreement.

The TRIPS Agreement sets minimum standards of protection for copyrights and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, integrated circuit layout designs, and undisclosed information. The TRIPS Agreement also establishes minimum standards for the enforcement of intellectual property rights through civil actions for infringement, actions at the border, and, at least with respect to cases of willful trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale, criminal actions. The TRIPS Agreement also provides a transition period for least-developed country WTO Members to apply the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, with the exception of provisions on national treatment and MFN treatment. This transition period, originally slated to end January 1, 2006, has been extended by the TRIPS Council until July 1, 2034.

In 2025, the TRIPS Council held formal meetings to consider its regular agenda in March, June, and November.

F. COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES

The Council for Trade in Services (CTS) oversees implementation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The work of the CTS includes a technical review of GATS Article XX:2 provisions; review of waivers from specific commitments pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement; a periodic review of developments in the air transport sector; the transitional review mechanism under Section 18 of China's Protocol of Accession; implementation of GATS Article VII; a review of Article II exemptions (to MFN treatment); and notifications made to the General Council pursuant to GATS Articles III:3, V:5, V:7, and VII:4. Four subsidiary bodies report to the CTS: (1) Committee on Trade in Financial Services (CTFS); (2) Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR); (3) Committee on Specific Commitments (CSC); and (4) Working Party on GATS Rules, which did not meet in 2025.

In 2025, the CTS held formal meetings in March, June, October, and December, and convened three informal thematic sessions. In March 2025, Members held a thematic session on Good Regulatory Practices. In October 2025, Members held a thematic session on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications. In December 2025, Members held a thematic session on the Green Services Economy and Sustainable Development.

The Special Session of the CTS, established to carry out the built-in negotiating agenda under Article XIX of the GATS, met in June, October, and December 2025.

In addition to technical review of the implementation of various articles of the GATS, the CTS also examines issues under the Work Program on Electronic Commerce. Members briefed the CTS and shared their experiences on policy developments in this area. As in past years, at the request of the United States and Japan, the CTS continued to discuss cybersecurity measures of China and Vietnam. Several Members joined the discussion to express concern about these measures, including their impact on foreign service suppliers and their potential inconsistency with national treatment obligations.

1. Committee on Trade in Financial Services

CTFS provides a forum for Members to explore financial services market access issues, including implementation of existing trade commitments. In 2025, the CTFS held formal meetings in March, June, October, and December. On September 29 and 30, the CTFS held a two-day informal session on Facilitating Digital Payment Systems and Remittance Services.

2. Working Party on Domestic Regulation; Joint Statement Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation

The Working Party on Domestic Regulation is responsible for implementation of GATS Article VI:4 on Domestic Regulation, which provides for Members to develop any necessary disciplines relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements and procedures. Although the Working Party did not meet in 2025, the United States was active in this area in 2025. In particular, throughout 2025, the United States advocated for Members that had joined the Joint Statement Initiative on Services Domestic Regulations (DR JSI) to fully incorporate the disciplines into their WTO services schedules. The DR JSI, which entered into force in 2024 for the first group of Members, focused

on increasing transparency, predictability, and efficiency of authorization procedures for service providers hoping to do business in foreign markets. As of December 31, 2025, the new disciplines had entered into force for 55 WTO Members, including the United States, and over 70 WTO Members had committed to implement the disciplines through their WTO services schedules.

3. Committee on Specific Commitments

CSC examines ways to improve the technical accuracy of scheduling commitments, primarily in preparation for the GATS negotiations, and oversees the application of the procedures for the modification of schedules under GATS Article XXI. The CSC also oversees implementation of commitments in WTO Members' schedules in all services sectors except financial services.

In 2025, the CSC held formal meetings in March, June, October, and December. In September 2025, the CSC held an informal session on Services Classification Related to the Environment.

G. OTHER GENERAL COUNCIL BODIES AND ACTIVITIES

1. Committee on Trade and Environment

The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) is a forum for discussion of a broad range of trade and environment issues.

In 2025, the CTE held regular meetings in April, July, and November, at which Members shared perspectives on various trade-related climate measures. The CTE also held thematic sessions on the margins of its regular meetings in April and November to advance understanding on environment-related technology transfer and sustainable agriculture. The CTE also continued informal discussions on trade-related climate measures, and the United States successfully pushed back against premature outcomes.

2. Committee on Trade and Development

The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) has a mandate to review the participation of developing country Members in the multilateral trading system. The CTD Regular Session focuses on technical cooperation and training, trade in commodities, market access in products of interest to developing countries, and the special concerns of least-developed countries, landlocked developing countries, and small economies.

In 2025, the CTD held regular meetings in March, June, October, and November, and held special workshops in December to advance Members' understanding of economic diversification and participation of developing countries in the global trade system. The United States continued to advocate for Member-driven discussions in the CTD, such as exchanges of information and experiences regarding effective capacity building partnerships.

3. Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions

The Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions reviews issues relating to balance-of-payments-related trade measures.

In 2025, the committee held regular meetings in May and November. Members did not bring to the committee's attention any trade-restrictive measure that a Member had attempted to use balance-of-payments to justify.

4. Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration

The Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration (Budget Committee) is responsible for providing Member oversight of the utilization of the Director-General's budget for the WTO Secretariat and for making budget and administrative recommendations to the General Council for Members' approval. The Budget Committee meets throughout the year to address the financial requirements of the WTO. In December 2025, it completed its review of the WTO Director-General's budget proposal for 2026-2027, which was approved by the General Council. Decisions on budgetary issues are taken by consensus. The United States is one of the most active participants in the Budget Committee, seeking to ensure that the WTO Secretariat provides sufficient transparency on all budget decisions.

Each Member is assessed a contribution based on its share of trade in goods, services, and intellectual property. In 2025, the United States was assessed 11.37 percent of the total budget assessment, or CHF 23,092,470 (approximately \$29.2 million as of December 31, 2025), which was the largest contribution to the WTO budget, followed by China.

For further discussion of the details required by Section 124 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 on the WTO's consolidated budget, see Annex V. Background Information on the World Trade Organization.

5. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements

The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) is charged with conducting reviews of regional trade agreements, customs unions, and various other agreements, including certain agreements between or among developing country Members, concerning trade in goods. Such agreements are authorized departures from the principle of MFN treatment.

In 2025, the CRTA held formal meetings in March, June, and December, and three informal meetings in September and October. At the meetings, the United States discussed potential functional improvements to the CRTA's operations.

6. Accessions to the World Trade Organization

The United States participated extensively in 2025 in formal and informal actions and discussions relating to requests from a number of countries to join, or "accede to," the WTO. Working Parties for the accession of Ethiopia and Uzbekistan met twice during the year, and Working Parties for the accessions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia each met once. The United States actively participated in these Working Parties to ensure that WTO accession standards remain high. Another applicant, Equatorial Guinea, submitted inputs to hold its first Working Party meeting in 2026, and Faroe Islands submitted a request to begin the accession process. The accession applications from a number of other countries were dormant in 2025.

7. Working Group on Trade, Debt, and Finance

The Working Group on Trade, Debt, and Finance was established to examine the relationship between trade, debt, and finance and provide a forum for assessment of certain development issues.

In 2025, the working group held one formal meeting and one informal meeting. In these meetings, Members discussed proposals by Pakistan and Egypt to examine the relationship between trade policies and debt management and, separately, to examine specific concerns raised by least-developed countries and net food-importing developing countries related to the financing of food imports. The United States engaged with other Members on how to improve Member-driven discussion in the Working Group, including exchanges of information and experiences. The United States also continued to call for full transparency from the Secretariat, consistent with the Secretariat's role in a Member-driven organization.

8. Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology

The Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology examines the relationship between trade and transfer of technology and assesses potential recommendations on proposals to increase flows of technology to developing countries. This working group held formal meetings in July and November of 2025, at which the United States worked to prevent overreach and duplication of work by the working group in light of ongoing discussions on technology transfer across the WTO.

9. Work Program on Electronic Commerce

The Work Program on Electronic Commerce engages in dedicated discussion on electronic commerce issues. At the 13th WTO Ministerial Conference in March 2024, Ministers agreed to extend the long-standing Work Program on Electronic Commerce and to maintain a moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions. This decision remains effective until the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference or March 31, 2026. In November 2025, the United States submitted a draft Ministerial Decision to extend on a permanent basis the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions. In 2025, Members engaged in dedicated discussions on electronic commerce issues, both in the context of the Work Program on Electronic Commerce and informal sessions involving outside experts.

H. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING

The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which is annexed to WTO Agreement, provides a mechanism to settle disputes under the WTO agreements.

The DSU is administered by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which consists of representatives of the entire membership of the WTO and is empowered to establish dispute settlement panels, adopt panel and appellate reports, oversee the implementation of panel recommendations adopted by the DSB, and authorize countermeasures. The DSB makes all of its decisions by consensus unless the DSU provides otherwise.

The DSB met twelve times in 2025 to oversee disputes, including through the establishment of new panels, the adoption of panel reports, the surveillance of implementation and recommendations adopted by the DSB, and to consider proposed additions to the roster of governmental and non-governmental panelists.

1. Dispute Settlement Reform

In 2025 the United States continued to raise long-held concerns about shortcomings and failings of the WTO dispute settlement system. The United States made clear its view that the dispute settlement system should be transparent, accessible, timely, restrained in its interpretations, and focused on resolving a specific dispute between two parties. The United States also emphasized that the dispute settlement system

should preserve the negotiated space for WTO Members to take the necessary domestic measures and provide confidence that the system equitably serves the interests of all Members.

With respect to the WTO Appellate Body, the United States made a series of statements at DSB meetings explaining that, for more than 20 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO Members and adding to or diminishing rights or obligations under the WTO Agreement.¹ Without WTO Members engaging with and addressing these critical issues, the United States was not prepared to agree to launch the process to fill vacancies on the Appellate Body, thereby allowing the Appellate Body to continue to hear appeals. Accordingly, there were no persons serving on the Appellate Body as of December 31, 2025.

2. Roster of Governmental and Non-Governmental Panelists

The WTO agreements and implementing documents provide requirements and criteria for selection of individuals to serve as panelists in WTO disputes. In 2025, a number of individuals were added to a roster of potential panelists, and the United States scrutinized the credentials of each individual to ensure his or her qualifications to serve as a dispute panelist.

Pursuant to the requirements of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 (URAA), the WTO panel roster is provided in the background information in Annex V. The list in the roster notes the areas of expertise of each roster member (*e.g.*, goods, services, or Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).

For further information, see Annex V. Background Information on the World Trade Organization.

3. Rules of Conduct for the Dispute Settlement Understanding

On December 3, 1996, the DSB adopted the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. A copy of the Rules of Conduct was printed in the Annual Report for 1996 and is available on the [WTO website](#). There were no changes to these rules in 2025.

The Rules of Conduct elaborate on the ethical standards built into the DSU to maintain the integrity, impartiality, and confidentiality of proceedings conducted under the DSU. The Rules of Conduct require all individuals called upon to participate in dispute settlement proceedings to disclose direct or indirect conflicts of interest prior to their involvement in the proceedings and to conduct themselves during their involvement in the proceedings so as to avoid such conflicts.

The coverage of the Rules of Conduct exceeds the goals established by the U.S. Congress in section 123(c) of the URAA, which directed USTR to seek conflict of interest rules applicable to persons serving on panels and members of the Appellate Body. The Rules of Conduct cover not only panelists and Appellate Body members, but also: (1) arbitrators; (2) experts participating in the dispute settlement mechanism (*e.g.*, the Permanent Group of Experts under the SCM Agreement); (3) members of the WTO Secretariat assisting a panel or assisting in a formal arbitration proceeding; and (4) members of the Secretariat supporting the Appellate Body.

¹ See, *e.g.*, U.S. Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (February 2020), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_World_Trade_Organization.pdf.

4. Dispute Settlement Activity in 2025

In 2025, a total of 9 requests for consultations were filed with respect to U.S. measures, including revisions to earlier requests. In addition, a number of disputes commenced prior to 2025 remained active in 2025.

For a discussion of those disputes in which the United States was a complainant or defendant during 2025, see Annex IV. Free Trade Agreement and World Trade Organization Enforcement.

I. TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY

The Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) is a subsidiary body of the General Council and is responsible for administering the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. The review mechanism examines domestic trade policies of each Member to strengthen Members' adherence to WTO provisions and to contribute to the smoother functioning of the WTO. The United States seeks to use trade policy reviews to improve the transparency of Members' trade and investment regimes, better enable least-developed countries to comply with their obligations under WTO agreements, and identify concerns about the policies and practices of its trading partners.

Common issues include:

- transparency in policy making and implementation;
- economic environment and trade liberalization;
- implementation of the WTO agreements;
- regional trade agreements and their relationship with the multilateral trading system;
- tariff issues, including the differences between applied and bound rates;
- customs valuation and customs clearance procedures;
- the use of trade remedy measures such as antidumping and countervailing duties;
- technical regulations and standards and their alignment with international standards;
- sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
- intellectual property rights legislation and enforcement;
- government procurement policies and practices;
- trade-related investment policy issues;
- sectoral trade policy issues, particularly liberalization in agriculture and certain services sectors; and
- technical assistance in implementing the WTO agreements and experience with Aid for Trade, and the Enhanced Integrated Framework.

The Member under review provides pertinent information to the WTO Secretariat, which produces a report on the trade policies and practices of the Member, accompanied by the Member's own report. Reports are publicly available on the WTO's [Documents Online database](#) under the document symbol WT/TPR. In a TPRB session, the WTO Member under examination provides information about its trade regime and other Members may react to the written reports and pose questions.

During the 2025 cycle, the TPRB reviewed 16 WTO Members: Australia, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Madagascar, Nepal, Norway, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Vanuatu, and Zambia. The United States participated in all reviews in 2025, and raised issues such as reducing tariffs and other trade barriers that limit U.S. exports, SPS regulations that are not fully science-based or that lack transparency (particularly those that block certain U.S. agricultural exports),

regulatory coherence and harmonization with international standards, the need to strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement, and missing or late WTO notifications.

J. PLURILATERALS

1. Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft

The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (Aircraft Agreement) is a plurilateral agreement that entered into force on January 1, 1980, and was subsequently included in Annex IV of the WTO Agreement. The rights and obligations under the Aircraft Agreement are limited to the Signatories, which includes the United States.² The Aircraft Agreement requires Signatories to eliminate tariffs on civil aircraft, engines, flight simulators, and related parts and components. It also establishes various obligations aimed at fostering free market forces. For example, signatory governments pledge that they will base their purchasing decisions strictly on technical and commercial factors.

In 2025, the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft held a formal meeting in October. At the meeting, Signatories discussed the work underway to update the Aircraft Agreement’s product coverage to reflect the most recent version of the Harmonized System, and issues related to strengthening transparency. The committee also continued to monitor Brazil’s accession to the Aircraft Agreement. In particular, although the committee had agreed in 2023 to terms of accession for Brazil, as of December 31, 2025, Brazil had not yet submitted the Aircraft Agreement, together with Brazil’s commitments, to its National Congress for approval.

2. Committee on Government Procurement

The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is a plurilateral agreement included in Annex IV of the WTO Agreement. Like the Aircraft Agreement, the rights and obligations of the GPA are limited to the parties to the agreement, which includes the United States and 48 other WTO Members.³

In 2025, the committee held formal meetings in March, October, and November, and informal meetings in March, June, and October. At the formal meetings, GPA Parties adopted a Decision regarding Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of Documents of the Committee on Government Procurement.

On October 15, 2025, the committee held an information-sharing workshop entitled “Women Entrepreneurs and Government Procurement: Lessons Learned.” Additional work was also done in the committee’s Work Programs on Sustainable Procurement, the Collection and Reporting of Statistical Data, and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.

² There are currently 33 Signatories to the Aircraft Agreement: Albania; Canada; Egypt; the EU (the following 19 EU Member States are also signatories in their own right: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden); Georgia; Japan; Macau; China; Montenegro; North Macedonia; Norway; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; the United Kingdom; and the United States. WTO Members with observer status in the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft are: Argentina; Australia; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cameroon; China; Colombia; Gabon; Ghana; India; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Israel; Mauritius; Nigeria; Oman; the Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Tajikistan; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Türkiye; and Ukraine. The International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development are also observers.

³ The WTO Members that are parties to the GPA are Armenia; Australia; Canada; the EU and its 27 Member States; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Israel; Japan; Republic of Korea; Liechtenstein; Moldova; Montenegro; the Netherlands with respect to Aruba; New Zealand; North Macedonia; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Ukraine; the United Kingdom; and the United States (collectively the GPA Parties).

3. Information Technology Agreement Committee

The Committee of the Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA Committee) oversees implementation of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), a plurilateral agreement to eliminate tariffs on certain information and communications technology (ICT) products. The ITA covers a wide range of ICT products, including computers and computer peripheral equipment, electronic components including semiconductors, computer software, telecommunications equipment, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and computer-based analytical instruments. As of December 31, 2025, 84 WTO Members were ITA participants. Morocco is a participant but has yet to submit the formal documentation to implement its ITA commitments.

In 2025, the ITA Committee held formal meetings in May and November, and informal meetings in March, May, July, and October. The United States raised concerns regarding implementation issues with respect to Indonesia and Egypt. As a result of sustained U.S. engagement, Indonesia addressed U.S. concerns and resolved the issue. Other issues discussed in the formal meetings in 2025 included reducing divergences of certain product classifications, and identifying possible future topics concerning non-tariff barriers. In November, the committee held a thematic session on “The Opportunities of ITA Participation: Participants’ and Stakeholders’ Experiences.”

In addition, individual participants in the ITA Committee, including the United States, met periodically in 2025 to discuss the ITA Expansion Agreement,⁴ and provided regular updates to the ITA Committee on the status of implementation.

K. SUBSIDIES MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT

1. Subsidies Enforcement

The SCM Agreement establishes multilateral disciplines on subsidies, including remedies for subsidies that have adverse effects not only in the importing country’s market, but also in the subsidizing government’s market and in third-country markets. The SCM Agreement also obligates all WTO Members to file biennial notifications of all specific subsidies that they maintain. This transparency is fundamental to assessing the nature and extent of Members’ subsidy programs, their likely impact on trade, and utilizing the remedies permitted under the SCM Agreement.

Before the SCM Agreement came into effect in 1995, the U.S. CVD law was, in effect, the only practical mechanism for U.S. companies to address subsidized foreign competition. The U.S. CVD law focuses exclusively on the effects of foreign subsidized competition in the United States. Although the procedures and remedies are different, the multilateral remedies under the SCM Agreement provide an alternative tool to address foreign subsidies that affect U.S. businesses.⁵

Section 281 of the URAA, and other authorities, set out the responsibilities of USTR and Commerce in enforcing U.S. rights in the WTO under the SCM Agreement. USTR coordinates the development and implementation of overall U.S. trade policy with respect to subsidy matters; represents the United States in the WTO, including in the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and in WTO

⁴ A subset of ITA participants concluded negotiations to expand significantly the product coverage of the ITA in 2015. Under the Declaration on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA Expansion Agreement) (WT/MIN(15)/25), each participant agreed to implement its initial tariff reductions for covered products beginning on July 1, 2016, subject to completion of its domestic procedural requirements.

⁵ The 2026 Subsidies Enforcement Annual Report to the Congress describes the actions by USTR and the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) to identify, monitor, and address trade-distorting foreign government subsidies.

dispute settlement relating to subsidies disciplines; and leads the interagency team on matters of policy. Commerce's Office of Enforcement and Compliance (E&C) enforces the CVD law and, in accordance with the URAA, pursues certain subsidies enforcement activities of the United States with respect to the SCM Agreement disciplines.

The E&C's Subsidies Enforcement Office (SEO) examines subsidy complaints and concerns raised by U.S. exporting companies and monitors foreign subsidy practices with respect to the impact on U.S. exports to foreign markets and the SCM Agreement. Once sufficient information about a subsidy practice has been gathered for it to be evaluated, USTR and Commerce confer with an interagency team to determine the best way to proceed. It is frequently advantageous to pursue resolution of these problems through a combination of informal and formal contacts. Remedies for breaches of the SCM Agreement may involve the withdrawal of a subsidy program or the elimination of the adverse effects of the program.

In 2025, USTR and E&C addressed numerous inquiries and met with representatives of U.S. industries concerned with the subsidization of foreign competitors. E&C officers stationed overseas (*e.g.*, in China), helped to gather, clarify, and check the accuracy of information concerning foreign subsidy practices.

The SEO's electronic subsidies database provides U.S. businesses with a centralized location to obtain information about the remedies available under the SCM Agreement and information that is needed to develop a CVD case or a WTO subsidies complaint. This database is accessible to the public through the [SEO website](#).

2. Monitoring and Challenging Foreign Antidumping, Countervailing Duty, and Safeguard Actions

Under the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement, WTO Members may impose AD duties or CVDs to offset material injury caused by dumping or subsidization of products exported from one Member to another. WTO Members must provide notice of such actions to the WTO. Twice per year, WTO Members also must notify to the WTO all AD and CVD actions they have taken during the preceding six months. These actions are identified in semiannual reports submitted for discussion in meetings of the relevant WTO committees. Finally, Members are required to notify to the WTO changes in their AD and CVD laws and regulations. The notifications may be accessed through the [WTO website](#).

The United States actively monitors and evaluates AD and CVD proceedings initiated by foreign countries, and where appropriate, participates in those proceedings to protect the interests of U.S. industry and provide comments concerning obligations under the WTO agreements. Further, E&C's Trade Remedy Compliance Staff (TRCS) tracks foreign AD and CVD actions, as well as safeguard actions involving U.S. exporters, enabling U.S. companies and U.S. Government agencies to monitor such actions. Information about foreign trade remedy actions that affect U.S. exports is accessible to the public on the [TRCS's website](#). The stationing of E&C officers to certain overseas locations, and close contacts with U.S. officials stationed in embassies worldwide, has also contributed to U.S. efforts to monitor foreign trade remedy proceedings that affect U.S. exports. In addition, E&C promotes fair treatment, transparency, and consistency with WTO obligations through technical exchanges and other bilateral engagements with other Members.

The United States works closely with U.S. companies affected by foreign countries' AD and CVD investigations to help them better understand WTO Members' AD and CVD systems. The United States also advocates on their behalf in connection with ongoing proceedings, with the goal of obtaining fair and objective treatment that is consistent with the WTO agreements. In addition, in CVD proceedings, the United States provides extensive information in response to questions from foreign governments regarding the subsidy allegations at issue.

In 2025, the United States closely monitored several trade remedy actions involving U.S. exports, including: (1) Brazil's AD investigation into polyethylene resin; (2) China's AD investigations into analog chips and pecans, and China's safeguards investigation into beef; (3) Canada's AD investigation into oil country tubular goods; (4) India's AD investigation into polyvinyl chloride suspension resins; (5) Canada's CVD investigation into renewable diesel; (6) the United Kingdom's CVD investigation into hydrotreated vegetable oil; and (7) Colombia's CVD investigation into milk powder.

V. TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

A. POLICY COORDINATION

The United States Trade Representative has primary responsibility, with the advice of the interagency trade policy organization, for developing and coordinating the implementation of U.S. trade policy, including on commodity matters (*e.g.*, coffee and rubber) and, to the extent they are related to trade, direct investment matters.

Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the U.S. Congress established an interagency trade policy mechanism to assist with the implementation of these responsibilities. This organization, as it has evolved, consists of tiers of interagency committees that constitute the principal mechanism for advising the U.S. Trade Representative.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) chairs and administers both the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) and the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC). The TPRG's membership is at the Deputy/Under Secretary level. The TPSC's membership is at the senior-civil-servant level. The 21 voting member agencies of the TPRG and TPSC are: USTR, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, State, Treasury, Labor, Justice, Defense, Interior, Transportation, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Office of Management and Budget; the Council of Economic Advisers; the Council on Environmental Quality; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the Small Business Administration; the National Economic Council; and the National Security Council. The U.S. International Trade Commission is a non-voting member of the TPSC and an observer at TPRG meetings. USTR may invite representatives of other agencies to attend meetings depending on the specific issues discussed.

Supporting the TPSC are over 100 subcommittees responsible for specialized issues. Through the TPSC process, USTR requests input and analysis from the subject matter experts of the appropriate TPSC subcommittee or task force. The conclusions and recommendations of the subcommittee or task force are presented to the TPSC. In cases where the TPSC does not reach consensus on a topic, or if the issue under consideration involves particularly significant policy questions, the issue may be referred to the TPRG or to Cabinet Principals.

The TPSC regularly seeks advice from the public on policy decisions and negotiations through *Federal Register* notices and public hearings.

In 2025, the TPSC held public hearings on: Nicaragua's Acts, Policies, and Practices regarding Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Rule of Law (January); the Special 301 Review (February); the People's Republic of China's (China) Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance (March); China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (March and May); the Annual Review of Country Eligibility for Benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act for Calendar Year 2026 (July); Brazil's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Digital Trade and Electronic Payment Services; Unfair, Preferential Tariffs; Anti-Corruption Enforcement; Intellectual Property Protection; Ethanol Market Access; and Illegal Deforestation (September); The Operation of the Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (December); and China's Implementation of Commitments Under the Phase One Agreement (December).

The TPSC also invited written comment from the public on a number of matters, including: Request for Comments To Assist in Reviewing and Identifying Unfair Trade Practices and Initiating All Necessary Actions To Investigate Harm From Non-Reciprocal Trade Arrangements (February); Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (February); Notice of Action and Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, Request for Comments (April); Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning the Annual Review of Country Eligibility for Benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act for Calendar Year 2026 (May); Request for Comments Regarding Foreign Nations Freeloading on American-Financed Innovation (May); Request for Comments Biennial Review of Country Eligibility for Benefits Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative for Calendar Year 2025 (June); Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning Russia’s Implementation of Its World Trade Organization Commitments (August); 2025 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy: Comment Request (August); Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning China’s Compliance With World Trade Organization Commitments (August); Request for Comments on Significant Foreign Trade Barriers for the 2026 National Trade Estimate Report (September); Request for Comments on Whether Particular Exclusions in the Section 301 Investigation of China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Warrant Further Extension (September); Request for Public Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Relating to the Operation of the Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (September); Notice of Modification and Proposed Modification Section 301 Action China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (October); Request for Comments Concerning Action Pursuant to Section 301: Nicaragua’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Labor Rights, Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Rule of Law (October); Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: China’s Implementation of Commitments Under the Phase One Agreement; Notice of Hearing; and Request for Public Comments (October); Notification of the Third United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement Labor Council Meeting (November); Request for Comments on Suspending Section 301 Action for One Year: China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (November); Request for Comments Concerning the Operation of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement with Respect to Trade in Automotive Goods (December); and Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Regarding the 2026 Special 301 Review (December). All written comments (not containing business confidential information) are posted on [Regulations.gov](https://www.regulations.gov) to ensure transparency.

B. TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC INPUT

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has drawn on congressional direction and advice from a wide array of diverse stakeholders including business, labor, agriculture, civil society, and the general public. USTR has sought to broaden opportunities for public input and has worked to ensure the transparency of trade policy through various initiatives carried out by USTR’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Engagement (IAPE).

The Office of IAPE works with USTR’s Offices of Public and Media Affairs and Congressional Affairs to coordinate with USTR’s 13 regional and functional offices, the Office of WTO and Multilateral Affairs, the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Trade Policy Coordination, and the Office of Economic Affairs to ensure that timely trade information is available to the public and disseminated widely to stakeholders. This is accomplished in part via USTR’s interactive website and social media accounts, online postings of *Federal Register* notices soliciting public comment and input, participation in public hearings held by the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), and stakeholder consultation and interaction with negotiators during trade negotiations. The Office of IAPE manages the agency’s outreach to and engagement with a diverse

set of stakeholder sectors, including, among others: a broad array of businesses and trade associations; agriculture groups; state local, and tribal governments; labor unions; environmental organizations; small and medium-sized enterprises; consumer advocacy groups; non-governmental organizations; academia; civil society; and think tanks. The Office of IAPE also provides regular updates to help the public understand and evaluate the role of trade, and participates in discussions of trade policy at major domestic trade events and academic conferences. In addition to public outreach, the Office of IAPE is responsible for administering USTR's statutory advisory committee system, created by the U.S. Congress under the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, as well as facilitating consultations with state local, and Tribal governments regarding the President's trade priorities and the status of trade negotiations that may affect them or touch upon state, and local, and Tribal government policies. Each of these elements is discussed below.

1. Transparency

The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (2015 TPA) set a goal of improving congressional oversight of negotiations and enforcement, encouraging public participation in policymaking, broadening stakeholder access and input, and ensuring senior-level institutional attention to transparency across the range of USTR's work. While the transparency provisions contained in the 2015 TPA have expired, USTR signaled its intention to continue to abide by a high transparency standard in the May 2021 Transparency Principles. USTR remains committed to make strides in accomplishing these transparency goals:

- During 2025, USTR continued to follow the May 2021 Transparency Principles during the day-to-day operations of USTR. These principles reflect USTR's long-standing commitment to comprehensive public engagement as it develops and implements a trade policy that advances the interests of all Americans. In the 2021 Transparency Principles, USTR committed to adhere to the Guidelines for Consultation and Engagement developed and adopted in October 2015, among other things, pursuant to the terms of the 2015 TPA.
- Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Jeffrey Goettman, serves as the Chief Transparency Officer (CTO) and is responsible for the agency's efforts to put the Transparency Principles into action and with identifying further opportunities for improving transparency in the development of U.S. trade policy. The position of the CTO was created by 2015 TPA and charges the official with taking concrete steps to increase transparency in trade negotiations, engage with the public, and consult with Congress on transparency policy.
- To broaden access to negotiating texts and further encourage congressional participation, in 2025 USTR made negotiating texts available to Members of Congress and their appropriately cleared staff, including professional staff with an appropriate security clearance of the Committees of Finance and Ways and Means, professional staff with an appropriate security clearance from other Committees interested in reviewing text relevant to that Committee's jurisdiction, the personal office staff of any Member of the Committees on Finance and Ways and Means with an appropriate security clearance, and personal office staff with an appropriate security clearance accompanying any Member of Congress. Where appropriate, any Member of the House or Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations, or any Member designated a congressional advisor on trade policy and negotiations by the Speaker of the House or the President *pro tempore* of the Senate (in both cases after consultation with the Chairman and Ranking Member of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction), and up to three professional staff with an appropriate security clearance from each of the Committees on Finance and Ways and Means is accredited to negotiating rounds. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and at the request of Congress, USTR improved access to classified text using a secure website.

2. Public Outreach

Federal Register Notices Seeking Public Input/Comments and Public Hearings

In 2025, USTR published approximately 42 *Federal Register* notices to solicit public comment on negotiations and policy decisions on a wide range of issues. Public comments received in response to *Federal Register* notices are available for inspection at www.regulations.gov. In addition, USTR also held public hearings or invited written comment from the public, as appropriate, regarding a variety of trade policy initiatives.

Open Door Policy

USTR officials, including the U.S. Trade Representative and staff in the Office of IAPE, conducted outreach with a broad array of stakeholders, including agricultural commodity groups and farm associations, labor unions, environmental organizations, businesses, trade associations, state and local governments, think tanks, and academics to discuss specific trade policy issues. USTR staff engaged in ongoing reciprocal trade agreement negotiations engaged regularly with stakeholders regarding the objectives, progress, and goals of those negotiations.

3. The Trade Advisory Committee System

Congress established the trade advisory committee system to ensure that U.S. trade policy and trade negotiating objectives adequately reflect U.S. public and private sector interests. The system is a central means of ensuring that USTR's senior officials and line negotiators receive ideas, input, and critiques from a wide range of public interests. The system now consists of 27 advisory committees, with a total membership of up to approximately 500 advisors. Advisory committee members represent a wide range of sectors and interests, including: manufacturing; agriculture; digital trade; intellectual property; services; small businesses; labor; environment, consumer, and public health organizations; and state and local governments.

USTR manages the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy Negotiations; the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee; the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa; and the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee. USTR co-manages the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee and the Seasonal and Perishable Agricultural Products Advisory Committee with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. USTR co-manages the Labor Advisory Committee with the U.S. Department of Labor. USTR also co-manages 20 technical and sectoral advisory committees organized by industry and agriculture in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, respectively.

The trade advisory committees provide information and advice on U.S. negotiating objectives, the operation of trade agreements, and other matters arising in connection with the development, implementation, and administration of U.S. trade policy.

Recommendations for candidates for committee membership are collected from a number of sources, including associations and organizations, publications, other federal agencies, responses to *Federal Register* notices, and self-nominated individuals who have demonstrated an interest in, and knowledge of, U.S. trade policy. Membership selection is based on qualifications, balance of sectors and geography represented, and the needs of the specific committee to maintain a balance of the perspectives represented. Committee members are required to have a security clearance in order to serve and have access to confidential trade documents on a secure encrypted website. Committees meet regularly in Washington,

D.C., as well as in conference call and videoconference meetings, to provide input and advice to USTR and other agencies. Members pay for their own travel and related expenses.

For additional information on the advisory committees, see the [USTR website](#).

Tier I: President’s Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations

As the highest-level committee in the system, the President’s Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) examines U.S. trade policy and agreements from the broad context of the overall national interest. The ACTPN consists of no more than 45 members, who are broadly representative of the key sectors of the economy affected by trade, as well as representatives of non-federal governments, labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, retailers, and consumer interests. The President appoints ACTPN members to four-year terms not to exceed the duration of the charter.

A list of all the ACTPN members and the diverse interests they represent is available on the [USTR website](#).

Tier II: Policy Advisory Committees

Members of the five policy advisory committees are appointed by the U.S. Trade Representative or in conjunction with other Cabinet officers. The Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade, the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee, and the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa are appointed and managed solely by USTR. Each committee provides advice based upon the perspective of its specific area, and its members are chosen to represent the diversity of interests in those areas.

A list of all the members of the Committees and the diverse interests they represent is available on the [USTR website](#).

Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee

The Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC) is designed to represent a broad spectrum of agricultural interests, including the interests of farmers, ranchers, processors, renderers, and public advocates, for the range of food and agricultural products grown and produced in the United States. Members serve at the discretion of the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. Trade Representative. The Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. Trade Representative jointly appoint a maximum of 40 members to four-year terms.

Seasonal and Perishable Agricultural Products Advisory Committee

The Seasonal and Perishable Agricultural Products Advisory Committee (SPAPAC) was established in 2024 to provide advice and recommendations to the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture in connection with U.S. trade policy that concerns administrative actions and legislation that would promote the competitiveness of southeastern U.S. producers of seasonal and perishable agricultural products. The SPAPAC consists of members who have expertise in general trade, investment, and development issues, and represent the views and interests of southeastern U.S. producers of seasonal and perishable agricultural products. The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. Trade Representative jointly appoint a maximum of 25 members to four-year terms not to exceed the duration of the charter.

Labor Advisory Committee

The Labor Advisory Committee (LAC) consists of not more than 30 members from the U.S. labor community appointed by the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Secretary of Labor, acting jointly.

Members represent unions from all sectors of the economy including steel, automotive, aerospace, farmworkers, teachers, pilots, artists, machinists, service workers, and food and commercial workers. Members are appointed by, and serve at the discretion of, the U.S. Secretary of Labor and the U.S. Trade Representative.

Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade

The Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade (IGPAC) consists of not more than 35 members appointed from, and representative of, the various states and other non-federal governmental entities within the jurisdiction of the United States. These entities include, but are not limited to, the executive and legislative branches of state, county, and municipal governments. Members may hold elective or appointive office. Members are appointed by, and serve at the discretion of, the U.S. Trade Representative.

Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee

The Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC) consists of not more than 35 members, including, but not limited to, representatives from environmental interest groups, industry, services, academia, and non-federal governments. The Committee is designed to be broadly representative of key sectors and groups of the economy with an interest in trade and environmental policy issues. Members of the Committee are appointed by, and serve at the discretion of, the U.S. Trade Representative.

Trade Advisory Committee on Africa

The Trade Advisory Committee on Africa (TACA) consists of not more than 30 members, including, but not limited to, representatives from industry, labor, investment, agriculture, services, academia, and non-profit development organizations. The members of the Committee are appointed to be broadly representative of key sectors and groups with an interest in trade and development in sub-Saharan Africa, including non-profit organizations, producers, and retailers. Members of the committee are appointed by, and serve at the discretion of, the U.S. Trade Representative.

Tier III: Technical and Sectoral Committees

The 20 technical and sectoral advisory committees are organized into the two areas of agriculture and industry. Representatives are appointed jointly by the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Secretaries of Agriculture or Commerce, respectively. Each sectoral or technical committee represents a specific sector, commodity group, or functional area and provides specific technical advice concerning the effect that trade policy decisions may have on its sector or issue.

Agricultural Technical Advisory Committees

There are six Agricultural Technical Advisory Committees (ATACs) focusing on the following products: (1) Animals and Animal Products; (2) Fruits and Vegetables; (3) Grains, Feed, Oilseeds, and Planting Seeds; (4) Processed Foods; (5) Sweeteners and Sweetener Products; and (6) Tobacco, Cotton, Peanuts, and Hemp. Members of each committee are appointed by, and serve at the discretion of, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. Trade Representative. Members must represent a U.S. entity with an interest in agricultural trade and should have expertise and knowledge of agricultural trade as it relates to policy and commodity-specific products. In appointing members to the committees, balance is achieved and maintained by assuring that the members appointed represent entities across the range of agricultural interests that will be directly affected by the trade policies of concern to the committee (*e.g.*, farm producers,

farm and commodity organizations, processors, traders, and consumers). Geographical balance on each committee is also sought.

A list of all the members of the committees and the interests they represent is available on the [U.S. Department of Agriculture](#) website.

Industry Trade Advisory Committees

There are 15 industry trade advisory committees (ITACs). As of December 31, 2025, those committees are: Aerospace Equipment (ITAC 1); Automotive Equipment and Capital Goods (ITAC 2); Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Health/Science Products and Services (ITAC 3); Consumer Goods (ITAC 4); Critical minerals and Nonferrous Metals (ITAC 5); Digital Economy (ITAC 6); Energy and Energy Services (ITAC 7); Forest Products and Building Materials (ITAC 8); Small, Minority, and Woman-led Business (ITAC 9); Services (ITAC 10); Steel (ITAC 11); Textiles and Clothing (ITAC 12); Customs Matters and Trade Facilitation (ITAC 13); Intellectual Property Rights (ITAC 14); and Standards and Technical Trade Barriers (ITAC 15). Additionally, there is a Committee of Chairs of the Industry Trade Advisory Committees, which is comprised of the Chairs of the 15 ITACs.

Members of the ITACs are appointed jointly by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative and serve at their discretion. Membership on the Committee of Chairs is automatically conferred by virtue of being elected Chair of an ITAC. Each of the committees consists of not more than 50 members representing diverse interests and perspectives, which may include, but are not limited to, labor unions, manufacturers, exporters, importers, service suppliers, producers, and representatives of small and large businesses. Committee members should have knowledge and experience in their industry or interest area and represent a U.S. entity that has an interest in trade matters related to the sectors or subject matters of concern to the individual committees. In appointing members to the committees, balance is ensured in terms of points of view, geography, and entity or organization size.

A list of all the members of the committees and the diverse interests the committees and their respective memberships represent is available on the [U.S. Department of Commerce](#) website.

4. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are key engines for U.S. economic growth, jobs, and innovation. USTR is focused on enhancing the benefits of trade for U.S. SMEs by removing foreign tariff and non-tariff barriers; helping small businesses to take advantage of new markets abroad; and helping them to onshore production to the United States, strengthen domestic supply chains, and support jobs at home. During 2025, USTR negotiated with foreign governments to open their markets and enforced existing U.S. trade agreements to expand market access for U.S. workers and businesses of all sizes. USTR worked to better integrate specific SME issues and priorities into trade policy development, increased outreach to SMEs around the country, and expanded interagency collaboration and coordination on SME trade issues.

In 2025, USTR continued to engage with its interagency partners and trading partners to develop and implement new and ongoing initiatives that support small business exports. USTR supported efforts to help more SMEs reach overseas markets by improving information availability, leveraging new technology applications, and empowering local export efforts. USTR worked closely with the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), the U.S. Department of Commerce, and other agencies that help provide U.S. SMEs with information, assistance, and counseling on specific export opportunities. In 2025, USTR undertook a range of actions in support of the SME Initiative.

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise-Related Trade Policy Activities

Unfair tariff and non-tariff barriers, lack of transparency relating to relevant regulations, and unduly burdensome customs procedures in foreign markets present particular challenges for U.S. SMEs exporting abroad. Under the SME Initiative, USTR's Small Business, Market Access & Industrial Competitiveness office, regional offices, and functional offices pursued initiatives and advanced efforts to address these issues.

U.S. trade agreements, as well as other trade dialogues and fora, provide a critical opportunity to address specific concerns of U.S. SMEs and facilitate their participation in export markets. For example:

- The negotiations on the Agreements on Reciprocal Trade address a wide array of foreign trade barriers that unfairly burden U.S. small businesses. These obligations require trading partners to take act in a manner that will help U.S. small businesses and manufacturers to increase U.S. exports, expand business opportunities, and help reduce the goods trade deficit. These provisions include eliminating or decreasing a range of tariff barriers across key goods sectors; breaking down non-tariff barriers for U.S. industrial exports, including by streamlining regulatory requirements and approvals for U.S. exports, such as accepting automotive parts built to U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and emissions standards and accepting U.S.-manufactured medical devices marketed in the United States; advancing trade facilitation measures; preventing barriers to digital trade, including through support of a permanent multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions; adopting and implementing good regulatory practices; and protecting intellectual property and enforcing intellectual property laws.

For additional information on SME activities, please see Chapters II.A.7. United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement; II.B.7. (Europe and Middle East) Other Agreements and Trade Activities; III.C. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum; and IV.A. (The World Trade Organization) Introduction.

Small Business Resources

- In 2025, USTR together with SBA, Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection, Department of Agriculture, Department of State, and the Export-Import Bank of the United States collaborated to produce a Small Business Resources Document to assist small business seeking to expand their exports and help small businesses to onshore their production to the United States, find U.S. suppliers, and strengthen our domestic supply chains. For example, SBA's [Make Onshoring Great Again Portal](#) is a free tool designed to help small businesses identify U.S. manufacturers and producers. With a database of more than 1 million American suppliers, the searchable portal empowers job creators to source domestic suppliers to support their operations. Sourcing through domestic supply chains shortens lead times, improves quality control, and reduces exposure to overseas disruptions. The Small Business Resources document may be found on the [USTR website](#).
- The U.S. Department of Commerce's Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) Supplier Scouting service assists U.S. small businesses in identifying domestic suppliers with capabilities from across the country. Small businesses that could benefit from a no-cost national search to identify a new supplier or contract manufacturer can complete the Supplier Scouting Opportunity Synopsis Form. Supplier Scouting service leverages MEP National Network's knowledge of and connections to U.S. manufacturers' capabilities, capacities, and business interests nationwide to increase domestic sourcing for manufacturing supply chains

and fill critical supply chain needs, in sectors such as defense and aerospace, food, medical equipment and supplies, construction, energy, and transportation and infrastructure. The MEP supplier scouting form may be found on the [MEP website](#).

USTR also participated in the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee's Small Business Working Group, collaborating with agencies such as SBA, the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State, and the U.S. Export-Import Bank to promote small business exports, including by connecting SMEs to trade information and resources to help them begin or expand their exports and take advantage of existing trade agreements. This work also involved improving U.S. Government digital outreach and engagement with potential small business exporters with online tools.

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Outreach and Consultations

In 2025, USTR regularly consulted with the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Small, Minority, and Women-led Business (ITAC-9) to seek its advice and input on U.S. trade policy negotiations and initiatives and met frequently with individual SMEs and associations representing SME members on specific issues. USTR briefed SMEs at several SME events in 2025 regarding U.S. trade priorities, including at the annual America's Small Business Development Center Conference in Orlando, Florida; the National Association of District Export Councils Trade Policy Committee meetings; and other events aimed at encouraging SMEs to begin or expand their exports and onshore manufacturing.

5. State, Local, and Tribal Government Relations

USTR maintains consultative procedures between federal trade officials and state, and local, and tribal governments. USTR informs the states, on an ongoing basis, of trade-related matters that directly relate to, or that may have a direct effect on, them. U.S. territories may also participate in this process. USTR also serves as a liaison point in the Executive Branch for state and local government and federal agencies to transmit information to interested state and local governments, and relay advice and information from the states on trade-related matters. This is accomplished through a number of mechanisms, detailed below.

Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade

USTR works closely with the IGPAC made up of various state, local, and tribal officials. The IGPAC makes recommendations to USTR and the Administration on trade policy matters from the perspective of state, and local, and Tribal governments. IGPAC members are also invited to participate in periodic teleconference briefings.

Meetings of State, Local, Business, and Trade Associations

USTR officials participate frequently in meetings of state and local government associations and local business and trade associations to apprise them of relevant trade policy issues and solicit their views. USTR staff and senior officials regularly meet with Governor's offices, governor associations, and, state, and local commissions and organizations.

Consultations Regarding Specific Trade Issues

USTR consults with states and localities on issues arising under the WTO and other U.S. trade agreements and frequently responds to requests for information from state and local governments.

6. Freedom of Information Act

USTR is subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a law that provides the public with a right of access to federal agency records except to the extent those records are protected from disclosure under particular FOIA exemptions or exceptions. Detailed information about the USTR FOIA program is available on the [USTR website](#). The number of FOIA requests USTR received in fiscal year 2025 increased from 135 requests in fiscal year 2024 to 170 requests. Over the course of fiscal year 2025 USTR processed 116 FOIA requests. The USTR FOIA Office demonstrated its ongoing commitment to transparency by, among other things, maintaining an average processing time below the U.S. Government-wide average despite the increase in number of large and multifaceted FOIA requests. In addition, the USTR FOIA Office proactively added links to certain materials in anticipation of high public interest, such as the confidentiality arrangements with trade negotiating partners. The USTR FOIA Office also updated frequently requested records including USTR's FOIA logs on a periodic basis. Proactively disclosed information is available in the [USTR FOIA Library](#).

C. CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS

In 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) had one of its most productive years on record. Implementing President Trump's America First Trade Policy was, and continues to be, an agency-wide effort requiring continuous engagement with Congressional partners. USTR facilitated over 1,000 touchpoints with members of Congress, congressional staff, and local stakeholders, ensuring that Congress and the wider public continued to be informed on the President's trade agenda. USTR also briefed members of Congress and their staff on issues relating to USTR's work on a regular basis.

The U.S. Trade Representative reported to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means on the President's trade policy during public hearings in April 2025. Additionally, USTR began the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement Joint Review statutory consultation process in September 2025, and USTR delivered his report to members of both committees of jurisdiction in December 2025.

USTR staff hosted regular briefings on presidential tariff actions, ongoing Agreements on Reciprocal Trade negotiations, and USTR enforcement efforts with Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committee staff throughout 2025.

ANNEX I

ANNEX I: U.S. TRADE IN 2025

I. 2025 OVERVIEW

During 2025, the global economy expanded at an estimated 3.3 percent in real terms, while trade of goods and services grew at 4.1 percent. This modest growth in world output and total trade during 2025 represented a continued slowdown from sharp increases in both measures in 2021, when recovery from the worst of the pandemic was beginning, and during 2022, when output and trade began to moderate at 3.6 percent and 5.7 percent, respectively. Normalization of output and trade growth during 2025 coincided with global moderation in consumer prices.¹

Total U.S. trade (exports and imports of goods and services) increased 5.4 percent (\$397.6 billion) to \$7.8 trillion in 2025,² following an increase of 5.9 percent in 2024 (*Figure 1*). U.S. exports of goods and services increased 6.2 percent (\$199.8 billion) in 2025, making for a marked rise in 2025 from the 1.1 percent and 4.5 percent increases in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Goods exports increased 5.7 percent (\$117.7 billion) in 2025 and services exports increased 7.1 percent (\$82.1 billion). U.S. imports of goods and services increased 4.8 percent (\$197.8 billion) in 2025. U.S. imports of goods increased 4.3 percent (\$143.2 billion) and U.S. imports of services increased 6.5 percent (\$54.5 billion).

Total U.S. trade as a share of GDP was 25.2 percent in 2025, similar to 2024, but down from 27.0 percent in 2022, and well below the 30-percent levels reached during the 2011-2013 period (*Figure 2*). In 2025, U.S. exports represented 11.2 percent of U.S. GDP, up slightly from 11.0 percent in 2024. U.S. imports represented 14.1 percent of U.S. GDP in 2025, similar to 2024.³

In real terms, U.S. trade was up 2.3 percent in 2025, below the 4.9 percent increase in 2024.⁴ Real U.S. exports of goods and services were up 3.2 percent in 2025, compared to an increase of 2.2 percent in 2024, while real U.S. imports of goods and services were up 4.2 percent in 2025, compared to an increase of 5.2 percent in 2024. U.S. exports of goods and services contributed 0.18 percentage points to U.S. GDP growth of 2.2 percent in 2025.

The U.S. deficit in goods and services trade decreased by \$2.1 billion (0.2 percent) in 2025 to \$901.5 billion. As a share of GDP, the U.S. goods and services deficit decreased from 3.1 percent in 2024 to 2.9 percent in 2025, and remained below its high of 5.5 percent in 2006.

The U.S. deficit in goods trade alone increased 2.1 percent (\$25.5 billion) to \$1.24 trillion in 2025. The U.S. services trade surplus increased, up 8.9 percent (\$27.6 billion) to \$339.5 billion in 2025. As a share of GDP, the U.S. goods deficit fell from 4.1 percent in 2024 to 4.0 percent in 2025, and the U.S. services surplus was 1.1 percent in 2025, similar to 2024.


¹ IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2026.

² On a balance of payments (BOP) basis.

³ The broadest measure of commercial trade is from the U.S. Current Account and includes goods and services as well as earnings/payments on foreign investment and current transfers. Earnings are considered trade because they are the payment made/received to foreign/U.S. residents for the service rendered by the use of foreign/U.S. capital. Based on the Current Account, trade increased by 5.3 percent in the first three quarters of 2025 (latest data available) and represented an annualized estimate of 37.1 percent of GDP (based on the first 3 quarters of 2025), from 37.3 percent in full year 2024.


⁴ On a National Income Products Account basis.

Figure 1 - Value of Goods and Services Trade, Exports, Imports and Total



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

Figure 2 - Goods and Services Trade as a Share of GDP, Exports, Imports and Total Trade



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

II. THE U.S. TRADE BALANCE

The U.S. deficit in goods and services trade⁵ decreased 0.2 percent (\$2.1 billion) in 2025 to \$901.5 billion. The U.S. goods and services deficit decreased as a share of GDP, from 3.1 percent in 2024 to 2.9 percent in 2025, and remained substantially lower than the record high of 5.5 percent in 2006.

The U.S. deficit in goods trade alone increased 2.1 percent (\$25.5 billion) from \$1.22 trillion in 2024 (4.1 percent of GDP) to \$1.24 trillion in 2025 (4.0 percent of GDP). The U.S. surplus in services trade increased 8.9 percent (\$27.6 billion), from \$311.9 billion in 2024 (1.1 percent of GDP), to a high of \$339.5 billion in 2025 (1.1 percent of GDP).

Table 1 - U.S. Trade Balances						
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
U.S. Trade Balances as a share of GDP						
Goods and Services	-3.0%	-3.5%	-3.5%	-2.8%	-3.1%	-2.9%
Goods	-4.3%	-4.6%	-4.5%	-3.8%	-4.1%	-4.0%
Services	1.2%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%
U.S. Trade Balances with the World (\$Billions)						
Goods and Services	-646.0	-837.3	-923.7	-774.2	-903.5	-901.5
Goods	-912.9	-1,083.2	-1,174.6	-1,057.5	-1,215.4	-1,240.9
Services	266.8	245.9	250.8	283.3	311.9	339.5

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

III. EXPORTS

U.S. exports of goods and services increased 6.2 percent (\$199.8 billion) in 2025 to a record \$3.4 trillion, and were up 58.0 percent since 2020 (*Table 2*). U.S. goods exports increased 5.7 percent (\$117.7 billion) to \$2.2 trillion, while U.S. services exports increased 7.1 percent (\$82.2 billion) to a record \$1.2 trillion.

⁵ On a balance of payments basis.

Table 2 - U.S. Exports					
	Value (\$Billions)			% Change	
	2020	2024	2025	20-25	24-25
Total Goods and Services	2,172.8	3,232.5	3,432.3	58.0%	6.2%
Goods on a BOP Basis	1,433.9	2,079.8	2,197.5	53.3%	5.7%
Foods, Feeds, Beverages	139.3	165.8	161.0	15.6%	-2.9%
Industrial Supplies	466.5	727.9	783.7	68.0%	7.7%
Capital Goods	463.2	646.4	710.3	53.4%	9.9%
Autos and Auto Parts	129.4	172.2	155.4	20.1%	-9.8%
Consumer Goods	175.0	260.1	269.2	53.9%	3.5%
Other Goods	56.8	89.3	105.8	86.3%	18.4%
Petroleum	131.1	280.4	254.3	94.0%	-9.3%
Manufacturing	1,172.7	1,647.4	1,763.8	50.4%	7.1%
Agriculture	155.1	184.3	178.9	15.3%	-2.9%
Services	739.0	1,152.7	1,234.9	67.1%	7.1%
Maintenance and repair services	19.9	35.5	43.8	120.3%	23.3%
Transport	57.5	102.2	104.9	82.6%	2.6%
Travel	72.5	213.8	213.2	194.1%	-0.3%
Construction	2.5	2.5	2.7	7.4%	6.4%
Insurance services	20.0	28.2	30.8	53.6%	9.3%
Financial services	150.8	194.5	208.8	38.4%	7.4%
Charges for the use of intellectual property	123.6	169.5	191.4	54.8%	12.9%
Telecom, computer, and information	60.3	90.8	100.6	66.9%	10.8%
Other business services	190.6	263.9	290.0	52.2%	9.9%
Personal, cultural, and recreational services	19.4	21.1	23.1	19.3%	9.4%
Government goods and services	22.0	30.8	25.6	16.5%	-16.8%

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Balance of Payments basis for total, Census basis for goods sectors.

A. U.S. Goods Exports

U.S. goods exports increased 5.7 percent (\$117.7 billion) in 2025 to \$2.2 trillion (*Table 2*). Goods exports accounted for 64 percent of total goods and services exports in 2025. U.S. manufacturing exports, which accounted for 80.3 percent of total goods exports, increased 7.1 percent (\$116.4 billion) in 2025 to \$1.8 trillion. Agricultural exports, which accounted for 8.1 percent of total goods exports, decreased 2.9 percent (\$5.4 billion) to \$178.9 billion.

Of the major end-use goods sectors, U.S. export growth in 2025 ranged from a 3.5 percent increase for consumer goods to an 18.4 percent increase for “Other Goods.” Exports of capital goods and industrial goods increased by 9.9 percent and 7.7 percent respectively, in 2025 compared to 2024.

Over the last five years (2020 to 2025), U.S. goods exports have increased 53.3 percent (\$763.6 billion). Over the same period, U.S. agricultural exports increased 15.3 percent (\$23.8 billion), while U.S.

manufacturing exports increased 50.4 percent (\$591 billion). Of the major end-use categories, industrial supplies had the largest increase in value, up 68.0 percent (\$317.2 billion) while consumer goods increased by 53.9 percent (\$94.2 billion), and foods, feeds, beverages increased by 15.6 percent (\$21.7 billion).

In 2025, U.S. goods exports increased in three of the top five export markets: U.S. goods exports increased to Mexico (up 1.2 percent), Japan (up 3.9 percent), and the European Union⁶ (up 12.1 percent) (*Table 3*), while U.S. goods exports decreased to Canada (down 5.7 percent) and China (down 25.8 percent). U.S. goods exports to the 20 U.S. free trade agreement (FTA countries⁷) decreased 1.7 percent.⁸ U.S. goods exports to advanced economies, accounting for 56.0 percent of U.S. total goods exports, increased 9.2 percent, while U.S. goods exports to emerging markets and developing economies increased 1.4 percent, accounting for 43.2 percent of U.S. total goods exports.

Table 3 - U.S. Goods Exports to Selected Countries/Regions					
	Value (\$Billions)			% Change	
	2020	2024	2025	20-25	24-25
Canada	256.2	349.9	329.8	28.7%	-5.7%
Mexico	212.5	334.0	337.9	59.0%	1.2%
China	124.6	143.2	106.3	-14.7%	-25.8%
Japan	64.0	79.0	82.0	28.1%	3.9%
European Union (27)	232.9	369.8	414.4	78.0%	12.1%
Latin America (excluding Mexico)	115.2	182.4	191.7	66.5%	5.1%
Pacific Rim (excluding Japan and China)	186.3	267.6	286.0	53.5%	6.9%
FTA Countries	651.7	960.2	944.0	44.8%	-1.7%
Advanced Economies	793.9	1,125.9	1,229.9	54.9%	9.2%
Emerging Markets and Developing Economies	636.1	935.8	948.5	49.1%	1.4%

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census basis

Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets as defined by the IMF

B. U.S. Services Exports

U.S. exports of services increased 7.1 percent (\$82.1 billion) to a record \$1.2 trillion in 2025 (*Table 2*). U.S. services exports accounted for 36.0 percent of the level of U.S. goods and services exports in 2025, up from 35.7 percent in 2024.

Of the eleven major services sectors, nine showed export gains in 2025, ranging from 2.6 percent (\$2.7 billion) for transport to 23.3 percent (\$8.3 billion) for maintenance and repair services. The two services sectors that showed export declines were government goods and services, down 16.8 percent (\$5.2 billion) and travel, down 0.3 percent (\$600 million).

⁶ The European Union is comprised of 27 Member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.

⁷ The United States has entered into FTAs with 20 countries: Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore.

⁸ The 20 countries with which the United States currently has FTAs accounted for 43.3 percent of total U.S. goods exports in 2025.

Over the last five years (2020 to 2025), U.S. services exports increased 67.1 percent (\$495.9 billion). U.S. service sectors with the largest export gains included travel, up 194.1 percent (\$140.7 billion); maintenance and repair services, up 120.3 percent (\$23.9 billion); transport, up 82.6 percent (\$47.5 billion); telecom, computer, and information services, up 66.9 percent (\$40.3 billion); and charges for the use of intellectual property, up 54.8 percent (\$67.8 billion).

The United Kingdom was the largest purchaser of U.S. services exports in 2024 (latest available full year data), accounting for 8.6 percent (\$99.4 billion) of total U.S. services exports. The next four largest purchasers of services exports in 2024 were Canada (\$90.3 billion), Ireland (\$83.3 billion), Switzerland (\$64.7 billion), and China (\$55.0 billion). Regionally, in 2024, the United States exported \$294.7 billion in services to the European Union, \$244.2 billion to the Asia and Pacific region (\$139.8 billion excluding Japan and China), \$158.0 billion to Latin America (excluding Mexico), and \$140.7 billion to Canada and Mexico (the USMCA countries).

IV. IMPORTS

U.S. imports of goods and services increased 4.8 percent (\$197.7 billion) in 2025 to \$4.3 trillion. U.S. goods imports increased 4.3 percent (\$143.2 billion) to \$3.4 trillion, while U.S. services imports increased 6.5 percent (\$54.5 billion) to \$895.4 billion (*Table 4*).

A. U.S. Goods Imports

U.S. goods imports increased 4.3 percent (\$143.2 billion) in 2025 to \$3.4 trillion, accounting for 79.3 percent of total goods and services imports (*Table 4*). U.S. manufacturing imports, which accounted for 87.2 percent of total goods imports, increased 5.3 percent (\$150.5 billion) in 2025. U.S. agriculture imports, accounting for 6.2 percent of total goods imports, decreased 0.4 percent (\$900 million).

Of the major end-use goods sectors, industrial supplies (3.4 percent; \$23.2 billion), capital goods (17.2 percent; \$165.8 billion), and “Other Goods” (13.9 percent; \$18.5 billion) showed import increases in 2025, while foods, feeds, beverages (0.3 percent; \$600 million), autos and auto parts (11.0 percent; \$52.0 billion), and consumer goods (0.7 percent; \$5.8 billion) showed import decreases in 2025.

Table 4 - U.S. Imports					
	Value (\$Billions)			% Change	
	2020	2024	2025	20-25	24-25
Total Goods and Services	2,818.9	4,136.1	4,333.8	53.7%	4.8%
Goods on a BOP Basis	2,346.7	3,295.2	3,438.4	46.5%	4.3%
Foods, Feeds, Beverages	154.3	216.0	215.4	39.6%	-0.3%
Industrial Supplies	478.7	675.8	699.0	46.0%	3.4%
Capital Goods	643.4	961.8	1,127.6	75.3%	17.2%
Autos and Auto Parts	309.2	474.4	422.4	36.6%	-11.0%
Consumer Goods	639.6	805.7	799.9	25.1%	-0.7%
Other Goods	106.3	132.8	151.3	42.3%	13.9%
Petroleum	116.7	236.5	196.5	68.3%	-16.9%
Manufacturing	2,063.9	2,849.2	2,999.7	45.3%	5.3%
Agriculture	146.8	214.0	213.1	45.2%	-0.4%
Services	472.2	840.9	895.4	89.6%	6.5%
Maintenance and repair services	6.1	7.5	9.6	58.1%	27.0%
Transport	73.0	154.7	156.4	114.3%	1.1%
Travel	34.4	178.9	191.8	457.5%	7.2%
Construction	1.2	2.4	2.5	120.2%	4.9%
Insurance services	57.8	95.1	102.5	77.2%	7.7%
Financial services	45.8	63.4	67.6	47.6%	6.7%
Charges for the use of intellectual property	45.5	54.0	49.5	8.8%	-8.4%
Telecom, computer, and information services	48.8	72.6	81.3	66.6%	11.9%
Other business services	113.4	159.7	178.4	57.3%	11.7%
Personal, cultural, and recreational services	21.8	26.8	30.3	39.2%	13.1%
Government goods and services	24.6	25.6	25.6	4.2%	-0.1%

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Balance of Payments basis, Census basis for goods sectors.

Over the last five years (2020 to 2025), U.S. goods imports increased 46.5 percent (\$1.1 trillion). Over this same period, U.S. manufacturing imports increased 45.3 percent (\$935.8 billion), while agricultural imports increased 45.2 percent (\$66.3 billion). All end-use goods sectors showed import gains, ranging from 25.1 percent (\$160.3 billion) for consumer goods to 75.3 percent (\$484.2 billion) for capital goods.

In 2025, U.S. goods imports increased for two of the top U.S. five import suppliers compared to 2024: Mexico (up 5.8 percent; \$29.3 billion) and the European Union (up 4.5 percent; \$27.5 billion) (*Table 5*). Imports from three top import suppliers decreased in 2025: China (down 29.7 percent; \$130.3 billion), Canada (down 7.0 percent; \$28.9 billion) and Japan (down 1.6 percent; \$2.4 billion). U.S. goods imports from the 20 U.S. FTA countries increased 0.5 percent (\$5.9 billion) in 2025. U.S. goods imports from advanced economies, accounting for 50.4 percent of U.S. total goods imports, increased 7.4 percent to \$1.73 trillion, while goods imports from emerging markets and developing economies increased 1.8 percent to \$1.68 trillion, accounting for 48.9 percent of U.S. total goods imports.

Table 5 - U.S. Goods Imports from Selected Countries/Regions

	Value (\$Billions)			% Change	
	2020	2024	2025	20-25	24-25
Canada	270.0	411.9	383.0	41.8%	-7.0%
Mexico	323.5	505.5	534.8	65.3%	5.8%
China	432.5	438.7	308.4	-28.7%	-29.7%
Japan	119.5	148.4	146.0	22.1%	-1.6%
European Union (27)	415.4	605.7	633.2	52.4%	4.5%
Latin America (excluding Mexico)	86.4	147.5	151.8	75.8%	2.9%
Pacific Rim (excluding Japan and China)	269.4	414.4	517.1	91.9%	24.8%
FTA Countries	785.1	1,219.7	1,225.6	56.1%	0.5%
Advanced Economies	1,126.2	1,613.9	1,733.6	53.9%	7.4%
Emerging Markets and Developing Economies	1,205.3	1,652.6	1,682.1	39.6%	1.8%

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census basis

Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets as defined by the IMF

B. U.S. Services Imports

U.S. services imports increased 6.5 percent (\$54.5 billion) to a record \$895.4 billion in 2025 (*Table 4*). U.S. services imports accounted for 20.7 percent of U.S. goods and services imports in 2025.

U.S. services imports increased for nine of the eleven major services sectors in 2025, led by maintenance and repair services at 27.0 percent (\$2.1 billion), personal cultural, and recreational services at 13.1 percent (\$3.5 billion), telecom, computer, and information services at 11.9 percent (\$8.7 billion), other business services at 11.7 percent (\$18.7 billion), insurance services at 7.7 percent (\$7.4 billion), and travel at 7.2 percent (\$12.9 billion). Imports declined in charges for the use of intellectual property at 8.4 percent (\$4.5 billion).

Over the last five years (2020 to 2025), U.S. services imports increased 89.6 percent (\$423.2 billion). Services imports increased for all eleven sectors, with the largest import growth being travel, up 457.5 percent (\$157.4 billion), and construction, up 120.2 percent (\$1.3 billion).

The United Kingdom remained the largest supplier of services to the United States, accounting for 11.1 percent (\$93.0 billion) of total U.S. services imports in 2024 (latest available full year data). The next four largest suppliers of U.S. services in 2024 were Canada (\$57.0 billion), Germany (\$47.6 billion), Mexico (\$45.1 billion), and Japan (\$42.5 billion). Regionally, in 2024 the United States imported \$206.1 billion of services from the European Union, \$151.7 billion from the Asia/Pacific Rim region (\$87.4 billion, excluding Japan and China), \$142.7 billion from Latin America (excluding Mexico), and \$102.2 billion from Canada and Mexico (the USMCA countries).

ANNEX II

ANNEX II: U.S. TRADE-RELATED AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS

I. Agreements That Have Entered Into Force

Following is a list of trade agreements entered into by the United States since 1984 and monitored by the Office of the United States Trade Representative for compliance.

Multilateral and Plurilateral Agreements

- Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) (signed April 15, 1994), the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations adopted by the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee on December 15, 1993, and subsequent WTO agreements.
 - a. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods
 - i. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
 - ii. Agreement on Agriculture
 - iii. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures
 - iv. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
 - v. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
 - vi. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
 - vii. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
 - viii. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection
 - ix. Agreement on Rules of Origin
 - x. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
 - xi. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
 - xii. Agreement on Safeguards
 - xiii. Agreement on Trade Facilitation (entered into force on February 22, 2017 for those Members that had accepted it by then (two-thirds of the WTO Members); thereafter to take effect for other Members upon acceptance)
 - b. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
 - i. Fourth Protocol to the GATS (Basic Telecommunication Services) (February 5, 1998)
 - ii. Fifth Protocol to the GATS (Financial Services) (March 1, 1999)
 - c. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (amended in 2017)
 - d. Plurilateral Trade Agreements
 - i. Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (April 12, 1979; amended in 1986)
 - ii. Agreement on Government Procurement (April 15, 1994; amended in 2014)
- WTO Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products (Information Technology Agreement (ITA)) (March 26, 1997)

- Declaration on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (July 28, 2015)
- International Tropical Timber Agreement (successor to the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement, December 7, 2011)
- Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (July 1, 2020)
 - i. Decision No. 3 of the Free Trade Commission of the CUSMA, T-MEC, USMCA (“Agreement”) (Signed December 8, 2021, January 2, 2022, and January 24, 2022; retroactively effective July 1, 2020)
 - ii. Decision No. 2 of the Free Trade Commission of the CUSMA, T-MEC, USMCA (“Agreement”) (May 18, 2021)
 - iii. Decision No. 1 of the Free Trade Commission of the CUSMA, T-MEC, USMCA (“Agreement”) (Signed July 2, 2020; retroactively effective July 1, 2020)
- Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (July 1, 2020)
- Environment Cooperation and Customs Verification Agreement between the United States and Mexico (July 1, 2020)
- Statement Concerning Semiconductors by the European Commission and the Governments of the United States, Japan, and Korea (June 10, 1999)
- Agreement on Mutual Acceptance of Oenological Practices (December 18, 2001)
- The Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (Costa Rica (January 1, 2009); the Dominican Republic (March 1, 2007); El Salvador (March 1, 2006); Guatemala (July 1, 2006); Honduras (April 1, 2006); and Nicaragua (April 1, 2006))
 - i. Amendment to the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement relating to Article 22.5 (March 29, 2006)
 - ii. Amendment to the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement relating to Textiles Matters (August 15, 2008)
 - iii. Amendment to the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement relating to Guatemala Tariffs on Beer (February 4, 2009)
 - iv. Decision Regarding the Rules of Origin for Textile and Apparel Goods (Feb. 23, 2011)
 - v. Decision Regarding Appendix 4.1-B (Feb. 23, 2011)
 - vi. Decision Regarding Annex 9.1.2(b)(i) (Feb. 23, 2011)
 - vii. Decision Regarding Common Guidelines for the Interpretation, Application and Administration of Chapter Four (October 27, 2012)
 - viii. Decision Regarding the Specific Rules of Origin of Annex 4.1 (March 26, 2015)
 - ix. Decision Regarding the Special Rules of Origin of Appendix 3.3.6 (March 26, 2015)
 - x. Decision Regarding The Tariff Elimination for Lines 15071000, 15121100 and 15152100 of Annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Costa Rica) (March 26, 2015)
 - xi. Decision Concerning the Tariff Elimination for Tariff Lines 0207 13 99B and 0207 14 99B (Tariff Schedule of Guatemala to Annex 3.3) (April 11, 2017)
 - xii. Decision Regarding the Specific Rules of Origin of Annex 4.1 (July 7, 2017)

- xiii. Decision Regarding The Determination Of The Chicken Tariff Rate Quota Volumes For Years 13 To 17 As Provided For In Appendix I Of The General Notes To The Tariff Schedule To Annex 3.3 Of El Salvador, Honduras And Nicaragua (September 17, 2017)
 - xiv. Exchange of Letters between the United States and Guatemala Regarding Tariff Elimination for Tariff Lines 0207 13 99B and 0207 14 99B (Tariff Schedule of Guatemala) (January 1, 2018)
 - xv. Exchange of Letters between the United States and Nicaragua Regarding Tariff Rate Quotas for Tariff Lines 0207139920, 0207149920 and 16023200A (Tariff Schedule of Nicaragua to Annex 3.3) (January 1, 2018)
 - xvi. Exchange of Letters between the United States and Honduras Regarding Tariff Rate Quotas for Tariff Lines 02071399B, 02071499B and 16023200A (Tariff Schedule of Honduras to Annex 3.3) (January 1, 2018)
 - xvii. Exchange of Letters between the United States and El Salvador Regarding Tariff Rate Quotas for Tariff Lines 02071399B, 02071499B and 16023200A (Tariff Schedule of El Salvador to Annex 3.3) (January 1, 2018)
 - xviii. Exchange of letters between the United States and Costa Rica regarding Costa Rica's conformity assessment procedures for new pneumatic tires (July 31, 2020)
- Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Matters Under the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (August 25, 2006)
 - Agreement on Duty-Free Treatment of Multi-Chips Integrated Circuits (MCPs) (January 18, 2006) (Korea, Taiwan, Japan, European Union, and the United States)
 - Agreement on Requirements for Wine Labeling (January 23, 2007) (Australia, Argentina, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, and the United States)
 - Agreement Between the Governments of Australia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United States of America, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam concerning the importation by Korea of rice (December 30, 2019)
 - WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation (February 27, 2024)
 - Agreement on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (October 11, 2024)
 - Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity Agreement Relating to a Fair Economy (October 12, 2024)
 - WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (September 15, 2025)

Bilateral Agreements

Albania

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (May 14, 1992)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Albania Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (January 4, 1998)

Argentina

- Private Courier Mail Agreement (May 25, 1989)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (October 20, 1994)

Armenia

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (April 7, 1992)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Armenia Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (March 29, 1996)

Australia

- Settlement on Leather Products Trade (November 25, 1996)
- Understanding on Automotive Leather Subsidies (June 20, 2000)
- Agreement to Implement Phase I of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (October 19, 2002)
- United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement (January 1, 2005)

Azerbaijan

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (April 21, 1995)
- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (August 2, 2001)

Bahrain

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Bahrain Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (May 30, 2001)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (August 1, 2006)
- Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Bahrain on Trade in Food and Agricultural Products (March 30, 2018)

Bangladesh

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bangladesh Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (July 25, 1989)

Belarus

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (February 16, 1993)

Bolivia

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (June 6, 2001) (Bolivia terminated the treaty in June 2012; investments established or acquired before the termination will continue to be protected under the treaty for 10 years following the date of termination.)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Bolivia Regarding Certain Distinctive Products (January 6, 2020)

Brazil

- Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Brazil and the Government of the United States Concerning Trade Measures in the Automotive Sector (March 16, 1998)
- Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the United States of America (March 19, 2011)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Brazil Regarding Certain Distinctive Products (April 9, 2012)
- Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Related to the Cotton Dispute (WT/DS267) (October 1, 2014)
- Protocol to the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Federative Republic of Brazil Relating to Trade Rules and Transparency (February 2, 2022)

Bulgaria

- Agreement on Trade Relations (November 22, 1991)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Bulgaria Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (June 2, 1994; amended January 1, 2007)
- Agreement Concerning Intellectual Property Rights (July 6, 1994)

Cambodia

- Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Cambodia on Trade Relations and Intellectual Property Rights Protection (October 8, 1996)

Cameroon

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Cameroon Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (April 6, 1989)

Canada

- Agreement on Salmon & Herring (May 11, 1993)
- Agreement Regarding Tires (May 25, 1993)
- Memorandum of Understanding on Provincial Beer Marketing Practices (August 5, 1993)
- Agreement on Ultra-High Temperature Milk (September 1993)
- Agreement on Beer Market Access in Quebec and British Columbia Beer Antidumping Cases (April 4, 1994)
- Agreement on Salmon & Herring (April 1994)
- Agreement on Barley Tariff-Rate Quota (September 8, 1997)
- Record of Understanding on Agriculture (December 1998)
- Agreement on Magazines (Periodicals) (May 1999)
- Agreement on Implementation of the WTO Decision on Canada's Dairy Support Programs (December 1999)
- Agreement to Implement Phase I of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (January 17, 2002)
- Agreement to Implement Phase II of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (January 28, 2003)
- United States–Canada Understanding on Implementation of the Decision of the WTO General Council of August 30, 2003, on “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” as Interpreted by the Accompanying Statement of the Chairman of the General Council of the Same Date (July 16, 2004)
- Technical Arrangement between the United States and Canada concerning Trade in Potatoes (November 1, 2007)
- Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada on Government Procurement (February 16, 2010)
- United States–Canada Exchange of Letters on Milk Equivalence (February 4, 2016)
- United States–Canada Exchange of Letters on the Sale of Wine (November 30, 2018)
- United States–Canada Exchange of Letters on Trade in Automotive Goods (November 30, 2018)

- United States–Canada Exchange of Letters on Research and Development Expenditures (November 30, 2018)
- United States–Canada Exchange of Letters on Measures Taken Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (November 30, 2018)
- United States–Canada Exchange of Letters on Energy (July 1, 2020)
- United States–Canada Exchange of Letters on Natural Water Resources (July 1, 2020)

Caribbean Community

- Trade and Investment Council Agreement (July 22, 1991)

Chile

- United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement (January 1, 2004)
- United States–Chile Agreement on Accelerated Tariff Elimination (November 14, 2008)
- United States–Chile Agreement on Trade in Table Grapes (November 21, 2008)
- United States–Chile Agreement on Beef Grade Labeling (March 26, 2009)
- United States–Chile Exchange of Letters on Chapter 17 of United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement (March 17, 2011)
- United States–Chile Exchange of Letters on Salmonid Eggs (February 4, 2016)
- Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Chile Regarding the Use of Certain Terms for Cheese and Meat Products (December 29, 2024)

China

- Accord on Industrial and Technological Cooperation (January 12, 1984)
- Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (January 17, 1992)
- Memorandum of Understanding on Prohibiting Import and Export in Prison Labor Products (June 18, 1992)
- Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Market Access (October 10, 1992)
- Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (February 1, 1980)
- Agreement on Providing Intellectual Property Rights Protection (February 26, 1995)
- Report on China’s Measures to Enforce Intellectual Property Protections and Other Measures (June 17, 1996)
- Interim Agreement on Market Access for Foreign Financial Information Companies (Xinhua) (October 24, 1997)

- Agreement on U.S.–China Agricultural Cooperation (April 10, 1999)
- Memorandum of Understanding between China and the United States Regarding China’s Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits (July 14, 2004)
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China Concerning Trade in Textile and Apparel Products (November 8, 2005)
- Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China Regarding Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions, or Exemptions from Taxes or Other Payments (November 29, 2007)
- Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China Regarding Certain Measures Affecting Foreign Suppliers of Financial Information Services (November 13, 2008)
- Memorandum of Understanding between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America Regarding Films for Theatrical Release (April 25, 2012)
- Economic and Trade Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (February 14, 2020)

Colombia

- Memorandum of Understanding on Trade in Bananas (January 9, 1996)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Colombia on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade Issues (February 27, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Colombia on Beef Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Issues (August 21, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters between United States and Colombia on Control Measures on Avian Influenza (April 15, 2012)
- Exchange of Letters between United States and Colombia on Control Measures on Salmonella in Poultry and Poultry Products (April 15, 2012)
- Exchange of Letters between United States and Colombia on Phyto-sanitary Measures for Paddy Rice (April 15, 2012)
- Exchange of Letters between United States and Colombia related to Constitutional Court Review of Certain IPR Treaties (April 15, 2012)
- United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (May 15, 2012)
 - i. Decision of the Free Trade Commission of the United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Regarding Clarification of the Definition of Poultry in the Context of Appendix I, Paragraph 6, of Colombia’s Tariff Schedule (September 25, 2012)
 - ii. Decision No. 2 of Free Trade Commission of the United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement by which ECOPETROL Qualifies as a Special Covered Entity Under Section D of Annex 9.1 (November 19, 2012)

- iii. Decision No. 3 of the Free Trade Commission of the United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement; Decision on Tariff-Rate Quotas Covering Yellow Corn (November 2017)
 - iv. Decision No. 4 of the Free Trade Commission of the United States – Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement; Decision on Tariff-Rate Quotas Covering Variety Meats (December 2017)
 - v. Decision No. 5 of the Free Trade Commission of the United States – Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement; Decision to Establish the Remuneration of Panelists, Assistants, and Experts, and the Payment of Expenses in Dispute Settlement Proceedings Under Chapter Twenty-One (Dispute Settlement) (July 2018)
 - vi. Decision No. 6 of the Free Trade Commission of the United States – Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement; Decision Establishing the Model Rules of Procedure (July 2018)
 - vii. Decision No. 7 of the Free Trade Commission of the United States – Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement; Decision Establishing a Code of Conduct (July 2018)
 - viii. Decision No. 8 of the Free Trade Commission of the United States – Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement; Decision to Modify Annex 3-A, Annex 3-B, Annex 3-C, and Annex 4.1 (February 2020)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Colombia Establishing the Committee of Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) and SPS Committee Terms of Reference (June 14, 2012)
 - Exchange of Letters between the United States and Colombia Rescinding the 2012 SPS Letter Exchange on Paddy Rice (August 2017)
 - Exchange of Letters between the United States and Colombia Regarding Chapter 16 of the United States – Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and Truck Scrappage Program (April 2018)
 - Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Matters (April 2019)
 - Exchange of Letters Regarding Preferential Treatment for U.S. Corn (July 15, 2021)

Congo, Democratic Republic of the (formerly Zaire)

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Zaire Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (July 28, 1989)

Congo, Republic of the

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (August 13, 1994)

Costa Rica

- Memorandum of Understanding on Trade in Bananas (January 9, 1996)
- Exchange of Letters on Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (May 31, 2007)

Croatia

- Memorandum of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights (May 26, 1998)
- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Croatia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (June 20, 2001)

Czech Republic

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (December 19, 1992; amended May 1, 2004)

Dominican Republic

- Exchange of Letters on Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (October 21, 2006)

Ecuador

- Trade and Investment Council Agreement (July 23, 1990)
- Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection (October 15, 1993) (Ecuador notified the United States on January 19, 2017 of its intent to withdraw from this treaty).
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (May 11, 1997) (Ecuador had notified the United States that it would terminate the treaty effective May 18, 2018; investments established or acquired before the termination will continue to be protected under the treaty for 10 years following the date of termination).
- Protocol to the Trade and Investment Council Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador Relating to Trade Rules and Transparency (December 8, 2020)

Egypt

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments (June 27, 1992)

El Salvador

- Exchange of Letters on Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (January 27, 2006)

Estonia

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Estonia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (February 16, 1997; amended May 1, 2004)

European Economic Area–European Free Trade Association

- Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the United States of America and the EEA EFTA States Regarding Telecommunications Equipment, Electromagnetic Compatibility and Recreational Craft (March 1, 2006)
- Agreement between the United States of America and the EEA EFTA States on the Mutual Recognition of Certificates of Conformity for Marine Equipment (March 1, 2006)

European Union

- Wine Accord (July 1983)
- Agreement for the Conclusion of Negotiations between the United States and the European Community under GATT Article XXIV:6 (January 30, 1987)
- Agreement on Exports of Pasta with Settlement, Annex and Related Letter (September 15, 1987)
- Agreement on Canned Fruit (updated) (April 14, 1992)
- Agreement on Meat Inspection Standards (November 13, 1992)
- Corn Gluten Feed Exchange of Letters (December 4 and 8, 1992)
- Malt-Barley Sprouts Exchange of Letters (December 4 and 8, 1992)
- Oilseeds Agreement (December 4 and 8, 1992)
- Agreement on Recognition of Bourbon Whiskey and Tennessee Whiskey as Distinctive U.S. Products (March 28, 1994)
- Memorandum of Understanding on Government Procurement (April 15, 1994)
- Letter on Financial Services Confirming Assurances to Provide Full Most-Favored-Nation and National Treatment (July 14, 1995)
- Agreement on EU Grains Margin of Preference (signed July 22, 1996; retroactively effective December 30, 1995)
- Exchange of Letters Concerning Implementation of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and Related Matters (June 26, 1996)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States of America and the European Community on a Settlement for Cereals and Rice, and Accompanying Exchange of Letters on Rice Prices (July 22, 1996)
- Agreement for the Conclusion of Negotiations between the United States of America and the European Community under GATT Article XXIV:6, and Accompanying Exchange of Letters (signed July 22, 1996; retroactively effective December 30, 1995)
- Tariff Initiative on Distilled Spirits (February 28, 1997)
- Agreement on Global Electronic Commerce (December 9, 1997)
- Agreed Minute on Humane Trapping Standards (December 18, 1997)

- Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the United States of America and the European Community (December 1, 1998) and United States – European Union Amended Sectoral Annex for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices (March 1, 2017)
- Agreement between the United States and the European Community on Sanitary Measures to Protect Public and Animal Health in Trade in Live Animals and Animal Products (July 20, 1999)
- Understanding on Bananas (April 11, 2001)
- Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community on the Mutual Recognition of Certificates of Conformity for Marine Equipment (July 1, 2004)
- Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the United States and the European Community Relating to the Method of Calculation of Applied Duties for Husked Rice (June 30, 2005; retroactively effective March 1, 2005)
- Agreement between the United States and European Community on Trade in Wine (March 10, 2006)
- Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the United States and the European Union pursuant to Article XXIV:6 and Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 Relating to the Modification of Concessions in the Schedules of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic in the Course of their Accession to the European Union (March 22, 2006)
- Joint Letter from the United States and the European Communities on implementation of GATS Article XXI procedures relating to the accession to the European Communities of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Poland, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Finland, and Sweden (August 7, 2006)
- Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and European Commission Regarding the Importation of Beef from Animals Not Treated with Certain Growth-Promoting Hormones and Increased Duties Applied to Certain Products of the European Communities (May 13, 2009)
- Agreement on Trade in Bananas Between the United States of America and the European Union (January 24, 2013)
- Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters Between the United States of America and the European Union Pursuant to Articles XXIV:6 and XXVIII of the GATT 1994 (July 1, 2013)
- Bilateral Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and Reinsurance (April 4, 2018)
- Agreement Related to the Revised Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the European Commission in Connection with the *EC – Hormones* Dispute (December 14, 2019)
- Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union regarding tariffs on certain products (November 20, 2020)
- Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America Pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 Relating to the Modifications of Concessions on All the Tariff-Rate Quotas Included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a Consequence of the United Kingdom's Withdrawal from the European Union (April 27, 2023)

Georgia

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (August 13, 1993)
- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Georgia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (August 17, 1997)

Grenada

- Treaty Between the United States of America and Grenada Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (March 3, 1989)

Guatemala

- Exchange of Letters on Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (June 23, 2006)

Haiti

- Exchange of Letters on Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (September 18, 2008)

Hong Kong, China

- Agreement to Implement Phase I and Phase II of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (April 4, 2005)
- Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Concerning Cooperation in Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (August 1, 2005)

Honduras

- Memorandum of Understanding on Worker Rights (November 15, 1995)
- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (July 11, 2001)
- Exchange of Letters on Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (March 7, 2006)

Hungary

- Agreement on Trade Relations (July 7, 1978)
- Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection (September 29, 1993)

India

- Agreement Regarding Indian Import Policy for Motion Pictures (February 5, 1992)
- Reduction of Tariffs on In-Shell Almonds (May 27, 1992)
- Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protections (March 1993)
- Agreement on Import Restrictions (December 28, 1999)

- Agreement on Textile Tariff Bindings (September 15, 2000)
- Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India Related to Market Access for Certain Products (June 22, 2023)
- Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India Related to Market Access for Certain Products (September 9, 2023)

Indonesia

- Conditions for Market Access for Films and Videos into Indonesia (April 19, 1992)
- Memorandum of Understanding with Indonesia Concerning Cooperation in Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (September 26, 2006)

Israel

- Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States of America (August 19, 1985)
- United States–Israel Agreement Concerning Certain Aspects of Trade in Agricultural Products (July 27, 2004; extended by Exchange of Letters (this agreement has been extended on a yearly basis since December 2008))
- Mutual Recognition Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (December 12, 2013)

Jamaica

- Agreement on Intellectual Property (February 1994)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and Jamaica Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (March 7, 1997)

Japan

- Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS) Agreement on Medical Equipment and Pharmaceuticals (January 9, 1986)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Tobacco (October 6, 1986)
- Foreign Lawyers Agreement (February 27, 1987)
- Science and Technology Agreement (June 20, 1988; extended June 16, 1993)
- Exchange of Letters on Procedures to Introduce Supercomputers (August 7, 1987)
- Measures Relating to Wood Products (June 15, 1990)
- Policies and Procedures Regarding Satellite Research and Development/Procurement (June 15, 1990)
- Policies and Procedures Regarding International Value-Added Network Services and Network Channel Terminating Equipment (July 31, 1990)

- Joint Announcement on Amorphous Metals (September 21, 1990)
- Measures Further to 1990 Policies and Procedures regarding International Value-Added Network Services (April 27, 1991)
- Measures Regarding International Value-Added Network Services Investigation Mechanisms (June 25, 1991)
- United States–Japan Major Projects Arrangement (July 31, 1991; originally negotiated 1988)
- Measures Related to Japanese Public Sector Procurement of Computer Products and Services (January 22, 1992)
- United States–Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership (July 10, 1993)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Apples (September 13, 1993)
- United States–Japan Public Works Agreement (January 18, 1994)
- Mutual Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights between the Japanese Patent Office and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (January 20, 1994)
- Rice (April 15, 1994)
- Harmonized Chemical Tariffs (April 15, 1994)
- Copper (April 15, 1994)
- Market Access (April 15, 1994)
- Actions to be Taken by the Japanese Patent Office and the U.S. Patents and Trademark Office pursuant to the January 20, 1994, Mutual Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights (August 16, 1994)
- Measures by the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan Regarding Insurance (October 11, 1994)
- Measures on Japanese Public Sector Procurement of Telecommunications Products and Services (November 1, 1994)
- Measures Related to Japanese Public Sector Procurement of Medical Technology Products and Services (November 1, 1994)
- Measures Regarding Financial Services (February 13, 1995)
- Policies and Measures Regarding Inward Direct Investment and Buyer-Supplier Relationships (June 20, 1995)
- Exchange of Letters on Financial Services (July 26 and 27, 1995)
- Interim Understanding for the Continuation of Japan–United States Insurance Talks (September 30, 1996)
- United States–Japan Insurance Agreement (December 24, 1996)
- Japan’s Recognition of United States-Grade Marked Lumber (January 13, 1997)

- Resolution of WTO dispute with Japan on Sound Recordings (January 13, 1997)
- National Policy Agency Procurement of VHF Radio Communications System (March 31, 1997)
- United States–Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy (June 19, 1997)
- United States–Japan Agreement on Distilled Spirits (December 17, 1997)
- First Joint Status Report on Deregulation and Competition Policy (May 29, 1998)
- United States–Japan Joint Report on Investment (April 28, 1999)
- Second Joint Status Report on Deregulation and Competition Policy (May 3, 1999)
- United States–Japan Agreement on NTT Procurement Procedures (July 1, 1999)
- Third Joint Status Report on Deregulation and Competition Policy (July 19, 2000)
- Fourth Joint Status Report on Deregulation and Competition Policy (June 30, 2001)
- United States–Japan Economic Partnership for Growth (June 30, 2001)
- First Report to the Leaders on the United States–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative (June 25, 2002)
- Second Report to the Leaders on the United States–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative (May 23, 2003)
- Third Report to the Leaders on the United States–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative (June 8, 2004)
- Fourth Report to the Leaders on the United States–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative (November 2, 2005)
- Fifth Report to the Leaders on the United States–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative (June 29, 2006)
- Sixth Report to the Leaders on the United States–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative (June 6, 2007)
- Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Results of Conformity Assessment Procedures between the United States of America and Japan (United States–Japan Telecom MRA) (January 1, 2008)
- Seventh Report to the Leaders on the United States–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative (July 5, 2008)
- Eighth Report to the Leaders on the United States–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative (July 6, 2009)
- Memorandum Between the Relevant Authorities of the United States and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan Concerning Enforcement of Japan’s Pesticide Maximum Residue Levels (July 28, 2009)
- Record of Discussion, United States–Japan Economic Harmonization Initiative (January 27, 2012)

- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters on certain distilled spirits and wine (February 4, 2016)
- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters on copyright term (April 13, 2018)
- Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Japan (January 1, 2020)
- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters regarding alcoholic beverages (January 1, 2020)
- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters regarding beef (January 1, 2020)
- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters regarding rice (January 1, 2020)
- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters regarding agricultural safeguard measures (January 1, 2020)
- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters regarding skimmed milk powder (January 1, 2020)
- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters regarding whey (January 1, 2020)
- Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning Digital Trade (January 1, 2020)
- United States–Japan Exchange of Letters regarding Interactive Computer Services (January 1, 2020)
- Protocol Amending the Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Japan (January 1, 2023)
- Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Strengthening Critical Minerals Supply Chains (March 28, 2023)

Jordan

- Agreement between the United States and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (December 17, 2001)
- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (June 12, 2003)

Kazakhstan

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (February 18, 1993)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (January 12, 1994)

Korea

- Record of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights (August 28, 1986)
- Agreement on Access of U.S. Firms to Korea’s Insurance Markets (August 28, 1986)
- Record of Understanding Concerning Market Access for Cigarettes (May 27, 1988; amended October 16, 1989)
- Agreement Concerning the Korean Capital Market Promotion Law (September 1, 1988)

- Agreement on the Importation and Distribution of Foreign Motion Pictures (December 30, 1988)
- Agreement on Market Access for Wine and Wine Products (January 18, 1989)
- Investment Agreement (May 19, 1989)
- Agreement on Liberalization of Agricultural Imports (May 25, 1989)
- Record of Understanding on Telecommunications (January 23, 1990)
- Record of Understanding on Telecommunications (February 15, 1990)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding the 1986 Intellectual Property Rights Agreement: Product Pipeline Protection (February 22, 1990)
- Record of Understanding on Beef (March 21, 1990)
- Exchange of Letters on Beef (April 26 and 27, 1990)
- Agreement on Wine Access (December 19, 1990)
- Record of Understanding on Telecommunications (February 7, 1991)
- Agreement on International Value-Added Services (June 20, 1991)
- Understanding on Telecommunications (February 17, 1992)
- Exchange of Letters Relating to Korea Telecom Company's Procurement of AT&T Switches (March 31, 1993)
- Beef Agreements (June 26, 1993; December 29, 1993)
- Record of Understanding on Agricultural Market Access in the Uruguay Round (December 13, 1993)
- Exchange of Letters on Telecommunications Issues Relating to Equipment Authorization and Korea Telecom Company's Procurement (March 29, 1995)
- Agreement on Steel (July 14, 1995)
- Shelf-Life Agreement (July 20, 1995)
- Revised Cigarette Agreement (August 25, 1995)
- Memorandum of Understanding to Increase Market Access for Foreign Passenger Vehicles in Korea (September 28, 1995)
- Exchange of Letters on Implementation of the 1992 Telecommunications Agreement (April 12, 1996)
- Korean Commitments on Trade in Telecommunications Goods and Services (July 23, 1997)
- Agreement on Korean Motor Vehicle Market (October 20, 1998)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Tobacco Sector Related Issues (June 14, 2001)
- Exchange of Letters on Data Protection (March 12, 2002)

- Record of Understanding between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea Regarding the Extension of Special Treatment for Rice (February 2005)
- Agreement to Implement Phase I of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (May 10, 2005)
- Agreed Minutes on Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regulations (February 10, 2011)
- Agreed Minutes on Visa Validity Period (February 10, 2011)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Korea related to the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement (February 10, 2011)
- United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement (March 15, 2012)
- Agreed Minutes on Korea Certification Mark and Korea’s Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regulations (September 24, 2018)
- Interpretation by the Joint Committee of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea Regarding the June 30, 2007 Exchange of Letters (September 24, 2018)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Korea Regarding Entry Into Force of the Protocol between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Amending the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (September 24, 2018)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Korea Regarding the Confirmation of Customs Principles and the Establishment of the Rules of Origin Verification Working Group under the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (September 24, 2018)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Korea Regarding Amendments to Korea’s Premium Pricing Policy for Global Innovative New Drugs (September 24, 2018)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Korea Regarding Korea’s Request to Modify the Rules of Origin under the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (September 24, 2018)
- Protocol between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Amending the February 10, 2011 Exchange of Letters (January 1, 2019)
- Protocol between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Amending the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (January 1, 2019)
- Exchange of Letters concerning Korea’s World Trade Organization tariff-rate quota for rice and the country-specific quota for the United States established within that tariff-rate quota (December 30, 2019)

- Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Related to Modifying the Rules of Origin for Certain Fabrics under HTS heading 5408 (August 1, 2024)

Kyrgyzstan

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (May 8, 1992)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (January 12, 1994)

Laos

- Bilateral Trade Agreement (February 4, 2005)

Latvia

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (August 21, 1992)
- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Latvia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (November 26, 1996; amended May 1, 2004)
- Agreement on Trade & Intellectual Property Rights Protection (January 20, 1995)

Lithuania

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (November 22, 2001; amended May 1, 2004)

Macao

- Memorandum of Understanding with Macao Concerning Cooperation in Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (August 8, 2005)

Marshall Islands

- Compact of Free Association Agreement Between the United States of America and the Marshall Islands (June 25, 1983)

Mexico

- Agreement with Mexico on Tire Certification (March 8, 1996)
- Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Mexico Regarding Areas of Food and Agriculture Trade (April 4, 2002)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters Regarding Mexico’s NAFTA Safeguard on Certain Poultry Products (July 24-25, 2003)
- Understanding Regarding the Implementation of the WTO Decision on Mexico’s Telecommunications Services (June 1, 2004)

- Agreement between the U.S. Trade Representative and Secretaria de Economia of the United Mexican States on Trade in Tequila (January 17, 2006)
- Agreement between the U.S. Trade Representative and Secretaria de Economia of the United Mexican State on Trade in Cement (April 3, 2006)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters Regarding Trade in Sweetener Goods (July 27, 2006)
- Bilateral Agreement on Customs Cooperation regarding Claims of Origin Under FTA Cumulation Provisions (January 26, 2007)
- Customs Cooperation Agreement with Mexico relating to Textiles Matters (August 15, 2008)
- Mutual Recognition Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (June 10, 2011)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters on Measures Taken Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (November 30, 2018)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters on Trade in Automotive Goods (November 30, 2018)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters on Dispute Settlement Regarding Trade in Automotive Goods Exchange (November 30, 2018)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters on the Ramsar Convention (December 10, 2019)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters on Safety Standards in the Automotive Sector (July 1, 2020)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters on Prior Users (July 1, 2020)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters on Distilled Spirits (July 1, 2020)
- United States–Mexico Exchange of Letters on Cheeses (July 1, 2020)

Micronesia

- Compact of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia (November 3, 1986)

Moldova

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (July 2, 1992)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Moldova Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (November 25, 1994)

Mongolia

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (January 23, 1991)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and Mongolia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (January 1, 1997)

- Agreement on Transparency in Matters Related to International Trade and Investment between the United States of America and Mongolia (March 20, 2017)

Morocco

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (May 29, 1991)
- United States–Morocco Free Trade Agreement (January 1, 2006)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco Concerning Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation (November 21, 2013)

Mozambique

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Mozambique Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (March 2, 2005)

Nicaragua

- Bilateral Intellectual Property Rights Agreement with Nicaragua (December 22, 1997)
- Exchange of Letters on Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (March 24, 2006)

Norway

- Agreement on Procurement of Toll Equipment (April 26, 1990)

Oman

- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (January 1, 2009)

Palau

- Compact of Free Association with the Republic of Palau (October 1, 1994)

Panama

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments (May 30, 1991)
- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (1994)
- Agreement on Cooperation in Agricultural Trade (December 20, 2006)
- Agreement regarding Certain Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures and Technical Standards Affecting Agricultural Products (December 20, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Autos (June 28, 2007)
- Confirmation Letter Regarding Ship Repairs (June 28, 2007)

- Confirmation Letter Regarding Panama Joining the ITA (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Free Trade Zones (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Article 9.15 (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Investment in Specified Sectors (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Retail Sales (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Cross Border Financial Service (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Insurance (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Pensions (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Traditional Knowledge (June 28, 2007)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Taxation (June 28, 2007)
- United States–Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (October 31, 2012)
 - i. Decision of the Free Trade Commission Regarding Article 3.20 and Article 6.3 (March 19, 2013)
 - ii. Decision No. 2 of the Free Trade Commission Establishing a Code of Conduct (May 28, 2014)
 - iii. Decision No. 3 of the Free Trade Commission to Establish the Remuneration of Panelists, Assistants, and Experts, and the Payment of Expenses in Dispute Settlement Proceedings under Chapter 20 (Dispute Settlement) (May 28, 2014)
 - iv. Decision No. 4 of the Free Trade Commission Establishing Model Rules of Procedure (May 28, 2014)
 - v. Decision No. 5 of the Free Trade Commission to Amend Annex 4.1 (December 6, 2016)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Multiple Services Businesses (October 31, 2012)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Beef and Beef Product Imports (March 27, 2013)
- Exchange of Letters on Free Trade Zones (October 2, 2013)
- Exchange of Letters Regarding Pet Food Containing Animal Origin Ingredients Imports (June 24, 2014)
- Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Enforcement Matters Under the United States – Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (December 21, 2015)

Peru

- Memorandum of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights (May 23, 1997)
- Exchange of Letters on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade Issues (January 5, 2006)
- Additional Letter Exchange on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade Issues (April 10, 2006)

- United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (February 1, 2009)
- Understanding for Implementing Article 18.8 of the United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (March 20, 2016)
- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Peru, and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States regarding a Secretariat for Submissions on Environmental Enforcement Matters under the United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (March 23, 2016)

Philippines

- Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (April 6, 1993)
- Agreement regarding Pork and Poultry Meat (February 13, 1998)
- Memorandum of Understanding with the Philippines Concerning Cooperation in Trade in Textile and Apparel Goods (August 23, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters on Special Treatment for Rice and Related Agricultural Concessions (June 5, 2014)

Poland

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland Concerning Business and Economic Relations (August 6, 1994; amended May 1, 2004)

Romania

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (April 3, 1992)
- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Romania Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (January 15, 1994; amended January 1, 2007)

Russia

- Trade Agreement Concerning Most Favored Nation and Nondiscriminatory Treatment (June 17, 1992)
- Joint Memorandum of Understanding on Market Access for Aircraft (January 30, 1996)
- Agreed Minutes regarding exports of poultry products from the United States to Russia (March 15, March 25, and March 29, 1996)
- Agreement on Russian Firearms & Ammunition (April 3, 1996; amended 2003)
- Protocol of the Negotiations between the Experts of Russia and the United States of America on the Issue of U.S. Poultry Meat Imports into the Russian Federation (March 31, 2002)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Trade in Certain Types of Poultry, Beef and Pork (June 15, 2005; amended December 29, 2008)

- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (November 19, 2006)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Market Access for Beef and Beef By-Products (November 19, 2006)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Importation of Pork and Pork By-Products into the Russian Federation (November 19, 2006)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Inspection of Facilities for Exporting Pork and Poultry to the Russian Federation (November 19, 2006)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Agricultural Biotechnology (November 19, 2006)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Establishment of Import licensing Procedures for Imports of Goods Containing Encryption Technology (November 19, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Tariff Treatment of Certain Aircraft Imported Under Operational Lease (November 19, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters between the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation and the Office of the United States Trade Representative on Tariff Treatment of Certain Combine Harvester-Threshers and Self-Propelled Forage Harvesters (November 19, 2006)
- Letter on Market Access between the United States and the Russian Federation for Service Suppliers in Certain Energy Related Sectors (November 19, 2006)
- Letter on Market Access between the United States and the Russian Federation for Certain Insurance Firms (November 19, 2006)
- Bilateral Agreement on Verification of Pathogen Reduction Treatments and Resumption of Trade in Poultry (July 14, 2010)
- Bilateral Agreement on Pre-Notification Requirements Applied to Certain Imports of Meat Products from the United States (applied provisionally as of December 14, 2011)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Trade in Parts and Components of Motor Vehicles between the United States of America and the Russian Federation (July 12, 2013)

Rwanda

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (January 1, 2012)

Saudi Arabia

- Exchange of Letters Regarding Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (November 17, 2025)

Senegal

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Senegal Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (October 25, 1990)

Singapore

- Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection (April 27, 1987)
- Agreement to Implement Phase I and Phase II of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (October 8, 2003)
- United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (January 1, 2004)

Slovakia

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (December 19, 1992; amended May 1, 2004)

Sri Lanka

- Agreement on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (September 20, 1991)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (May 1, 1993)

Suriname

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (1993)

Switzerland

- Exchange of Letters on Financial Services (November 9 and 27, 1995)
- Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America Relating to Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practice (July 27, 2023)

Taiwan

- Agreement on Customs Valuation (August 22, 1986)
- Agreement on Export Performance Requirements (August 1986)
- Agreement Concerning Beer, Wine, and Cigarettes (1987)
- Agreement on Turkeys and Turkey Parts (March 16, 1989)
- Agreement on Beef (June 18, 1990)
- Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection (June 5, 1992)
- Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection (Trademark) (April 1993)

- Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection (Copyright) (July 16, 1993)
- Agreement on Market Access (April 27, 1994)
- Telecommunications Liberalization by Taiwan (July 19, 1996)
- United States–Taiwan Medical Device Issue: List of Principles (September 30, 1996)
- Agreement on Market Access (February 20, 1998)
- Agreement to Implement Phase I of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (March 16, 1999)
- Understanding on Government Procurement (August 23, 2001)
- Protocol of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)-Related Measures for the Importation of Beef and Beef Products for Human Consumption from the Territory of the Authorities Represented by the American Institute in Taiwan (November 2, 2009)
- Agreement Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States Regarding Trade Between the United States of America and Taiwan (December 10, 2023)

Tajikistan

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (November 24, 1993)

Thailand

- Agreement on Cigarette Imports (November 23, 1990)
- Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement (December 19, 1991)

Trinidad and Tobago

- Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement (September 26, 1994)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (December 26, 1996)

Tunisia

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Tunisia Concerning Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (February 7, 1993)

Turkey

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments (May 18, 1990)
- WTO Settlement Concerning Taxation of Foreign Film Revenues (July 14, 1997)

Turkmenistan

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (October 25, 1993)

Ukraine

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (June 23, 1992)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (November 16, 1996)
- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Ukraine on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures (February 21, 2007)
- Agreement between the United States and the Ukraine on Export Duties on Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Scrap Metal (February 22, 2007)

United Kingdom

- Agreement on Trade in Wine (December 31, 2020)
- Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Certain Distilled Spirits/Spirits Drinks (December 31, 2020)
- Agreement on Mutual Recognition (including sectoral annexes on Telecommunications Equipment, Electromagnetic Compatibility, and Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices) (December 31, 2020)
- Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Certificates of Conformity for Marine Equipment (December 31, 2020)
- Bilateral Agreement on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and Reinsurance (December 31, 2020)
- Memorandum of Understanding in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom with respect to the Obligations of the United Kingdom concerning Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) under Article XXVII of the GATT 1994 (May 9, 2022)

Uruguay

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (November 1, 2006)

Uzbekistan

- Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations (January 13, 1994)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Uzbekistan on Imports of U.S. Meat, Poultry, and Egg Products (December 19, 2024)

Vietnam

- Agreement between the United States and Vietnam on Trade Relations (December 10, 2001)

- Copyright Agreement (June 27, 1997)
- Exchange of Letters on Equivalence of Food Safety Inspection Systems (May 31, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters on Beef (May 31, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters on Biotechnology (May 31, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters on Energy Services (May 31, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters on Elimination of Prohibited Subsidies to Textile and Garment Sector (May 31, 2006)
- Bilateral Agreement on Export Duties on Ferrous and Nonferrous Scrap Metals (May 31, 2006)
- Exchange of Letters on Shelf Life (May 31, 2006)
- Acceptance of U.S. Certificates for Exports of Poultry Meat and Meat Products (May 31, 2006)
- Agreement to Implement Phase I of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (June 19, 2008)
- Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the United States of America on Illegal Logging and Timber Trade (October 1, 2021)

II. Agreements That Have Been Negotiated, But Have Not Yet Entered Into Force

Following is a list of trade agreements concluded by the United States since 1984 that have not yet entered into force.

Multilateral and Plurilateral Agreements

- OECD Agreement on Shipbuilding (December 21, 1994; interested parties evaluating implementing legislation)
- Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (signed by the United States on October 1, 2011)
- The Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement Decision Regarding the Specific Rules of Origin of Annex 4.1 (signed by the United States on July 6, 2017) Bilateral Agreements

Argentina

- United States of America – Argentine Republic Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment (signed February 5, 2026)

Bangladesh

- Agreement Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on Reciprocal Trade (signed February 9, 2026)

Belarus

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Belarus Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed January 15, 1994)

Cambodia

- Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Cambodia on Reciprocal Trade (October 26, 2025)

El Salvador

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of El Salvador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment In (signed March 10, 1999)
- Agreement Between the United State of America and the Republic of El Salvador on Reciprocal Trade (signed January 29, 2026)

Estonia

- Trade and Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (April 19, 1994; requires approval by Estonian legislature)

Guatemala

- Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Guatemala on Reciprocal Trade (signed January 30, 2026)

Indonesia

- Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia on Reciprocal Trade (signed February 19, 2026)

Israel

- Decision of the Joint Committee of the Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area Between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States of America on Annex III (Rules of Origin) (2020)
- Agreement to Modify the Agreement Between the United States of America and the State of Israel Concerning Certain Aspects of Trade in Agricultural Products (signed December 1, 2025)

Kazakhstan

- Exchange of Letters on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures of Kazakhstan (signed July 2, 2015)

Lithuania

- Trade and Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (April 26, 1994; requires approval by Lithuanian legislature)

Malaysia

- Agreement Between the United States of America and Malaysia on Reciprocal Trade (October 26, 2025)

Nicaragua

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed July 1, 1995)

Russia

- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed June 17, 1992)

Taiwan

- Agreement Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States on Reciprocal Trade Between the United States of America and Taiwan (signed February 12, 2026)

Uzbekistan

- Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed December 16, 1994)

III. Other Trade-Related Agreements, Understandings and Declarations

Following is a list of other trade-related agreements, understandings and declarations negotiated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative from January 1993. These documents provide the framework for negotiations leading to future trade agreements or establish mechanisms for structured dialogue in order to develop specific steps and strategies for addressing and resolving trade, investment, intellectual property, and other issues among the signatories.

Multilateral Agreements and Declarations

- Second Ministerial of the World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce (May 20, 1998)
- WTO Guidelines for the Negotiation of Mutual Recognition Agreements on Accountancy (May 29, 1997)
- Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
 - 1st Joint Ministerial Statement (November 6-7, 1989)
 - 2nd Joint Ministerial Statement (July 29-31, 1990)
 - 3rd Joint Ministerial Statement (November 12-14, 1991)
 - 4th Joint Ministerial Statement (September 10-11, 1992)
 - 5th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 17-19, 1993)
 - Leaders' Economic Vision Statement (November 20, 1993)
 - Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (October 6, 1994)
 - 6th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 11-12, 1994)
 - Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve (November 15, 1994)
 - 7th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 16-17, 1995)
 - Leaders' Declaration for Action (November 19, 1995)
 - Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (July 15-16, 1996)
 - 8th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 22-23, 1996)
 - Leaders' Declaration: From Vision to Action (November 25, 1996)
 - Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (May 8-10, 1997)
 - 9th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 21-22, 1997)

- Leaders' Declaration on Connecting the APEC Community (November 25, 1997)
- Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Agreement (June 5, 1998)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 22-23, 1998)
- 10th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 14-15, 1998)
- Leaders' Declaration on Strengthening the Foundations for Growth (November 18, 1998)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 29-30, 1999)
- 11th Joint Ministerial Statement (September 9-10, 1999)
- Leaders' Declaration: The Auckland Challenge (September 13, 1999)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 6-7, 2000)
- 12th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 12-13, 2000)
- Leaders' Declaration: Delivering to the Community (November 16, 2000)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 6-7, 2001)
- 13th Joint Ministerial Statement (October 17-18, 2001)
- Leaders' Declaration: Meeting New Challenges in the New Century (October 21, 2001)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (May 29-30, 2002)
- 14th Joint Ministerial Statement (October 23-24, 2002)
- Leaders' Declaration: Expanding the Benefits of Cooperation for Economic Growth and Development-Implementing the Vision (October 27, 2002)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 2-3, 2003)
- 15th Joint Ministerial Statement (October 17-18, 2003)
- Declaration: A World of Differences-Partnership for the Future (October 21, 2003)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 4-5, 2004)
- 16th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 17-18, 2004)
- Leaders' Declaration: One Community, Our Future (November 20-21, 2004)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 2-3, 2005)
- 17th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 15-16, 2005)

- Leaders' Declaration: Towards One Community: Meet the Challenge, Make the Change (November 18-19, 2005)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 1-2, 2006)
- 18th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 15-16, 2006)
- Leaders' Declaration: Towards a Dynamic Community for Sustainable Development and Prosperity (November 18-19, 2006)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (July 5-6, 2007)
- 19th Joint Ministerial Statement (September 5-6, 2007)
- Leaders' Declaration: Strengthening our Community, Building a Sustainable Future (September 9, 2007)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (May 31-June 1, 2008)
- 20th Joint Ministerial Statement (November 19-20, 2008)
- Leaders' Declaration: A New Commitment to Asia-Pacific Development (November 22-23, 2008)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (July 21-22, 2009)
- 21st Joint Ministerial Statement (November 11-12, 2009)
- Leaders' Declaration: Sustaining Growth, Connecting The Region (November 14-15, 2009)
- Ministers Responsible for Trade Statement (June 5-6, 2010)
- 22nd Joint Ministerial Statement (November 10-11, 2010)
- Leaders' Declaration: The Yokohama Vision-Bogor and Beyond (November 13-14, 2010)
- Ministers' Responsible for Trade Statement (May 19-20, 2011)
- 23rd Joint Ministerial Statement (November 11, 2011)
- Leaders' Declaration: Toward a Seamless Regional Economy (November 12-13, 2011)
- Ministers' Responsible for Trade Statement (June 4-5, 2012)
- 24th Joint Ministerial Statement (September 5-6, 2012)
- Leaders' Declaration: Integrate to Grow, Innovate to Prosper (September 8-9, 2012)
- Ministers' Responsible for Trade Statement (April 20-21, 2013)
- 25th Joint Ministerial Statement (October 5, 2013)

- Leaders' Declaration: Resilient Asia-Pacific, Engine of Global Growth (October 8, 2013)
- Cooperation Agreement Among the Partner States of the East African Community and the United States of America on Trade Facilitation, Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures, and Technical Barriers to Trade (February 26, 2015)
- Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Telecommunications Commission (CITEL) Mutual Recognition Agreement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (October 29, 1999)
- United States–Association of Southeast Asian Nations Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement (August 25, 2006)
- World Wine Trade Group Memorandum of Understanding on Certification Requirements (October 20, 2011)
- Understanding Between the United States, Mexico, and Canada regarding Article 23.6 of the Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, done at Mexico City, on November 30, 2018 (December 10, 2019)
- Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation for Trade and Investment Between the African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat and the Government of the United States of America (December 14, 2022)

Bilateral Agreements and Declarations

Afghanistan

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (September 21, 2004)
- Memorandum of Understanding on Joint Efforts to Enable the Economic Empowerment of Women and to Promote Women's Entrepreneurship (June 16, 2013)

Algeria

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (July 13, 2001)

Angola

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Angola (May 19, 2009)

Argentina

- Bilateral Council on Trade and Investment (February 2002)
- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Argentine Republic (March 23, 2016)

Armenia

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Armenia (November 13, 2015)

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

- Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement Between the United States of America and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (August 25, 2006)

Bangladesh

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on a Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum (signed November 25, 2013)

Bolivia

- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia concerning a United States–Bolivia Council on Trade and Investment (May 8, 1990)

Brazil

- Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil (March 19, 2011)

Brunei Darussalam

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Brunei Darussalam (December 16, 2002)

Burma

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (May 13, 2013)

Cambodia

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Royal Government of Cambodia (July 14, 2006)

Canada

- The Canada–United States Organic Equivalency Arrangement (June 17, 2009)

Caribbean Community

- United States–CARICOM Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (2013)

Central Asian Economies

- Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Government Turkmenistan, and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (June 1, 2004)

China

- United States–China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade Agreements (April 21, 2004)
- United States–China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade Agreements (July 11, 2005)
- Memorandum of Understanding on Combating Illegal Logging and Associated Trade (May 5, 2008)

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (October 29, 2001)

East African Community

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the East African Community and the Government of the United States of America (July 16, 2008)
- Cooperation Agreement Among the Partner States of the East African Community and the United States of America on Trade Facilitation, Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures, and Technical Barriers to Trade (February 26, 2015)

Economic Community of West African States

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Economic Community of West African States (March 9, 2015)

Egypt

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (July 1, 1999)

European Union

- United States–EU Transatlantic Economic Partnership (May 18, 1998)
- United States–EU Joint Action Plan for the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (November 9, 1998)
- Decision to Establish the United States–EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, Joint Statement of the United States–EU Summit (November 28, 2010)
- United States–EU Organic Equivalency Arrangement (February 15, 2012)

Fiji

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Fiji (October 15, 2020)

Georgia

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and Georgia (June 20, 2007)
- United States–Georgia Trade Principles for Information and Communication Technology Services (October 30, 2015)

Ghana

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Ghana Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (February 26, 1999)

Gulf Cooperation Council

- Framework Agreement for Trade, Economic, Investment and Technical Cooperation Between the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the Government of the United States of America (signed September 25, 2012)

Iceland

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iceland on Trade and Investment Cooperation (January 15, 2009)

India

- United States–India Trade Policy Forum, Framework for Cooperation on Trade and Investment (March 17, 2010)

Indonesia

- Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Establishment of the Council on Trade and Investment (July 16, 1996)
- Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Combating Illegal Logging and Associated Trade (November 16, 2006)
- Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to resolve certain outstanding issues in order to enhance the Parties' bilateral trade relationship (October 3, 2014)

Israel

- Understanding regarding Israel's intellectual property regime for pharmaceutical products (February 18, 2010)

Iraq

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Iraq Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (July 11, 2005)

Japan

- United States–Japan Joint Statement on the Bilateral Steel Dialogue (September 24, 1999)
- Exchange of Letters between the United States and Japan—Letters Regarding Electro-Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) Testing of Unintentional Radiators and Industrial Scientific and Medical (ISM) Equipment (February 26, 2007)
- Requirements for Beef and Beef Products to be Exported to Japan from the United States of America (January 25, 2013)
- United States–Japan Organic Equivalency Arrangement (September 26, 2013)
- United States–Japan Organic Equivalency Arrangement Appendix 1, for organic livestock products and organic processed food products containing livestock ingredients (July 16, 2020)

Korea

- United States–Korea Organic Equivalency Arrangement (June 30, 2014)

Kuwait

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Kuwait Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (February 6, 2004)

Laos

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (February 17, 2016)

Lebanon

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lebanon Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (November 30, 2006)

Liberia

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Liberia (February 15, 2007)

Libya

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the State of Libya and the Government of the United States of America (November 5, 2019)

Malaysia

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Malaysia (May 10, 2004)
- Agreement to Implement Phase I of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (June 28, 2016)

Maldives

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Maldives (October 17, 2009)

Mauritius

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Mauritius (September 18, 2006)
- United States–Mauritius Trade Principles for Information and Communication Technology Services (June 18, 2012)

Mongolia

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Mongolia Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (July 15, 2004)

Morocco

- Kingdom of Morocco–United States Trade Principles for Information and Communication Technology Services (December 5, 2012)
- Statement of Principles for International Investment (December 5, 2012)

Mozambique

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (June 21, 2005)

Nepal

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of United States of America and the Government of Nepal (April 15, 2011)

New Zealand

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of New Zealand Concerning a Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultations Regarding Trade and Investment Relations (October 2, 1992)

Nigeria

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Public of Nigeria Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (February 16, 2000)

Oman

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (July 7, 2004)

Pakistan

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (June 25, 2003)

Paraguay

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Paraguay (January 13, 2017)

Philippines

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (November 9, 1989)
- Protocol to the 1989 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation (November 13, 2011)

Qatar

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Qatar Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (March 19, 2004)

Rwanda

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (June 7, 2006)

Saudi Arabia

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (July 31, 2003)

South Africa

- Agreement Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the United States of America (June 18, 2012)

Southern Africa Customs Union

- Cooperative Agreement Between the United States Of America and the Southern African Customs Union to Foster Trade, Investment and Development (July 16, 2008)

Sri Lanka

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (July 25, 2002)

Switzerland

- Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Swiss Confederation Establishing a Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum (May 25, 2006)
- United States–Switzerland Organic Equivalency Arrangement (July 10, 2015)

Taiwan

- Agreement Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs Concerning a Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultations Regarding Trade and Investment (September 19, 1994)
- United States–Taiwan Organic Equivalency Arrangement (May 30, 2020)

Thailand

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Thailand (October 23, 2002)

Tunisia

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Tunisia Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (October 2, 2002)

Turkey

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey (September 29, 1999)

Ukraine

- Trade and Investment Cooperation Agreement Between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America (March 28, 2008)

United Arab Emirates

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (March 15, 2004)

United Kingdom

- United States–United Kingdom Organic Equivalency Arrangement (January 1, 2021)

Uruguay

- United States–Uruguay Bilateral and Commercial Trade Review (May 20, 1999)
- Joint Commission on Trade and Investment (January 25, 2007)
- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay (January 25, 2007)
 - i. Protocol to the 2007 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning Trade and Environment Public Participation (October 2, 2008)
 - ii. Protocol to the 2007 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning Trade Facilitation (October 2, 2008)

Vietnam

- Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (June 21, 2007)

West African Economic and Monetary Union

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the West African Economic and Monetary Union Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Framework Relations (April 24, 2002)

Yemen

- Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Yemen Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations (February 6, 2004)

ANNEX III

ANNEX III: TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

Overview and Assistance for Workers

The Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers Program (TAA Program) was authorized under Chapter 2 of Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq.). On June 30, 2022, the authorization for the TAA Program expired, and the program had not been reauthorized as of December 31, 2025. The program entered a phased termination, effective July 1, 2022.

Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers

The Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers Program was authorized under Chapter 6 of Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and was reauthorized by the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 for FY 2015 through FY 2021. The program lapsed in July 2022 and had not been reauthorized as of December 31, 2025.

Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms

The U.S. Economic Development Administration Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program (TAAF Program), which provides trade adjustment assistance for import impacted U.S. firms, was authorized by Chapters 3 and 5 of Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. Key portions of the authorization for the TAAF Program expired on June 30, 2022 and had not been reauthorized as of December 31, 2025.

ANNEX IV

ANNEX IV: FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ENFORCEMENT

This annex includes a comprehensive discussion of current U.S. involvement in free trade agreement (FTA) and World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement processes. Further information on WTO disputes to which the United States is a party, and a list of U.S. submissions, are available on the [Office of the United States Trade Representative website](#).

Free Trade Agreement Disputes Brought by the United States

USMCA: Canada—Dairy Tariff-Rate Quota Allocation Measures (CDA-USA-2021-31-01)

On December 9, 2020, the United States requested USMCA Chapter 31 consultations with Canada regarding Canada’s administration of its dairy tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). These consultations concerned the 14 TRQs on dairy products that Canada has the right to maintain under the USMCA on milk, cream, skim milk powder, butter and cream powder, industrial cheeses, cheeses of all types, milk powders, concentrated or condensed milk, yogurt and buttermilk, powdered buttermilk, whey powder, products consisting of natural milk constituents, ice cream and ice cream mixes, and other dairy.

In notices to importers that Canada published in June and October 2020 and May 2021 for dairy TRQs, Canada set aside and limited access to a percentage of the quota for processors and for so-called “further processors.” By setting aside and limiting access to a percentage of each dairy TRQ exclusively for processors, the United States alleged that Canada undermined the ability of American dairy farmers, processors, and exporters to benefit from the agreed-upon TRQs and sell a wide range of dairy products to Canadian consumers. The United States challenged Canada’s measures as inconsistent with Articles 3.A.2.4(b), 3.A.2.6(a), 3.A.2.11(b), 3.A.2.11(c), and 3.A.2.11(e) of the USMCA.

On December 21, 2020, Canada and the United States held consultations via videoconference, but the Parties failed to resolve the matter. On May 25, 2021, the United States requested and established a dispute settlement panel under the USMCA to review Canada’s dairy TRQ allocation measures. The Panel was composed on July 5, 2021. The Parties composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Elbio Rosselli, Chair; and Ms. Julie Bédard and Mr. Mark C. Hansen, Members. On October 25 and October 26, 2021, a panel hearing was held in Ottawa, Canada.

The final panel report was released to the Parties on December 20, 2021, and to the public on January 4, 2022. The Panel agreed with the United States that Canada’s allocation of dairy TRQs, specifically the set-aside of a percentage of each dairy TRQ exclusively for Canadian processors, is inconsistent with Canada’s commitment in Article 3.A.2.11(b) of the USMCA not to “limit access to an allocation to processors.”

On May 16, 2022, Canada published policy changes to implement the panel’s finding. The United States does not consider the changes to bring Canada into compliance with its USMCA obligations.

USMCA: Canada—Dairy Tariff-Rate Quota Allocation Measures 2 (CDA-USA-2023-31-01)

On May 25, 2022, the United States requested consultations under Chapter 31 of the USMCA for the second time regarding Canada’s dairy TRQ allocation measures, specifically relating to the ineligibility of certain types of importers to apply for USMCA dairy TRQ allocations, the imposition of a 12-month activity

requirement for TRQ allocation applicants and recipients, and the partial allocation of the calendar year 2022 dairy TRQs. Consultations were held on June 9, 2022, but the Parties failed to resolve the matter.

After initiating consultations with Canada in May 2022, the United States identified additional aspects of Canada's measures that appear to be inconsistent with Canada's obligations under the USMCA, and on December 20, 2022, the United States requested a new round of consultations with Canada. With the new request, the United States expanded its challenge of Canada's dairy TRQ allocation measures to include Canada's use of a market-share approach for determining TRQ allocations. The United States expressed concern that Canada applies different criteria for calculating the market share of different segments of applicants, and that Canada is failing to allow importers the opportunity to fully utilize TRQ quantities. The United States also continued to challenge Canada's dairy TRQ allocation measures that impose new conditions on the allocation and use of the TRQs, and that prohibit eligible applicants, including retailers, food service operators, and other types of importers, from accessing TRQ allocations. The United States considered that, through these measures, Canada undermines the market access that it agreed to provide in the USMCA.

On January 31, 2023, the United States requested and established a dispute settlement panel under the USMCA to review Canada's revised dairy TRQ allocation measures. The Panel was composed on February 24, 2023. The Parties composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Mateo Diego-Fernández, Chair; and Ms. Kathleen Claussen and Mr. Serge Fréchette, Members. On July 19 and July 20, 2023, a panel hearing was held in Ottawa, Canada.

The final panel report was released to the Parties on November 10, 2023, and to the public on November 24, 2023. Two of the three panelists found that Canada's measures do not breach of any of the USMCA commitments that the United States cited. One panelist, however, agreed with a principal U.S. claim challenging Canada's narrow definition of eligible applicants, which excludes a substantial number of importers that would be eager to bring higher-value, retail-ready U.S. dairy products to Canadian consumers.

The United States is disappointed by the panel's findings. Throughout 2025, USTR continued to work closely with U.S. industry to consider all options to ensure that the U.S. dairy sector receives the full benefit of market access under the USMCA.

USMCA: Mexico—Measures Related to Energy

On July 20, 2022, the United States requested consultations with Mexico under the USMCA. The consultations relate to certain measures by Mexico that undermine American companies and U.S.-produced energy in favor of Mexico's state-owned electrical utility, the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), and state-owned oil and gas company, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). Specifically, the United States is challenging a 2021 amendment to Mexico's Electric Power Industry Law that prioritizes CFE-produced electricity over electricity generated by all private competitors; Mexico's inaction, delays, denials, and revocations of private companies' abilities to operate in Mexico's energy sector; a December 2019 regulation granting only PEMEX an extension to comply with the maximum sulfur content requirements under Mexico's applicable automotive diesel fuel standard; and a June 2022 action that advantages PEMEX, CFE, and their products in the use of Mexico's natural gas transportation network. These measures appear to be inconsistent with several of Mexico's USMCA obligations, including under the Market Access, Investment, and State-Owned Enterprises chapters. As of December 31, 2025, the Parties continued to consult on this matter.

USMCA: Mexico—Measures Concerning Genetically Engineered Corn (MEX-USA-2023-31-01)

On August 17, 2023, the United States established a dispute settlement panel under the USMCA, challenging two sets of measures reflected in Mexico’s February 13, 2023 presidential decree: (1) the ban on use of genetically engineered (GE) corn in tortillas or dough; and (2) the instruction to Mexican government agencies to gradually substitute—*i.e.*, ban—the use of GE corn in all products for human consumption and for animal feed. The United States considers that Mexico’s measures are inconsistent with several of Mexico’s USMCA commitments under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Market Access Chapters. On June 26, 2024, the United States participated in a hearing before a dispute settlement panel composed of the following panelists: Mr. Christian Häberli, Chair; and Mr. Hugo Perezcano Díaz and Ms. Jean Kalicki, Members.

The final panel report was released to the Parties on December 20, 2024. The panel agreed with the United States on all seven legal claims, finding that Mexico’s measures were not based on science and undermined the market access that Mexico agreed to provide in the USMCA. The U.S. Trade Representative noted that the panel’s findings reaffirmed the long-standing concerns of the United States concerning Mexico’s biotechnology policies and the detrimental impact of those policies on U.S. agricultural exports. The panel’s findings further underscored the importance of science-based trade policies that allow American farmers and agricultural producers to compete fairly and leverage their innovation to address climate change and enhance productivity. On February 6, 2025, USTR welcomed the action by Mexico to declare ineffective the two sets of measures successfully challenged in the dispute.

USMCA: Canada—Digital Services Tax

On August 30, 2024, the United States requested consultations with Canada under Chapter 31 of the USMCA concerning Canada’s Digital Services Tax (DST). Canada’s DST applies a three percent tax on the sum of revenues deemed connected to Canada from online marketplaces, online targeted advertising, social media platforms, and user data. The tax applies to companies or groups with annual global revenues of €750 million (approximately \$833 million) or more and Canadian digital services revenue of more than CAD20 million (approximately \$14.3 million). As stated in the request for consultations, the DST appears to be targeted at U.S. companies providing Canadian digital services and to be discriminating against U.S. companies and in favor of Canadian companies. It thus appears to be inconsistent with Canada’s national treatment obligations under the Investment and Cross-Border Trade in Services Chapters of the USMCA. As from June 30, 2025, Canada halted collection of its DST and announced it would rescind the measure. An act to rescind the DST was tabled in Parliament on November 4, 2025.

USMCA: Rapid Response Labor Mechanism—Atento Servicios

On April 16, 2024, the United States requested the establishment of an RRM panel under the USMCA to verify compliance with Mexican labor laws at a call center facility of Atento Servicios (Atento) and determine whether workers at the Atento call center were being denied the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. In August 2025, the RRM panel found in favor of the United States in a determination regarding a labor dispute between Atento and STRM, a Mexican labor union. The Panel found a Denial of Rights occurred at the Atento call center and that the actions taken by Mexico were not sufficient to remediate the Denial of Rights, especially “in view of the gravity, duration and structural nature of the denial” because Mexico’s actions “did not change the labor climate.” This is the first denial of rights determination by an RRM panel, and the first successful labor case under the dispute mechanism of any trade agreement.

Free Trade Agreement Disputes Brought Against the United States

USMCA: United States—Automotive Rules of Origin (USA-MEX-2022-31-01)

On August 20, 2021, Mexico requested consultations with the United States regarding the interpretation and application of certain rules of origin provisions for automobiles under the USMCA. On August 26, 2021, Canada notified its intent to join the consultations. The United States held consultations with Mexico on September 24, 2021. Mexico requested and established a dispute settlement panel on January 6, 2022, and Canada joined the dispute as a co-complainant on January 13, 2022. The Parties composed the Panel on March 22, 2022, as follows: Mr. Elbio Rosselli, Chair; and Ms. Kathleen Claussen, Ms. Ann Ryan Robertson, Mr. Jorge Miranda, and Mr. Donald McRae, Members.

A final panel report finding in favor of Canada and Mexico was released to the Parties on December 14, 2022, and to the public on January 11, 2023. Following that ruling, as required under the USMCA, the Parties have engaged in discussions regarding a resolution to the dispute.

USMCA: United States—Additional (Fentanyl) Duties

On March 4, 2025, Canada requested dispute settlement consultations with the United States under the USMCA regarding the imposition of tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), with respect to the failure of Canada to take action with respect to illegal immigration and the fentanyl crisis. The United States accepted the request.

USMCA: United States—Section 232 Import Duties on Steel and Aluminum Products

On March 12, 2025, Canada requested dispute settlement consultations with the United States under the USMCA regarding the imposition of tariffs pursuant to Section 232 on certain steel and aluminum articles. The United States accepted the request.

USMCA: United States—Section 232 Import Duties on Automobiles and Automobile Parts

On April 3, 2025, Canada requested dispute settlement consultations with the United States under the USMCA regarding the imposition of tariffs pursuant to Section 232 on passenger vehicles, light trucks, and automotive parts. The United States accepted the request.

World Trade Organization Disputes Brought by the United States

This section includes brief summaries of dispute settlement activity in 2025 where the United States was a complainant (listed alphabetically by responding party, and then chronologically).

China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (DS363)

On April 10, 2007, the United States requested consultations with the People's Republic of China (China) regarding certain measures related to the import and/or distribution of imported films for theatrical release, audiovisual home entertainment products (*e.g.*, video cassettes and DVDs), sound recordings, and publications (*e.g.*, books, magazines, newspapers, and electronic publications). On July 10, 2007, the United States requested supplemental consultations with China regarding certain measures pertaining to the distribution of imported films for theatrical release and sound recordings.

Specifically, the United States was concerned that certain Chinese measures: (1) restricted trading rights (such as the right to import goods into China) with respect to imported films for theatrical release, audiovisual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and publications; and (2) restricted market access for, or discriminated against, imported films for theatrical release and sound recordings in physical form, and foreign service providers seeking to engage in the distribution of certain publications, audiovisual home entertainment products, and sound recordings. The Chinese measures at issue appeared to be inconsistent with several WTO provisions, including provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), as well as specific commitments made by China in its WTO accession agreement.

The United States and China held consultations in June and July 2007. At the request of the United States, the WTO established a panel on November 27, 2007, to examine the U.S. complaint. On March 27, 2008, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Florentino P. Feliciano, Chair; and Mr. Juan Antonio Dorantes and Mr. Christian Häberli, Members.

The report of the Panel was circulated to WTO Members and made public on August 12, 2009. In the final report, the Panel made three critical sets of findings. First, the Panel found that China's restrictions on foreign invested enterprises (and in some cases foreign individuals) from importing films for theatrical release, audiovisual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and publications are inconsistent with China's trading rights commitments as set forth in China's protocol of accession to the WTO. The Panel also found that China's restrictions on the right to import these products are not justified by Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. Second, the Panel found that China's prohibitions and discriminatory restrictions on foreign owned or controlled enterprises seeking to distribute publications and audiovisual home entertainment products and sound recordings over the Internet are inconsistent with China's obligations under the GATS. Third, the Panel also found that China's treatment of imported publications is inconsistent with the national treatment obligation in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.

In September 2009, China filed a notice of appeal to the WTO Appellate Body, and the United States filed an appeal on one aspect of the Panel's analysis of China's defense under GATT 1994 Article XX(a). On December 21, 2009, the Appellate Body issued its report. The Appellate Body rejected each of China's claims on appeal. The Appellate Body also found that the Panel had erred in the aspect of the analysis that the United States had appealed. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body and panel reports on January 19, 2010. On July 12, 2010, the United States and China notified the DSB that they had agreed on a 14-month period of time for implementation, to end on March 19, 2011.

China subsequently issued several revised measures, and repealed other measures, relating to the market access restrictions on books, newspapers, journals, DVDs, and music. As China acknowledged, however, it did not issue any measures addressing theatrical films. Instead, China proposed bilateral discussions with the United States in order to seek an alternative solution. The United States and China reached agreement in February 2012 on an MOU providing for substantial increases in the number of foreign films imported and distributed in China each year and substantial additional revenue for foreign film producers. The MOU calls for China and the United States to engage in consultations in calendar year 2017 and, through this consultation process, to provide for further meaningful compensation to the United States. China and the United States initiated consultations in 2017; however, to date, China has not agreed to provide further meaningful compensation, as it committed to do under the MOU.

China—Measures Relating to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (DS394)

On June 23, 2009, the United States requested consultations with China regarding China's export restraints on a number of important raw materials. The materials at issue are: bauxite, coke, fluor spar, magnesium,

manganese, silicon metal, silicon carbide, yellow phosphorus, and zinc. These materials are inputs for numerous downstream products in the steel, aluminum, and chemical sectors.

The United States challenged China's export restraints on these raw materials as inconsistent with several WTO provisions, including provisions in the GATT 1994, as well as specific commitments made by China in its WTO accession agreement. Specifically, the United States challenged certain Chinese measures that impose: (1) quantitative restrictions in the form of quotas on exports of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, silicon carbide, and zinc ores and concentrates, as well as certain intermediate products incorporating some of these inputs; and (2) export duties on several raw materials. The United States also challenged other related export restraints, including export licensing restrictions, minimum export price requirements, and requirements to pay certain charges before certain products can be exported, as well as China's failure to publish relevant measures.

The United States and China held consultations in July and September 2009, but did not resolve the dispute. The EU and Mexico also requested and held consultations with China on these measures. On November 19, 2009, the EU and Mexico joined the United States in requesting the establishment of a panel, and on December 21, 2009, the WTO established a single panel to examine all three complaints. On March 29, 2010, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Elbio Rosselli, Chair; and Ms. Dell Higgie and Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti, Members.

The Panel's final report was circulated to Members on July 5, 2011. The Panel found that the export duties and export quotas imposed by China on various forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, and zinc constitute a breach of WTO rules and that China failed to justify those measures as legitimate conservation measures, environmental protection measures, or short supply measures. The Panel also found China's imposition of minimum export price, export licensing, and export quota administration requirements on these materials, as well as China's failure to publish certain measures related to these requirements inconsistent with WTO rules.

On January 30, 2012, the Appellate Body issued a report affirming the Panel's findings on all significant claims, including that the Panel correctly made recommendations for China to bring its measures into conformity with its WTO commitments.

The DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body reports on February 22, 2012. The United States, the EU, Mexico, and China agreed that China would have until December 31, 2012, to implement the WTO's recommendations.

At the conclusion of the reasonable period of time (RPT) for China to comply, it appeared that China had eliminated the export duties and export quotas on the products at issue in this dispute, as of January 1, 2013. However, China maintains export licensing requirements for a number of the products. The United States continues to monitor actions by China that might operate to restrict exports of raw materials at issue in this dispute.

China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services (DS413)

On September 15, 2010, the United States requested consultations with China concerning issues relating to certain restrictions and requirements maintained by China pertaining to electronic payment services (EPS) for payment card transactions and the suppliers of those services. EPS enable transactions involving credit card, debit card, charge card, check card, automated teller machine (ATM) card, prepaid card, or other similar card or money transmission product, and manage and facilitate the transfers of funds between institutions participating in such card-based electronic payment transactions. The best-known EPS suppliers are credit and debit card companies based in the United States.

China instituted and maintains measures that operate to block foreign EPS suppliers, including U.S. suppliers, from supplying these services, and that discriminate against foreign suppliers at every stage of a card-based electronic payment transaction. The United States challenged China's measures affecting EPS suppliers as inconsistent with China's national treatment and market access commitments under the GATS.

The United States and China held consultations on October 27 and October 28, 2010, but these consultations did not resolve the dispute. At the request of the United States, on March 25, 2011, the WTO established a panel to examine the U.S. complaint. On July 4, 2011, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Virachai Plasai, Chair; and Ms. Elaine Feldman and Mr. Martín Redrado, Members.

The Panel circulated its report on July 16, 2012. China did not appeal the Panel's findings, and the Panel Report was adopted by the DSB on August 31, 2012.

The United States prevailed on significant threshold issues, including:

- EPS is a single service (or EPS are integrated services) and each element of EPS is necessary for a payment card transaction to occur.
- EPS is properly classified under the same subsector, item (viii) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services, which appears as subsector (d) of China's Schedule (All payment and money transmission services, including credit, charge, and debit cards) as the United States argued, and no element of EPS is classified as falling in item (xiv) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services (settlement and clearing of financial assets, including securities, derivative products, and other negotiable instruments), as China argued and for which China has no WTO commitments.
- In addition to the "four-party" model of EPS (*e.g.*, Visa[®] and MasterCard[®]), the "three-party" model (*e.g.*, American Express[®]) and other variations, third-party issuer processor and merchant processors also are covered by subsector (d) of China's Schedule.

With respect to the U.S. GATS national treatment claims, the Panel found the following breaches:

- China imposes requirements on issuers of payment cards that payment cards issued in China bear the "Yin Lian/UnionPay logo," and therefore China requires issuers to become members of the China Union Pay (CUP) network; that the cards they issue in China meet certain uniform business specifications and technical standards; and that these requirements fail to accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than China accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
- China imposes requirements that all terminals (ATMs, merchant processing devices, and point of sale (POS) terminals) in China that are part of the national card interbank processing network be capable of accepting all payment cards bearing the Yin Lian/UnionPay logo, and that these requirements fail to accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than China accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
- China imposes requirements on acquirers (those institutions that acquire payment card transactions and that maintain relationships with merchants) to post the Yin Lian/UnionPay logo, and, furthermore, China imposes requirements that acquirers join the CUP network and comply with uniform business standards and technical specifications of interbank interoperability, and that terminal equipment operated or provided by acquirers be capable of accepting bank cards bearing

the Yin Lian/UnionPay logo, and that these requirements fail to accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than China accords to its own like services and service suppliers.

With respect to the U.S. GATS market access claims, the Panel found that China's requirements related to certain Hong Kong and Macau transactions are inconsistent with Article XVI: 2(a) of the GATS because, contrary to China's Sector 7B (d) mode 3 market access commitments, China maintains a limitation on the number of service suppliers in the form of a monopoly.

The United States and China agreed that the RPT for China to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings would be 11 months from the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings, that is, until July 31, 2013.

In April 2015, the State Council of China issued a formal decision announcing that China's market would be open to foreign suppliers that seek to provide EPS for domestic currency payment card transactions. The People's Bank of China followed this in July 2015 by publishing a draft licensing regulation for public comment. This draft licensing regulation was finalized in June 2016. In June 2020, four months after the entry into force of the China Economic and Trade Agreement, American Express became the first foreign supplier of EPS to secure a network clearing license to operate in China's market. Likewise, in November 2023, the People's Bank of China granted a payment clearing license to Mastercard's local joint venture. The United States continues to urge China to ensure that approvals for foreign EPS suppliers to operate in China occur without delay, in accordance with China's WTO obligations, and continues to monitor the situation closely.

China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum (DS431)

On March 13, 2012, the United States requested consultations with China regarding China's export restraints on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum. These materials are vital inputs in the manufacture of electronics, automobiles, steel, petroleum products, and a variety of chemicals that are used to produce both everyday items and highly sophisticated, technologically advanced products, such as hybrid vehicle batteries, wind turbines, and energy efficient lighting.

The United States challenged China's export restraints on these materials as inconsistent with several WTO provisions, including provisions in the GATT 1994, as well as specific commitments made by China in its WTO accession agreement. Specifically, the United States challenged: (1) China's quantitative restrictions in the form of quotas on exports of rare earth, tungsten, and molybdenum ores and concentrates, as well as certain intermediate products incorporating some of these inputs; (2) China's export duties on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum; and (3) China's other export restraints on these materials, including prior export performance and minimum capital requirements.

The United States, together with the EU and Japan, held consultations with China on April 25 and 26, 2012, but the consultations did not resolve the dispute.

On June 29, 2012, the EU and Japan joined the United States in requesting the establishment of a panel, and on July 23, 2012, the WTO DSB established a single panel to examine all three complaints. On September 24, 2012, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi, Chair; and Mr. Hugo Cayrús and Mr. Darlington Mwape, Members. The Panel held its meetings with the Parties from February 26 to February 28, 2013, and on June 18 and June 19, 2013.

On March 26, 2014, the Panel circulated its report. The Panel found that the export quotas and export duties imposed by China on various forms of rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum constitute a breach of WTO

rules and that China failed to justify those measures as legitimate conservation measures or environmental protection measures, respectively. The Panel also found China's imposition of prior export performance and minimum capital requirements inconsistent with WTO rules.

On August 7, 2014, the Appellate Body issued a report affirming the Panel's findings on all significant claims. On August 29, 2014, the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body reports. The United States, the EU, Japan, and China agreed that China would have until May 2, 2015, to comply with the recommendations and rulings.

China announced that it had eliminated its export quotas on the products at issue in this dispute as of January 1, 2015, and its export duties as of May 1, 2015. The United States continues to monitor actions by China, such as export licensing requirements, that might operate to restrict exports of the materials at issue in this dispute.

China—Measures Related to Demonstration Bases and Common Service Platform Programs (DS489)

On February 11, 2015, the United States requested consultations regarding the People's Republic of China's (China) "Demonstration Bases-Common Service Platform" export subsidy program. Under this program, China appears to provide prohibited export subsidies through "Common Service Platforms" to manufacturers and producers across seven economic sectors and dozens of sub-sectors located in more than 150 industrial clusters, known as "Demonstration Bases."

Pursuant to this Demonstration Bases-Common Service Platform program, China provides free and discounted services as well as cash grants and other incentives to enterprises that meet export performance criteria and are located in 179 Demonstration Bases throughout China. Each of these Demonstration Bases is comprised of enterprises from one of seven sectors: (1) textiles, apparel, and footwear; (2) advanced materials and metals (including specialty steel, titanium, and aluminum products); (3) light industry; (4) specialty chemicals; (5) medical products; (6) hardware and building materials; and (7) agriculture. China maintains and operates this extensive program through over 150 central government and sub-central government measures throughout China.

The United States held consultations with China on March 13, April 1, and April 2, 2015. At the request of the United States, on April 22, 2015, the WTO established a panel to examine the U.S. complaint. The United States and China held additional consultations following the establishment of the Panel and reached agreement in April 2016 on an MOU. Pursuant to the MOU, China agreed to terminate the export subsidies it had provided through the Demonstration Bases-Common Service Platform program. The United States continues to monitor China's actions with respect to its compliance with the terms of the MOU.

China—Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials (DS508)

On July 13 and July 19, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China regarding China's restraints on the exportation of antimony, chromium, cobalt, copper, graphite, indium, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum, and tin. These materials are critical to the production of downstream products made in the United States in industries including aerospace, automotive, construction, electronics, and steel.

The United States challenged China's export restraints on these materials as inconsistent with several WTO provisions, including provisions in the GATT 1994, as well as specific commitments made by China in its WTO accession agreement. The export restraints include export quotas, export duties, and additional requirements that impose restrictions on the trading rights of enterprises seeking to export various forms of the materials, such as prior export performance requirements.

The United States, together with the EU, held consultations with China on September 8 and September 9, 2016. Consultations did not resolve the dispute. At the request of the United States, the WTO established a panel on November 8, 2016. In light of Chinese actions to cease to apply the export duties and quotas in 2017, the United States is continuing to monitor China's actions.

China—Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers (DS511)

On September 13, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China concerning China's provision of domestic support in favor of agricultural producers, in particular, to those producing wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn. It appears that China's level of domestic support is in excess of its commitment level of *nil* specified in Section I of Part IV of China's Schedule CLII because, for example, China provides domestic support in excess of its product-specific *de minimis* level of 8.5 percent for each of wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn.

China's level of domestic support appears to be inconsistent with Articles 3.2, 6.3, and 7.2(b) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture Agreement. The parties consulted on this matter on October 20, 2016, but the consultations did not resolve the dispute.

At the request of the United States, the WTO established a panel on January 25, 2017, to examine the U.S. complaint. Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, the EU, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Vietnam reserved their rights to participate in panel proceedings as third parties. On June 24, 2017, the parties agreed to compose the Panel as follows: Mr. Gudmundur Helgason, Chair; and Mr. Juan Antonio Dorantes Sánchez and Ms. Elaine Feldman, Members.

On February 28, 2019, the Panel circulated its report. The Panel found that China had breached Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agriculture Agreement by exceeding, in each year from 2012 to 2015, its *de minimis* level of support for wheat, Indica rice, and Japonica rice. The DSB adopted the Panel report on April 26, 2019. The United States and China agreed that the RPT for China to come into compliance with WTO rules would end March 31, 2020.

On July 16, 2020, the United States requested authorization to suspend the application to China of tariff concessions and other obligations at an estimated level of \$1.3 billion for 2020 pursuant to Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). On July 27, 2020, China objected to the U.S. request, automatically referring the matter to arbitration. On August 5, 2020, China requested the establishment of a compliance panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, and at its meeting on September 28, 2020, the DSB established a compliance panel.

China—Administration of Tariff-Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products (DS517)

On December 15, 2016, the United States requested consultations with China regarding the administration of TRQs for certain agricultural products, namely, wheat, corn, and rice.

The measures identified in the request establish a system by which the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) annually allocates quota to eligible enterprises, and reallocates quota returned unused, based on eligibility requirements and allocation principles that are not clearly specified. The TRQs for these commodities have under filled, even in years where market conditions would suggest demand for imports. China's administration of these TRQs inhibits the filling of the TRQs, restricting opportunities for U.S. and other trading partners to export wheat, corn, and rice to China.

On February 9, 2017, the United States and China held consultations in Geneva. The EU, Canada, Australia, and Thailand requested to join the consultations, but China denied the third parties' requests.

The consultations failed to resolve the U.S. concerns, and at the request of the United States, the WTO established a panel on September 22, 2017. Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, the EU, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Ukraine and Vietnam reserved third-party rights. The Panel was composed on February 22, 2018, as follows: Mr. Mateo Diego-Fernandez, Chair; and Mr. Stefan H. Johannesson and Mr. Esteban B. Conejos, Jr., Members.

The Panel circulated its report on April 18, 2019. The Panel found that with respect to the United States' claims under Paragraph 116 of China's Working Party Report:

- The basic eligibility criteria used in China's administration of its TRQs for wheat, rice, and corn are inconsistent with the obligations to administer TRQs on a transparent, predictable, and fair basis, and to administer TRQs using clearly specified requirements.
- The allocation principles used in China's administration of its wheat, rice, and corn TRQs are inconsistent with the obligations to administer TRQs on a transparent, predictable, and fair basis, and to administer TRQs using clearly specified administrative procedures.
- The reallocation procedures used in China's administration of its wheat, rice, and corn TRQs are inconsistent with the obligation to administer TRQs using clearly specified administrative procedures.
- The public comment process used in China's administration of its wheat, rice, and corn TRQs is inconsistent with the obligations to administer TRQs on a transparent, predictable, and fair basis, and to administer TRQs using clearly specified administrative procedures.
- The administration of STE and non-STE portions of China's wheat, rice, and corn TRQs is inconsistent with the obligations to administer TRQs on a transparent, predictable, and fair basis, to administer TRQs using clearly specified administrative procedures, and to administer TRQs in a manner that would not inhibit the filling of each TRQ.
- The usage requirements for imported wheat and corn used in China's administration of its TRQ for wheat and corn are inconsistent with the obligations to administer TRQs on a predictable basis, to administer TRQs using clearly specified administrative procedures, and to administer TRQs in a manner that would not inhibit the filling of each TRQ.

The Panel also found that China's administration of its wheat, rice, and corn TRQs is, as a whole, inconsistent with the obligations to administer TRQs on a transparent, predictable, and fair basis, to administer TRQs using clearly specified requirements and administrative procedures, and to administer TRQs in a manner that would not inhibit the filling of each TRQ.

The DSB adopted the Panel report on May 28, 2019. The United States and China agreed that the RPT for China to come into compliance with WTO rules would end on June 29, 2021.

On July 15, 2021, the United States requested authorization to suspend the application to China of tariff concessions and other obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU. China objected to the U.S. request, automatically referring the matter to arbitration. On July 15, 2021, China requested the establishment of a

compliance panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, and at its meeting on August 30, 2021, the DSB established a compliance panel.

China—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States (DS558)

On July 16, 2018, the United States requested consultations with China with respect to its imposition of additional duties on certain products originating in the United States. China imposed the additional duties in retaliation for the action the President took under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. The U.S. consultations request alleges that the additional duties contravene China's obligations under the WTO Agreement because they: (1) fail to extend to U.S. products an advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by China to products originating in the territory of other WTO Members; (2) accord less favorable treatment to products originating in the United States; and (3) impose duties in excess of those set forth in China's schedule.

The United States held consultations with China on August 29, 2018, but these consultations did not resolve the dispute. At the request of the United States, the WTO established a panel on November 21, 2018, to examine the U.S. complaint. On January 25, 2019, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. William Ehlers, Chair; and Mr. Cristian Espinosa Cañizares and Ms. Mónica Rolong, Members. In August 2023, the Panel circulated its final report agreeing with the United States that China's retaliatory tariffs breached WTO rules and that the U.S. Section 232 measures were taken pursuant to the essential security exception under the GATT 1994. On September 18, 2023, China notified the DSB of an appeal of the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

European Union—Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones) (DS26, 48)

The United States and Canada challenged the EU ban on imports of meat from animals to which any of six hormones for growth promotional purposes had been administered. The Panel found that the EU ban is inconsistent with the EU's obligations under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), and that the ban is not based on science, a risk assessment, or relevant international standards.

Upon appeal, the Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's findings that the EU ban fails to satisfy the requirements of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body also found that, while a country has broad discretion in electing what level of protection it wishes to implement, in doing so it must fulfill the requirements of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body concluded that in this case, the ban imposed is not rationally related to the conclusions of the risk assessments the EU had performed.

Because the EU did not comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by May 13, 1999, the final date of its compliance period as set by arbitration, the United States sought WTO authorization to suspend concessions with respect to certain products of the EU in an amount equal to the value of the estimated annual harm to U.S. exports resulting from the EU's failure to lift its ban on imports of U.S. meat. The EU exercised its right to request arbitration concerning the amount of the suspension. On July 12, 1999, the arbitrators determined the level of suspension to be \$116.8 million. On July 26, 1999, the DSB authorized the United States to suspend such concessions and the United States proceeded to impose 100 percent *ad valorem* duties on a list of EU products with an annual trade value of \$116.8 million.

On November 3, 2003, the EU notified the WTO that it had amended its hormones ban. On November 8, 2004, the EU requested consultations with respect to "the United States[]" continued suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements" in the EU-Hormones dispute. The

Appellate Body issued its report in the *United States—Continued Suspension (WT/DS320)* on October 16, 2008.

On October 31, 2008, USTR announced that it was considering changes to the list of EU products on which 100 percent *ad valorem* duties had been imposed in 1999. A modified list of EU products was announced by USTR on January 15, 2009.

On December 22, 2008, the EU requested consultations with the United States and Canada pursuant to Articles 4 and 21.5 of the DSU, regarding the EU's implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this matter. In its consultations request, the EU stated that it considered that it has brought into compliance the measures found inconsistent in this matter by, among other things, adopting its revised ban in 2003. Consultations took place in February 2009. Pursuant to an MOU between the United States and the EU, further litigation in the compliance proceeding has been suspended.

In 2016, industry representatives requested that the United States reinstate suspension of concessions, as authorized by the DSB. USTR accordingly initiated proceedings under Section 306 of the Trade Act. In 2019, the United States and the EU concluded successful negotiations to resolve concerns with the operation of the TRQ established by the MOU. On August 2, 2019, the United States and the EU signed the Agreement on the Allocation to the United States of a Share in the Tariff Rate Quota for High Quality Beef Referred to in the Revised MOU Regarding the Importation of Beef from Animals Not Treated with Certain Growth-promoting Hormones and Increased Duties Applied by the United States to Certain Products of the European Union. On December 13, 2019, USTR published notice of its determination not to reinstate action in connection with the EU's measures concerning meat and meat products in the *Federal Register*.

For further discussion of the U.S. suspension of concessions and the MOU, see Chapter I.C.2. Section 301—Addressing Unfair Foreign Practices Affecting U.S. Trade.

European Union—Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotechnology products (DS291)

Since the late 1990s, the EU has pursued policies that undermine the commercialization and trade of agricultural biotechnology products. After approving a number of agricultural biotechnology products through October 1998, the EU adopted an across-the-board moratorium under which no further biotechnology applications were allowed to reach final approval. In addition, six Member States (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Luxemburg) adopted unjustified bans on certain biotechnology crops that had been approved by the EU prior to the adoption of the moratorium. These measures have caused a growing portion of U.S. agricultural exports to be excluded from EU markets and unfairly cast concerns about biotechnology products around the world, particularly in developing countries.

On May 13, 2003, the United States filed a consultation request with respect to: (1) the EU's moratorium on all new biotechnology approvals; (2) delays in the processing of specific biotechnology product applications; and (3) the product-specific bans adopted by six EU Member States (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg). The United States requested the establishment of a panel on August 7, 2003. Argentina and Canada submitted similar consultation and panel requests. On August 29, 2003, the DSB established a panel to consider the claims of the United States, Argentina, and Canada. On March 4, 2003, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Christian Häberli, Chair; and Mr. Mohan Kumar and Mr. Akio Shimizu, Members.

The Panel issued its report on September 29, 2006. The Panel agreed with the United States, Argentina, and Canada that the disputed measures of the EU, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg are inconsistent with the obligations set out in the SPS Agreement. In particular:

- The Panel found that the EU adopted a *de facto*, across-the-board moratorium on the final approval of biotechnological products, starting in 1999 up through the time the Panel was established in August 2003.
- The Panel found that the EU had presented no scientific or regulatory justification for the moratorium, and thus that the moratorium resulted in “undue delays” in violation of the EU’s obligations under the SPS Agreement.
- The Panel identified specific, WTO inconsistent “undue delays” with regard to 24 of the 27 pending product applications that were listed in the U.S. panel request.
- The Panel upheld the United States’ claims that, in light of positive safety assessments issued by the EU’s own scientists, the bans adopted by six EU Member States on products approved in the EU prior to the moratorium were not supported by scientific evidence, and were thus inconsistent with WTO rules.

The DSB adopted the Panel report on November 21, 2006. On June 21, 2006, the United States, Argentina, and Canada notified the DSB that they had agreed with the EU on a one-year period of time for implementation, to end on November 21, 2007. On November 21, 2007, the United States, Argentina, and Canada notified the DSB that they had agreed with the EU to extend the implementation period to January 11, 2008.

On January 17, 2008, the United States submitted a request for authorization to suspend concessions and other obligations with respect to the EU under the covered agreements at an annual level equivalent to the annual level of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to the United States resulting from the EU’s failure to bring measures concerning the approval and marketing of biotechnology products into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. On February 6, 2008, the EU objected under Article 22.6 of the DSU, claiming that the level of suspension proposed by the United States was not equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, referring the matter to arbitration. The United States and the EU mutually agreed to suspend the Article 22.6 arbitration proceedings on February 18, 2008.

Subsequent to the suspension of the Article 22.6 proceeding, the United States continues monitoring EU developments and has been engaging with the EU in discussions with the goal of normalizing trade in biotechnology products.

European Communities and certain Member States—Measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft (DS316)

On October 6, 2004, the United States requested consultations with the EU, as well as with Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Spain, with respect to subsidies provided to Airbus, a manufacturer of large civil aircraft (LCA). The United States alleged that such subsidies violated various provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), as well as Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994. Consultations were held on November 4, 2004. On January 11, 2005, the United States and the EU agreed to a framework for the negotiation of a new agreement to end subsidies for LCA. The parties set a three-month time frame for the negotiations and agreed that, during negotiations, they would not request panel proceedings.

The United States and the EU were unable to reach an agreement within the 90-day time frame. Therefore, the United States filed a request for a panel on May 31, 2005. The Panel was established on July 20, 2005. The U.S. request challenged several types of EU subsidies that appear to be prohibited, actionable, or both.

On October 17, 2005, the Deputy Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Carlos Pérez del Castillo, Chair; and Mr. John Adank and Mr. Thinus Jacobsz, Members.

The Panel issued its report on June 30, 2010. It agreed with the United States that the disputed measures of the EU, France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom were inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. In particular:

- Every instance of “launch aid” provided to Airbus was a subsidy because in each case, the terms charged for this unique low interest, success-dependent financing were more favorable than were available in the market.
- Some of the launch aid provided for the A380, Airbus’s newest and largest aircraft, was contingent on exports and, therefore, a prohibited subsidy.
- Several instances in which German and French government entities created infrastructure for Airbus were subsidies because the infrastructure was not general, and the price charged to Airbus for use resulted in less than adequate remuneration to the government.
- Several government equity infusions into the Airbus companies were subsidies because they were on more favorable terms than available in the market.
- Several EU and Member State research programs provided grants to Airbus to develop technologies used in its aircraft.
- These subsidies caused adverse effects to the interests of the United States in the form of lost sales, displacement of U.S. imports into the EU market, and displacement of U.S. exports into the markets of Australia, Brazil, Chinese Taipei, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of China (China).

The EU filed a notice of appeal on July 21, 2010. On May 18, 2011, the Appellate Body issued its report. The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel’s central findings that European government launch aid had been used to support the creation of every model of LCA produced by Airbus. The Appellate Body also confirmed that launch aid and other challenged subsidies to Airbus have directly resulted in Boeing losing sales involving purchases of Airbus aircraft by EasyJet, Air Berlin, Czech Airlines, Air Asia, Iberia, South African Airways, Thai Airways International, Singapore Airlines, Emirates Airlines, and Qantas, as well as lost market share, with Airbus gaining market share in the EU and in third-country markets, including China and Korea, at the expense of Boeing. The Appellate Body also found that the Panel applied the wrong standard for evaluating whether subsidies are export subsidies, and that the Panel record did not have enough information to allow application of the correct standard.

On December 1, 2011, the EU provided a notification in which it claimed to have complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings. On December 9, 2011, the United States requested consultations regarding the notification and also requested authorization from the DSB to impose countermeasures. The United States and the EU held consultations on January 13, 2012. On December 22, 2011, the EU objected to the level of suspension of concessions requested by the United States, and the matter was referred to arbitration

pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU. On January 19, 2012, the United States and the EU requested that the arbitration be suspended pending the conclusion of the compliance proceeding.

On March 30, 2012, in light of the Parties' disagreement over whether the EU had complied with the DSB's recommendations and rulings, the United States requested that the DSB refer the matter to the original Panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. The DSB did so at a meeting held on April 13, 2012. On April 25, 2012, the compliance Panel was composed with the members of the original Panel: Mr. Carlos Pérez del Castillo, Chair; and Mr. John Adank and Mr. Thinus Jacobsz, Members.

On September 22, 2016, the report of the Article 21.5 Panel was circulated to the Members. The Panel found that the EU breached Articles 5(c) and 6.3(a), (b), and (c) of the SCM Agreement, and that the EU and certain Member States failed to comply with the DSB recommendations under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement to "take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or ... withdraw the subsidy."

Significant findings by the compliance Panel against the EU include:

- 34 out of 36 alleged compliance "steps" notified by the EU did not amount to "actions" with respect to the subsidies provided to the Airbus or the adverse effects that those subsidies were to have caused in the original proceeding.
- As a result, the EU failed to withdraw the subsidies, as recommended by the DSB.
- Those subsidies were a genuine and substantial cause of lost sales to U.S. aircraft, and displacement and impedance of exports of U.S. aircraft to Australia, China, India, Korea, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

On October 13, 2016, the EU notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the compliance panel. The Division hearing the appeal was composed of Ricardo Ramirez-Hernandez as Presiding Member, and Peter van den Bossche and Ujal Singh Bhatia.

On May 15, 2018, the Appellate Body issued its report. The Appellate Body confirmed that the EU and certain Member States failed to comply with the earlier WTO determination finding launch aid inconsistent with their WTO obligations. The Appellate Body further confirmed that almost \$5 billion in new launch aid for the A350 XWB was WTO-inconsistent. The Appellate Body found that the WTO-inconsistent subsidies continue to cause significant lost sales of Boeing aircraft in the twin-aisle and very large aircraft markets, and that these subsidies impede exports of Boeing 747 aircraft to numerous geographic markets. The Appellate Body also found that, due to the passage of time, the EU no longer needed to take action regarding some of the earlier (*i.e.*, pre-A380) launch aid subsidies previously found to be WTO-inconsistent.

On July 13, 2018, at the request of the United States, the arbitration regarding the level of countermeasures (suspended in January 2012) was resumed. On October 2, 2019, the Arbitrator issued its decision that the level of countermeasures commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist is up to \$7.5 billion annually. On October 14, 2019, the WTO accordingly authorized the United States to take countermeasures consistent with the award of the Arbitrator. The United States imposed tariffs on certain imports from the involved EU Member States pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act.

On May 17, 2018, the EU represented to the DSB that it had taken new steps to achieve compliance with its WTO obligations. However, following consultations, the United States did not agree that the EU had achieved compliance. At the request of the EU, the WTO established a second compliance panel on August 27, 2018.

On December 2, 2019, the second compliance Panel issued its report. The Panel found that the EU continued to be in breach of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(a), (b), and (c) of the SCM Agreement, and that the EU and certain Member States had accordingly failed to comply with the DSB recommendations under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement to “take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or ... withdraw the subsidy.” The Panel agreed with the United States that none of the measures taken by the four EU Member States amounted to a withdrawal of the launch aid for the A350XWB and A380. The Panel also found that that launch aid for the A380 and A350XWB continued to be a genuine and substantial cause of lost sales to U.S. aircraft, and impedance of exports of U.S. aircraft to China, India, Korea, Singapore, and the UAE.

On December 6, 2019, the EU notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain findings of the compliance Panel.

On June 15 and June 17, 2021, the United States reached understandings on cooperative frameworks with the EU and the United Kingdom, respectively, on the parallel aircraft disputes (DS316 and DS353). In accordance with the understandings, each side intends not to impose any WTO-authorized countermeasures for a period of five years starting from July 4, 2021. Each side also intends to provide any financing to its LCA producer for the production or development of LCA on market terms. Additionally, each side intends to provide any funding for research and development (R&D) for LCA to its LCA producer through an open and transparent process while making the results of fully government funded R&D widely available. A working group is also established under each framework to analyze and overcome any disagreements in the sector, including on any existing support measures. The working group will also collaborate on jointly analyzing and addressing non-market practices of third parties that may harm their respective LCA industries.

For further discussion of the U.S. countermeasures, see Chapter I.C.2. Section 301—Addressing Unfair Foreign Practices Affecting U.S. Trade 2025.

European Union—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States (DS559)

On July 16, 2018, the United States requested consultations with the EU with respect to its imposition of additional duties on certain products originating in the United States. The EU imposed the additional duties in retaliation for the action the President took under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. The U.S. consultations request alleges that the additional duties contravene the EU’s obligations under the WTO Agreement because they: (1) fail to extend to U.S. products an advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by the EU to products originating in the territory of other WTO Members; (2) accord less favorable treatment to products originating in the United States; and (3) impose duties in excess of those set forth in the EU’s schedule.

The United States held consultations with the EU on August 28, 2018, but these consultations did not resolve the dispute. At the request of the United States, the WTO established a panel on November 21, 2018, to examine the U.S. complaint. On January 25, 2019, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. William Ehlers, Chair; and Ms. Olga Lucía Lozano Ferro and Mr. Anwar Zaheer Jamali, Members.

In November 2021, the United States and EU announced arrangements on steel and aluminum cooperation, and the EU announced that it would suspend its additional duties. The United States requested that the Panel suspend its work. The EU informed the Panel that it did not object to that request, and the Panel granted it. Pursuant to that agreement, the United States and the EU mutually agreed to resort to arbitration regarding the matter pending before the Panel in this dispute. Upon composition of the Arbitrator, the

arbitration was immediately and indefinitely suspended and the dispute before this Panel was terminated. On January 17, 2022, the United States and the EU notified the DSB that they were terminating this dispute before the panel in light of the agreed procedures for arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU. On January 20, 2022, the Chair of the panel informed the DSB that it had ceased all work in these proceedings.

On January 17, 2022, the United States and the EU notified the DSB that they had agreed, pursuant to Article 25.2 of the DSU, to resort to arbitration on the matter pending before the panel in this dispute. The arbitrator was composed on January 20, 2022, with the same persons who served as members of the Panel. As provided in the Parties' communication of January 17, 2022, the arbitration was suspended.

Indonesia—Import Restrictions on Horticultural Products, Animals, and Animal Products (DS455, DS465 and DS478)

On May 8, 2014, the United States, joined by New Zealand, requested consultations with Indonesia concerning certain measures affecting the importation of horticultural products, animals, and animal products into Indonesia. The measures on which consultations were requested include Indonesia's import licensing regimes for horticultural products and for animals and animal products, as well as certain prohibitions and restrictions that Indonesia imposes through these regimes.

The United States had previously requested consultations on prior versions of Indonesia's import licensing regimes governing the importation of horticultural products and animals and animal products, including the regime established in 2012. The United States was concerned about these regimes and certain measures imposed through them and, on January 10, 2013, requested consultations with Indonesia. Indonesia subsequently amended or replaced its import licensing regulations changing their structure and requirements. The United States requested consultations again, this time joined by New Zealand, on August 30, 2013. Indonesia again amended its import licensing regimes shortly thereafter, and the consultation request in the current dispute (DS478) followed.

The United States was concerned that Indonesia, through its import licensing regimes, imposes numerous prohibitions and restrictions on the importation of covered products, including: (1) prohibiting the importation of certain products altogether; (2) imposing strict application windows and validity periods for import permits; (3) restricting the type, quantity, and country of origin of products that may be imported; (4) requiring that importers actually import a certain percentage of the volume of products allowed under their permits; (5) restricting the uses for which products may be imported; (6) imposing local content requirements; (7) restricting imports on a seasonal basis; and (8) setting a "reference price" below which products may not be imported. The Indonesian measures at issue appeared to be inconsistent with several WTO provisions, including Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement.

The United States and New Zealand held consultations with Indonesia on June 19, 2014, but these consultations failed to resolve the dispute. On March 18, 2015, the United States, together with New Zealand, requested the WTO to establish a dispute settlement panel to examine Indonesia's import restrictions. A panel was established on May 20, 2015. The Director-General Composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Christian Espinoza Cañizares, Chair; and Mr. Gudmundur Helgason and Ms. Angela Maria Orozco Gómez, Members. The Panel held meetings with the Parties on February 1 and February 2, 2016, and on April 13 and April 14, 2016.

The Panel circulated its report on December 22, 2016. The Panel found that all of Indonesia's import restricting measures for horticultural products and animal products are inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The Panel also found that Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that the challenged measures are justified under any general exception available under the GATT 1994. Indonesia appealed the Panel's

report on February 17, 2017. An appellate report was issued on November 9, 2017, affirming the finding of the Panel that all of Indonesia's measures are inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and that Indonesia had not established an affirmative defense with respect to any measure.

The WTO adopted the appellate report and the Panel report on November 22, 2017. A WTO arbitrator set the RPT for Indonesia to bring its measures into compliance with WTO rules to expire on July 22, 2018. On August 2, 2018, the United States requested WTO authorization to suspend concessions of other obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU. On August 14, 2018, Indonesia objected to the United States' proposed level of suspension of concessions pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU, referring the matter to arbitration. The United States paused the arbitration on August 20, 2018, to provide more time for the parties to discuss a resolution to the dispute. Indonesia notified the DSB on December 18, 2020, that a new law that aims to address one of the inconsistent measures had entered into force on November 2, 2020. With respect to the other inconsistent measures, Indonesia notified the DSB that it made "significant adjustments" to its relevant regulations that include the removal of some of the measures. As of December 31, 2025, Indonesia continued to assert to the DSB that it removed or adjusted the measures to comply with the DSB rulings and recommendations. The United States continues to monitor the situation closely.

Russia—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States (DS566)

On July 16, 2018, the United States requested consultations with Russia with respect to its imposition of additional duties on certain products originating in the United States. Russia imposed the additional duties in retaliation for the action the President took under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. The U.S. consultations request alleged that the additional duties contravene Russia's obligations under the WTO Agreement because they: (1) fail to extend to U.S. products an advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by Russia to products originating in the territory of other WTO Members; (2) accord less favorable treatment to products originating in the United States; and (3) impose duties in excess of those set forth in Russia's schedule.

The United States held consultations with Russia on August 28, 2018, but these consultations did not resolve the dispute. At the request of the United States, the WTO established a panel on December 18, 2018 to examine the U.S. complaint. On January 25, 2019, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. William Ehlers, Chair; and Ms. Petina Gappah and Mr. Syed Tauquir Hussain Shah, Members. As of December 31, 2025, the panel proceeding was ongoing.

Türkiye—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States (DS561)

On July 16, 2018, the United States requested consultations with Türkiye with respect to its imposition of additional duties on certain products originating in the United States. Türkiye imposed the additional duties in retaliation for the action the President took under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. The U.S. consultations request alleges that the additional duties contravene Türkiye's obligations under the WTO Agreement because they: (1) fail to extend to U.S. products an advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by Türkiye to products originating in the territory of other WTO Members; (2) accord less favorable treatment to products originating in the United States; and (3) impose duties in excess of those set forth in Türkiye's schedule.

The United States held consultations with Türkiye on August 29, 2018, as well as supplemental consultations on November 14, 2018, regarding an amendment to Türkiye's measure imposing the additional duties. These consultations, however, did not resolve the dispute. At the request of the United States, on January 28, 2019 the WTO established a panel to examine the matter. On February 29, 2019, the

Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. William Ehlers, Chair; and Mr. Johannes Bernabe and Mr. Homero Larrea, Members. On December 19, 2023, the Panel circulated its final report agreeing with the United States that Türkiye's retaliatory tariffs breached WTO rules and that the U.S. Section 232 measures were taken pursuant to the essential security exception under the GATT 1994. On January 26, 2024, Türkiye notified the DSB of an appeal of the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

Disputes Brought Against the United States

This section includes summaries of dispute settlement activity for disputes in which the United States was a responding party (listed by DS number).

United States—Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act (DS160)

As amended in 1998 by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act exempts certain retail and restaurant establishments that play radio or television music from paying royalties to songwriters and music publishers. The EU claimed that, as a result of this exception, the United States was in violation of its WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) obligations. Consultations with the EU took place on March 2, 1999. A panel on this matter was established on May 26, 1999. On August 6, 1999, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Ms. Carmen Luz Guarda, Chair; and Mr. Arumugamangalam V. Ganesan and Mr. Ian F. Sheppard, Members. The Panel issued its final report on June 15, 2000, and found that one of the two exemptions provided by section 110(5) is inconsistent with the U.S. WTO obligations. The Panel report was adopted by the DSB on July 27, 2000, and the United States has informed the DSB of its intention to respect its WTO obligations. On October 23, 2000, the EU requested arbitration to determine the period of time to be given to the United States to implement the Panel's recommendation. By mutual agreement of the parties, Mr. J. Lacarte-Muró was appointed to serve as arbitrator. He determined that the deadline for implementation should be July 27, 2001. On July 24, 2001, the DSB approved a U.S. proposal to extend the deadline until the earlier of the end of the then current session of the U.S. Congress or December 31, 2001.

On July 23, 2001, the United States and the EU requested arbitration to determine the level of nullification or impairment of benefits to the EU as a result of section 110(5)(B). In a decision circulated to WTO Members on November 9, 2001, the arbitrators determined that the value of the benefits lost to the EU in this case was \$1.1 million per year. On January 7, 2002, the EU sought authorization from the DSB to suspend its obligations vis-à-vis the United States. The United States objected to the details of the EU request, thereby causing the matter to be referred to arbitration.

However, because the United States and the EU had been engaged in discussions to find a mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute, the arbitrators suspended the proceeding pursuant to a joint request by the parties filed on February 26, 2002.

On June 23, 2003, the United States and the EU notified the WTO of a mutually satisfactory temporary arrangement regarding the dispute. Pursuant to this arrangement, the United States made a lump sum payment of \$3.3 million to the EU, to a fund established to finance activities of general interest to music copyright holders, in particular, awareness raising campaigns at the national and international level and activities to combat piracy in the digital network. The arrangement covered a three-year period, which ended on December 21, 2004.

United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act (DS176)

Section 211 addresses the ability to register or enforce, without the consent of previous owners, trademarks or trade names associated with businesses confiscated without compensation by the Cuban Government. The EU questioned the consistency of Section 211 with the TRIPS Agreement and requested consultations on July 7, 1999. Consultations were held September 13 and December 13, 1999. On June 30, 2000, the EU requested a panel. A panel was established on September 26, 2000, and at the request of the EU, the Director-General composed the Panel on October 26, 2000. The Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Wade Armstrong, Chair; and Mr. François Dessemontet and Mr. Armand de Mestral, Members. The Panel report was circulated on August 6, 2001, rejecting 13 of the EU's 14 claims and finding that, in most respects, section 211 is not inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the TRIPS Agreement. The EU appealed the decision on October 4, 2001. The Appellate Body issued its report on January 2, 2002.

The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's one finding against the United States and upheld the Panel's favorable findings that WTO Members are entitled to determine trademark and trade name ownership criteria. The Appellate Body found certain instances, however, in which section 211 might breach the national treatment and Most-Favored-Nation obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. The Panel and Appellate Body reports were adopted on February 1, 2002, and the United States informed the DSB of its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings. The RPT for implementation ended on June 30, 2005. On June 30, 2005, the United States and the EU agreed that the EU would not request authorization to suspend concessions at that time and that the United States would not object to a future request on grounds of lack of timeliness.

In January 2016, the United States notified the EU of positive developments that resolved a long-standing issue of concern to the EU and others, which helped move this dispute into a more cooperative phase.

United States—Antidumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan (DS184)

Japan alleged that the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the U.S. International Trade Commission's (USITC) preliminary and final determinations in their antidumping investigations of certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan issued on November 25 and November 30, 1998, February 12, 1999, April 28, 1999, and June 23, 1999, were erroneous and based on deficient procedures under the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 and related regulations. Japan claimed that these procedures and regulations violate the GATT 1994, as well as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) and the Agreement Establishing the WTO. Consultations were held on January 13, 2000, and a panel was established on March 20, 2000. In May 2000, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Harsha V. Singh, Chair; and Mr. Yanyong Phuangrath and Ms. Lidia di Vico, Members. On February 28, 2001, the Panel circulated its report, in which it rejected most of Japan's claims, but found that, *inter alia*, particular aspects of the antidumping duty calculation, as well as one aspect of the U.S. antidumping duty law, were inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement. On April 25, 2001, the United States filed a notice of appeal on certain issues in the Panel report.

The Appellate Body report was issued on July 24, 2001, reversing in part and affirming in part. The reports were adopted on August 23, 2001. Pursuant to a February 19, 2002 arbitral award, the United States was given 15 months, or until November 23, 2002, to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings. On November 22, 2002, Commerce issued a new final determination in the hot-rolled steel antidumping duty investigation, which implemented the recommendations and rulings of the DSB with respect to the calculation of antidumping margins in that investigation. The RPT ended on July 31, 2005. With respect to the outstanding implementation issue, on July 7, 2005, the United States and Japan agreed that Japan

would not request authorization to suspend concessions at that time and that the United States would not object to a future request on grounds of lack of timeliness.

United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (DS217/234)

On December 21, 2000, Australia, Brazil, Chile, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand requested consultations with the United States regarding the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA) (19 U.S.C. § 754), which amended Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 to transfer import duties collected under U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty orders from the U.S. Treasury to the companies that filed the antidumping and countervailing duty petitions. Consultations were held on February 6, 2001. On May 21, 2001, Canada and Mexico also requested consultations on the same matter, which were held on June 29, 2001. On July 12, 2001, the original nine complaining parties requested the establishment of a panel, which was established on August 23, 2001. On September 10, 2001, a panel was established at the request of Canada and Mexico, and all complaints were consolidated into one panel. The Panel was composed of: Mr. Luzius Wasescha, Chair; and Mr. Maamoun Abdel-Fattah and Mr. William Falconer, Members.

The Panel issued its report on September 2, 2002, finding against the United States on three of the five principal claims brought by the complaining parties. Specifically, the Panel found that the CDSOA constitutes a specific action against dumping and subsidies and, therefore, is inconsistent with the Antidumping and SCM Agreements as well as Article VI of the GATT 1994. The Panel also found that the CDSOA distorts the standing determination conducted by Commerce and, therefore, is inconsistent with the standing provisions in the Antidumping and SCM Agreements. The United States prevailed against the complainants' claims under the Antidumping and SCM Agreements that the CDSOA distorts Commerce's consideration of price undertakings (agreements to settle antidumping and countervailing duty investigations). The Panel also rejected Mexico's actionable subsidy claim brought under the SCM Agreement. Finally, the Panel rejected the complainants' claims under Article X:3 of the GATT 1994, Article 15 of the Antidumping Agreement, and Articles 4.10 and 7.9 of the SCM Agreement. The United States appealed the Panel's adverse findings on October 1, 2002.

The Appellate Body issued its report on January 16, 2003, upholding the Panel's finding that the CDSOA is an impermissible action against dumping and subsidies, but reversing the Panel's finding on standing. The DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body reports on January 27, 2003. At the meeting, the United States stated its intention to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings. On June 13, 2003, the Arbitrator determined that this period would end on December 27, 2003. On June 19, 2003, legislation to bring the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act into conformity with U.S. obligations under the Antidumping Agreement, the SCM Agreement, and the GATT of 1994 was introduced in the U.S. Senate (S. 1299).

On January 15, 2004, eight complaining parties (Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EU, India, Japan, South Korea, and Mexico) requested WTO authorization to retaliate. The remaining three complaining parties (Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand) agreed to extend to December 27, 2004, the period of time in which the United States had to comply with the WTO rulings and recommendations in this dispute. On January 23, 2004, the United States objected to the requests from the eight complaining parties to retaliate, thereby referring the matter to arbitration. On August 31, 2004, the Arbitrators issued their awards in each of the eight arbitrations. They determined that each complaining party could retaliate, on a yearly basis, covering the total value of trade not exceeding, in U.S. dollars, the amount resulting from the following equation: amount of disbursements under CDSOA for the most recent year for which data are available relating to antidumping or countervailing duties paid on imports from each party at that time, as published by the U.S. authorities, multiplied by 0.72.

Based on requests from Brazil, the EU, India, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Mexico, on November 26, 2004, the DSB granted these Members authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations, as provided in DSU Article 22.7 and in the Decisions of the Arbitrators. The DSB granted Chile authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations on December 17, 2004. On December 23, 2004, and January 7 and January 11, 2005, the United States reached agreements with Australia, Thailand, and Indonesia that these three complaining parties would not request authorization to suspend concessions at that time, and that the United States would not object to a future request on grounds of lack of timeliness.

On February 8, 2006, the U.S. President signed the Deficit Reduction Act into law. That Act included a provision repealing the CDSOA.

The United States has informed WTO Members that it has withdrawn the challenged measure and come into compliance in this dispute.

United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS285)

On March 13, 2003, Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) requested consultations regarding its claim that U.S. Federal, State, and territorial laws on gambling violate U.S. specific commitments under the GATS, as well as Articles VI, XI, XVI, and XVII of the GATS, to the extent that such laws prevent or can prevent operators from Antigua from lawfully offering gambling and betting services in the United States. Consultations were held on April 30, 2003.

Antigua requested the establishment of a panel on June 12, 2003. The DSB established a panel on July 21, 2003. At the request of Antigua, on August 21, 2003, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. B.K. Zutshi, Chair; and Mr. Virachai Plasai and Mr. Richard Plender, Members. The Panel's final report, circulated on November 10, 2004, found that the United States breached Article XVI (Market Access) of the GATS by maintaining three U.S. Federal laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955) and certain statutes of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Utah. It also found that these measures were not justified under exceptions in Article XIV of the GATS.

The United States filed a notice of appeal on January 7, 2005. The Appellate Body issued its report on April 7, 2005, in which it reversed and/or modified several Panel findings. The Appellate Body overturned the Panel's findings regarding the state statutes, and found that the three U.S. Federal gambling laws at issue "fall within the scope of 'public morals' and/or 'public order'" under Article XIV. To meet the requirements of the Article XIV chapeau, the Appellate Body found that the United States needed to clarify an issue concerning Internet gambling on horse racing.

The DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body reports on April 20, 2005. On May 19, 2005, the United States stated its intention to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings. On August 19, 2005, an Article 21.3(c) arbitrator determined that the RPT for implementation would expire on April 3, 2006.

At the DSB meeting of April 21, 2006, the United States informed the DSB that the United States was in compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the dispute. On June 8, 2006, Antigua requested consultations with the United States regarding U.S. compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings. The parties held consultations on June 26, 2006. On July 5, 2006, Antigua requested the DSB to establish a panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, and a panel was established on July 19, 2006. The chair of the original panel and one of the panelists were unavailable to serve. The Parties agreed on their replacements, and the Panel was composed as follows: Mr. Lars Anell, Chair; and Mr. Mathias Francke and Mr. Virachai Plasai, Members. The report of the Article 21.5 Panel, which was circulated on March

30, 2007, found that the United States had not complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.

On May 4, 2007, the United States initiated the procedure provided for under Article XXI of the GATS to modify the schedule of U.S. commitments so as to reflect the original U.S. intent of excluding gambling and betting services.

The DSB adopted the report of the Article 21.5 panel on May 22, 2007. On June 21, 2007, Antigua submitted a request, pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU, for authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the United States of concessions and related obligations of Antigua under the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement. On July 23, 2007, the United States referred this matter to arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU. The arbitration was carried out by the three panelists who served on the Article 21.5 Panel.

On December 21, 2007, the Article 22.6 arbitration award was circulated. The Arbitrator concluded that Antigua's annual level of nullification or impairment of benefits is \$21 million, and that Antigua may request authorization from the DSB to suspend its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement in this amount. On December 6, 2012, Antigua submitted a request under Article 22.7 of the DSU for authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations under the TRIPS Agreement consistent with the award of the Arbitrator. At the DSB meeting of January 28, 2013, the DSB authorized Antigua to suspend concessions or other obligations under the TRIPS Agreement consistent with the award of the Arbitrator.

During 2007 and early 2008, the United States reached agreement with every WTO Member, aside from Antigua, that had pursued a claim of interest in the GATS Article XXI process of modifying the U.S. schedule of GATS commitments so as to exclude gambling and betting services. Antigua and the United States have engaged in efforts to achieve a mutually agreeable resolution to this matter.

United States—Subsidies on Large Civil Aircraft (DS317)

On October 6, 2004, the EU requested consultations with respect to “prohibited and actionable subsidies provided to U.S. producers of large civil aircraft.” The EU alleged that such subsidies violated several provisions of the SCM Agreement, as well as Article III:4 of the GATT. Consultations were held on November 5, 2004. On January 11, 2005, the United States and the EU agreed to a framework for the negotiation of a new agreement to end subsidies for LCA. The parties set a three-month timeframe for the negotiations and agreed that, during negotiations, they would not request panel proceedings. These discussions did not produce an agreement. On May 31, 2005, the EU requested the establishment of a panel to consider its claims. The EU filed a second request for consultations regarding LCA subsidies on June 27, 2005. This request covered many of the measures covered in the initial consultations, as well as many additional measures that were not covered.

A panel was established with regard to the October claims on July 20, 2005. On October 17, 2005, the Deputy Director-General established the Panel as follows: Ms. Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón, Chair; and Ms. Gloria Peña and Mr. David Unterhalter, Members. Since that time, Ms. Ramírez and Mr. Unterhalter have resigned from the Panel. They have not been replaced.

The EU requested establishment of a panel with regard to its second panel request on January 20, 2006. That Panel was established on February 17, 2006. On December 8, 2006, the WTO issued notices changing the designation of this Panel to DS353. The summary below of *United States—Subsidies on large civil aircraft (Second Complaint) (DS353)* discusses developments with regard to this Panel.

United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (DS353)

On June 27, 2005, the EU filed a second request for consultations regarding LCA subsidies allegedly applied by the United States. The section above on *United States—Subsidies on Large Civil Aircraft (DS317)* discusses developments with regard to the dispute arising from the initial request for consultations. The June 2005 request covered many of the measures in the initial consultations, as well as many additional measures that were not covered. The EU requested establishment of a panel with regard to its second panel request on January 20, 2006. A panel was established on February 17, 2006. On November 22, 2006, the Deputy Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Crawford Falconer, Chair; and Mr. Francisco Orrego Vicuña and Mr. Virachai Plasai, Members.

On March 31, 2011, the Panel circulated its report with the following findings:

Findings against the European Union

- Most of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) research spending challenged by the EU did not go to Boeing.
- Most of the U.S. Department of War (DoW) research payments to Boeing were not subsidies or did not cause adverse effects to Airbus.
- Treatment of patent rights under U.S. Government contracts is not a subsidy specific to the aircraft industry.
- Treatment of certain overhead expenses in U.S. Government contracts is not a subsidy.
- Washington State infrastructure and plant location incentives were not a subsidy or did not cause adverse effects.
- Commerce research programs were not a subsidy specific to the aircraft industry.
- The U.S. Department of Labor payments to Edmonds Community College in Snohomish County, Washington, were not specific subsidies.
- Kansas and Illinois tax programs were not subsidies or did not cause adverse effects.
- The Foreign Sales Corporation/Extraterritorial Income tax measures were a WTO inconsistent subsidy, but as the United States removed the subsidy in 2006, there was no need for any further recommendation.

Findings against the United States

- NASA research programs conferred a subsidy to Boeing of \$2.6 billion that caused adverse effects to Airbus.
- Tax programs and other incentives offered by the State of Washington and some of its municipalities conferred a subsidy of \$16 million that caused adverse effects to Airbus.

- Certain types of research projects funded under the DoW's Manufacturing Technology and Dual Use Science and Technology programs were a subsidy to Boeing of approximately \$112 million that caused adverse effects to Airbus.

On April 1, 2011, the EU filed a notice of appeal on certain findings, and on April 28, 2011, the United States filed a notice of other appeal. On March 12, 2012, the Appellate Body circulated its report with the following findings:

- The Panel erred in its analysis of whether NASA and DoW research funding was a subsidy. However, the Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's subsidy finding with regard to NASA research funding and DoW research funding through assistance instruments on other grounds. The Appellate Body declared the Panel's findings with regard to DoW procurement contracts moot, but made no further findings.
- The Panel correctly found that NASA and DoW rules regarding the allocation of patent rights were not, on their face, specific subsidies. The Appellate Body found that the Panel should have addressed the EU allegations of *de facto* specificity, but was unable to complete the Panel's analysis of this issue.
- The Panel correctly found that Washington State tax measures and industrial revenue bonds issued by the City of Wichita were subsidies.
- The Panel erred in concluding that the WTO DSB was not obligated to initiate information-gathering procedures requested by the EU, but this error did not require any modification in the panel's ultimate findings.
- The Panel correctly concluded that NASA research funding and DoW funding of research through assistance instruments caused adverse effects to Airbus.
- The Panel erred in analyzing the effects of the Wichita industrial revenue bonds separately from other tax measures. The Appellate Body grouped the Wichita measure with the other tax benefits.
- The Panel erred in concluding that Washington State tax benefits, in tandem with Foreign Sales Corporation/ Extraterritorial Income (FSC/ETI) tax benefits program, caused lost sales, lost market share, and price depression of the Airbus A320 and A340 product lines. The Appellate Body found that the evidence before it justified a finding of lost sales only in two instances, involving 50 A320 airplanes.

On March 23, 2012, the DSB adopted its recommendations and rulings in this dispute. At the following DSB meeting, on April 13, 2012, the United States informed the DSB of its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in connection with this matter. On September 23, 2012, the United States notified the DSB that it had brought the challenged measures into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.

On September 25, 2012, the EU requested consultations regarding the U.S. notification. On October 11, 2012, the EU requested that the DSB refer the matter to the original Panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. The DSB did so at a meeting held on October 23, 2012. On October 30, 2012, the compliance Panel was composed with the members of the original Panel: Mr. Crawford Falconer, Chair; and Mr. Francisco Orrego Vicuña and Mr. Virachai Plasai, Members.

The compliance Panel circulated its report on June 9, 2017, with the following findings:

Findings against the European Union

- The EU alleged that DoW provided Boeing with funding and other resources worth \$2.9 billion to conduct research that assisted Boeing's development of LCA. The Panel rejected most of the EU claims for procedural reasons. It found that the remaining claims were worth only \$41 million, that most of those programs were not subsidies. The Panel subsequently found that the DoW funding found to constitute subsidies did not cause adverse effects to Airbus.
- The Panel found that NASA R&D programs were subsidies, but only conferred benefits of approximately \$158 million. It found that these subsidies did not cause adverse effects to Airbus.
- The EU alleged that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided funding and resources worth \$28 million to Boeing. The Panel found that the FAA program in question was a subsidy, and agreed that it was worth \$28 million. However, it found that these subsidies did not cause adverse effects to Airbus.
- The EU alleged that Boeing received \$51 million in tax benefits from 2007 through 2014 under the FSC/ETI program that Congress discontinued in 2006. The Panel found that there was no evidence that Boeing benefitted from this program in the 2007 to 2014 period.
- The EU asserted that the City of Wichita issued "industrial revenue bonds" in a way that gave Boeing tax subsidies. The Panel found that this program was a subsidy, but that it did not constitute a WTO breach because it was not "specific," *i.e.*, targeted toward particular entities or industries.
- The EU brought claims with respect to a number of Washington State programs. The Panel rejected one of the EU claims for procedural reasons. The Panel found that all of the remaining programs were subsidies. However, with one exception, the Panel found that these programs did not cause any adverse effects to Airbus.
- The EU alleged that several South Carolina programs worth a total of \$1.7 billion caused adverse effects to Airbus. The Panel found that all but three of these programs either were not subsidies or were not "specific," *i.e.*, did not involve the type of targeting needed to establish a WTO breach. Although it found that three South Carolina programs, worth a total of \$78 million, were subsidies, the Panel concluded that they did not cause adverse effects to Airbus.

Findings against the United States

- The EU argued that Washington State's adjustment to its Business and Occupation tax applicable to aerospace manufacturing foregoes revenue that could otherwise be collected from Boeing, making it a subsidy for WTO purposes. The Panel found that this program confers a subsidy on Boeing, worth an average value of \$100–\$110 million per year during the period of review. The Panel further found that these subsidies cause adverse effects, but only with respect to certain sales of the Airbus A320 aircraft.

On June 29, 2017, the EU filed a notice of appeal on certain findings, and the United States filed a notice of other appeal on August 10, 2017. The Division assigned to hear the appeal consisted of Mr. Peter Van

den Bossche, Mr. Thomas R. Graham, and Mr. Shree B.C. Servansing. On March 28, 2019, the Division circulated its report with the following relevant findings:

- The Panel did not err in including DoW procurement contracts within its terms of reference, but the panel did not sufficiently engage with evidence and arguments regarding whether the funding conferred a benefit. However, there were insufficient factual findings by the panel or undisputed facts on the record for the Appellate Body to complete the analysis in this respect.
- The Panel erred when considering whether revenue was “foregone” with respect to the FSC/ETI tax concessions by focusing on the conduct of eligible taxpayers rather than the government. The Appellate Body completed the legal analysis and found that the measure was inconsistent with the SCM Agreement to the extent that Boeing remains entitled to FSC/ETI tax concessions.
- The Panel did not err in using the period following the end of the implementation period to assess whether Wichita industrial revenue bonds were specific because of the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidies to certain enterprises, but the Panel erred in finding that no disparity existed between the expected and actual distribution of the subsidies. However, there were insufficient factual findings by the Panel or undisputed facts on the record for the Appellate Body to complete its legal analysis in this respect.
- The Panel did not err in its interpretation of the term “limited number” of certain enterprises with respect to the specificity of the South Carolina economic development bonds, but the panel erred by excluding evidence as to the percentage of bonds by value used by certain enterprises from its evaluation of whether the subsidy was specific by reason of predominant use by certain enterprises. However, there were insufficient factual findings by the Panel or undisputed facts on the record for the Appellate Body to complete its legal analysis in this respect.
- The Panel erred in the application of the term “designated geographical region” in assessing the specificity of the South Carolina multi-county industrial park job tax credits. The Appellate Body completed the legal analysis with respect to this and found that the subsidy was specific.
- The Panel correctly found that the EU had failed to establish that there was a continuation of the original adverse effects of the pre-2007 aeronautics R&D subsidies into the post-implementation period in the form of present serious prejudice in relation to the A330 and A350XWB.
- The Panel erred in its analysis of whether the technology effects of the pre-2007 aeronautics R&D subsidies in relation to certain U.S. aircraft continued into the post-implementation period, and therefore, the panel’s finding that the EU failed to establish that the pre-2007 R&D subsidies were a genuine and substantial cause of adverse effects to the A350XWB and A320neo in the post-implementation period was reversed. However, there were insufficient factual findings by the panel or undisputed facts on the record for the Appellate Body to complete its legal analysis in this respect, and there was no basis to conclude that the original adverse effects, in the form of technology effects, continued into the post-implementation period.
- The Panel correctly found that the EU failed to establish that the tied tax subsidies caused adverse effects in the twin-aisle LCA market in the post-implementation period, but that there were adverse effects in the post-implementation period in the form of significant lost sales in the single-aisle LCA and in the form of threat of impedance of imports of Airbus single-aisle LCA in the U.S. and UAE markets.

On September 27, 2012, the EU requested authorization from the DSB to impose countermeasures. On October 22, 2012, the United States objected to the level of suspension of concessions requested by the EU, referring the matter to arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU. On November 27, 2012, the United States and the EU each requested that the arbitration be suspended pending the conclusion of the compliance proceeding. On June 5, 2019, at the request of the EU, the arbitration regarding the level of countermeasures was resumed. On October 13, 2020, the Arbitrator issued its decision with respect to the adverse effects caused by the Washington State tax rate reduction during an historical 2012 reference period. The Arbitrator determined the level of countermeasures commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist is approximately \$3.99 billion annually. On October 26, 2020, the WTO granted the EU authorization to take countermeasures consistent with the Arbitrator's decision. Because the Washington State tax rate reduction was repealed effective April 1, 2020, the EU has no legal basis to maintain countermeasures on U.S. goods.

On June 15 and June 17, 2021, the United States reached understandings on cooperative frameworks with the EU and the United Kingdom, respectively, on the parallel aircraft disputes (DS316 and DS353). In accordance with the understandings, each side intends not to impose any WTO-authorized countermeasures for a period of five years starting from July 4, 2021. Each side also intends to provide any financing to its large civil aircraft producer (LCA producer) for the production or development of large civil aircraft on market terms. Additionally, each side intends to provide any funding for R&D for large civil aircraft to its LCA producer through an open and transparent process while making the results of fully government funded R&D widely available. A working group was also established under each framework to analyze and overcome any disagreements in the sector, including on any existing support measures. The working group will collaborate on jointly analyzing and addressing non-market practices of third parties that may harm their respective large civil aircraft industries.

United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (DS437)

On May 25, 2012, China requested consultations regarding numerous U.S. countervailing duty determinations in which Commerce had determined that various Chinese state-owned enterprises were “public bodies” under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, with a view towards extending the Appellate Body's analysis in DS379 to those determinations. China challenged various other aspects of these investigations as well, including but not limited to Commerce's calculation of benchmarks, initiation standard, determination of specificity of the subsidies, use of facts available, and finding that export restraints were a countervailable subsidy.

Consultations were held in July 2012, and a panel was established in September 2012. The Panel was composed by the Director-General on November 26, 2012, as follows: Mr. Mario Matus, Chair; and Mr. Scott Gallacher and Mr. Hugo Perezcano Díaz, Members. The Panel circulated its report on July 14, 2014. The Panel found that Commerce's determinations in 12 investigations that certain state-owned enterprises were “public bodies” were inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, based on the Appellate Body's analysis in DS379. However, the Panel found in favor of the United States with respect to China's claims regarding Commerce's calculation of benchmarks, initiation of investigations, and use of facts available. The Panel also upheld most of Commerce's specificity determinations. The Panel also found that China established that Commerce acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement by initiating countervailing duty investigations of export restraints.

On August 22, 2014, China appealed the Panel's findings regarding Commerce's calculation of benchmarks, specificity determinations, and use of facts available. On August 27, 2014, the United States appealed the Panel's finding that a section of China's panel request setting forth claims related to Commerce's use of facts available was within the panel's terms of reference. The Appellate Body held a

hearing in Geneva on October 16 and October 17, 2014, with Peter Van den Bossche as Chair; and Ujal Singh Battia and Seung Wha Chang as Members.

On December 18, 2014, the Appellate Body circulated its report. On benchmarks, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel and found that Commerce's determination to use out-of-country benchmarks in four countervailing duty investigations was inconsistent with Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. On specificity, the Appellate Body rejected one of China's claims with respect to the order of analysis in *de facto* specificity determinations. However, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's findings that Commerce did not act inconsistently with Article 2.1 when it failed to identify the "jurisdiction of the granting authority" and "subsidy programme" before finding the subsidy specific. On facts available, the Appellate Body accepted China's claim that the Panel's findings regarding facts available were inconsistent with Article 11 of the DSU, and reversed the Panel's finding that Commerce's application of facts available was not inconsistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. Lastly, the Appellate Body rejected the U.S. appeal of the Panel's finding that China's panel request failed to meet the requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU to present an adequate summary of the legal basis of its claim sufficient to present the problem clearly.

The DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the Panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body report, on January 16, 2015. In a letter dated February 13, 2015, the United States notified the DSB of its intention to comply with its WTO obligations and indicated it would need a RPT to do so.

On June 26, 2015, China requested that the RPT be determined through arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. On July 17, 2015, the Director-General appointed Mr. Georges M. Abi-Saab as the arbitrator. On October 9, 2015, the Arbitrator issued his award, deciding that the RPT would be 14 months and 16 days, ending on April 1, 2016.

Commerce subsequently issued redeterminations in 15 separate countervailing duty investigations and with respect to one "as such" finding of the DSB. Commerce implemented these determinations on April 1, 2016, and May 26, 2016. On June 22, 2016, the United States notified the DSB that it had brought the challenged measures into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.

On May 13, 2016, China requested consultations regarding the U.S. implementation. The United States and China held consultations on May 27, 2016. On July 8, 2016, China requested that the DSB refer the matter to the original Panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. The DSB did so at a meeting held on July 21, 2016. On October 5, 2016, the compliance Panel was composed with one member of the original Panel: Mr. Hugo Perezcano Diaz, Chair; and two additional panelists Mr. Luis Catibayan and Mr. Thinus Jacobsz, Members, who were selected to replace unavailable members of the original panel. The compliance Panel circulated its report on March 21, 2018. The compliance Panel found that Commerce's redeterminations that certain state-owned enterprises were "public bodies" were not inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, and Commerce's Public Bodies Memorandum is not inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, "as such." The compliance Panel also upheld Commerce's redetermination concerning regional specificity. However, the compliance Panel found in favor of China with respect to China's claims regarding Commerce's calculation of benchmarks and its input specificity analysis.

On April 27, 2018, the United States appealed certain findings of the compliance Panel regarding the Public Bodies Memorandum, Commerce's benchmarks and input specificity redeterminations, and whether certain Commerce determinations were within the compliance Panel's terms of reference. On May 2, 2018, China appealed certain findings of the compliance Panel regarding Commerce's redeterminations that certain state-owned enterprises were "public bodies," the Public Bodies Memorandum, and the legal interpretation of Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. The three persons hearing the appeal were Thomas R. Graham as Presiding Member; and Ujal Singh Battia and Shree B.C. Servansing. An appellate report was circulated on July 16, 2019. The Appellate Majority upheld the findings of the compliance Panel. The

appellate report includes a lengthy dissent that calls into question the reasoning and interpretative analysis of the appellate majority and prior Appellate Body reports.

The DSB considered the appellate report and the compliance Panel report, as modified by the appellate report, at its meeting on August 15, 2019. The United States noted in its DSB statement that, through the interpretations applied in this proceeding, based primarily on erroneous approaches by the Appellate Body in past reports, the WTO dispute settlement system is weakening the ability of WTO Members to use WTO tools to discipline injurious subsidies. The SCM Agreement is not meant to provide cover for, and render untouchable, one Member's policy of providing massive subsidies to its industries through a complex web of laws, regulations, policies, and industrial plans. Finding that the kinds of subsidies at issue in this dispute cannot be addressed using existing WTO remedies, such as countervailing duties, calls into question the usefulness of the WTO to help WTO Members address the most urgent economic problems in today's global economy. The United States noted specific aspects of the findings of the appellate report that are erroneous and undermine the interests of all WTO Members in a fair-trading system, including erroneous interpretations of "public body" and out-of-country benchmarks, diminishing U.S. rights and adding to U.S. obligations, engaging in fact-finding, and treating prior reports as "precedent."

On October 17, 2019, China requested authorization to suspend concessions and other obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU. On October 25, 2019, the United States objected to China's request, referring the matter to arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU. On November 15, 2019, the WTO notified the parties that the arbitration would be carried out by the panelists who served during the compliance proceeding: Mr. Hugo Perezcano Diaz, Chair; and Mr. Luis Catibayan and Mr. Thinus Jacobsz, Members. In January 2022, the Arbitrator decided that the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations should be no more than \$645.121 million annually.

United States—Certain Methodologies and their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China (DS471)

On December 3, 2013, the United States received a request from China for consultations pertaining to antidumping measures imposed by the United States pursuant to final determinations issued by Commerce following antidumping investigations regarding a number of products from China, including certain coated paper suitable for high-quality print graphics using sheet-fed presses; certain oil country tubular goods; high pressure steel cylinders, polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet, and strip; aluminum extrusions; certain frozen and canned warm water shrimp; certain new pneumatic off-the-road tires; crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not assembled into modules; diamond sawblades and parts thereof; multilayered wood flooring; narrow woven ribbons with woven selvage; polyethylene retail carrier bags; and wooden bedroom furniture. China claimed that Commerce's determinations, as well as certain methodologies used by Commerce, are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under Articles 2.4.2, 6.1, 6.8, 6.10, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, and Annex II of the Antidumping Agreement; and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. Specifically, China challenged Commerce's application in certain investigations and administrative reviews of a "targeted dumping methodology," "zeroing" in connection with such methodology, a "single rate presumption for non-market economies," and an "NME-wide methodology" including certain "features." China also challenged a "single rate presumption" and the use of "adverse facts available" "as such."

The United States and China held consultations on January 23, 2014. On February 13, 2014, China requested that the DSB establish a panel, and a panel was established on March 26, 2014. On August 28, 2014, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. José Pérez Gabilondo, Chair; and Ms. Beatriz Leycegui Gardoqui and Ms. Enie Neri de Ross, Members.

The Panel circulated its report on October 19, 2016. The Panel found that a number of aspects of the "targeted dumping methodology" applied by Commerce in three challenged investigations were not

inconsistent with the requirements of the Antidumping Agreement, including certain quantitative aspects of Commerce's methodology. However, the Panel found fault with other aspects of Commerce's methodology and with Commerce's explanation of why resort to the alternative methodology was necessary. The Panel also found that Commerce's application of the alternative methodology to all sales, rather than only to so-called pattern sales, and Commerce's use of "zeroing" in connection with the alternative methodology, were inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement. The Panel found that Commerce's use of a rebuttable presumption that all producers and exporters in China comprise a single entity under common government control—the China-government entity—to which a single antidumping margin is assigned, both as used in specific proceedings and generally, is inconsistent with certain obligations in the Antidumping Agreement concerning when exporters and producers are entitled to a unique antidumping margin or rate. Finally, the Panel agreed with the United States that China had not established that Commerce has a general norm whereby it uses adverse inferences to pick information that is adverse to the interests of the China-government entity in calculating its antidumping margin or rate. The Panel also decided to exercise judicial economy with respect to the information Commerce utilized in particular proceedings.

On November 18, 2016, China appealed certain of the Panel's findings regarding Commerce's "targeted dumping methodology," use of "adverse facts available," and the "single rate presumption." The Appellate Body held a hearing in Geneva on February 27 and February 28, 2017, and issued a report on May 11, 2017. The Appellate Body rejected virtually all of China's claims on appeal and did not make any additional findings of inconsistency against the United States.

On May 22, 2017, the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body reports. On June 19, 2017, the United States stated that it intends to implement the recommendations of the DSB in this dispute in a manner that respects U.S. WTO obligations, and that it will need a RPT in which to do so. On October 17, 2017, China requested that an Article 21.3(c) arbitrator determine the RPT for implementation. The Arbitrator determined the RPT to be 15 months, expiring on August 22, 2018.

On September 9, 2018, China requested authorization to suspend concessions and other obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU. On September 19, 2018, the United States objected to China's request, referring the matter to arbitration. On October 5, 2018, the WTO notified the parties that the arbitration would be carried out by the original panelists: Mr. José Pérez Gabilondo, Chair; and Ms. Beatriz Leycegui Gardoqui and Ms. Enie Neri de Ross, Members. The Arbitrator circulated its decision on November 1, 2019. The Arbitrator determined that the level of nullification or impairment to China from U.S. noncompliance with respect to determinations made by Commerce in a number of antidumping proceedings involving goods from China, as well as certain methodologies China claimed Commerce applies in antidumping proceedings, totaled no more than \$3.579 billion per year.

United States—Countervailing Measures on Supercalendered Paper from Canada (DS505)

On March 30, 2016, Canada requested consultations with the United States to consider claims related to U.S. countervailing duties on supercalendered paper from Canada (Investigation C-122-854). Consultations between the United States and Canada took place in Washington, D.C. on May 4, 2016.

On June 9, 2016, Canada requested the establishment of a panel, alleging that the U.S. measures at issue were inconsistent with obligations under Articles 1.1(a)(1), 1.1(b), 2, 10, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.6, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.7, 12.8, 14, 14(d), 19.1, 19.3, 19.4, 22.3, 22.5, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement; and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994.

A panel was established on July 21, 2016. On August 31, 2016, the Panel was composed by the Director-General to include: Mr. Paul O'Connor, Chair; and Mr. David Evans and Mr. Colin McCarthy, Members.

The Panel met with the parties on March 21 and March 22, 2017, and on June 13 and June 14, 2017. The Panel report was circulated on July 5, 2018. The Panel report, among other things, upheld Canada's claims that there was "ongoing conduct" with respect to Commerce's treatment of subsidies that Canadian respondents refused to disclose in response to Commerce questionnaires, but which Commerce subsequently discovered during verification in the course of the countervailing duty investigation. The Panel report also found that such treatment was inconsistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. Commerce terminated the countervailing duties on July 5, 2018.

On August 27, 2018, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain of the Panel's findings. The persons hearing the appeal were Ujal Singh Battia as Presiding Member, and Thomas R. Graham and Hong Zhao. An Appellate Body report was issued on February 6, 2020. The document contains a majority view upholding the findings of the Panel and also a separate opinion that calls into question the reasoning and interpretative analysis of the appellate majority concerning "ongoing conduct."

The DSB considered the appellate document and panel report at its meeting on March 5, 2020. The United States noted in its DSB statement that there were serious procedural and substantive concerns with the appellate document, and objected to the adoption of the document as an Appellate Body Report. The United States explained that the document cannot be an Appellate Body report because the Chinese national who served on the appeal was not a valid member of the Appellate Body given that the individual is affiliated with the Government of China, in breach of Article 17.3 of the DSU. The concern related to the individual's service was further compounded because the appeal directly implicated the interests of the Government of China. The United States also reiterated its concerns of ex-Appellate Body members' continuation of service without authorization by the DSB, and the failure to adhere to the deadline in Article 17.5 of the DSU. Accordingly, the United States did not join in a consensus to adopt the document and report that were before the DSB. The United States explained that because there was no valid Appellate Body report in this dispute, the document and report could only be adopted by positive consensus. Because there was no consensus on adoption, the DSB did not validly adopt any document and report in this dispute, and therefore there was no valid recommendation of the DSB with which to bring a measure into conformity with a covered agreement.

On June 18, 2020, Canada requested authorization to suspend concessions and other obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU. On June 26, 2020, the United States objected to Canada's request, referring the matter to arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU. The Arbitrator adopted the U.S. economic model as the basis for determining a future level of nullification or impairment, and rejected Canada's proposed formula as the basis of the Arbitrator's award. However, given that the challenged "ongoing conduct" measure had been removed with the revocation of the CVD order, following the issuance of the Arbitrator's decision, there was no monetary award for Canada to seek based on the CVD order on supercalendered paper.

United States—Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (DS515)

On December 12, 2016, China requested consultations with the United States regarding its use of a non-market economy (NME) methodology in the context of antidumping investigations involving Chinese producers. In its request, China asserts that WTO Members were required to terminate the use of an NME methodology by December 11, 2016, and thereafter apply the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 to determine normal value.

Specifically, China alleges that the following "measures" are inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.2, 9.2, 18.1, and 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement and Articles I:1, VI:1, and VI:2 of GATT 1994:

- Sections 771(18) and 773 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended;

- Part 351.408 of Commerce’s regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 351.408;
- Commerce’s 2006 determination that China is a “non-market economy” for purposes of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended;
- The failure of the United States, by way of omission, to revoke the 2006 determination or otherwise modify its laws with respect to antidumping investigations and reviews of Chinese products initiated and/or resulting in preliminary or final determinations after December 11, 2016.

China also challenged Section 773(e) of the Tariff Act of 1930—the constructed value provision that applies to market economies—to the extent that it permits the use of “surrogate values.” Consultations took place on February 7 and February 8, 2017, in Geneva.

China requested supplemental consultations on November 3, 2017, which took place on January 4, 2018, in Geneva. As part of its supplemental consultations request, China further alleged that certain of the following “measures” were also inconsistent with: Articles 2.1, 2.2, 5.2, 5.3, 7.1(ii), 9.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 18.1, and 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement; Articles I:1, VI:1, and VI:2 of GATT 1994; and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO:

- Commerce’s 2017 determination that China is a “non-market economy” for purposes of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended;
- The policy or practice of using surrogate values to determine normal value in both original and administrative review determinations in antidumping proceedings involving Chinese products, whether that conduct is pursuant to Section 773(c) of the Tariff Act, Section 773(e), or any other provision of U.S. law;
- Certain named Commerce final determinations of normal value in antidumping investigations or administrative reviews of Chinese imports made subsequent to December 11, 2016, which were based on the use of “surrogate values”;
- Commerce’s preliminary affirmative determinations in Certain Hardwood Plywood Products From the People’s Republic of China (June 23, 2017), Certain Aluminum Foil From the People’s Republic of China (October 26, 2017), and Carton-Closing Staples from the People’s Republic of China (October 27, 2017);
- Certain named Commerce final determinations in sunset reviews in which Commerce relied on margins of dumping calculated on the basis of “surrogate values”;
- The policy or practice of making final determinations in sunset reviews of antidumping orders applicable to Chinese products relying on margins of dumping calculated on the basis of surrogate values, whether pursuant to Section 773(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, Section 773(e), or any other provision of U.S. law; and
- The failure of Commerce, by way of omission, to conduct “reviews based on changed circumstances” pursuant to Section 751(b) of the Tariff Act in the antidumping investigations of Chinese products, by virtue of the expiration of Section 15(a)(ii) of China’s Accession Protocol.

China further added that the measures at issue are “not justifiable” under the second Supplementary Provision of Article VI:1 of GATT 1994, as referenced in Article 2.7 of the Antidumping Agreement. The parties consulted in December 2016 and November 2017, but China has not moved forward with panel proceedings.

United States—Countervailing Measures on Certain Pipe and Tube Products from Türkiye (DS523)

On March 8, 2017, Türkiye requested consultations concerning CVD measures imposed by the United States pursuant to four final CVD determinations issued by Commerce pertaining to certain pipe and tube products. Türkiye alleges inconsistencies with Articles 1.1(a)(1), 1.1(b), 2.1(c), 2.4, 10, 12.7, 14(d), 15.3, 19.4, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994.

Türkiye challenges the application of measures in four final CVD determinations with respect to the provision of hot-rolled steel for less than adequate remuneration. Specifically, Türkiye challenges Commerce’s “public bodies” determination, use of facts available, and determination of specificity of the subsidy program. Türkiye also challenges Commerce’s calculation of benchmarks, both as applied and “as such.” With respect to injury, Türkiye challenges the USITC’s “practice” of cross-cumulating imports, as well as the application of that practice in the underlying determinations.

Consultations between the United States and Türkiye took place in Geneva on April 28, 2017. A panel was established on June 19, 2017, and on September 14, 2017, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Guillermo Valles, Chair; and Ms. Luz Elena Reyes de la Torre and Mr. Jose Antonio de la Puente Leon, Members.

The Panel circulated its report on December 18, 2018. With respect to public body, the Panel found that Commerce acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) by failing to apply the standard set out previously by the Appellate Body, and failing to establish based on record evidence that the relevant entities were public bodies. With respect to benchmarks as such, the Panel rejected Türkiye’s claims that Commerce has a practice of rejecting in-country benchmarks solely based on majority or substantial government ownership or control of the market. For benchmarks as applied, the Panel declined to make a finding under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement because the relevant determination had ceased to have legal effect prior to the Panel’s establishment. With respect to specificity, the Panel found that Commerce acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1(c) and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement by failing to identify and clearly substantiate the existence of a subsidy program, and failing to take into account the extent of diversification of Türkiye’s economy and the length of time in which the program had been in place. With respect to facts available, the Panel found Commerce acted inconsistently with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement by failing to do a comparative process of reasoning and evaluation before selecting from the facts available in certain circumstances. With respect to injury, the Panel found that Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement does not permit the USITC to assess cumulatively the effects of imports not subject to CVD investigations with the effects of imports subject to CVD investigations. The Panel thus found cross-cumulation by the USITC, both in the original investigations at issue and as a practice, to be inconsistent with Article 15.3. With respect to cross-cumulation in sunset reviews, the Panel found the USITC did not act inconsistently with Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement, either “as such” or in connection with the sunset review at issue.

On January 25, 2019, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain legal conclusions and interpretations of the Panel. On January 30, 2019, Türkiye also filed an appeal.

United States—Countervailing Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada (DS533)

On November 28, 2017, the United States received from Canada a request for consultations pertaining to the final determination issued by Commerce following a CVD investigation regarding softwood lumber from Canada. Canada claimed that Commerce’s determination is inconsistent with U.S. commitments and obligations under Articles 1.1(a), 1.1(b), 2.1(a), 2.1(b), 10, 11.2, 11.3, 14(d), 19.1, 19.3, 19.4, 21.1, 21.2, 32.1, and 32.5 of the SCM Agreement; and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. Specifically, Canada challenged Commerce’s determinations regarding benchmarks for stumpage, log export permitting processes, and non-stumpage programs.

The United States and Canada held consultations on January 17, 2018. At Canada’s request, the WTO established a panel on April 9, 2018. On July 6, 2018, the Director-General composed the panel as follows: Ms. Enie Neri de Ross, Chair; and Mr. Gustav Brink and Mr. Alberto Trejos, Members.

The Panel circulated its report on August 24, 2020. The Panel found that Commerce’s determinations regarding benchmarks for stumpage, log export permitting processes, and non-stumpage programs were inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. The Panel effectively applied the WTO Appellate Body’s flawed test for using out-of-country benchmarks in its analysis of benchmarks from within Canada that Commerce used to measure the benefit of subsidies. The Panel also applied a heightened level of scrutiny in its review of Commerce’s determination, in essence putting itself in the place of the investigating authority, contrary to the terms of the SCM Agreement.

On September 28, 2020, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Anti-Dumping Measures Applying Differential Pricing Methodology to Softwood Lumber from Canada (DS534)

On November 28, 2017, the United States received from Canada a request for consultations pertaining to the final determination issued by Commerce following an antidumping investigation regarding softwood lumber from Canada. Canada claimed that Commerce’s determination is inconsistent with U.S. commitments and obligations under Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4, and 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement; and Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994. Specifically, Canada challenged Commerce’s application of a differential pricing methodology, including the United States’ use of zeroing when applying the average-to-transaction comparison methodology.

The United States and Canada held consultations on January 17, 2018. At Canada’s request, the WTO established a panel on April 9, 2018. On May 22, 2018, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Thinus Jacobsz, Chair; and Ms. María Valeria Raiteri and Mr. Guillermo Valles, Members.

The Panel circulated its report on April 9, 2019. The Panel found that Commerce’s use of zeroing when applying the average-to-transaction comparison methodology was not inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement or the GATT 1994. Among other things, the Panel reasoned that nothing in the text of the Antidumping Agreement directly addresses the use of zeroing. The Panel agreed with the United States that, if the use of zeroing were prohibited in connection with the alternative, targeted dumping methodology, then the alternative calculation methodology necessarily always would result in a margin of dumping that is mathematically equivalent to that calculated using the normal calculation methodology, which would render the alternative methodology useless. In coming to its conclusion, the Panel also examined and disagreed with findings in prior WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports. The Panel explained why it found the approach of those reports not persuasive.

The Panel also found that one aspect of Commerce's differential pricing analysis, in which Commerce aggregated differences in export prices across categories (*i.e.*, purchasers, regions, and time periods) to find a single pattern of export prices which differed significantly among different purchasers, regions, and time periods, was inconsistent with the requirements of the Antidumping Agreement.

On June 4, 2019, Canada notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain of the panel's findings.

United States—Certain Systemic Trade Remedies Measures from Canada (DS535)

On December 20, 2017, Canada requested consultations with the United States concerning certain laws, regulations, and practices that Canada claims are maintained by the U.S. in its AD and CVD proceedings. Specifically, Canada alleged that the United States: (1) failed to implement WTO-inconsistent findings by liquidating final duties in excess of WTO-consistent rates, and failed to refund cash deposits collected in excess of WTO-consistent rates; (2) retroactively collected provisional AD and CVD duties following preliminary affirmative critical circumstances determinations; (3) treated export controls as a financial contribution and improperly initiated investigations into and/or imposed duties; (4) improperly calculated the benefit in determining whether there is a provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration; (5) effectively closed the evidentiary record before the preliminary determination and failed to exercise its discretion to accept additional factual information; and (6) created an institutional bias in favor of affirmative results in injury, threat of injury, or material retardation when the commissioners of the USITC are evenly divided on whether a determination should be affirmative or negative.

Canada claims these alleged measures are inconsistent with Articles VI (in particular, VI:2 and VI:3) and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994; Articles 1, 3.1, 6 (in particular, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.9), 7 (in particular, 7.4 and 7.5), 9 (in particular, 9.2, 9.3, 9.3.1, and 9.4), 10 (in particular, 10.1 and 10.6), 11 (in particular 11.1 and 11.2), 18 (in particular, 18.1 and 18.4) of the Antidumping Agreement; Articles 1 (in particular, 1.1(a) and 1.1(b)), 10, 11 (in particular, 11.2, 11.3, and 11.6), 12 (in particular, 12.1 and 12.8), 14(d), 15.1, 17 (in particular, 17.3, 17.4, and 17.5), 19 (in particular, 19.1, 19.3 and 19.4), 20 (in particular, 20.1 and 20.6), 21 (in particular, 21.1 and 21.2), and 32 (in particular, 32.1 and 32.5) of the SCM Agreement; and Articles 21.1 and 21.3 of the DSU.

Consultations between the United States and Canada took place on February 6, 2018.

United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Fish Fillets from Vietnam (DS536)

On January 8, 2018, Vietnam requested consultations concerning antidumping measures on fish fillets from Vietnam. Vietnam claimed that Commerce's determinations, as well as certain methodologies used by Commerce, are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 6, 9, 11, 17.6, and Annex II of the Antidumping Agreement; Articles I:1, VI:1, VI:2, and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994; and Vietnam's Protocol of Accession. The United States and Vietnam held consultations on March 1, 2018, but were unable to resolve the dispute. On June 8, 2018, Vietnam requested the establishment of a panel. The DSB established a panel on July 20, 2018. On December 3, 2018, the Director-General composed the panel as follows: Mr. José Alfredo Graça Lima, Chair; and Mr. Shahid Bashir and Mr. Greg Weppner, Members. The Panel met with the parties on May 8 and May 9, 2019, and on August 6 and August 7, 2019.

On January 17, 2025, the United States and Vietnam notified the DSB that they had reached a mutually agreed solution.

United States—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products and the Use of Facts Available (DS539)

In February 2018, Korea requested WTO dispute settlement consultations regarding Commerce’s use of facts available in certain antidumping and countervailing duty measures against Korea, and certain laws, regulations, and other measures maintained by the United States with respect to the use of facts available in antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. The United States and Korea held consultations in March 2018, but those consultations failed to resolve the dispute. On April 27, 2018, Korea requested the establishment of a panel. On May 28, 2018, the DSB established a panel. Following agreement of the parties, a panel was composed on December 5, 2018 as follows: Ms. Marta Lemme, Chair; and Ms. Leonora Blumberg and Mr. Matthew Kennedy, Members.

The Panel circulated its report on January 21, 2021. The Panel found that Commerce acted inconsistently with the Antidumping Agreement, or SCM Agreement, in either resorting to facts available or selecting the replacement facts in the eight instances challenged by Korea. With respect to the “as such” claim against an alleged unwritten measure, the panel found that Korea failed to establish that such an unwritten rule even existed. This obviated the Panel’s need to evaluate whether such a rule (if it did exist) would breach the Antidumping Agreement or SCM Agreement.

On March 19, 2021, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China (DS543)

On April 4, 2018, China requested consultations with the United States concerning certain tariff measures on Chinese goods that the United States might implement under Section 301-310 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. China alleged that the tariff measures are inconsistent with U.S. commitments and obligations under Articles I:1, II:1(a), and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 23 of the DSU. On July 6, July 16, and September 18, respectively, China requested additional consultations regarding tariff measures imposed under Section 301 that supplemented its original consultations request of April 4, 2018. The United States and China held consultations in Geneva on August 28 and October 22, 2018.

At China’s request, the WTO established a panel on January 28, 2019. On June 3, 2019 the Panel was composed by the Director-General. Following the resignation of a panelist on September 25, 2019, the Director-General appointed a new panelist on October 17, 2019. The Panel includes: Mr. Alberto Juan Dumont, Chair; and Mr. Álvaro Espinoza and Ms. Athaliah Lesiba Molokomme, Members.

The Panel circulated its report on September 15, 2020. The Panel concluded that the tariff measures at issue are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 (Most-Favored-Nation), because they fail to provide treatment for Chinese products that is no less favorable than that granted to like products originating from other WTO Members, and with Articles II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994, because the additional duties are in excess of the bound rates found in the U.S. Schedule.

On October 27, 2020, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products (DS544)

On April 5, 2018, China requested consultations concerning certain duties that the United States had imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. China claimed that imposition of the duties breached various provisions of the GATT 1994, and the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States and China held consultations on July 19, 2018, but the consultations failed to resolve the dispute. At China's request, the WTO established a panel on November 21, 2018. On January 25, 2019, the Panel was composed by the Director-General to include: Mr. Elbio Rosselli, Chair; and Mr. Esteban B. Conejos, Jr. and Mr. Rodrigo Valenzuela, Members.

The Panel circulated its final report on December 9, 2022. The Panel concluded that the Section 232 measures are inconsistent with Article I of the GATT 1994 because exemptions for certain countries from Section 232 tariffs confer an advantage to products from those countries that have not been accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products from all other Members, and with Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 because the Section 232 duties do not accord the treatment provided for in the United States' Schedule. The Panel rejected the complainant's claims under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards because the measures at issue are not safeguard measures, as they were sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to a provision of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX, namely Article XXI of the GATT 1994. The Panel disagreed with the long-standing U.S. interpretation that the essential security exception is self-judging and concluded that the measures at issue were not "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations" within the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii). Accordingly, the Panel found that the Section 232 measures were not justified under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994. In response to the reports, the United States rejected the Panel's flawed interpretation and conclusions and reiterated that the United States has held the clear and unequivocal position, for over 70 years, that issues of national security cannot be reviewed in WTO dispute settlement and the WTO has no authority to second-guess the ability of a WTO Member to respond to a wide-range of threats to its security. On January 26, 2023, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Safeguard Measure on Imports of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products (DS545)

On May 14, 2018, Korea requested consultations with the United States concerning a safeguard measure imposed by the United States on imports of CSPV products. Korea claimed that the measure appears to be inconsistent with Articles 1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 7.1, 7.4, 8.1, 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards; and Articles II:1, X:3, XIII, and XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994. China, the EU, Malaysia, and Thailand requested to join the consultations, and the United States accepted each request. Consultations were held on June 26, 2018.

At Korea's request, the WTO established a panel on September 26, 2018.

United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products (DS548)

On June 1, 2018, the EU requested consultations concerning certain duties that the United States had imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. The EU claimed that imposition of the duties breached various provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States and the EU held consultations on July 19, 2018, but the consultations failed to resolve the dispute. At the EU's request, the WTO established a panel on November 21, 2018. On January 25, 2019, the Panel was

composed by the Director-General to include: Mr. Elbio Rosselli, Chair; and Mr. Esteban B. Conejos, Jr. and Mr. Rodrigo Valenzuela, Members.

In November 2021, the United States and the EU announced arrangements on steel and aluminum, including U.S. TRQs for EU steel and aluminum products free of duties under Section 232. The EU requested that the Panel suspend its work. The United States informed the Panel that it did not object to that request, and the Panel granted it. Pursuant to that agreement, the United States and the EU mutually agreed to resort to arbitration regarding the matter pending before the Panel in this dispute. Upon composition of the Arbitrator, the arbitration was immediately and indefinitely suspended and the dispute before the Panel was terminated.

On January 17, 2022, the EU and the United States notified the DSB that they were terminating this dispute before the panel in light of the agreed procedures for arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU. On January 20, 2022, the Chair of the Panel informed the DSB that it had ceased all work in these proceedings.

On January 17, 2022, the EU and the United States notified the DSB that they had agreed, pursuant to Article 25.2 of the DSU, to resort to arbitration on the matter pending before the Panel in this dispute. The Arbitrator was composed on January 20, 2022 with the same persons who served as members of the Panel. As provided in the Parties' communication of January 17, 2022, the arbitration was suspended.

United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products (DS552)

On June 13, 2018, Norway requested consultations concerning certain duties that the United States had imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. Norway claimed that imposition of the duties breached various provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States and Norway did not hold consultations. At Norway's request, the WTO established a panel on November 21, 2018. On January 25, 2019, the Panel was composed by the Director-General to include: Mr. Elbio Rosselli, Chair; and Mr. Esteban B. Conejos, Jr. and Mr. Rodrigo Valenzuela, Members.

The Panel circulated its final report on December 9, 2022. The Panel concluded that the Section 232 measures are inconsistent with Article I of the GATT 1994, because exemptions for certain countries from Section 232 tariffs confer an advantage to products from those countries that has not been accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products from all other Members, and with Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 because the Section 232 duties do not accord the treatment provided for in the United States' Schedule. The Panel also concluded that the Section 232 measures were inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because by imposing import quotas on steel and aluminum from certain countries, the United States has instituted prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges on the importation of those products of the territory of those members. The Panel rejected the complainant's claims under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards because the measures at issue are not safeguard measures, as they were sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to a provision of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX, namely Article XXI of the GATT 1994.

The Panel disagreed with the long-standing U.S. interpretation that the essential security exception is self-judging and concluded that the measures at issue were not "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations" within the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii). Accordingly, the Panel found that the Section 232 measures were not justified under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994. In response to the reports, the United States rejected the Panel's flawed interpretation and conclusions and reiterated that the United States has held the clear and unequivocal position, for over 70 years, that issues of national security cannot be reviewed in WTO dispute settlement and the WTO has no authority to second-guess the ability of a WTO Member to respond to a wide-range of threats to its security. On January 26, 2023, the United

States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products (DS556)

On July 9, 2018, Switzerland requested consultations concerning certain duties that the United States had imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. Switzerland claimed that imposition of the duties breached various provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States and Switzerland held consultations on August 30, 2018, but the consultations failed to resolve the dispute. At Switzerland's request, the WTO established a panel on December 4, 2018. On January 25, 2019, the Panel was composed by the Director-General to include: Mr. Elbio Rosselli, Chair; and Mr. Esteban B. Conejos, Jr. and Mr. Rodrigo Valenzuela, Members.

The Panel circulated its final report on December 9, 2022. The Panel concluded that the Section 232 measures are inconsistent with Article I of the GATT 1994, because exemptions for certain countries from Section 232 tariffs confer an advantage to products from those countries that has not been accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products from all other Members, and with Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 because the Section 232 duties do not accord the treatment provided for in the United States' Schedule. The Panel also concluded that the Section 232 measures were inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because by imposing import quotas on steel and aluminum from certain countries, the United States has instituted prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges on the importation of those products of the territory of those members. The Panel rejected the complainant's claims under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, because the measures at issue are not safeguard measures, as they were sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to a provision of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX, namely Article XXI of the GATT 1994.

The Panel disagreed with the long-standing U.S. interpretation that the essential security exception is self-judging and concluded that the measures at issue were not "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations" within the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii). Accordingly, the Panel found that the Section 232 measures were not justified under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994. In response to the reports, the United States rejected the Panel's flawed interpretation and conclusions and reiterated that the United States has held the clear and unequivocal position, for over 70 years, that issues of national security cannot be reviewed in WTO dispute settlement and the WTO has no authority to second-guess the ability of a WTO Member to respond to a wide-range of threats to its security. On January 26, 2023, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Safeguard Measure on Imports of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products (DS562)

On August 14, 2018, China requested consultations with the United States concerning a safeguard measure imposed by the United States on CSPV products. China claimed that the measure appears to be inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 7.1, 7.4, 8.1, 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards; and Articles X:3, XIII, XIX:1(a), and XIX:2 of the GATT 1994. The EU and Thailand requested to join the consultations, and the United States accepted each request. Consultations were held on October 22, 2018.

At China's request, the WTO established a panel on August 15, 2019. On October 24, 2019, the Panel was composed by the Director-General to include: Mr. Guillermo Valles, Chair; and Mr. José Antonio de la Puente León and Ms. Chantal Ononaiwu, Members.

The Panel circulated its final report on September 2, 2021. The Panel rejected all of China's claims against the U.S. safeguard measure.

On September 16, 2021, China notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Certain Measures Related to Renewable Energy (DS563)

On August 2018, China requested consultations with the United States concerning certain measures adopted and maintained in the States of California, Michigan, and Washington in relation to alleged subsidies or domestic content requirements in the energy sector. China alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with U.S. obligations under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement, Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement, and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. The United States and China held consultations on October 23, 2018.

United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products (DS564)

On August 15, 2018, Türkiye requested consultations concerning certain duties that the United States had imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, on imports of steel and aluminum products that threaten to impair U.S. national security. Türkiye claimed that imposition of the duties breached various provisions of the GATT 1994, and the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States and Türkiye held consultations on October 10, 2018, but the consultations failed to resolve the dispute. At Türkiye's request, the WTO established a panel on November 21, 2018. On January 25, 2019, the Panel was composed by the Director-General to include: Mr. Elbio Rosselli, Chair; and Mr. Esteban B. Conejos, Jr. and Mr. Rodrigo Valenzuela, Members.

The Panel circulated its final report on December 9, 2022. The Panel concluded that the Section 232 measures are inconsistent with Article I of the GATT 1994 because exemptions for certain countries from Section 232 tariffs confer an advantage to products from those countries that has not been accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products from all other Members, and with Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 because the Section 232 duties do not accord the treatment provided for in the United States' Schedule. The Panel also concluded that the Section 232 measures were inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because by imposing import quotas on steel and aluminum from certain countries, the United States has instituted prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges on the importation of those products of the territory of those members. The Panel rejected the complainant's claims under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, because the measures at issue are not safeguard measures, as they were sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to a provision of the GATT 1994 other than Article XIX, namely Article XXI of the GATT 1994.

The Panel disagreed with the long-standing U.S. interpretation that the essential security exception is self-judging and concluded that the measures at issue were not "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations" within the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii). Accordingly, the Panel found that the Section 232 measures were not justified under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994. In response to the reports, the United States rejected the Panel's flawed interpretation and conclusions and reiterated that the United States has held the clear and unequivocal position, for over 70 years, that issues of national security cannot be reviewed in WTO dispute settlement and the WTO has no authority to second-guess the ability

of a WTO Member to respond to a wide-range of threats to its security. On January 26, 2023, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China II (DS565)

On August 23, 2018, China requested consultations with the United States concerning certain tariff measures on Chinese goods that the United States might implement under Section 301-310 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. China alleged that the tariff measures are inconsistent with U.S. commitments and obligations under Articles I:1, II:1(a), and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 23 of the DSU. The United States and China held consultations on October 22, 2018.

United States—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from Spain (DS577)

On January 29, 2019, the EU requested consultations with the United States concerning the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties on ripe olives from Spain. The EU alleged that the duties imposed, as well as the administrative acts and legislation that were the basis for the imposition of those duties, appear to be inconsistent with various provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994. The United States and the EU held consultations on March 20, 2019, but the consultations failed to resolve the dispute. At the EU's request, the WTO established a panel on June 24, 2019. On October 18, 2019, the WTO Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Mr. Daniel Moulis, Chair; and Mr. Martin Garcia and Ms. Charis Tan, Members.

On November 19, 2021, the Panel circulated its report. The Panel found that the United States acted inconsistently with the SCM Agreement and GATT 1994 in calculating the final subsidy rate of one respondent, and in relying upon Section 771B of the Tariff Act of 1930 to attribute benefits to downstream agricultural processors. The Panel also found that certain factual findings related to Commerce's specificity determination were inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. The Panel rejected the EU's other claims concerning specificity and rejected all of the EU's claims concerning the USITC's injury determination. On December 20, 2021, the DSB adopted the Panel report.

On January 19, 2022, the United States stated that it intended to implement the recommendations of the DSB in this dispute in a manner that respects U.S. WTO obligations, and that it will need a RPT in which to do so. On July 1, 2022, the United States and the EU informed the DSB that they had agreed that the RPT to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings would be 12 months and 25 days, expiring on January 14, 2023. In July 2022, Commerce initiated an administrative proceeding pursuant to Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 to reexamine Commerce's original countervailing duty determination.

Commerce issued its preliminary Section 129 determination on September 26, 2022, and its final Section 129 determination on December 20, 2022. In its final Section 129 determination Commerce: (1) reconsidered its specificity analysis of the basic payment scheme program and found that the program is *de facto* specific under Section 771(5A)(D)(iii)(III) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended; (2) modified its definition of the "prior stage product" from all raw olives to four biologically distinct table and dual-use olive varieties and found that 55.28 percent of these varieties were processed into table olives; and (3) revised Aceitunas Guadalquivir S.L.U.'s total subsidy rate from 27.02 percent to 11.63 percent and the all-others rate from 14.97 percent to 11.08 percent. On January 12, 2023, USTR directed the Department of Commerce to implement the Section 129 determinations, and on January 16, 2023, the United States provided a status report to the DSB confirming it had completed implementation of the DSB's recommendations.

On April 28, 2023, the EU requested consultations with the United States with respect to Commerce's redetermination of the attribution of benefits to downstream agricultural processors in the Section 129 determinations. The United States and the EU held consultations on May 24, 2023, but the consultations failed to resolve the dispute. At the EU's request, the WTO established a compliance panel on July 28, 2023. The EU claims that Section 771B remains inconsistent with Article V:3 of the GATT 1994 and Article 10 of the SCM Agreement, both "as such" and as applied in the Section 129 determinations. On July 31, 2023, the WTO Director-General composed the compliance Panel as follows: Mr. Daniel Moulis, Chair; and Mr. Martin Garcia and Ms. Charis Tan, Members.

The panel circulated its final report on February 20, 2024, and found that Commerce's revised analysis of Section 771B failed to implement the relevant DSB recommendations that Section 771B is "as such" inconsistent with Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 and Article 10 of the SCM Agreement. The panel also found that Commerce's application of Section 771B in the Section 129 proceeding was inconsistent with Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 and Article 10 of the SCM Agreement. On March 19, 2024, the DSB adopted the panel report. On November 14, 2024, the EU requested authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions under Article 22.2 of the DSU at an annual level of approximately \$35 million, and in an additional amount based on a formula commensurate with the trade effects to be caused to the EU by the United States' non-compliance with the "as such" recommendations and rulings. On November 22, 2024, the United States objected to the EU request under Article 22.6 of the DSU, referring the matter to arbitration. On November 29, 2024, the Arbitrator was composed of the members who served on the original panel. On October 29, 2025, the Arbitrator circulated its decision and found that the level of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to the EU as a result of the application of Section 771B in the countervailing duty investigation on ripe olives from Spain is \$13.64 million, annually. In addition, the Arbitrator set out a methodology for calculating suspension of concessions or other obligations in relation to any future application of Section 771B to products from the EU. On December 19, 2025, the DSB granted authorization to the EU to impose countermeasures consistent with the Arbitrator's decision.

United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Carbon-Quality Steel from Russia (DS586)

On July 5, 2019, Russia requested consultations with the United States concerning antidumping duty measures pertaining to hot-rolled flat-rolled carbon quality steel products from Russia. Russia alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with various provisions of the Antidumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. The United States and Russia held consultations on September 11, 2019.

United States—Origin Marking Requirement (DS597)

On October 30, 2020, Hong Kong, China, requested consultations concerning certain measures affecting marks of origin with respect to imported goods produced in Hong Kong, China. Hong Kong, China, alleged that the measures are inconsistent with Articles I:1, IX:1, and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, Articles 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The United States and Hong Kong, China, held consultations on November 24, 2020. At the request of Hong Kong, China, the WTO established a panel on February 22, 2021. On April 29, 2021, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows: Ms. Beatriz Leycegui Gardoqui, Chair; and Mr. Johannes Human and Mr. Alexander Hugh McPhail, Members.

On December 21, 2022, the Panel circulated its report. The Panel found that the marking requirement is inconsistent with Article IX:1 of the GATT 1994 because it accords products of Hong Kong, China, less favorable treatment with respect to marking requirements than the treatment accorded to like products of other countries, and exercised judicial economy with respect to the claims under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, Article 2(c) and 2(d) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The Panel disagreed with the long-standing U.S. interpretation that the

essential security exception is self-judging and concluded that the situation with respect to Hong Kong, China is not “an emergency in international relations” within the meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii). The Panel therefore concluded that the measure at issue is not justified under Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994.

In response to the reports, the United States rejected the Panel’s flawed interpretation and conclusions and reiterated that the United States has held the clear and unequivocal position, for over 70 years, that issues of national security cannot be reviewed in WTO dispute settlement and the WTO has no authority to second-guess the ability of a WTO Member to respond to what it considers a threat to its security. On January 26, 2023, the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report. As of December 31, 2025, no division of the Appellate Body could be established to hear the appeal.

United States—Measures on Certain Semiconductors and Other Products, and Related Services and Technologies (DS615)

On December 12, 2022, China requested consultations concerning measures related to trade restrictions on certain advanced computing semiconductor chips, supercomputer items, semiconductor manufacturing items, and related services and technologies destined for China. China alleged that the measures are inconsistent with Articles I:1, XI:1, and X:3 of the GATT 1994, Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, and Article VI of the GATS. The United States and China held consultations on March 29, 2023. On September 15, 2023, China supplemented its earlier consultations request with a request for further consultations. On December 19, 2024, China submitted a revised request for consultations.

United States—Anti-Dumping Measure on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (DS617)

On May 17, 2023, Argentina requested consultations concerning antidumping duty measures pertaining to oil country tubular goods from Argentina and Section 771(7)(G) of the Tariff Act of 1930 regarding the cumulation of imports for purposes of an injury determination. Argentina alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with various provisions of the Antidumping Agreement and the GATT 1994. The United States and Argentina held consultations on July 6, 2023, but the consultations failed to resolve the dispute. At Argentina’s request, the WTO established a panel on October 26, 2023. On January 7, 2024, the Panel was composed by the Director-General to include: Ms. Enie Neri de Ross, Chair; and Mr. Jorge Miranda and Mr. Marco César Saraiva da Fonseca, Members. As of December 31, 2025, the panel proceeding was ongoing.

United States—Certain Tax Credits Under the Inflation Reduction Act (DS623)

On March 26, 2024, China requested consultations concerning aspects of five clean energy tax credits created or amended by the Inflation Reduction Act, P.L. 117-169, and related implementing guidance. China alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with various provisions of the GATT 1994, the TRIMS Agreement, and the SCM Agreement. The United States and China held consultations on May 7, 2024, but the consultations failed to resolve the dispute. On December 19, 2024, the Panel was composed by the Director-General to include: Ms. Athaliah Lesiba Molokomme, Chair; and Ms. Elaine Feldman and Ms. Amina Mohamed, Members. As of December 31, 2025, the panel proceeding was ongoing.

United States—Additional Tariff Measures on Goods from China (DS633)

On February 4, 2025, China requested consultations concerning tariff measures, consisting of a 10 percent additional tariff, on goods originating in China. China alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles I:1, II:1(a), and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. On March 4, 2025, China requested additional consultations to supplement its earlier request for consultations. China’s additional request for

consultations concerned measures that increased the additional tariffs on goods originating in China from 10 percent to 20 percent. The United States accepted China's request for additional consultations.

United States—Additional Import Duties on Goods from Canada (DS634)

On March 4, 2025, Canada requested consultations concerning measures imposing a 25 percent *ad valorem* rate of import duty on Canadian non-energy goods and a 10 percent *ad valorem* rate of import duty on Canadian energy goods entering the United States. Canada alleged that the measures are inconsistent with Articles I:1, II:1(a), II:1(b), and V:3 of the GATT 1994 and Article 7.8.2(d) of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. The United States accepted Canada's request.

United States—Additional Import Duties on Steel and Aluminum Articles from Canada (DS635)

On March 12, 2025, Canada requested consultations pertaining to measures imposing *ad valorem* rates of import duty on certain steel and aluminum articles. Canada alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. The United States accepted Canada's request for consultations.

United States—Additional Duties on Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts from Canada (DS637)

On April 3, 2025, Canada requested consultations concerning measures imposing 25 percent tariffs on automobiles and automotive parts. Canada alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles II:1(a), II:1(b), and VIII:3 of the GATT 1994. The United States accepted Canada's request for consultations.

United States—Universal and Country-Specific Additional Duties on Imports from China (DS638)

On April 4, 2025, China requested consultations concerning measures imposing universal and country-specific additional duties on imports from China. China alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with various provisions of the GATT 1994, certain provisions of the Customs Valuation Agreement, and Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. The United States accepted China's request. On April 9, 2025, and April 11, 2025, China requested additional consultations to supplement its earlier request. China's additional requests for consultations concerned measures that further increased the additional duties on imports from China. The United States accepted China's additional requests.

United States—Tariff Measures on Goods from Brazil (DS640)

On August 5, 2025, Brazil requested consultations pertaining to measures imposing a 10 percent *ad valorem* duty on goods originating in Brazil and a 40 percent additional *ad valorem* duty on certain products of Brazilian origin, as well as any further tariff measures. Brazil alleged that the measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles I:1, II:1(a), and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 23.1 and 23.2(a) of the DSU. The United States accepted Brazil's request.

ANNEX V

ANNEX V: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

MEMBERSHIP OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

As of December 31, 2025 (166 Members)

Government	Entry into Force	Government	Entry into Force
Afghanistan	July 29, 2016	Lesotho	May 31, 1995
Albania	September 8, 2000	Liberia	July 14, 2016
Angola	November 23, 1996	Liechtenstein	September 1, 1995
Antigua and Barbuda	January 1, 1995	Lithuania	May 31, 2001
Argentina	January 1, 1995	Luxembourg	January 1, 1995
Armenia	February 5, 2003	Macao, China	January 1, 1995
Australia	January 1, 1995	Republic of Macedonia	April 4, 2003
Austria	January 1, 1995	Madagascar	November 17, 1995
Bahrain	January 1, 1995	Malawi	May 31, 1995
Bangladesh	January 1, 1995	Malaysia	January 1, 1995
Barbados	January 1, 1995	Maldives	May 31, 1995
Belgium	January 1, 1995	Mali	May 31, 1995
Belize	January 1, 1995	Malta	January 1, 1995
Benin	February 22, 1996	Mauritania	May 31, 1995
Bolivia	September 12, 1995	Mauritius	January 1, 1995
Botswana	May 31, 1995	Mexico	January 1, 1995
Brazil	January 1, 1995	Moldova	July 26, 2001
Brunei Darussalam	January 1, 1995	Mongolia	January 29, 1997
Bulgaria	December 1, 1996	Montenegro	April 29, 2012
Burkina Faso	June 3, 1995	Morocco	January 1, 1995
Burundi	July 23, 1995	Mozambique	August 26, 1995
Cambodia	October 12, 2004	Myanmar	January 1, 1995
Cameroon	December 13, 1995	Namibia	January 1, 1995
Canada	January 1, 1995	Nepal	April 23, 2004
Cape Verde	July 23, 2008	The Netherlands	January 1, 1995
Central African Republic	May 31, 1995	New Zealand	January 1, 1995
Chad	October 19, 1996	Nicaragua	September 3, 1995
Chile	January 1, 1995	Niger	December 13, 1996
China	December 11, 2001	Nigeria	January 1, 1995
Colombia	April 30, 1995	Norway	January 1, 1995

Comoros	August 21, 2024	Oman	November 9, 2000
Democratic Republic of the Congo	January 1, 1997	Pakistan	January 1, 1995
Republic of the Congo	March 27, 1997	Panama	September 6, 1997
Costa Rica	January 1, 1995	Papua New Guinea	June 9, 1996
Côte d'Ivoire	January 1, 1995	Paraguay	January 1, 1995
Croatia	November 30, 2000	Peru	January 1, 1995
Cuba	April 20, 1995	Philippines	January 1, 1995
Cyprus	July 30, 1995	Poland	July 1, 1995
Czech Republic	January 1, 1995	Portugal	January 1, 1995
Denmark	January 1, 1995	Qatar	January 13, 1996
Djibouti	May 31, 1995	Romania	January 1, 1995
Dominica	January 1, 1995	Russia	August 22, 2012
Dominican Republic	March 9, 1995	Rwanda	May 22, 1996
Ecuador	January 21, 1996	Saint Kitts and Nevis	February 21, 1996
Egypt	June 30, 1995	Saint Lucia	January 1, 1995
El Salvador	May 7, 1995	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	January 1, 1995
Estonia	November 13, 1999	Samoa	May 10, 2012
Eswatini	January 1, 1995	Saudi Arabia	December 11, 2005
European Union	January 1, 1995	Senegal	January 1, 1995
Fiji	January 14, 1996	Seychelles	April 26, 2015
Finland	January 1, 1995	Sierra Leone	July 23, 1995
France	January 1, 1995	Singapore	January 1, 1995
Gabon	January 1, 1995	Slovak Republic	January 1, 1995
The Gambia	October 23, 1996	Slovenia	July 30, 1995
Georgia	June 14, 2000	Solomon Islands	July 26, 1996
Germany	January 1, 1995	South Africa	January 1, 1995
Ghana	January 1, 1995	Spain	January 1, 1995
Greece	January 1, 1995	Sri Lanka	January 1, 1995
Grenada	February 22, 1996	Suriname	January 1, 1995
Guatemala	July 21, 1995	Sweden	January 1, 1995
Guinea	October 25, 1995	Switzerland	July 1, 1995
Guinea Bissau	May 31, 1995	Taiwan (referred to in the WTO as The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu)	January 1, 2002
Guyana	January 1, 1995	Tajikistan	March 2, 2013

Haiti	January 30, 1996	Tanzania	January 1, 1995
Honduras	January 1, 1995	Thailand	January 1, 1995
Hong Kong, China	January 1, 1995	Timor-Leste	August 30, 2024
Hungary	January 1, 1995	Togo	May 31, 1995
Iceland	January 1, 1995	Tonga	July 27, 2007
India	January 1, 1995	Trinidad and Tobago	March 1, 1995
Indonesia	January 1, 1995	Tunisia	March 29, 1995
Ireland	January 1, 1995	Turkey (referred to in the WTO as Türkiye)	March 26, 1995
Israel	April 21, 1995	Uganda	January 1, 1995
Italy	January 1, 1995	Ukraine	May 16, 2008
Jamaica	March 9, 1995	United Arab Emirates	April 10, 1996
Japan	January 1, 1995	United Kingdom	January 1, 1995
Jordan	April 11, 2000	United States of America	January 1, 1995
Kazakhstan	November 30, 2015	Uruguay	January 1, 1995
Kenya	January 1, 1995	Vanuatu	August 24, 2012
Republic of Korea	January 1, 1995	Venezuela	January 1, 1995
Kuwait	January 1, 1995	Vietnam	January 11, 2007
Kyrgyz Republic	December 20, 1998	Yemen	June 26, 2014
Laos	February 2, 2013	Zambia	January 1, 1995
Latvia	February 10, 1999	Zimbabwe	March 5, 1995

2026 Budget for the WTO Secretariat
(in thousand Swiss francs)

Part	Section	Line	2026 Budget	
A Staffing Resources	1. Staff Expenditure	i) Staff Remuneration	91,770	
		ii) Staff Pension & Post-Employment Benefits	26,259	
		iii) Staff Health & Invalidity Insurance	7,497	
		iv) Staff Family & International Benefits	10,243	
		v) Other Staff Expenditure	2,200	
	2. Temporary Assistance	i) Short-Term Staff	10,171	
		ii) Consulting	8,004	
		iii) Panelists	850	
	A Staffing Resources Total			156,994
	B Other Resources	3. General Services	i) Telecommunication & Post	441
ii) Contractual Services & Maintenance			13,113	
iii) Energy & Supplies			2,216	
iv) Documentation & Publication			1,458	
v) Other / Miscellaneous			48	
4. Travel & Hospitality		i) Travel	7,393	
		ii) Hospitality	214	
5. Implementing Partners		i) Implementing Partners	213	
6. Capital Expenditure		i) Procurement of Fixed Assets	2,555	
		ii) Rental & Leasing of Equipment	540	
7. Financial Expenditure		i) Bank & Interest Charges	380	
		ii) Building Loan Reimbursement	1,200	
B Other Resources Total			29,771	
C Operating Funds and ITC	8. Contributions to ITC & Special Reserves	i) Contribution to ITC	16,964	
		iii) Ministerial Conference Operating Fund	600	
		iv) Building Renovation Fund	600	
C Operating Funds and ITC Total			18,164	
Grand Total			204,929	

Scale of Contributions for 2026
(in Swiss francs and with a minimum contribution of 0.015 percent)

Member	2026 Contribution CHF	2026 Contribution %
Afghanistan	34,527	0.017%
Albania	52,806	0.026%
Angola	217,317	0.107%
Antigua and Barbuda	30,465	0.015%
Argentina	609,300	0.300%
Armenia	62,961	0.031%
Australia	2,731,695	1.345%
Austria	2,006,628	0.988%
Bahrain, Kingdom of	243,720	0.120%
Bangladesh	465,099	0.229%
Barbados	30,465	0.015%
Belgium	3,816,249	1.879%
Belize	30,465	0.015%
Benin	34,527	0.017%
Bolivia, Plurinational State of	85,302	0.042%
Botswana	56,868	0.028%
Brazil	2,347,836	1.156%
Brunei Darussalam	71,085	0.035%
Bulgaria	391,983	0.193%
Burkina Faso	42,651	0.021%
Burundi	30,465	0.015%
Cabo Verde	30,465	0.015%
Cambodia	199,038	0.098%
Cameroon	62,961	0.031%
Canada	4,841,904	2.384%
Central African Republic	30,465	0.015%
Chad	30,465	0.015%
Chile	714,912	0.352%
China	23,185,896	11.416%
Colombia	485,409	0.239%
Comoros	30,465	0.015%
Congo	46,713	0.023%
Costa Rica	186,852	0.092%
Côte d'Ivoire	113,736	0.056%
Croatia	280,278	0.138%
Cuba	87,333	0.043%
Cyprus	199,038	0.098%
Czech Republic	1,507,002	0.742%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	174,666	0.086%
Denmark	1,726,350	0.850%
Djibouti	36,558	0.018%
Dominica	30,465	0.015%
Dominican Republic	190,914	0.094%
Ecuador	225,441	0.111%
Egypt	540,246	0.266%
El Salvador	89,364	0.044%
Estonia	213,255	0.105%
Eswatini	30,465	0.015%

Member	2026 Contribution CHF	2026 Contribution %
European Union ¹	0	0.000%
Fiji	30,465	0.015%
Finland	887,547	0.437%
France	7,228,329	3.559%
Gabon	46,713	0.023%
The Gambia	30,465	0.015%
Georgia	89,364	0.044%
Germany	12,935,439	6.369%
Ghana	188,883	0.093%
Greece	721,005	0.355%
Grenada	30,465	0.015%
Guatemala	160,449	0.079%
Guinea	56,868	0.028%
Guinea-Bissau	30,465	0.015%
Guyana	52,806	0.026%
Haiti	30,465	0.015%
Honduras	87,333	0.043%
Hong Kong, China	5,120,151	2.521%
Hungary	1,115,019	0.549%
Iceland	83,271	0.041%
India	5,193,267	2.557%
Indonesia	1,793,373	0.883%
Ireland	4,614,432	2.272%
Israel	1,005,345	0.495%
Italy	5,028,756	2.476%
Jamaica	52,806	0.026%
Japan	7,004,919	3.449%
Jordan	156,387	0.077%
Kazakhstan	499,626	0.246%
Kenya	123,891	0.061%
Korea, Republic of	5,382,150	2.650%
Kuwait, the State of	507,750	0.250%
Kyrgyz Republic	36,558	0.018%
Lao People's Democratic Republic	58,899	0.029%
Latvia	192,945	0.095%
Lesotho	30,465	0.015%
Liberia	30,465	0.015%
Liechtenstein	69,054	0.034%
Lithuania	385,890	0.190%
Luxembourg	1,188,135	0.585%
Macao, China	192,945	0.095%
Madagascar	32,496	0.016%
Malawi	30,465	0.015%
Malaysia	1,884,768	0.928%
Maldives	30,465	0.015%
Mali	46,713	0.023%
Malta	162,480	0.080%
Mauritania	30,465	0.015%

¹ The European Union is not subject to contributions. However, its 27 members are assessed individually. The total share of members of the European Union represents 30.94% of the total contributors in 2026.

Member	2026 Contribution CHF	2026 Contribution %
Mauritius	46,713	0.023%
Mexico	4,283,379	2.109%
Moldova, Republic of	48,744	0.024%
Mongolia	79,209	0.039%
Montenegro	30,465	0.015%
Morocco	420,417	0.207%
Mozambique	69,054	0.034%
Myanmar	127,953	0.063%
Namibia	42,651	0.021%
Nepal	62,961	0.031%
Netherlands	6,464,673	3.183%
New Zealand	448,851	0.221%
Nicaragua	56,868	0.028%
Niger	30,465	0.015%
Nigeria	511,812	0.252%
North Macedonia	77,178	0.038%
Norway	1,338,429	0.659%
Oman	349,332	0.172%
Pakistan	367,611	0.181%
Panama	219,348	0.108%
Papua New Guinea	71,085	0.035%
Paraguay	113,736	0.056%
Peru	452,913	0.223%
Philippines	859,113	0.423%
Poland	2,849,493	1.403%
Portugal	865,206	0.426%
Qatar	668,199	0.329%
Romania	936,291	0.461%
Russian Federation	3,261,786	1.606%
Rwanda	30,465	0.015%
Saint Kitts and Nevis	30,465	0.015%
Saint Lucia	30,465	0.015%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	30,465	0.015%
Samoa	30,465	0.015%
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	2,026,938	0.998%
Senegal	69,054	0.034%
Seychelles	30,465	0.015%
Sierra Leone	30,465	0.015%
Singapore	5,463,390	2.690%
Slovak Republic	818,493	0.403%
Slovenia	371,673	0.183%
Solomon Islands	30,465	0.015%
South Africa	861,144	0.424%
Spain	3,800,001	1.871%
Sri Lanka	140,139	0.069%
Suriname	30,465	0.015%
Sweden	2,136,612	1.052%
Switzerland	3,972,636	1.956%
Chinese Taipei	2,912,454	1.434%
Tajikistan	30,465	0.015%
Tanzania	89,364	0.044%

Member	2026 Contribution CHF	2026 Contribution %
Thailand	2,290,968	1.128%
Timor-Leste	30,465	0.015%
Togo	30,465	0.015%
Tonga	30,465	0.015%
Trinidad and Tobago	75,147	0.037%
Tunisia	129,984	0.064%
Türkiye	2,258,472	1.112%
Uganda	67,023	0.033%
Ukraine	534,153	0.263%
United Arab Emirates	2,664,672	1.312%
United Kingdom	7,305,507	3.597%
United States of America	23,155,431	11.401%
Uruguay	134,046	0.066%
Vanuatu	30,465	0.015%
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	207,162	0.102%
Viet Nam	2,483,913	1.223%
Yemen	48,744	0.024%
Zambia	73,116	0.036%
Zimbabwe	54,837	0.027%
TOTAL	203,100,000	100.000%

WTO Professional Staff Members by Nationality
(Excluding Linguistic Staff)
(as per information available on June 30, 2025)

30 JUNE 2025 (90 Members Represented)						
Member	Nbr of Females	%	Nbr of Males	%	Total Nbr	%
France	19	4.9%	22	5.6%	41	10.5%
Germany	11	2.8%	15	3.8%	26	6.6%
Italy	10	2.6%	10	2.6%	20	5.1%
United States of America	10	2.6%	9	2.3%	19	4.9%
United Kingdom	5	1.3%	12	3.1%	17	4.3%
Canada	5	1.3%	10	2.6%	15	3.8%
India	4	1.0%	10	2.6%	14	3.6%
Spain	9	2.3%	5	1.3%	14	3.6%
China	6	1.5%	7	1.8%	13	3.3%
Brazil	4	1.0%	7	1.8%	11	2.8%
Philippines	4	1.0%	6	1.5%	10	2.6%
Switzerland	7	1.8%	3	0.8%	10	2.6%
Ireland	5	1.3%	2	0.5%	7	1.8%
Korea, Republic of	6	1.5%	1	0.3%	7	1.8%
Bulgaria	2	0.5%	4	1.0%	6	1.5%
Japan	3	0.8%	3	0.8%	6	1.5%
Russian Federation	5	1.3%	1	0.3%	6	1.5%
Australia	1	0.3%	4	1.0%	5	1.3%
Colombia	1	0.3%	4	1.0%	5	1.3%
Sweden	3	0.8%	2	0.5%	5	1.3%
Ecuador	3	0.8%	1	0.3%	4	1.0%
Egypt	3	0.8%	1	0.3%	4	1.0%
Hungary	2	0.5%	2	0.5%	4	1.0%
Mexico	1	0.3%	3	0.8%	4	1.0%
Netherlands		0.0%	4	1.0%	4	1.0%
Peru	2	0.5%	2	0.5%	4	1.0%
Trinidad and Tobago	3	0.8%	1	0.3%	4	1.0%
Tunisia	2	0.5%	2	0.5%	4	1.0%
Türkiye	1	0.3%	3	0.8%	4	1.0%
Austria	1	0.3%	2	0.5%	3	0.8%
Cameroon	2	0.5%	1	0.3%	3	0.8%
Chile	1	0.3%	2	0.5%	3	0.8%
El Salvador	2	0.5%	1	0.3%	3	0.8%
Guatemala	2	0.5%	1	0.3%	3	0.8%
Kenya	3	0.8%		0.0%	3	0.8%
Nepal	1	0.3%	2	0.5%	3	0.8%
Nigeria	1	0.3%	2	0.5%	3	0.8%
Pakistan	1	0.3%	2	0.5%	3	0.8%
Uganda	2	0.5%	1	0.3%	3	0.8%
Zimbabwe	2	0.5%	1	0.3%	3	0.8%
Belgium	1	0.3%	1	0.3%	2	0.5%
Benin		0.0%	2	0.5%	2	0.5%
Costa Rica	1	0.3%	1	0.3%	2	0.5%
Finland	1	0.3%	1	0.3%	2	0.5%
Malawi	1	0.3%	1	0.3%	2	0.5%
Malaysia		0.0%	2	0.5%	2	0.5%
Mauritius		0.0%	2	0.5%	2	0.5%
Poland		0.0%	2	0.5%	2	0.5%
Portugal		0.0%	2	0.5%	2	0.5%
Romania	2	0.5%		0.0%	2	0.5%
Senegal		0.0%	2	0.5%	2	0.5%
Singapore	2	0.5%		0.0%	2	0.5%
Ukraine	2	0.5%		0.0%	2	0.5%
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of		0.0%	2	0.5%	2	0.5%
Viet Nam	2	0.5%		0.0%	2	0.5%
Argentina		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Armenia	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Bangladesh		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Bolivia, Plurinational State of		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Burkina Faso		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Burundi		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Côte d'Ivoire		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Croatia	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Cuba		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Czech Republic	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Denmark		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%

30 JUNE 2025 (90 Members Represented)

Member	Nbr of Females	%	Nbr of Males	%	Total Nbr	%
Dominica	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Dominican Republic	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Estonia	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Ghana	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Greece	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Guinea		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Haiti		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Jamaica	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Jordan	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Lithuania		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Madagascar	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Mauritania	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Moldova, Republic of	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Morocco		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Mozambique	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Nicaragua	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Rwanda		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
South Africa		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Sri Lanka	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Tajikistan		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Tanzania	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
The Gambia	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Uruguay		0.0%	1	0.3%	1	0.3%
Zambia	1	0.3%		0.0%	1	0.3%
Grand Total	186	47.6%	205	52.4%	391	100.0%

WAIVERS CURRENTLY IN FORCE
(as of December 31, 2025)

WAIVER	DECISION	DATE of ADOPTION of DECISION	GRANTED UNTIL	REPORT in 2025 ²
Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions ³	WT/L/1229	16 December 2025	31 December 2026	-
Introduction of Harmonized System 2007 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions ⁴	WT/L/1230	16 December 2025	31 December 2026	-
Introduction of Harmonized System 2012 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions ⁵	WT/L/1231	16 December 2025	31 December 2026	-
Introduction of Harmonized System 2017 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions ⁶	WT/L/1232	16 December 2025	31 December 2026	-
Introduction of Harmonized System 2022 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions ⁷	WT/L/1233	16 December 2025	31 December 2026	-
Cuba—Article XV:6—Extension of waiver	WT/L/1128	24 November 2021	31 December 2026	WT/L/1227
Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least- Developed Countries—Decision on Extension of waiver	WT/L/1069	16 October 2019	30 June 2029	-
United States—Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act	WT/L/1220	23 July 2025	30 September 2030	WT/L/1224
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds - Extension of Waiver ⁸	WT/L/1213	16 December 2024	31 December 2030	-
United States—Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	WT/L/1000	7 December 2016	31 December 2026	WT/L/1225
European Union—Application of Autonomous Preferential Treatment to the Western Balkans	WT/L/1114	28 July 2021	31 December 2026	WT/L/1199

² Applicable if so stipulated in the corresponding waiver Decision.

³ The Member which has requested to be covered under this waiver is: China.

⁴ The Members which have requested to be covered under this waiver are: Argentina; Brazil; China; Dominican Republic; European Union; and Malaysia.

⁵ The Members which have requested to be covered under this waiver are: Argentina, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, European Union, Guatemala, India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, and United States.

⁶ The Members which have requested to be covered under this waiver are: Argentina; Brazil; Canada; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; European Union; Guatemala; Hong Kong, China; India, Kazakhstan; Republic of Korea; New Zealand; Norway; Paraguay; Philippines; Russian Federation; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States; and Uruguay.

⁷ The Members which have requested to be covered under this waiver are: Australia; Canada; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; European Union; Guatemala; Hong Kong, China; India; Republic of Korea; Macao, China; Norway; Paraguay; Philippines; Russian Federation; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; and United States.

⁸ Annex: Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, European Union, Guyana, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Norway, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.

WAIVER	DECISION	DATE of ADOPTION of DECISION	GRANTED UNTIL	REPORT in 2025 ²
Implementation of Preferential Treatment in favour of Services and Service Suppliers of LDCs and Increasing LDC Participation in Services Trade ⁹	WT/L/982 WT/MIN(15)/48	19 December 2015	31 December 2030 ¹⁰	-
Least-Developed Country Members—Obligations under Article 70.8 and Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to Pharmaceutical Products	WT/L/971	30 November 2015	1 January 2033	-
Canada–CARIBCAN	WT/L/1166	9 May 2023	31 December 2033	WT/L/1196 and Add.1
Preferential Treatment to Services and Service Suppliers of Least-developed countries ¹¹	WT/L/847	17 December 2011	15 years from the date of its adoption ¹²	-
Implementation of Para. 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ¹³	WT/L/540 and WT/L/540/Corr.1	30 August 2003	See WT/L/540 and WT/L/540/Corr.1	IP/C/101

⁹ This Ministerial Decision was adopted in furtherance of the waiver on Preferential Treatment to Services and Service Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries adopted in 2011 ([WT/L/847](#)) and of the subsequently operationalized in the Decision on the Operationalization of the Waiver Concerning Preferential Treatment to Services and Service Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries ([WT/MIN\(13\)/43–WT/L/918](#)).

¹⁰ At the Nairobi Ministerial Conference ([WT/MIN\(15\)/48–WT/L/982](#)), Ministers decided to extend the 2011 waiver on Preferential Treatment to Services and Service Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries ([WT/L/847](#)).

¹¹ Two decisions were subsequently adopted at the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial Conferences in furtherance of this waiver: in 2013 ([WT/MIN\(13\)/43–WT/L/918](#)) and in 2015 ([WT/MIN\(15\)/48–WT/L/982](#)).

¹² At the Nairobi Ministerial Conference, Ministers decided to extend the waiver until 31 December 2030 ([WT/MIN\(15\)/48–WT/L/982](#)).

¹³ Pursuant to the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 ([WT/L/540](#) and [Corr.1](#)), a Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement was adopted by the General Council on 6 December 2005 ([WT/L/641](#)) and submitted to Members for acceptance. In accordance with Article X:3 of the WTO Agreement, the Protocol entered into force on 23 January 2017. Since then, the amended TRIPS Agreement applies to those Members who have accepted it. For each other Member, the Protocol will take effect upon acceptance by it. In the meantime, the 2003 Decision continues to apply to those Members. For the purposes of the 2003 Decision, the Annual Review of the Special Compulsory Licensing System is deemed to fulfil the review requirements of Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement.

WT/DSB/44/Rev.68

9 December 2025

**INDICATIVE LIST OF GOVERNMENTAL AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL PANELISTS**

Revision

1. To assist in the selection of panelists, the DSU provides in Article 8.4 that the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of governmental and non-governmental individuals.
2. The attached is a revised consolidated list of governmental and non-governmental panelists.¹⁴ The list is based on the previous Indicative List issued on 4 June 2025 (WT/DSB/44/Rev.67). It includes one additional name approved by the DSB at its meeting on 4 November 2025¹⁵. Any future modifications or additions to this list submitted by Members will be circulated in periodic revisions of this list.
3. For practical purposes, the proposals for the administration of the indicative list approved by the DSB on 31 May 1995 are reproduced as an Annex to this document.

¹⁴ Curricula Vitae containing more detailed information are available to WTO Members upon request from the Secretariat (Council & TNC Division).

¹⁵ See document WT/DSB/W/753.

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
ARGENTINA	BARDONESCHI, Mr. Rodrigo C.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	BÉRAUD, Mr. Alan Claudio	Trade in Goods
	BERTONI, Mr. Ramiro	Trade in Goods
	CHIARADIA, Mr. Alfredo Vicente	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	CIMA, Mr. Marcelo	Trade in Goods and Services
	CURI, Mr. Alfredo Esteban	Trade in Goods
	DUMONT, Mr. Alberto Juan	Trade in Goods
	FORADORI, Mr. Carlos M.	Trade in Goods
	LAVOPA, Mr. Federico	Trade in Goods and Services
	LUNAZZI, Mr. Gustavo Nerio	Trade in Goods
	MAKUC, Mr. Adrián Jorge	Trade in Goods
	MALVAREZ, Mr. Martín	Trade in Goods
	MÉNDEZ, Mr. Gustavo Héctor	Trade in Goods and Services
	MONNER SANS, Mr. Alejo	Trade in Goods
	NEGUELOAETCHEVERRY, Mr. Pedro	Trade in Goods
	NISCOVOLOS, Mr. Luis Pablo	Trade in Goods and Services
	RAITERI, Ms. María Valeria	Trade in Goods
	SERRA, Mr. Adrián	Trade in Goods and Services
	TABOADA, Mr. Gabriel Gaspar	Trade in Goods
	TEMPONE, Mr. Eduardo	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	VICIEN-MILBURN, Ms. Rosa María	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
AUSTRALIA	BENNETT, Ms. Annabelle	Trade in Goods and Services
	CHURCHE, Mr. Milton	Trade in Goods
	FARBENBLOOM, Mr. Simon	Trade in Goods and Services
	GALLAGHER, Mr. Peter	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	GOSPER, Mr. Bruce	Trade in Goods
	HOLMES, Ms. Patricia Ann	Trade in Goods
	JENNINGS, Mr. Mark	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	MITCHELL, Mr. Andrew	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	MORETTA, Mr. Remo	Trade in Goods and Services
	MULGREW, Mr. Michael	Trade in Goods

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	MYLER, Mr. Paul	Trade in Goods and Services
	O'CONNOR, Mr. Paul Richard	Trade in Goods
	RAPER, Ms. Cathy	Trade in Goods and Services
	SIN FAR LEE, Ms. Stephanie	Trade in Goods
	STOLER, Mr. Andrew	Trade in Goods and Services
	VOON, Ms. Tania Su Lien	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	WITBREUK, Ms. Trudy	Trade in Goods and Services
	YOUNG, Ms. Elizabeth	Trade in Goods
BOLIVIA, PLURINATIONAL STATE OF	ZELADA CASTEDO, Mr. Alberto	Trade in Goods
BRAZIL	AMARAL DE ANDRADE JUNQUEIRA, Ms. Carla	Trade in Goods
	BARRAL, Mr. Webber Oliveira	Trade in Goods
	BASSO, Ms. Maristela	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	BENTES, Mr. Pablo M.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	BERENHOLC, Mr. Mauro	Trade in Goods
	CAETANO DE MARINIS, Ms. Ana Teresa	Trade in Goods
	CASTAÑON PENHA VALLE, Ms. Marília	Trade in Goods
	CELLI JUNIOR, Mr. Umberto	Trade in Goods and Services
	DE CAMARGO VIDIGAL NETO, Mr. Geraldo	Trade in Goods
	DO AMARAL JÚNIOR, Mr. Alberto	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	KANAS GRYTZ, Ms. Vera	Trade in Goods
	KANITZ, Mr. Roberto H.	Trade in Goods
	KRAMER, Ms. Cynthia	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	MANZANO SAYEG, Ms. Fernanda	Trade in Goods and Services
	MEDRADO, Mr. Renê Guilherme S.	Trade in Goods
	NASSER, Mr. Rabih	Trade in Goods
	PUPO, Mr. Rodrigo Luís	Trade in Goods
	SALDANHA-URES, Ms. Carolina	Trade in Goods
	SETTI DIAZ, Mr. José	Trade in Goods
	THORSTENSEN, Ms. Vera Helena	Trade in Goods
CAMEROON	NGANGJOH HODU, Mr. Yenkong	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
CANADA	BERNIER, Mr. Ivan	Trade in Goods and Services
	BRADFORD, Mr. Meriel V. M.	Trade in Goods and Services
	BROWN, Ms. Catherine Anne	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	CLARK, Mr. Peter James	Trade in Goods and Services
	CLOSE, Ms. Patricia Margaret	Trade in Goods
	DE MESTRAL, Mr. Armand	Trade in Goods
	EYTON, Mr. Anthony T.	Trade in Goods
	GHERSON, Mr. Randolph	Trade in Goods
	GOODWIN, Ms. Kirsten M.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	HALLIDAY, Mr. Anthony L.	Trade in Goods and Services
	HERMAN, Mr. Lawrence L.	Trade in Goods
	HINES, Mr. Wilfred Roy	Trade in Goods
	MacMILLAN, Ms. Kathleen E.	Trade in Goods
	McRAE, Mr. Donald Malcolm	Trade in Goods
	OSTRY, Ms. Sylvia	Trade in Goods
	RITCHIE, Mr. Gordon	Trade in Goods
	THOMAS, Mr. Christopher	Trade in Goods and Services
	WINHAM, Mr. Gilbert R.	Trade in Goods
CHILE	BIGGS, Mr. Gonzalo	Trade in Goods
	BOZA, Ms. Sofía	Trade in Goods
	ERNST, Mr. Felipe	Trade in Goods and Services
	ESCUDERO, Mr. Sergio	TRIPS
	ESPINOZA, Mr. Alvaro	Trade in Goods
	JANA, Mr. Álvaro	Trade in Goods
	MATUS, Mr. Mario	Trade in Goods
	MLADINIC, Mr. Carlos	Trade in Goods
	PEÑA, Ms. Gloria	Trade in Goods
	SAEZ, Mr. Sebastián	Trade in Goods and Services
	SATELER, Mr. Ricardo	TRIPS
	SOSA, Ms. Luz	Trade in Goods and Services
	TIRONI, Mr. Ernesto	Trade in Goods

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
CHINA	CHEN, Mr. Yusong	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	DONG, Mr. Shizhong	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	E, Mr. Defeng	Trade in Goods
	GONG, Mr. Baihua	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	HAN, Mr. Liyu	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	HONG, Mr. Xiaodong	Trade in Services
	HUANG, Mr. Dongli	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	LI, Mr. Enheng	Trade in Goods and Services
	LI, Ms. Yongjie	Trade in Goods and Services
	LI, Mr. Zhongzhou	Trade in Goods
	SHI, Ms. Xiaoli	Trade in Goods
	SUO, Mr. Bicheng	Trade in Goods
	YANG, Mr. Guohua	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	ZHANG, Ms. Liping	Trade in Goods and Services
	ZHANG, Mr. Naigen	TRIPS
	ZHANG, Mr. Xiangchen	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	ZHANG, Mr. Yuqing	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	ZHU, Ms. Lanye	Trade in Services; TRIPS
COLOMBIA	IBARRA PARDO, Mr. Gabriel	Trade in Goods
	JARAMILLO, Mr. Felipe	Trade in Goods and Services
	LOZANO FERRO, Ms. Olga Lucia	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	OROZCO GOMEZ, Ms. Angela María	Trade in Goods
	OROZCO, Ms. Claudia	Trade in Goods
	PRIETO, Mr. Diego	Trade in Goods and Services
	ROJAS ARROYO, Mr. Santiago	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	TANGARIFE, Mr. Marcel	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	GOSSET, Ms. Marie	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
CUBA	VÁZQUEZ De ALVARÉ, Ms. Dánice	TRIPS
DJIBOUTI	PIQUEMAL, Mr. Alain	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	DE LOS SANTOS DE PIANTINI, Ms. Roxana	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	NAUT, Ms. Katrina	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
ECUADOR	BETANCOURT, Mr. Roberto	Trade in Goods and Services
	CAICEDO, Mr. Diego	Trade in Goods and Services
	CASTRILLÓN, Mr. Juan Carlos	Trade in Goods and Services
	ESPINOSA CAÑIZARES, Mr. Cristian	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	LARREA MONARD, Mr. Homero	Trade in Goods and Services
	MONTAÑO HUERTA, Mr. César	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	MUÑOZ, Ms. Mireya	Trade in Goods and Services
	VAYAS, Mr. Luis	TRIPS
EGYPT	EL-SEGINY, Mr. Ibrahim	Trade in Goods
	EL-SHABRAWY, Ms. Yomna	Trade in Goods and Services
	FARAHAT, Mr. Magdí Ahmed	Trade in Goods
	GAWAD ALLAM, Mr. Mohamed. A.	Trade in Goods and Services
	HATEM, Mr. Samy Affify	Trade in Goods
	RIAD, Mr. Tarek Fouad	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	SHAHIN, Ms. Magda	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	SHARAF ELDIN, Mr. Ahmed	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	ZHRAN, Mr. Mohamed Mounir	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
European Union		
AUSTRIA	BENEDEK, Mr. Wolfgang	Trade in Goods
	REITERER, Mr. Michael G. K.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	ZEHETNER, Mr. Franz	Trade in Goods
BELGIUM	DIDIER, Mr. Pierre	Trade in Goods
	PAUWELYN, Mr. Joost	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	VAN CALSTER, Mr. Geert	Trade in Goods
	VAN DER BORGHT, Mr. Kim	Trade in Goods
	VANDER SCHUEREN, Ms. Paulette	Trade in Goods and Services

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	WOUTERS, Mr. Jan	Trade in Goods and Services
	ZONNEKEYN, Mr. Geert A.	Trade in Goods
CZECH REPUBLIC	PALEČKA, Mr. Peter	Trade in Goods and Services
DENMARK	ELMEGAARD (born NIELSEN), Dr. Laura	Trade in Goods and Services
	OLSEN, Ms. Birgitte Egelund	Trade in Goods
	WEGENER, Mr. Christian	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
EUROPEAN UNION	BRAKELAND, Mr. Jean-François	Trade in Goods and Services
	CARL, Mr. Mogens Peter	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	KUIJPER, Mr. Pieter Jan	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	WHITE, Mr. Eric	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
FINLAND	HIMANEN, Mr. Vesa	Trade in Goods
	LUOTONEN, Mr. Yrjö Kim David	Trade in Goods
	PYYSALO, Mr. Tapio	Trade in Goods
FRANCE	ARMAIGNAC, Ms. Marie-Christine	Trade in Services; TRIPS
	BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, Mrs. Laurence	Trade in Goods and Services
	JENNY, Mr. Frédéric Yves	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	METZGER, Mr. Jean-Marie	Trade in Goods
	MONNIER, Mr. Pierre	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	RIEGERT, Mr. François	Trade in Goods
	RUIZ-FABRI, Ms. Hélène	Trade in Goods and Services
	STERN, Ms. Brigitte	Trade in Goods
GERMANY	HERRMANN, Mr. Christoph Walter	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	PETERSMANN, Mr. Ernst-Ulrich	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	STEINBACH, Mr. Armin	Trade in Goods and Services
	TANGERMANN, Mr. Stefan	Trade in Goods
GREECE	STANGOS, Mr. Petros N.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
HUNGARY	HALGAND DANI, Ms. Virág	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	LAKATOS, Mr. Andrés	Trade in Goods and Services
IRELAND	MATTHEWS, Mr. Alan Henry	Trade in Goods
ITALY	GIARDINA, Mr. Andrea	Trade in Goods and Services
	MALAGUTI, Ms. Maria Chiara	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	MENSI, Mr. Maurizio	Trade in Goods
LITHUANIA	ALISAUSKAS, Mr. Raimondas	Trade in Goods and Services
MALTA	BONELLO, Mr. Michael C.	Trade in Services
NETHERLANDS	BRONCKERS, Mr. Marco	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	GENEE, Mr. Otto	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	HOEKMAN, Mr. Bernard Marco	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
POLAND	PIETRAS, Mr. Jaroslaw	Trade in Services
PORTUGAL	CALHEIROS DA GAMA, Mr. José Sérgio	TRIPS
ROMANIA	BERINDE, Mr. Mihai	Trade in Goods
	CAMPEANU, Ms. Victoria	Trade in Goods
	FRATITA, Ms. Carmen Florina	Trade in Goods
SPAIN	LÓPEZ DE SILANES MARTÍNEZ, Mr. Juan Pablo	Trade in Goods and Services
	PÉREZ SANCHEZ, Mr. José Luis	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	RIGO, Mr. Andrés	Trade in Services
SWEDEN	AHNLID, Mr. Anders Gustav Ragnar	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	JOHANSSON, Ms. Lena	Trade in Goods and Services
	REITER, Mr. Joakim H.	Trade in Goods and Services
	STELLINGER, Ms. Anna	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	WALDER, Ms. Eva	Trade in Goods and Services
GHANA	NIMAKO-BOATENG, Ms. Gertrude	Trade in Goods and Services
	OPOKU AWUKU, Mr. Emmanuel	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
HONG KONG, CHINA	CARTLAND, Mr. Michael David	Trade in Goods and Services
	CHEUNG, Mr. Peter Kam Fai	TRIPS
	LEUNG, Ms. Ada Ka Lai	TRIPS
	LITTLE, Mr. David	Trade in Goods and Services
	MILLER, Mr. Tony J.A.	Trade in Goods and Services
ICELAND	BJÖRGVINSSON, Mr. David Þór	Trade in Goods and Services
	JÓHANNSSON, Mr. Einar M.	Trade in Goods
	SANDHOLT, Mr. Brynjólfur	Trade in Goods
INDIA	AGARWAL, Mr. Vinod Kumar	Trade in Goods; TRIPS

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	AGRAWAL, Mr. Rameshwar Pal	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	BHANSALI, Mr. Sharad	Trade in Goods
	BHATNAGAR, Mr. Mukesh	Trade in Goods
	BHATTACHARYA, Mr. G. C.	Trade in Goods
	CHANDRASEKHAR, Mr. Kesava Menon	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	CHAUDHURI, Mr. Sumanta	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	DAS, Mr. Abhijit	Trade in Goods
	DAS, Mr. Bhagirath Lal	Trade in Goods
	DASGUPTA, Mr. Jayant	Trade in Goods
	GOPALAN, Mr. Rajarangamani	Trade in Goods
	GOYAL, Mr. Arun	Trade in Services
	KAUSHIK, Mr. Atul	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	KHER, Mr. Rajeev	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	KHULLAR, Mr. Rahul	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	KUMAR, Mr. Mohan	Trade in Goods and Services
	MOHANTY, Mr. Prasant Kumar	Trade in Goods
	MUKERJI, Mr. Asoke Kumar	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	NARAYANAN, Mr. Srinivasan	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	PARTHASARATHY, Mr. R.	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	PRABHU, Mr. Pandurang Palimar	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	PRASAD, Ms. Anjali	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	RAMAKRISHNAN, Mr. N.	Trade in Goods
	RAO, Mr. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa	Trade in Goods
	REGE, Mr. Narayan Vinod	Trade in Goods
	SABHARWAL, Mr. Narendra	TRIPS
	SAJJANHAR, Mr. Ashok	Trade in Goods
	SESHADRI, Mr. V.S.	Trade in Goods
	SHARMA, Mr. Lalit	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	VENUGOPAL, Mr. Krishnan	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	YADAV, Mr. Amit	Trade in Services
	ZUTSHI, Mr. B. K.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
INDONESIA	KOESNAIDI, Mr. Joseph Wira	Trade in Goods
	LIMENTA, Ms. Michelle Engel	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	WINANTI, Ms. Poppy Sulistyaning	Trade in Services; TRIPS
ISRAEL	ALTUVIA, Mr. Magen	Trade in Goods
	BROUDE, Mr. Tomer	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	FRID DE VRIES, Ms. Rachel	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	GABAY, Mr. Mayer	TRIPS
	HARAN, Mr. Ephraim F.	Trade in Services
	HARPAZ, Mr. Guy	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	HOROVITZ, Mr. Dan	Trade in Goods and Services
	PEREZ VARON, Ms. Tehila	Trade in Goods
	POLINER, Mr. Howard Zvi	TRIPS
	REICH, Mr. Arie	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	RIVAS, Mr. Rodolfo C.	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	SEMADAR, Mr. Moshe	Trade in Goods
	SHATON, Mr. Michael Marcel	Trade in Goods and Services
	TALBAR, Mr. Michael Adin	Trade in Goods
	WEILER, Mr. Joseph H.H.	Trade in Goods
JAMAICA	ROBINSON, Mr. Patrick L.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
JAPAN	ABE, Mr. Yoshinori	Trade in Goods and Services
	ARAKI, Mr. Ichiro	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	FUKUNAGA, Ms. Yuka	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	HIGUCHI, Mr. Keiichi	Trade in Goods
	ITO, Mr. Kazuyori	Trade in Goods and Services
	KANDA, Mr. Hideki	Trade in Services
	KAZEKI, Mr. Jun	Trade in Goods and Services
	KIKUMA, Mr. Azusa	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	KOBAYASHI, Mr. Tomohiko	Trade in Goods and Services
	KOMETANI, Mr. Kazumochi	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	MIYAOKA, Mr. Kunio	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	NAIKI, Ms. Yoshiko	Trade in Goods

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	OTA, Ms. Tomoko	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	SAITO, Mr. Koji	Trade in Goods
	SANO, Mr. Tadakatsu	Trade in Goods
	SHIMIZU, Mr. Akio	Trade in Goods
	SHIMIZU, Ms. Mari	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	SUZUKI, Mr. Masabumi	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	TSURUOKA, Mr. Koji	Trade in Services
	YAMANE, Ms. Hiroko	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
KAZAKHSTAN	KASSABEKOVA, Ms. Aray	Trade in Goods
KENYA	GATHII, Mr. James T.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	MCHARO, Ms. Pauline W.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	MILIMO MUHAMBE, Mr. Dennis	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	NDERITU, Mr. Wilfred N.	Trade in Goods and Services
	WARUHIU, Mr. Andrew	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
KOREA	AHN, Mr. Dukgeun	Trade in Goods
	AHN, Mr. Ho-Young	Trade in Goods
	BARK, Mr. Taeho	Trade in Goods
	CHO, Mr. Tae-Yul	Trade in Goods
	CHOI, Mr. Byung-il	Trade in Services
	CHOI, Mr. Seung-Hwan	Trade in Goods
	CHOI, Mr. Won-Mog	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	CHUNG, Mr. Chan-Mo	Trade in Goods
	KIM, Mr. Jong Bum	Trade in Goods
	KANG, Mr. Junha	Trade in Goods
	KIM, Mr. Doo-Sik	Trade in Goods
	KIM, Mr. Youngjae	Trade in Goods
	LEE, Mr. Jaehyoung	Trade in Goods
	LEE, Mr. Jaemin	Trade in Goods
	WANG, Mr. Sanghan	Trade in Goods
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	DJUMALIEV, Mr. Muktar	Trade in Goods and Services
LIECHTENSTEIN	ZIEGLER, Mr. Andreas R.	Trade in Services; TRIPS

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
MADAGASCAR	ANDRIANARIVONY, Mr. Minoarison	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
MALAYSIA	HARUN, Mrs. Hiswani	Trade in Goods
	KASIMIR, Mr. Merlyn	Trade in Goods and Services
	YACOB, Mr. Muhammad Noor	Trade in Goods
MAURITIUS	BEEKARRY, Mr. Navin	Trade in Goods and Services
	BHUGLAH, Mr. Achad	Trade in Goods and Services
MEXICO	DE LA PEÑA, Mr. Alejandro	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	DE MATEO VENTURINI, Mr. Fernando	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	DE ROSENZWEIG, Mr. Francisco	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	FERRARI, Mr. Bruno	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	JASSO TORRES, Mr. Humberto	Trade in Goods
	LEYCEGUI, Ms. Beatriz	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	MALPICA SOTO, Mr. Guillermo	Trade in Services
	PEREZCANO DÍAZ, Mr. Hugo Manuel	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	PÉREZ GARATE, Mr. Orlando	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	POBLANO, Mr. José F.	Trade in Services; TRIPS
	REYES, Ms. Luz Elena	Trade in Goods
	TRASLOSHEROS HERNÁNDEZ, Mr. José Gerardo	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	VÉJAR, Mr. Carlos	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	ZABLUDOVSKY KUPER, Mr. Jaime	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
MOLDOVA, REP. OF	FOLTEA, Ms. Marina	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
MONTENEGRO	SCEPANOVIC, Mr. Goran	Trade in Goods
	VUJANOVIC, Ms. Snezana	Trade in Goods
NEPAL	PANDEY, Mr. Posh Raj	Trade in Goods and Services
	SUBEDI, Mr. Surya P.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
NEW ZEALAND	CARSON, Mr. Christopher Barr	Trade in Goods
	EVANS, Mr. David	Trade in Goods
	GALLACHER, Mr. Scott	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	GARCIA, Mr. Martin	Trade in Goods
	GROSER, Mr. Tim	Trade in Goods
	HALLUM, Ms. Victoria	Trade in Services

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	HARVEY, Mr. Martin Wilfred	Trade in Goods
	HIGGIE, Ms. Dell Clark	Trade in Goods
	HONEY, Ms. Stephanie	Trade in Goods
	KELLY, Ms. Clare	Trade in Goods and Services
	MACEY, Mr. Adrian	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	McPHAIL, Mr. Alexander Hugh	Trade in Goods
	NOTTAGE, Mr. Hunter	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	PATERSON, Ms. Sarah	Trade in Goods
	SANDFORD, Mr. Iain	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	SLADE, Ms. Michelle	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	TRAINOR, Mr. Mark Julian	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	WALKER, Mr. David John	Trade in Goods and Services
	VITALIS, Mr. Vangelis	Trade in Goods and Services
NIGER	TANKOANO, Mr. Amadou	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
NIGERIA	AGAH, Mr. Yonov Frederick	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	NNONA, Mr. George C.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
NORWAY	ANDREASSEN, Mr. Harald	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	BLOM, Ms. Camilla	Trade in Goods and Services
	EDVARTSEN, Ms. Linn	Trade in Goods
	FLEISCHER, Ms. Benedicte	Trade in Goods and Services
	HANSEN, Ms. Kristin	Trade in Goods and Services
	HOLTEN, Ms. Inger	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	LILLERUD, Mr. Kjell	Trade in Goods and Services
	MIDTBØ STADSHAUG, Ms. Kaja	TRIPS
	NEPLE, Mr. Harald	Trade in Goods and Services
	SANDVIK, Mr. Jostein	TRIPS
	SELAND, Mr. Helge A.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	SKEI, Mr. Jonas	Trade in Goods
	VEDERHUS, Mr. Alf	Trade in Goods

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
PAKISTAN	AMIN, Mrs. Anjum A.	Trade in Goods
	ARIF, Mr. Muhammad Ikram	Trade in Goods
	BASHIR, Mr. Shahid	Trade in Goods
	HAMID ALI, Mr. Muhammad	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	HAYAT, Mr. Khizar	Trade in Goods
	HUSAIN, Mr. Ishrat	Trade in Services
	KHAN, Mr. Mujeeb Ahmed	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	MALIK, Mr. Riaz Ahmad	Trade in Goods
	MUKHTAR, Mr. Ahmad	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	NAYYAR, Mr. Syed I. M.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
PANAMA	ALVAREZ DE SOTO, Mr. Francisco	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	FERRER, Mr. Alejandro	Trade in Goods and Services
	FRANCIS LANUZA, Ms. Yavel Mireya	Trade in Goods and Services
	GONZALEZ, Mr. Carlos Ernesto	Trade in Goods and Services
	HARRIS ROTKIN, Mr. Norman	Trade in Goods and Services
	SALAZAR FONG, Ms. Diana Alejandrina	Trade in Goods
	SHEFFER MONTES, Mr. Leroy Jhon	Trade in Goods and Services
PERU	BELAÚNDE G., Mr. Victor Andres	TRIPS
	DE LA PUENTE LEON, Mr. Jose A.	Trade in Goods and Services
	DIEZ LIZARDO, Mr. Juan	Trade in Goods
	LEÓN-THORNE, Mr. Raúl	Trade in Goods and Services
PHILIPPINES	CONEJOS, Mr. Esteban B.	Trade in Goods
	TEEHANKEE, Mr. Manuel A. J.	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
QATAR	AL-ADBA, Mr. Nasser M.	Trade in Goods and Services
	AL-KUWARI, Dr. Mohammed	Trade in Goods and Services
	AL-SULAITI, Mr. Ahmed	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	FETAIS, Mr. Abdulmehsen	Trade in Goods and Services
	MAKKI, Mr. Fadi	Trade in Goods and Services
SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF	ALMOQBEL, Mr. Saqer	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	ALSHARIF, Mr. Sultan	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
SINGAPORE	GAFOOR, Mr. Burhan	TRIPS

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	GOVINDASAMY, Mr. Peter Mari	Trade in Goods and Services
	HONG, Ms. Fan Sin Daphne	Trade in Services; TRIPS
	ITHNAIN, Mr. Rossman	Trade in Goods
	KWOK, Mr. Fook Seng	Trade in Goods
	LOH, Mr. K. Y. Derek	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	NG, Ms. Bee Kim	Trade in Goods
	ONG, Mr. Chin Heng	Trade in Goods and Services
	TAN, Mr. T. K. Jason	Trade in Goods and Services
	YEOW, Ms. P. L. Danielle	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
SRI LANKA	JAYASEKERA, Mr. Douglas	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
SWITZERLAND	ADDOR, Mr. Felix	TRIPS
	CHAMBOVEY, Mr. Didier	Trade in Goods
	COTTIER, Mr. Thomas	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	HÄBERLI, Mr. Christian	Trade in Goods
	HOLZER, Mr. Patrick Edgar	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	INEICHEN-FLEISCH, Ms. Marie-Gabrielle	Trade in Goods and Services
	KAUFMANN, Ms. Christine	Trade in Services
	LEGLER, Mr. Thomas	TRIPS
	MÄCHLER, Ms. Monica	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	MEYER, Mr. Matthias	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	PANNATIER, Mr. Serge Nicolas	Trade in Goods
	SCHMID, Mr. Michael	Trade in Goods and Services
	TSCHÄENI, Mr. Hanspeter	Trade in Goods
	WEBER, Mr. Rolf H.	Trade in Services
	ZULAUF, Mr. Daniel	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU	CHANG, Ms. Yie-Yun	TRIPS
	KAO, Mr. Pei-Huan	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	LI, Ms. Catherine	Trade in Goods
	LIN, Ms. Tsai-Yu	Trade in Goods
	LO, Mr. Chang-Fa	Trade in Goods and Services
	NI, Mr. Kuei-Jung	Trade in Goods; TRIPS

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	PENG, Ms. Shin-Yi	Trade in Goods and Services
	YANG, Ms. Guang-Hwa	Trade in Goods and Services
	YANG, Ms. Jen-Ni	Trade in Goods and Services
THAILAND	SUCHATKULVIT, Ms. Vandee	Trade in Goods
	THANITCUL, Mr. Sakda	Trade in Goods
TUNISIA	YAHYAOU, Mr. Issam	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
TÜRKIYE	AKŞAHİN ŞİMŞEK, Ms. Zöre	Trade in Goods
	BEBEKOĞLU, Ms. Aylin	Trade in Goods
	BOZDOĞAN, Mr. Doğan	Trade in Goods
	DILEMRE, Mr. Hüsnü	Trade in Goods
	GÜÇLÜ, Ms. Bahar	Trade in Goods
	GÜREŞÇİ, Mr. Burak	Trade in Goods
	KAYA, Mr. Talat	Trade in Goods
	KOŞAN, Ms. Çiğdem	Trade in Services
	SAFALI, Ms. Ayşe Figen	Trade in Services
	ŞAHİNOĞLU YERDEŞ, Ms. Ayşegül	Trade in Goods
	TUZCU, Mr. Mustafa	Trade in Goods
UNITED KINGDOM	BETHLEHEM, Mr. Daniel	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	JOHNSON, Mr. Michael David Clarke	Trade in Goods
	QURESHI, Mr. Asif Hasan	Trade in Goods
	ROBERTS, Mr. Christopher William	Trade in Goods and Services
	ROBERTS, Mr. David F.	Trade in Goods
	SAROOSHI, Mr. Dan	Trade in Services
UNITED STATES	BROWN-WEISS, Ms. Edith	Trade in Goods and Services
	CONNELLY, Mr. Warren	Trade in Goods
	GANTZ, Mr. David A.	Trade in Goods
	GORDON, Mr. Michael Wallace	Trade in Goods
	HODGSON, Ms. Mélida	Trade in Goods and Services
	KASSINGER, Mr. Theodore W.	Trade in Goods and Services
	KHO, Mr. Stephen	Trade in Goods and Services; TRIPS
	LAYTON, Mr. Duane	Trade in Goods

MEMBER	NAME	SECTORAL EXPERIENCE
	LICHTENSTEIN, Ms. Cynthia Crawford	Trade in Services
	McGINNIS, Mr. John Oldham	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	PARTAN, Mr. Daniel G.	Trade in Goods
	POWELL, Mr. Stephen J.	Trade in Goods
	SANDSTROM, Mr. Mark R.	Trade in Goods and Services
	THOMPSON, Mr. George W.	Trade in Goods
	TROSSEVIN, Ms. Marguerite	Trade in Goods
	VERRILL, Jr. Mr. Charles Owen	Trade in Goods
URUGUAY	AMORÍN, Mr. Carlos	Trade in Goods; TRIPS
	CAYRÚS, Mr. Hugo	Trade in Goods and Services
	EHLERS, Mr. William	Trade in Goods
	ROSSELLI, Mr. Elbio	Trade in Goods
	VANERIO, Mr. Gustavo	Trade in Goods and Services
VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF	ESCOBAR, Mr. José Benjamín	Trade in Services
	MARQUEZ, Mr. Guillermo	Trade in Services
	ROJAS PENSO, Mr. Juan Francisco	Trade in Goods and Services

ANNEX

Administration of the Indicative List

1. To assist in the selection of panelists, the DSU provides in Article 8.4 that the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of qualified governmental and non-governmental individuals. Accordingly, the Chairman of the DSB proposed at the 10 February meeting that WTO Members review the roster of non-governmental panelists established on 30 November 1984 (BISD 31S/9) (hereinafter referred to as the “1984 GATT Roster”) and submit nominations for the indicative list by mid-June 1995. On 14 March, The United States delegation submitted an informal paper discussing, amongst other issues, what information should accompany the nomination of individuals, and how names might be removed from the list. The DSB further discussed the matter in informal consultations on 15 and 24 March, and at the DSB meeting on 29 March. This note puts forward some proposals for the administration of the indicative list, based on the previous discussions in the DSB.

General DSU requirements

2. The DSU requires that the indicative list initially include “the roster of governmental and non-governmental panelists established on 30 November 1984 (BISD 31S/9) and other rosters and indicative lists established under any of the covered agreements, and shall retain names of persons on those rosters and indicative lists at the time of entry into force of the WTO Agreement” (DSU 8.4). Additions to the indicative list are to be made by Members who may “periodically suggest names of governmental and non-governmental individuals for inclusion on the indicative list, providing relevant information on their knowledge of international trade and of the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements.” The names “shall be added to the list upon approval by the DSB” (DSU 8.4).

Submission of information

3. As a minimum, the information to be submitted regarding each nomination should clearly reflect the requirements of the DSU. These provide that the list “shall indicate specific areas of experience or expertise of the individuals in the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements” (DSU 8.4). The DSU also requires that panelists be “well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member” (DSU 8.1).

4. The basic information required for the indicative list could best be collected by use of a standardized form. Such a form, which could be called a Summary Curriculum Vitae, would be filled out by all nominees to ensure that relevant information is obtained. This would also permit information on the indicative list to be stored in an electronic database, making the list easily updateable and readily available to Members and the Secretariat. As well as supplying a completed Summary Curriculum Vitae form, persons proposed for inclusion on the indicative list could also, if they wished, supply a full Curriculum Vitae. This would not, however, be entered into the electronic part of the database.

Updating of indicative list

5. The DSU does not specifically provide for the regular updating of the indicative list. In order to maintain the credibility of the list, it should however be completely updated every two years. Within the first month of each two-year period, Members would forward updated Curricula Vitae of persons appearing on the indicative list. At any time, Members would be free to modify the indicative list by proposing new names

for inclusion, or specifically requesting removal of names of persons proposed by the Member who were no longer in a position to serve, or by updating the summary Curriculum Vitae.

6. Names on the 1984 GATT Roster that are not specifically resubmitted, together with up-to-date summary Curriculum Vitae, by a Member before 31 July 1995 would not appear after that date on the indicative list.

Other rosters

7. The Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement Procedures for the GATS (S/L/2 of 4 April 1995), adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 1 March 1995, provides for a special roster of panelists with sectoral expertise. It states that “panels for disputes regarding sectoral matters shall have the necessary expertise relevant to the specific services sectors which the dispute concerns.” It directs the Secretariat to maintain the roster and “develop procedures for its administration in consultation with the Chairman of the Council.” A working document (S/C/W/1 of 15 February 1995) noted by the Council for Trade in Services states that “the roster to be established under the GATS pursuant to this Decision would form part of the indicative list referred to in the DSU.” The specialized roster of panelists under the GATS should therefore be integrated into the indicative list, taking care that the latter provides for a mention of any service sectoral expertise of persons on the list.

8. A suggested format for the Summary Curriculum Vitae form for the purposes of maintaining the Indicative List is attached.

**SUMMARY CURRICULUM VITAE
FOR PERSONS PROPOSED FOR THE INDICATIVE LIST¹⁶**

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 1. | Name: | full name |
| 2. | Sectoral Experience | |
| | List here any particular sectors of expertise:
(e.g., technical barriers, dumping, financial services, intellectual property, etc.) | |
| 3. | Nationality(ies) | all citizenships |
| 4. | Nominating Member: | the nominating Member |
| 5. | Date of birth: | full date of birth |
| 6. | Current occupations: | year beginning, employer, title, responsibilities |
| 7. | Post-secondary education | year, degree, name of institution |
| 8. | Professional qualifications | year, title |
| 9. | Trade-related experience in Geneva in the WTO/GATT system | |
| | a. Served as a panelist | year, dispute name, role as chairperson/member |
| | b. Presented a case to a panel | year, dispute name, representing which party |
| | c. Served as a representative of a contracting party or member to a WTO or GATT body, or as an officer thereof | year, body, role |
| | d. Worked for the WTO or GATT Secretariat | year, title, activity |
| 10. | Other trade-related experience | |
| | a. Government trade work | year, employer, activity |
| | b. Private sector trade work | year, employer, activity |
| 11. | Teaching and publications | |
| | a. Teaching in trade law and policy | year, institution, course title |
| | b. Publications in trade law and policy | year, title, name of periodical/book, author/editor (if book) |
| 12. | Language capabilities | ability to work as a panelist in WTO-official languages and any other language capability |
| | a. English | |
| | b. French | |
| | c. Spanish | |
| | d. Other language(s) | |

¹⁶ Members putting forward an individual for inclusion on the indicative list are requested to provide full contact details for this individual separately. The Summary Curriculum Vitae and the contact details should be sent electronically to the Secretariat.

Where to Find More Information on the WTO

Information about the WTO and trends in international trade is available to the public at the following websites:

The USTR home page: <https://www.ustr.gov>

The WTO home page: <https://www.wto.org>

U.S. communications to WTO Members are available electronically on the WTO website using Documents Online, which can retrieve an electronic copy by the document symbol. Electronic copies of U.S. submissions in WTO disputes are available at the USTR website.

Examples of Information Available on the WTO Home Page

- WTO Organizational Chart
- Biographic backgrounds
- Budgets for the WTO
- WTO Budget Contributions
- Membership
- General Council activities
- WTO Secretariat Statistics

WTO News, such as:

- Status of dispute settlement cases
- Press Releases on Appointments to WTO Bodies, Appellate Body Reports and Panel Reports, and others
- Trade Policy Review Mechanism reports on individual Members' trade practices
- Schedules of future WTO meetings
- WTO presentations and Committee information sharing sessions

Resources including Official Documents, such as:

- Notifications required by the Uruguay Round Agreements
- Working Procedures for Appellate Review
- Special Studies on key WTO issues
- Online document database where one can find and download official documents
- Legal Texts of the WTO agreements
- WTO Annual Reports

Community and other Fora, such as:

- Media and non-governmental organizations
- General public news
- Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn

Trade Topics, such as:


- Briefing Papers on WTO activities in individual sectors, including goods, services, intellectual property, and other topics
- Disputes and Dispute Reports

Ordering WTO Publications

The World Trade Organization
Publications Unit
154 rue de Lausanne
1211 Geneva 21
Switzerland
Tel: +41 (22) 739 53 08
Fax: +41 (22) 739 57 92
sales@wto.org
www.wto.org/publications
<https://onlinebookshop.wto.org>

The Brookings Institution Press
Ingram Publisher Services / Jackson
210 American Dr
Jackson, TN 38301
Toll free: +1 800 343-4499
ipsjacksonorders@ingramcontent.com
<https://www.brookings.edu/bipress/>

Bernan Press, an imprint of
Rowman & Littlefield
15200 NBN Way Bldg C
Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214
Tel: +1 301 459-2255
Toll free: +1 800 865-3457
Fax: +1 800 865-3450
customercare@bernan.com
<https://rowman.com/Page/Bernan>



**OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE**

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508
USTR.GOV

